Part 2 (Click for Part 1)

By Shaykh Haider Hobbollah

In our previous session, we spoke about the first viewpoint, the viewpoint that says the Ahl al-Bayt did in fact approve of, permit and did not object to the conquests that took place across different regions (during the early period of Islam). We mentioned some of the main arguments that the supporters of this view usually put forward, however we still have two remaining points that are worth discussing. They complete the discussion and the second of them is right at the core of the topic.

Point 1 – Imam Ali’s participation

The first point was this: Did Imam Ali participate as a soldier under the leadership of Abu Bakr in the Ridda Wars? This statement appears in a speech by Syed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr addressed to the Iraqi people shortly before his martyrdom on the nineteenth of July 1979. In that statement he says the following while speaking about Imam Ali: “…Imam Ali fought as a soldier in the Ridda Wars under the banner of the first caliph, Abu Bakr”.¹. This statement gives us the impression that Syed Sadr was convinced that Imam Ali did in fact fight in the Ridda Wars and that the commander in these campaigns was Abu Bakr and that Imam Ali’s participation took place under his banner.

Now this statement from Syed Sadr comes at the very end of his life but we have something very similar from the early years of his life as well which probably strengthens the idea that this was not a political statement from him to do with his social circumstances [but rather he believed it historically happened]. It suggests that Syed Sadr saw this issue as something deeper than political rhetoric. He mentions the same idea at the beginning of his scholarly life, in his book Fadak fī al-Tārīkh. There he says: “…Ali, whom the Messenger of God raised, and raised Islam alongside him, the two, Ali and Islam, became like his two dear children. Ali felt a deep sense of brotherhood toward Islam, and that feeling pushed him to sacrifice everything for this ‘brother’ of his…to the point that he even participated in the Ridda Wars that the Muslims launched at that time, and the fact that someone else was leading those wars did not stop him from fulfilling this sacred duty…because even if Abu Bakr had seized his right and taken away his inheritance, Islam had raised Ali to the highest peak.²

This is Syed Sadr’s statement in Fadak fī al-Tārīkh, first printed in 1374 AH (1954) when he was only twenty-one years old. So this is about twenty-five years before the speech he made to the Iraqi people at the end of his life. Again showing that it is very likely he believed this to have historically happened [and was not saying it simply as a pro-unity call]. Now, these remarks were criticized by a number of scholars, both by those were sympathetic to him and within his line of thought, and also by those who were at odds with him and belonged to different factions altogether.

Among those who criticised him on this specific issue was the contemporary historian Shaykh Yusuf al-Gharawi. In an interview published in Nusus Mu’asira, he comments on this matter and says, in summary, that nothing clearly indicate that Imam Ali participated in the Ridda Wars, and he pointed out specifically that we have nothing that shows the Imam participated “as a soldier” under the command of Abu Bakr. This is the point under discussion.

But something may be inferred from the words of Ibn Tawus. Ibn Tawus, in his well-known book that he wrote to his son, Kashf al-Maḥajja li-Thamrat al-Muhajja, speaks in a way that might give this impression. While talking about the spread of apostasy and that only Ta’if remained firm he says: “…what value does Ta’if have when all the other groups had turned back? If it were not for your father, Amir al-Mu’minin, calming that rebellion and aggression by refraining from fighting Abu Bakr, and by helping the people of Madina against those who had apostatized from Islam and faith, and extinguishing that chaos…if it were not for that, Islam at that time would have vanished entirely…”³

So perhaps Syed Sadr understood from Ibn Tawus’s expression that Imam Ali did in fact participate in the Ridda Wars. The text of Ibn Tawus does indicate that Imam Ali participated but it does not indicate that Imam Ali participated as a soldier under the command of Abu Bakr. It only suggests some type of participation but when it comes to the military structure, the chain of command, who was formally under whom — this is not clear at all. Especially since according to some reports, even from scholars who themselves were critical of Syed Sadr’s opinion, they say that Imam Ali took part in defending Madina when the city came under attack from the apostates.

