By Ustad Soroush Mahallati – Translated by Sayyid Ali Imran

These are translations of classes delivered by Ustad Soroush Mahallati during the summer vacation on political philosophy and political jurisprudence. In this post, I have translated the second lesson from July 11th, 2025.

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On the Types of Governance and Leadership

I extend my greetings and salutations to all dear companions and respected listeners.

In Kitab al-Millah, the first topic al-Farabi presents is the definition of Millah. This is in fact the first of several introductory points that he raises in this work.

Second Introduction: Types of Leadership

The second introductory topic is a classification that al-Farabi offers concerning the different types of leadership (riyasah) in society. According to this classification, from al-Farabi’s perspective, leadership takes four forms:

1. Virtuous Leadership (riyasah fadilah)

2. Ignorant Leadership (riyasah jahiliyyah)

3. Deviant Leadership (riyasah dallah)

4. Deceptive Leadership (riyasah mumawwahah or tamwih)

In this second introduction, al-Farabi outlines these various forms of leadership. Of course, what al-Farabi ultimately has in mind and favors is the first type, namely virtuous leadership. But in order to prevent confusion and to avoid mixing up virtuous leadership with non-virtuous ones, he finds it necessary to explain the other types as well, so that the distinction between virtuous and non-virtuous leadership is made clear.

Now, this leadership refers to the role of the First Ruler, that is, the individual who holds supreme authority. This leadership may be characterized as virtuous (fadilah), ignorant (jahilah), deviant (dallah), or deceptive (tamwih). But what is the criterion by which such a division is made? In other words, what makes one leadership virtuous, whereas the others are not?

The Criterion of Division

Al-Farabi bases this division on a central question: What is the ultimate goal (ghayah) and purpose (gharad) of politics? What is the goal of the politician? What is the aim of the city and society?

From al-Farabi’s point of view, the goal is one and the same across all these domains:

• It is the same goal that religion (din) seeks to achieve, as a divinely revealed program from God,

• It is the same goal that the First Ruler—who stands at the head of power—strives to realize,

• It is the same goal that must be fulfilled within the city (madinah),

• And it is the very same goal that politics must be directed toward.

According to al-Farabi, this goal is none other than true happiness (sa‘adah haqiqiyyah). At this point, we won’t delve deeply into the precise definition of true happiness, since our current discussion is introductory. For now, we are only sketching a general picture of al-Farabi’s perspective in this opening section.

Virtuous Leadership vs. Ignorant Leadership

The defining axis is true happiness. Now, either the First Ruler pursues true happiness and establishes his leadership for the sake of realizing it—using the Millah (i.e., religion) as a means to attain true happiness—or he does not concern himself with true happiness and instead pursues a different objective through his leadership, aiming either for his own personal goals or for some alternate objective for the people.

In the first scenario, the leadership is virtuous. In the second scenario, it is not virtuous. So, if it is not virtuous, then what is it? If the First Ruler does not pursue true happiness, then he must be pursuing other objectives. What might these other objectives be?

Al-Farabi lists a number of alternate aims that can exist in governance and leadership. The first of these are necessary aims, things that are essential for basic living, such as health, safety, and security. It is possible that the First Ruler has no concern for true happiness, but still seeks to secure these basic needs of life. He may even go further, seeking prosperity and general well-being. He might pursue pleasure, or dignity, honor, glory, status, or he may simply seek power and dominance. All of these can be considered possible aims for the First Ruler.

Now, when true happiness, or what may be called ultimate happiness, is not the objective, and instead the ruler pursues these other forms of life, then this pursuit can take three forms:

1. First Form: The ruler wants all these things – prosperity, pleasure, honor – only for himself, and uses the people as tools and means to achieve his own goals. He wants luxury for himself, pleasure for himself, dignity for himself, while the people are merely instruments to achieve those ends.

2. Second Form: The ruler seeks these goals not for himself, but rather for the people. He wants health, wealth, and similar goods for them.

3. Third Form: He wants these aims for both himself and the people.

The worst form is the first, in which the ruler desires everything for himself and uses the people solely for his personal ambitions, striving for more power and wealth. The other two forms—whether the ruler pursues such goods for both himself and the people, or only for the people—are better and more acceptable.