In my opinion is also possible that Syed Sadr, and perhaps Ibn Tawus as well, were basing their opinion on the words of Imam Ali himself. In the letter Imam Ali sent with Malik al-Ashtar to the people of Egypt when he appointed him as their governor, he says: “I was suddenly taken by surprise when people rushed toward so-and-so to pledge allegiance to him. So I held back my hand until I saw that the people were returning back from Islam, calling for the destruction of the religion of Muhammad. So I feared that if I did not step forward to support Islam and its people, I would see in it a tear or a ruin. And the disaster of that would be greater for me than losing your governorship which is nothing but the passing comfort of a few days, disappearing like a mirage or like clouds that drift away. I rose up during those events, until falsehood was pushed back, and the religion found stability and calm again.”⁴

From this text one understands that Imam Ali did take part in the fighting, that he was involved in those events, and despite the conflict and disagreement that arose after people pledged allegiance to “so-and-so” the Imam still took part. And it also seems from Ibn Abi al-Hadid that he understood exactly this point. Ibn Abi al-Hadid also understood this text to mean that Imam Ali fought in front of Abu Bakr, and that Imam Ali, through this letter, is actually explaining and justifying why he fought during that period.

So Imam Ali, in this letter that he sent with Malik al-Ashtar to the Egyptians, is explaining the reason behind that. He is saying: it is not as some imagined, but it was out of the duty to prevent harm from reaching oneself and from reaching the religion. And this duty remains whether there is an Imam or there is no Imam. If apostates attack the city, then fighting becomes obligatory regardless of whether an Imam is present or not.

This text might actually be the most important one here and the one that explains that Imam Ali took part in the Ridda Wars. It suggests that he may have participated under the authority of the caliph at that time. Some, however, tried to interpret it differently like Shaykh Muhammad Abduh. Shaykh Muhammad Abduh, in his commentary on Nahj al-Balagha, understood that Imam Ali is referring here not to the time of Abu Bakr, but to the time of Uthman ibn Affan and that during Uthman’s era, the religion began to weaken, and people began to deviate from truth and justice because of the corrupt governors and officials. And so Imam Ali rose up, took leadership, and removed those unworthy governors.

So now we have two interpretations for this passage where Imam Ali is speaking to the people of Egypt. One interpretation is the one understood by Ibn Abi al-Hadid [and potentially also ibn Tawus and Syed Sadr] and that the Imam here is speaking about fighting in the Ridda Wars. The other interpretation is like that of Shaykh Muhammad Abduh who understands the text to be referring to the time of Uthman and that when the religion was on the verge of collapsing, Imam Ali then “rose to the task.”

In my evaluation of it, Shaykh Muhammad Abduh’s interpretation is not very convincing. When we read the structure of the text, its phrases, what comes before and what comes after, it becomes difficult to accept that Imam Ali is talking exclusively about the period of Uthman. And when we read this statement of Imam Ali in some of its other transmitted forms  for example, as it appears in Kitāb al-Gharāt by al-Thaqafi, we see that right after this passage, Imam Ali says: “Abu Bakr then took charge of those affairs. He was sometimes lenient, sometimes strict, sometimes compromising, sometimes balanced — and I accompanied him with sincere counsel, and I obeyed him diligently in whatever he obeyed God.”⁵

This clearly shows that the earlier passage from Nahj al-Balagha that we read a moment ago  is not talking about the time of Uthman. It is talking about the moments after the Messenger of God died. And what “events” were those, other than the Ridda Wars? When we put the structure of the text together, I believe it greatly weakens the interpretation offered by Shaykh Muhammad Abduh.

So to summarise, Imam Ali’s words do point to his participation in the Ridda Wars (assuming of course that it is established with a reliable chain and is historically sound). However it does not clarify the nature of that participation. What kind of role was it? How did he “go out” and “push back falsehood” and “restore order”? Was it participation in administration? In planning? In directing others? Was it participation alongside a group protecting Madina? And given that the situation at that moment may have been chaotic, there may not have been a clear, central authority for the caliph. Imam Ali may have simply taken action, and when the crisis of the apostates ended, everything returned to how it had been before. So the text is not very clear on the idea that he was “a soldier under the command of Abu Bakr” (as claimed by Syed Sadr) but it does give the sense that he participated in the Ridda Wars, and although the Ridda Wars are not our main subject here, we are touching on them incidentally.

It is also possible that Syed Sadr’s opinion wasn’t just based on this text alone, but he may have reasoned in a way similar to that of Muḥaddith Bahrani (the approach we mentioned in our last session). Sadr may have reasoned that it is unlikely that Imam Ali would not participate in the Ridda Wars because those wars threatened the very existence of Islam. And just as Bahrani approached the question of Ahl al-Bayt’s participation in the conquests with this sort of reasoning, Syed Sadr may have done the same here, perhaps even more strongly, concluding that Imam Ali must have participated because it is difficult to imagine Imam Ali sitting on the sidelines while the Ridda Wars were spreading. Of course, when I say “Ridda Wars,” I am putting aside the detailed debates about who exactly apostasised, how many groups were involved, etc.. I do not want to enter into those details now. There is disagreement among Muslims about the identity of these wars and whether they were all of one type or whether, as Shaykh Tusi and thus the Imami school maintain, some of them were genuine Ridda Wars and some were not. That is a separate discussion.

So Syed Sadr may have drawn his conclusion not only from the text we cited but also from his understanding of the priorities that defined Imam Ali’s life which, by the nature of things, would lead one to expect that Imam Ali participated. And that is not far-fetched at all, if the Ridda Wars were truly on the scale some describe, and especially if, as is often said, they threatened Madina itself. But what type of participation? What form did it take? We simply do not have reliable information. And for this reason, Sayyid Hashim Ma‘ruf al-Hasan, in his Sīrat al-A’imma al-Ithnā ‘Ashar also mentions Imam Ali’s participation in the Ridda Wars but he describes it as participation in the form of support, advice, guidance, something resembling planning.

And based on all of this, it seems very difficult to establish historically that Imam Ali participated in the Ridda Wars [as a soldier] under the banner of Abu Bakr.

Point 2 – Did Imam Hassan and Hussayn participate in the conquests?

Now on to the second point, with which I will complete the first viewpoint [that the Imas supported the conquests]. and this one is even more directly tied to our topic: Did Imam Hassan and Hussayn participate in the conquests or not?

Some researchers especially modern ones, including some from within the Imami Shi‘i tradition — have gone to the view that Imam Hassan and Imam Hussayn did indeed participate in the conquests, or at least that one of them took part. For example Shaykh Baqir Sharif al-Qarashi, in his Hayāt al-Imam al-Hasan ibn ‘Ali; Sayyid Hashim Ma‘ruf al-Hasani, in his Sīrat al-A’imma al-Ithnā ‘Ashar; Shaykh Ahmad al-Wa‘ili, in more than one of his lectures; ‘Abdullah al-‘Ala’ili, in his book on Imam Husayn; It is interesting to note that some of them state this opinion that they participated in the conquests like it is undisputed and widely accepted historical fact.

So do we have anything that actually supports this claim? There are some historical reports on the issue so let’s review them and comment on them.

Reports of Participation in Tabaristan

The first historical report is what is mentioned about the campaign of Tabaristan which is, the region in northern Iran, today part of Mazandaran and nearby areas. Tabaristan was invaded by Sa’id ibn al-As. Al-Baladhuri, the historian, describes Sa’id’s campaign in Tabaristan and explains the circumstances. In his book Futūḥ al-Buldān he says: “Sa‘id marched on Tabaristan, and with him in his expedition was…as it is said were Hassan and Hussayn, the sons of  Ali ibn Abi Talib, peace be upon them.”⁶

Al-Tabari also relates this episode in a different way. He says: “‘Habbash ibn Malik’  or: ‘Hanish ibn Malik’  reported: Sa‘id ibn al-‘As marched from Kufa in the year 30, heading toward Khurasan. With him were Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman, a number of the Companions of the Messenger of God, and with him were Hassan and Hussayn, and ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas, and ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar, and ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, and ‘Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr…” and so on.⁷

Critique of these two reports

In regard to the report of Baladhuri, it is clear from the report itself that he himself is not certain. The phrase “as it is said” makes that clear. He is demonstrating his own doubt even before anyone else questions it and he also does not tell us the source from which he got this information. So we cannot rely on his report alone.

Now we turn to Tabari and his chain of transmission here is also weak. For example, in the chain is Ali ibn Mujahid, someone who is explicitly accused in the books of rijal across the Muslim tradition of fabrication, lying, and inventing narrations. And in the chain we also have “Hanish ibn Malik”, a person that is unknown. As far as my own research was concerned I could not find a single mention of him in the books of hadith or history. And God knows best, but except for this story, he does not appear anywhere. Where did this name come from? We don’t know. Who benefits from narrating this story, whether regarding the two Imams or regarding any other part of the story, we simply cannot tell. So again this report is also unreliable.