This is a summary of the picture that al-Farabi presents regarding virtuous leadership and ignorant leadership.

Deviant Leadership and Deceptive Leadership

The basis of the classification remains the same, but al-Farabi adds two more categories, turning the classification into four types of leadership.

Why? Because sometimes, a First Ruler may aim for true happiness, but fails to recognize what it truly is—he makes a mistake, becomes misguided, and ends up chasing imagined forms of happiness, rather than the real thing. In such cases, the leadership is called deviant (riyasah dallah). This is essentially similar to ignorant leadership, but the ruler believes he is pursuing true happiness. That is the third type.

Then, there is a fourth type:

The ruler does not make a mistake. He knows what true happiness is. He is also aware of illusory or imagined forms of happiness. He recognizes both. Yet, he pretends, in the public eye, to be seeking true and eternal happiness, while in reality, he is chasing after illusory happiness. In this case, there is no ignorance; rather, the issue is deception.

In the third type, the First Ruler makes a mistake—he is genuinely pursuing true happiness but fails to properly identify it. In the fourth type, he knows the truth but chooses not to pursue true happiness. Instead, he deceives the people by appearing to be virtuous while, in reality, pursuing worldly pleasures and political power.

Al-Farabi calls this kind of leadership deceptive leadership (riyasah tamwih), which involves trickery and hypocrisy. Outwardly, such a ruler speaks of God, the Prophet, justice, and values. But in truth, what he pursues is far from true happiness. He is after pleasure, power, and the same objectives that characterized ignorant politics.

So, in total, there are four types of leadership. However, the original division is essentially between the first two types: virtuous leadership and ignorant leadership. The third and fourth types are subdivisions or variants of ignorant leadership: sometimes appearing transparently, other times cloaked in error or deceit.

This concludes a summary and categorization of the framework al-Farabi provides regarding the different types of leadership.

The Connection Between Politics and True Happiness

We begin by reading al-Farabi’s own words in order to become familiar with his conceptual framework and interpretation. Then, given the importance and foundational nature of this topic, we will proceed to analyze it more thoroughly and examine its various dimensions with due care, God willing.

One of the central issues here is that al-Farabi consistently, in this and all his works, seeks to tie governance, politics, and leadership to the pursuit of true happiness. This is a claim that, in our time, is widely doubted or outright denied.

What al-Farabi refers to as ignorant politics or ignorant leadership, namely, governance that seeks only to secure minimal necessities such as health, safety, abundant wealth, public comfort, and pleasure, he considers inferior leadership. Yet today, governments, particularly minimalist or welfare states, are often defined by exactly these parameters.

Therefore, we must ask: Why does al-Farabi ground the very essence of rulership in the concept of true happiness? There are two key discussions we will need to explore:

1. What is true happiness or ultimate happiness (al-saʿādah al-quṣwá) according to al-Farabi? What does it truly mean?

2. How can happiness serve as the end goal of governance and leadership?

This latter question becomes particularly pressing in light of modern views, which argue that politics and happiness should be separated, that rulers should not concern themselves with whether people achieve happiness or not. Rather, they should merely fulfill basic material needs, such as security, without interfering in personal fulfillment. This presents a serious ideological divergence between the ancient and modern eras.

For now, let us begin by reading al-Farabi’s original statement and understanding his view more precisely.

Explanation and Analysis of al-Farabi’s View

Continuing from where we left off in the previous session, al-Farabi states:

“The First Ruler is the one who stands at the top of power, with none above him.”

If this ruler is virtuous in reality, then his leadership is virtuous. That is to say, the method and form of his leadership are grounded in virtue.

“If he seeks – through what he prescribes from the Millah – to attain for himself and all who are under his rule the ultimate happiness,”

This means: If such a ruler uses the Millah – the religious or ideological system that he prescribes – to guide both himself and others toward ultimate happiness, then this is virtuous leadership.

We have previously read that the First Ruler is the one who formulates the Millah, i.e., the religion, the way, the doctrine. So, if by presenting this system – this Millah, this worldview – he aims to guide both himself and his people to the highest form of happiness, this is considered virtuous leadership.