Reports of Participation in North Africa and Critique

Then we come to the second claim of the two Imams participating in the conquests of North Africa during the time of Uthman. Ibn Khaldun says that ‘Abdullah ibn Abi Sarh had been ordered by ‘Uthman to advance toward North Africa in the year 25 AH. I’ll summarize the story here. He went to Africa, faced resistance, encountered difficulties, and things became complicated. So he sent a message back to Madina saying we need reinforcements, we need more strength. In short, they advised Uthman to send support, so he prepared an army from Madina — meaning troops set out from Madina to join Ibn Abi Sarh. Among them were a group of Companions: Ibn ‘Abbas, Ibn ‘Umar, ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, Ibn Ja‘far, Hassan and Hussayn, and Ibn Zubayr. And they marched with Ibn Abi Sarh in the year 26 AH.

This report is used to claim that the two grandsons participated in the conquests albeit this time on the western front. The earlier claim was about the eastern front, in Tabaristan; this one is about the western front, in Africa. But again, there is something very strange: this report appears only with Ibn Khaldun who died in 808 AH. Meaning the gap between him and the actual event is several centuries, and he mentions it with no chain of transmission, no source, nothing. We simply do not know where he got this story from. And in all my research I have not found any earlier historical source that mentions it before Ibn Khaldun so it is very difficult to rely on this.

Then we have a third and final case: what Ibn Asakir mentions in his biographical entry for Imam Hussayn. At the beginning of the entry, he says: “Hussayn came to Mu‘awiya… and he then set out as a warrior to Constantinople in the army whose commander was Yazid ibn Muawiya.”⁸

Now, the story of Constantinople is a story of its own in history. Everyone knows it. There is a Prophetic hadith that is frequently cited about the virtues of the army that conquers Constantinople and a lot has been written about it. I won’t go into that here. But there was an attempt, historically, to insert Yazid’s name into this narrative — perhaps to cleanse his image, perhaps to suggest his guaranteed reward. What concerns us here is that Ibn Asakir claims that Imam Hussayn took part in the conquests, specifically in the campaign against Constantinople in an army whose commander was Yazid ibn Muawiya.

And this is an enormous claim. In fact, when we examine it carefully and set aside all sectarian sensitivities, it becomes extremely puzzling. There is nothing like this in the earlier historical sources. It lacks even the most basic elements required for historical confirmation. Ibn Asakir provides no source, no chain, nothing and yet he is the only one narrating it. And if Imam Hussayn had actually participated in the campaign of Constantinople under the command of Yazid, this would have been a widely reported, widely debated matter especially after the martyrdom of Imam Hussayn and in the period leading up to his confrontation with Yazid. It would have been a major subject of discussion.

In fact, what we do find is that some earlier Shi‘i theologians criticised Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, whose shrine is now in Istanbul, because he participated in the campaign of Constantinople under the command of Muawiya. For example, al-Kashshi reports that Fadl ibn Shadhan, a major scholar of the third century, was asked about Abu Ayyub al-Ansari and his fighting alongside Muawiya against the pagans. Fadl ibn Shadhan responded saying: “That was from him a sign of weak understanding and heedlessness. He thought he was doing something for himself — strengthening Islam and weakening polytheism — and he assumed that being with Mu‘awiya or not being with him made no difference.”⁹

Meaning he did not pay attention to Muawiya’s political project or agendas; he only saw the immediate act of fighting the pagans. And this, according to Fadl ibn Shadhan, was a lack of insight and awareness. Now, if this is Fadl ibn Shadhan’s commentary on Abu Ayyub al-Ansari then imagine what the reaction would have been if Imam Hussayn, God forbid, had taken part in the campaign of Constantinople under Yazid. Would this not have become a huge issue?

Of course, Fadl ibn Shadhan’s remark was not accepted by all Imami scholars. Among those who objected was Syed Khoei. Syed Khoei commented on Fadl’s view, saying: “Fadl’s objection to Abu Ayyub is misplaced. You have no right to object to Abu Ayyub al-Ansari in this way. Fighting the pagans under unjust rulers, if it is done with the Imam’s general or specific permission, is permissible. In fact, it even brings reward. Who told you that every time a ruler is unjust, it becomes impermissible to fight alongside him? Sometimes we must fight, if the Imam has given general or explicit permission…For he fought the unbelievers alongside someone far worse than Muawiya, and those who were with him were far greater and far more virtuous than Abu Ayyub.” In all honesty, Syed Khoie’s point here is, from a fiqhi perspective, very sound.¹⁰

So it becomes clear that we really have no proof, not for any form of participation by the two grandsons, neither leaving Madina nor taking part in the conquests. Not in Tabaristan, not in Africa and not in Constantinople. As for what some people say that it is impossible for the Ahl al-Bayt to join an army whose commander is not from them, or an army whose commander is an Umayyad, this claim itself needs to be examined further. Do we have a theological problem with that? It’s possible the Imams might have seen a secondary interest, a subordinate maslaha, and so they went to fight. Do we have a rational principle that makes it impossible for them to go out under any other commander? That also requires investigation.

If we had concrete historical evidence then we would accept it. Perhaps, in some exceptional circumstance, the Imams might have seen a unique benefit for Islam that required them to participate. But the simple fact is that we do not have any historical proof, neither for Imam Ali participating under anyone’s command in the Ridda Wars, nor for Imam Hassan and Imam Hussayn participating under anyone at all, let alone participating in any manner in conquests outside Madina.

This completes the discussion on the first viewpoint (the viewpoint that claimed the Ahl al-Bayt approved of the conquests, and perhaps even took part in them). We have seen that proving participation is extremely difficult whereas proving a degree of tacit approval is easier, perhaps through certain consultations or indirect permissions. However, we cannot make a final judgment until we listen to the second viewpoint, the viewpoint that says the Ahl al-Bayt rejected these conquests, that they opposed them, that they did not give permission for them. This is probably the more famous position within Imami circles.

The view that the Imams did not agree with the conquests

Among the most prominent figures associated with this position is Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani who passed away in 1361 AH. Another major figure often cited is Syed Khoei, whose views on this issue are more complex and developed over time.

In his early work Misbah al-Fiqahah which was written during the first period of his teaching of advanced jurisprudence when he was still in his thirties he clearly rejected the idea that the Ahl al-Bayt had authorized these conquests. He stated that there was no evidence that they had given permission and therefore the conquests did not have their approval.

However, in his later work al-Mustanad, specifically in the section on khums, which was written afterwards, he presents a different view. He says: “…the correct view is that the issue under discussion is not really about whether explicit permission was given. Rather, permission may have already been assumed. This is because it has been established that the Imams accepted and endorsed what was carried out by the sultans and unjust rulers of their time, including warfare and fighting against disbelievers, and that they gave a general permission for such actions.”¹¹

From this statement we can see that where was a shift in his position, or at least some ambiguity in how his views should be interpreted.

Another scholar who expressed a similar view is Mirza Fattah Shahidi, the author of the well-known commentary on al-Makasib. He stated that most of the Islamic conquests took place without the permission of the Imam, while allowing for the possibility that some specific cases may have involved permission, particularly in relation to Iraq.

So, the broader question remains: what are the evidences presented that show the Ahl al-Bayt did not support or give approval to the conquests? I will now go through a number of the evidences used by this group.

Evidence 1 – the Hadith of al-Harith

“I heard ‘Abd al Malik ibn A‘yan asking Abu ‘Abd Allah. He kept questioning him until he finally said, ‘So have the people been destroyed?’ The Imam replied, ‘Yes, by Allah, O son of A‘yan, all the people have been destroyed.’ I then said, ‘Those in the East and those in the West as well?’ He replied, ‘It [the land] was conquered upon misguidance. Yes, by Allah, they were destroyed except for three.’ Then Abu Sasan, ‘Ammar, Shutayrah, and Abu ‘Amrah later joined them, and so they became seven.”¹²

The tradition is talking about the individuals who remained with Imam Ali. This tradition can also be found in Shaykh Mufid’s al-Ikhtisas. So what does the phrase “it was conquered upon misguidance” mean? It means that these lands in the East and these lands in the West were conquered upon misguidance. In other words, they were conquered in a way that was not based on truth but on deviation. At first glance, this may appear to be a condemnation of the conquests and a rejection of them. However, stopping at this narration and using it as proof for that conclusion does not seem convincing to me. This is because the phrase “conquered upon misguidance” does not necessarily refer to the military conquests themselves [but rather the ones who were doing it were on misguidance]. It is not clear that the criticism is directed at the act of conquest as such. It may instead mean that affairs were opened [by people on] misguidance, ie that these lands were opened without the wilayah of the Ahl al-Bayt.