“Then his goal in drawing up this Millah is to attain for himself and for all under his authority the ultimate happiness.”

In this case, the goal is the ultimate happiness, that which is truly happiness in the deepest sense, not an imagined or illusory happiness. The purpose is to bring people to true fulfillment. And thus, the Millah, this religious or doctrinal program, is also a virtuous Millah. The leadership is virtuous, the politics is virtuous, and the doctrine is virtuous.

We noted earlier that al-Farabi defines Millah broadly as a system encompassing opinions and actions. This includes every ideology and every doctrine, and sometimes the Millah is virtuous, as in this first case, while at other times, it is ignorant, a doctrine that fails to lead human beings toward ultimate happiness.

In this first type, the goal of virtuous leadership is to bring both the leader and the people to the highest degree of happiness. The program devised by the First Ruler to achieve this goal – a system of opinions and actions – is called the Millah, and it must be compatible with this ultimate happiness.

This concept is the central axis of all the discussions in Kitab al-Millah, and in fact, forms the core and foundation of al-Farabi’s political thought.

In contrast to virtuous politics, other types of politics and governance also exist.

“And if the First Ruler is not virtuous and his leadership is not virtuous, then it is ignorant.”

Virtuous leadership is the leadership of the wise, the elite, the virtuous. Ignorant leadership, by contrast, is the rule of fools, where society is governed by ignorance. What, then, does the First Ruler pursue in such ignorant leadership?

“He seeks—through what he prescribes from the Millah—a particular good (khayr) for himself or others.”

So, what goal does he pursue by offering his doctrine or ideology? He is trying to reach some kind of good, but what kind?

“Either he seeks that good solely for himself,”

This is the first form: the ruler wants all the benefit for himself alone.

“Or he seeks it for others, excluding himself,”

This is the second form: he wants others to benefit, but not necessarily himself.

“Or he seeks it for both himself and the people,”

This is the third form: he desires this good for both himself and the society. The distinction lies in who is intended to benefit from this good. Is it for the ruler, for the people, or for both? Now, what is this good (khayr)? What kind of good is being pursued here?

The term khayr in this context is broad and has many interpretations. Al-Farabi explains:

“Sometimes this good is one of necessity (ḍarūrī)—a minimal requirement of life, such as health and security.”

These are basic needs, the minimum conditions necessary for life. So, he says: “He desires—through what he sets forth—to attain for himself some benefit.” That is, he wants to reach a personal gain through the people, a type of benefit from the benefits of ignorance (khayrāt al-jāhiliyyah).

What kinds of benefits are we talking about here? Sometimes the benefit is basic and necessary, for example, health and safety, the minimal conditions needed for life. These are necessary goods. Or, the benefit may not be health and safety, but wealth and abundance—comfort, luxury, urban prosperity. This is the second goal. Or, it may be pleasure, pure sensual enjoyment, a life of indulgence and amusement. These are included as the third category, where the focus is on satisfying desires and increasing opportunities for sensual gratification.

The fourth category is not about pleasure at all. Perhaps the ruler denies himself pleasures, lives a simple life, and closes the doors of indulgence. What matters to him is status, prestige, dignity, grandeur, and power, titles and appearances. These symbolic benefits are of great value to him. That’s a different kind of desire.

Or, the fifth type: He forsakes everything else—pleasure, wealth, dignity—for the sake of maximum domination and control, wanting total sovereignty and absolute authority. He wants his realm and dominion to expand limitlessly.

“He seeks, by means of the people, to attain these goals”
“And he attains that benefit and happiness for himself, excluding others.”

So first, he wants to reach happiness for himself by means of these things—believing that pleasure is happiness. He has no concern for how the people live—whether they enjoy their lives or suffer, whether they live in wealth or poverty. He lives in comfort and luxury, while the people may dwell in hardship.

“He turns those under his rule into instruments that he uses.”

That is, he treats all the citizens under his leadership as tools and means, exploiting them to attain his own comfort, power, rule, and well-being.

“He uses those under his leadership as instruments to reach his own goal and maintain it.”

That is, he employs the people to achieve his ends and then tries to preserve those ends, ensuring his power continues. This is a key point that I emphasized in the previous session—earlier, it was said:

“His aim is either for the people, or through them.”

In one case, the goal of governance is for the people—their prosperity, their well-being. In the other case, it is through the people—they serve his prosperity, his domination, and his ego. Everyone is made to serve; they carry the burdens and pay the costs so that he may rule. This is the ignorant type of leadership. Of course, within this, there are three types, depending on the aim:

• The benefit is only for himself,

• The benefit is only for the people,

• The benefit is for both himself and the people.

Naturally, the last two cases are preferable to the first. Among the leaders of ignorant governance, the last two types are superior to the first type, who only sought benefit for himself.

“These two are the best of the ignorant rulers.”

Because we divided ignorant rulers into three, and the first type is the one who seeks only his own gain and uses all people as mere tools, while:

“He turns those under his rule into instruments to be used to achieve his goal and maintain it.”

Alternatively,

“He seeks to bring that benefit to the people and not to himself.”

So, pay attention to the phrase:

“He only seeks to attain, through what he prescribes, some benefit for himself via the people.”

That’s the first form of ignorant leadership. Then,

“Or he seeks to bring that benefit to the people, not to himself.”

That’s the second form. Then the third form:

“Or both he and the people benefit together.”

So, we have three types here.

“And these last two are the best of the ignorant rulers.”

Because the first one only seeks benefit for himself. Up to this point, we have explained the first and second categories of rulership. Now, to complete this topic, we need to describe the remaining two categories, even if, in essence, these two don’t significantly affect the core argument.

The main axis of our discussion is this: Either the goal of governance is true happiness, which is virtuous leadership, or it is not. When it’s not, the goals are instead worldly benefits, which al-Farabi calls ignorant aims, and he provides examples of each. Sometimes, it is explicitly stated that the ruler pursues worldly goods and denies true happiness, saying: “We are seeking comfort; we don’t believe in true happiness.” If that’s the case, then it falls under the second category of ignorant rule.

But if he says, “No, we are seeking true happiness,” but mistakenly defines true happiness as worldly life and comforts, then his rule is misguided (ḍāllah)—he has made an error in judgment. That is the third type of rulership. Virtuous Leadership is the first category. Ignorant Leadership is the second. Now we begin the third category, which is Misguided Leadership (riyāsah ḍalālah):

“And if his leadership is that of misguidance…”

What is riyāsat al-ḍalālah? The misguided leader believes, mistakenly, that he possesses virtue and wisdom:

“He assumes, within himself, that he possesses virtue and wisdom.”

“And those under his leadership also hold this belief about him.”

That is, both the leader and his followers believe that he is a virtuous man, someone who can lead them to true happiness. This mistaken belief circulates among the people. But in reality, this is not the case:

“In reality, he is not so.”

They are mistaken. The people have formed a false image of the leader. Or, the leader himself is also deluded, thinking he is guiding people to true happiness when in fact he is not. So, in this third category:

“He seeks, through his rulership, to attain—both for himself and his followers—something he believes to be the highest happiness.”

He believes that the goal he pursues is supreme happiness, but this is a false assumption based on ignorance.

“When, in fact, that [goal] has no true reality.”

Thus, the goal is mistaken. The ruler believes, or the people believe, that they are pursuing true happiness. But in reality, the thing they pursue is not true happiness. They have wrongly applied the label of happiness to things that are not truly happiness. This is the third category of leadership.

Then we come to the fourth type:

“And if his leadership is one of deception (tamwīh)…”

This is the fourth category. Al-Fārābī uses the term tamwīh often. Even in his discussions on logical fallacies, he refers to tamwīh, which means deception, trickery, fraud, camouflage, or misleading presentation. He says there is a fourth type of leadership, which is a deceptive or hypocritical rulership. How is this different from the previous categories?

Here, the leader is fully aware that what he seeks is not true happiness. He knows what true happiness is. But he does not pursue it. Still, he disguises his real aims under the labels of religion, God, and the Hereafter. He acts hypocritically in order to maintain power among the people.