In this reading, the narration is not criticizing the act of conquering the lands itself. Rather, it is criticizing what resulted after the conquest, namely that it took place without the authority and leadership of the Ahl al-Bayt. There is a difference between criticizing the conquest itself, and saying that unfortunately this conquest, which should have brought people to true faith, ended up leading them into misguidance. This narration seems to point to the second meaning. So there is a difference between saying that the Ahl al-Bayt were completely dissatisfied with the entire unfolding of the conquests and saying that they had a problem with the outcomes of those conquests. To argue that this tradition is speaking about the conquests [and not the result of it] is counter intuitive and would appear to be an unnatural interpretation.

This is especially so because the original question was not about the conquest itself. The question was about the people. “Have those in the East and the West been destroyed or not?” The Imam replied that they were destroyed because it was conquered upon misguidance. So the focus is not on the act of conquering the lands but rather on the result. The result was that these people followed a school other than the school of the Ahl al-Bayt.

Evidence 2 – the Hadith of Imam Ali rejecting leading the army

There is another narration that this group of scholars have relied on [to argue that the Ahl al-Bayt did not approve of the conquests]. The report is about the consultations that Umar had with his companions about who should be appointed as the commander of the army in one of the military campaigns:

Uthman said, “Stay, O Commander of the Faithful (Umar), and send out the armies. I fear that if anything were to happen to you, the Arabs would turn back from Islam. So send out the armies, support one with another, and appoint a man who has experience in war and clear insight into it.”
Umar said, “And who is that?”
He replied, “Ali ibn Abi Talib.”
Umar said, “Then go and meet him. Speak to him and discuss this with him. Do you think he will respond quickly or not?”
So Uthman went out and met Ali and discussed the matter with him. But Ali refused and disliked it. Uthman then returned to Umar and informed him.

This report can be found in Masudi’s Muruj al-Dhahab and a similar report can be found in Baladuri’s Futuh al-Baldan. So what does this report mean? Why did Imam Ali dislike it [i.e leading the army]. Does this mean that he was not pleased with these conquests, or that he did not agree with them? If the conquests were something good and just, then why would he dislike being the commander of the army, especially when this would normally be considered an honorable role.

This narration has been discussed and examined and there is nothing clear in it to show that Imam Ali rejected the idea of the conquests themselves. There is no clear indication that he opposed Umar declaring these campaigns, setting their timing, or directing them along a particular course. The narration does not clearly identify what exactly Imam Ali disliked or why. It appears that what Imam Ali disliked and refused was nsot the conquests as such, nor the act of carrying them out at that time. Rather, what he refused was taking on the role himself. The phrase in the report “Ali refused and disliked it” refers to his refusal to personally assume the leadership of the army [and not the conquests].

This was the specific matter that Umar and Uthman had agreed to raise with him, to see whether he would accept it or not. Imam Ali declined to be the commander of the army and it is possible that he believed it was in his interest to remain in Medina. He may have seen greater benefit in not leaving the city. From this report transmitted by Masudi, all we really know is that Imam Ali did not want to go out as the army commander and that he disliked taking on that role. But does this dislike mean that he rejected the principle of the conquests? Does it mean that he rejected the historical actions taken at that moment by Abu Bakr or Umar in sending armies to conquer lands. This is not clear. What is clear is that he refused to take on this task himself at that moment in time.

There is no need to exaggerate the matter as I think it’s quite straightforward. “Ali refused and disliked it” simply means that he did not want to go out as the commander of the army. There could be many reasons for why he did this. He may have distrusted their intentions and feared, for example, that they might kill him. He may have felt uneasy about leaving Medina or believed that remaining there was the wiser and more beneficial course. This is like how Uthman himself believed that it was better for Umar to remain in Medina rather than go out personally. In any case, this narration does not provide clarity beyond that point.