This is the fourth category, and it is distinct from mere ignorance or error. It is deliberate deception. For example, during the time of Imam Ali (a), he said of the Khawarij:

“They sought the truth but made a mistake.”

They were misguided, but sincerely mistaken. In contrast, Mu’awiyah did not seek the truth—he was pursuing falsehood, but often disguised it.

“He misrepresented the truth.”

So this fourth form of leadership is politics of deception – a hypocritical form of leadership:

“Where the leader deliberately does this.”

He intentionally presents one thing publicly, but acts differently in reality. This is done knowingly and purposefully.

“And those under his rule are unaware of the deception.”

Deception and trickery only work if people don’t notice them. If the public becomes aware and exposes the ruler, it’s no longer tamwīh, the mask is off, and the deception fails. The subjects under this ruler are unaware, and they believe in the ruler’s apparent claims, that he is virtuous and wise.

“They believe in him and presume that he possesses virtue and wisdom.”

They say: “What a good person he is! How moral! What an excellent leader! How God-fearing and compassionate!”

“Yet he is merely seeking, through what he prescribes…”

His policies and commandments are two-faced:

“Outwardly, he appears to seek supreme happiness for himself and for the people.”

All his public tribunes and proclamations announce that they are on the path to truth, to eternal happiness.

“But inwardly, he seeks to attain—through them—one of the ignorant benefits.”

And we already explained what these ignorant benefits are: domination, pleasure, wealth. So he acts hypocritically, presenting these jāhiliyyah aims in the guise of true happiness. This is the politics of deception and manipulation.

Al-Fārābī presents these four categories to clearly distinguish them. So that when we return to the first category—Virtuous Leadership—we know precisely what it is.

Thus:

“The First Virtuous Ruler…”

We now return to the first type, as this is the real subject of al-Fārābī’s discussion. We are not concerned with the second, third, or fourth types for now. This completes the theoretical framework of al-Fārābī’s thought.

Commentary on the Fourfold Classification of Politics in al-Fārābī’s Thought

At this point, we need to provide some explanation regarding the concept of saʿādah, which al-Fārābī refers to as al-saʿādah al-quṣwā (ultimate happiness), and how he incorporates it into the domain of governance and leadership.

I had planned to speak in more depth about al-Fārābī’s philosophical foundation and what exactly saʿādah al-quṣwā means, but upon checking the time, I see that we don’t have much left, and such a foundational discussion requires ample time. So, I will postpone that discussion until another occasion, God willing.

In the remaining time, I will make a few important remarks to complement the fourfold classification that al-Fārābī presents, where leadership and governance are divided into four types, and by extension, politics also takes four forms, and so do societies. I’ll now add a few key points for the benefit of our listeners.

First Point: The Meaning of Happiness in the Fourfold Typology and Their Interrelationships

The first point is to examine this notion of al-saʿādah al-quṣwā, which is situated in the first type of leadership. In contrast, in the second type, the aim is comfort, ease, and human dignity, and so on. What is the relationship between these two goals?

Does al-Fārābī consider these two aims to be mutually exclusive (tabāyun)? That is, either a person pursues saʿādah, which has an otherworldly aspect, or they pursue comfort, ease, health, and security, which belong to this worldly life.

In the first scenario, the city becomes a virtuous city. In the second, it becomes an ignorant city. Likewise, leadership in the first case is virtuous leadership, whereas in the second, it is ignorant leadership.

But no, al-Fārābī does not view these two aims as mutually exclusive. To understand this, we must refer to other works of al-Fārābī, especially those in which he lays out the scope of saʿādah in both this world and the next.

From his broader writings, it becomes evident that saʿādah, for al-Fārābī, has both a worldly and an otherworldly dimension. Therefore, the various worldly goods listed in the second type of city, such as food, health, and comfort, are also encompassed within the higher goal of al-saʿādah al-quṣwā in the first city.

This indicates a general–specific relationship (ʿāmm wa khāṣṣ) between the two: The happiness of the virtuous city encompasses all the legitimate worldly enjoyments, as well as the ultimate spiritual felicity.

This understanding is clarified by al-Fārābī himself in his work Fusūl al-Madaniyyah (Selected Aphorisms on Civil Governance). Allow me to quote a portion from page 92, under the chapter titled “Al-Siyāsah al-Fāḍilah” (Virtuous Politics):

“Al-sā’is (the ruler) achieves through it (virtuous politics) a kind of virtue that cannot be attained except through it. And it is the most perfect form of virtue that a human can attain. Likewise, the governed (al-masūs) also attain, in their worldly lives and in their otherworldly lives, a kind of excellence that cannot be attained without it. In worldly life, their bodies attain the best physical conditions that the natural disposition of each person allows, and their souls attain the best states according to their innate potential and strengths. And these virtues lead to happiness in the afterlife. And their lives become more pleasant and more joyful than all other forms of living.”

This passage explains what virtuous politics is: It exists in the virtuous city, and it is implemented by the First Virtuous Ruler (al-ra’īs al-awwal al-fāḍil). The goal of virtuous politics is to help both the leader and the people attain virtue, a goal that cannot be achieved without this specific path of virtuous political leadership.

According to al-Fārābī, those who live under the governance of virtuous politics – that is, the general public – will attain virtues that perfect both their worldly and otherworldly lives, and these virtues are only accessible through this kind of governance.

So what are these virtues in worldly life that arise from virtuous politics? Al-Fārābī says that in such a society:

• Physically, people will have the best bodily states: good nourishment, excellent health, well-being, and comfort.

• This is reflected in the phrase: “Their bodies will be in the best possible condition allowed by their natural capacities.”

• Psychologically and spiritually, their souls will attain the best states, according to their individual strengths and temperaments. “Their souls will be in the most excellent inner states.”

• These conditions will enable them to attain happiness in the Hereafter: “These virtues are the cause of happiness in the afterlife.”

Thus, the phrase al-saʿādah al-quṣwā in al-Fārābī’s writings should not be misinterpreted as if it excludes worldly happiness. On the contrary, al-Fārābī’s conception is comprehensive. He writes: “And their life will be the purest and most delightful among all ways of living.”

This means that in a virtuous society, people experience the purest form of life, the most pleasurable life, and a blissful life that is both joyous and moral. This type of enjoyment does not even exist in corrupt societies, because they pursue pleasures without purification, while in the virtuous city, purity and pleasure go hand in hand.

So, when we speak of al-madīnah al-fāḍilah and contrast it with al-madīnah al-jāhilah, and when we note that worldly goods appear to be emphasized in the ignorant city, this does not mean that such goods are absent from the virtuous city. According to al-Fārābī, the virtuous city encompasses both.

Second Point: Types of Cities and Societies in al-Fārābī’s Other Works

The second point I’d like to mention here is that al-Fārābī discusses the classification of cities in a more detailed and structured way in his other works. In this book al-Millah, which we are currently reading, the types of societies and leaderships are only discussed briefly. Therefore, if we want to thoroughly understand al-Fārābī’s political theory, I believe we must refer to his other writings, especially where he elaborates on the types of cities in more detail.

In Kitāb al-Millah, al-Fārābī only briefly mentions that societies and governments can be divided into four types, but we should not limit ourselves to this concise treatment.

The first type is the virtuous city. The second type is the misguided city, or the misguided leadership or misguided politics, and all these come together by necessity. Here, al-Fārābī briefly refers to a few types of ignorant cities (madīnah jāhilah). For example, he mentions:

• Cities concerned only with physical needs like health and security.

• Cities focused on wealth, abundance, and comfort.

• Cities concerned with domination and conquest.

• Cities concerned with human dignity and status.

He refers to these types in passing, without much elaboration. However, in his other work, al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, al-Fārābī presents these divisions in much greater detail. He dedicates one or more pages to each of these cities, discussing:

• What the city of wealth (madīnat al-yasār) looks like and its specific features.

• What the city of domination (madīnat al-taghallub) entails.

• How the city of dignity (madīnat al-karāmah) is defined.

He devotes about ten pages to this discussion. I believe paying attention to this expanded classification is necessary for anyone studying Kitāb al-Millah. In fact, this classification is essential to properly understanding al-Fārābī’s vision of politics and governance.