What might strengthen this interpretation of the events is another report transmitted by Ibn Abi al Hadid. He reports a dialogue between Ibn Abbas and Umar. Umar says to him that your cousin [Ali] seems upset and uncomfortable. When ibn Abbas asked why, Umar says that he asked him to go out with him [in the conquests], but he did not do so. Ibn Abbas then responds that Ali is still upset over missing out on the Caliphate. ¹³ This additional report supports the idea that Imam Ali refusal was about participation or leadership in that specific context, not a rejection of the conquests themselves. Imam Ali may not have wanted to deal directly with the ruling Caliph and therefore declined the position.

Evidence 3 – the Hadith of Abu Bakr criticizing Imam Ali

Abu Bakr said to him, “So shall we add this to your withdrawal from supporting Islam and your lack of eagerness for jihad? Is this something that Allah and His Messenger commanded you to do, or are you acting on your own?”

Ali, peace be upon him, replied, “O Abu Bakr, and with someone like me do the ignorant seek understanding? The Messenger of Allah commanded you to pledge allegiance to me, made obedience to me obligatory upon you, and placed me among you like the Sacred House of Allah, which people come to but which does not go to them….

He also informed me from my Lord, the Exalted, that after his death I would not draw my sword except in three situations. He said, ‘You will fight the oath breakers (nakithin), the unjust (qasitin), and the deviants (mariqin), and the time for that has not yet come.’¹⁴

From this story, some understand that Imam Ali did not take part in military fighting after the death of the Messenger of Allah until the battles against the oath breakers, the unjust, and the deviants. This could suggest that he had a negative stance regarding the conquests.

However, I do not want to go too deeply into this narration. Firstly, the context of the report suggests that it is speaking about the wars of apostasy rather than the later conquests, and this contradicts with some of the points mentioned earlier [in relation to the Imam’s participation in them] . Additionally, this narration does not show that Imam Ali rejected the conquests themselves, rather, it shows that he refused to personally participate.

I repeat that it may be the case that Imam Ali did not see his own participation as a soldier in a military campaign at that moment as appropriate or beneficial. This is very different from having a political position against the ongoing conquests, let alone a deeper religious objection to the principle of offensive jihad itself. It is also possible that he wished to register a form of protest regarding the issue of the caliphate through these kinds of decisions and actions.

In addition to all this, the narration itself has no known chain of transmission, and its source is unclear. Al-Daylami lived in the eighth century Hijri and reports this account roughly seven to eight hundred years after the events in question, which further weakens its reliability.

Evidence 4 – the Hadith of Imam Sadiq and his companion Abd al-Malik

“O Abd al Malik, why is it that I do not see you going out to those places [for conquest] that the people of your land go to?” He said, “I asked, where do you mean?” He replied, “Jeddah, Abadan, al Masisah, and Qazvin.” I said, “I am waiting for your instruction [to authorize the conquest] and following your example.”

He replied, “Yes, by Allah. If it were something good, they would not have gone ahead of us in it.” I then said to him, “The Zaydis say that there is no difference between us and Ja‘far except that he does not believe in jihad.” He replied, “I do believe in it. Yes, by Allah, I do believe in it. But I dislike abandoning my knowledge in favor of their ignorance.”¹⁵

This hadith is clear in its argument against the conquests: if what the Muslims were doing, referring to the conquest and fighting the disbelievers, were truly something good, then they (the Umayyads) would not have preceded the Ahl al-Bayt in doing it. This suggest that the Imam had a fixed position on the conquests and even regarding the principle of offensive jihad.

There are some additional points to consider also. Apart from the weakness of its chain, the narration speaks about border regions. Frontier duty refers to guarding border areas and that would be closer to defensive warfare. It would not make sense for defensive warfare to be prohibited, or for the Imam to be against defending Muslim lands, whether in principle or in practice.

What the narration clearly points to is a refusal to cooperate with the ruling authorities during the Umayyad or Abbasid periods, depending on when the report was issued. This refusal extended even to serving as a frontier guard. Other narrations explain that if a person does serve at the frontiers and is forced into that position, then their intention should be to defend Islam itself, not to preserve the rule of a specific ruler or dynasty.¹⁶ This makes it clear that the real issue here is not partaking in the conquest as such but avoiding participation that serves to legitimize an unjust state. If one is required to participate in these areas then it should be solely for the purpose of protecting Islam from aggression against Muslim lands.

Evidence 5 – Jihad can only be authorized by a true Imam

This evidence argues that jihad is conditional upon the presence [and approval] of the true Imam. According to this view, all those who ruled from the period after the death of the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him and his family, up to the third Islamic century and beyond were illegitimate. From the standpoint of Imami doctrine, this is considered self-evident as these authorities are seen as illegitimate rulers.

Of course, in later Imami thought, some scholars discussed the idea of primary legitimacy and secondary legitimacy. One example is Shaykh Waez Zadeh Khorasani, who presented a particular view on this issue. He argued that after Imam Ali realized that the situation had stabilized and that it was no longer possible to reclaim the caliphate, he dealt with the political reality as a settled matter. Shaykh Waez Zadeh referred to this as a form of secondary legitimacy, meaning that the authority had effectively become a reality that had to be dealt with as if it were legitimate since the possibility of retaking the caliphate had ended. Based on perspectives like this, some conclude that these rulers were illegitimate, and since jihad is conditional upon a legitimate Imam, then the conquests must also be illegitimate.

Many people have fallen into this mistake, and it is not accurate at all in its assessment (namely, the claim that all military conquests are automatically illegitimate simply because they were carried out under rulers considered illegitimate, without asking whether the true Imam gave permission or approval). This is because we are not talking about an individual person deciding on his own to go out and take part in jihad under an illegitimate authority. That is not the issue. Rather, the discussion assumes that the one who gives permission to go out, or approves of participation, or even goes out himself, is the Imam. If the true Imam gives permission to his followers to go out alongside an illegitimate authority, then the matter is resolved, because participation in that jihad would be by the permission of the true Imam. So the real question is whether the Imams gave permission for these conquests or not, and whether they approved of them or not. If historical evidence shows that they did approve, then when a Shia or a follower of the Ahl al-Bayt went out, he did so by their permission, not by the permission of the ruling authority. This situation has occurred many times in Shia history, as Shias often lived as a minority and had to navigate their relationship with the powers in control.

Conclusion

So the conclusion I wish to reach is this: the evidence for the Ahl al-Bayt’s approval of the conquests, in the sense we explained earlier, or for their direct participation in them, is not firmly established. At the same time, the evidence for their rejection of the conquests is weaker than the evidence indicating their general acceptance. For this reason, one may cautiously lean toward the view that supports their approval of it, but only as a preference (tarjih). It is difficult to confidently side with either the first group or the second group based on the evidence available.

From a historical perspective, it is difficult to firmly stand in either camp. It is hard to be certain that there was approval, and it is equally hard to be certain that there was no approval. While a general form of acceptance appears closer to the available historical data than total rejection, this inclination is still not enough to allow a definitive or conclusive judgment on the matter.

This is a concise summary of the two main approaches. This discussion has been especially prominent in the modern period within the Imami Shia scholarly context, particularly regarding the nature of the relationship between the Ahl al-Bayt and the conquests. This includes questions of participation, planning, assistance, support, facilitation, or endorsement of the actions that took place, setting aside some of the secondary or finer details. As I mentioned, these are the two main perspectives, along with the evidence each side has presented, which I have stated here briefly and concisely.

1. Syed Kadhim Ha’iri, Mabahith al-Usul, p. 138
2. Syed Sadr, Fadak fī al-Tārīkh, p. 76
3. ibn Tawus, Kashf al-Maḥajja li-Thamrat al-Muhajja, p. 70
4. Nahj al-Balagha, letter 62
5. al-Thaqafi, Kitāb al-Gharāt, v.1, p.203
6. Al-Baladhuri, Futūḥ al-Buldān, v.2, p. 411
7. Tarikh al-Tabari, v.3, p.323
8. Ibn Asakir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, v.14, p.111
9. al-Kashshi, Ikhtiyar ma’rifat al-rijal, v.1, p. 38
10. Syed Khoei, Mu’jam rijal al-Hadith, v.8, p.26
11. Syed Khoei, al-Mustanad, v.25, p. 16
12. al-Kashshi, Ikhtiyar ma’rifat al-rijal, v.1, p.7
13. Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, v.21, p.78
14. al-Daylami, Irshad al-Qulub, v. 2, p. 270
15. Kulayni, al-Kafi, v.5, p. 19
16. See this tradition in al-Kafi for example.