This broader classification matters today and it has two main implications:

First, we need to ask: In this typology that al-Fārābī offers, does it account for modern democratic governments, which are based on freedom, human rights, and pluralism?

Some might assume that since al-Fārābī speaks only about the virtuous city, he was simply unaware of democracy, that he had not experienced it, and therefore turned to the ideal of the madīnah fāḍilah.

So we must ask: What was al-Fārābī’s horizon of imagination? What kinds of governance could he conceive of? To answer this, we must look into his other works and see how comprehensively he laid out various models of governance—not just ideal ones, but also realistic alternatives.

Second, when discussing the virtuous city or virtuous leadership, we inevitably face a practical question: What if the ideal conditions for such a city or leadership do not exist? In such a case, which of the other types of society and government should we pursue?

For this secondary choice, it is essential that we familiarize ourselves with the other models of governance that al-Fārābī outlines. Fortunately, this is exactly what he provides in his other writings. We need that awareness and understanding. Since we cannot cover that comprehensive discussion here in full, I will instead point you to where you can find it.

Starting from page 87 of al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, al-Fārābī writes:

“The virtuous city is contrasted with the ignorant city, the immoral city, and the misguided city…”

Then he adds:

“As for the people of ignorance, they are civil people (madaniyyūn), and their cities and civil gatherings differ in many ways…”

He continues with a detailed classification of the types of ignorant societies (ijtimaʿāt jāhilah), including:

1. Societies concerned only with physical needs
   – These societies exist only for securing necessities.

2. Societies of base desire and greed
   – Here, people seek material wealth and excessive luxury.

3. Societies of lowly pleasures
   – These are centered around play, entertainment, and sensual indulgence.

4. Societies of honor and prestige
   – These societies value personal dignity and status.

5. Societies of domination
   – Where the aim is power, military strength, and superiority over others.

These five were briefly referenced in Kitāb al-Millah, and here again in al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, al-Fārābī elaborates on them extensively.

The City of the Free and the Communal Society

Al-Fārābī introduces a sixth category in al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, which he does not mention in Kitāb al-Millah due to its brief and general nature. This sixth type is:

“The society of freedom in the communal city or the city of the free.”

This refers to a society governed on the basis of freedom, where the primary value is that all individuals enjoy the greatest possible degree of liberty.

Al-Fārābī discusses this model in al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah starting from page 87, and the discussion continues until around page 104.

Now, I’d like to read to you a portion from this final part (which is not found in Kitāb al-Millah). He speaks about a city where:

• All individuals are completely free.

• No one has superiority over another.

• People live according to their own preferences, as long as their freedom does not infringe on the freedom of others.

Everyone is free, so long as they do not harm others or interfere with others’ liberties. There is a diversity of beliefs, morals, and lifestyles, yet people coexist. This vision closely resembles the modern ideal of a pluralistic, liberal society—and interestingly, al-Fārābī describes it in detail.

Al-Fārābī writes:

“As for the communal city (al-madīnah al-jamāʿiyyah), it is a city in which every individual is completely left to himself to do as he wills.”

“Its people are equal. None claim superiority over the other. No one interferes in another’s life or fate.”

Their principle is:

“There is no virtue of one person over another in any way at all.”

Everyone is equal, and so everyone is free. What does this freedom mean? It means each person determines the lifestyle and conduct they desire for themselves. No one commands another. There is no ruler or authority, except in one situation: If someone acts in a way that infringes on the freedom of others, then and only then does the government intervene—to stop that aggression. Outside of that, all people are free.

In this society, morals vary, lifestyles are diverse, desires, pleasures, and aims are countless and too many to number. Some people are similar to one another; others are completely different. People are not all the same.

Then al-Fārābī says:

“Its general population does not own the wealth of the rulers.”

“The one who is considered a ruler only rules with the consent of the ruled.”

This is one of the defining features of this society—no one has the right to rule over another. Rule belongs to the people themselves. Leadership is based entirely on:

• The will of the governed.

• The desires and preferences of the people.

If any problem arises and becomes too complex:

“Then, in truth, there is no ruler and no ruled.”

In other words, there is no division between ruler and subject—the people govern themselves. Authority is not given to a distinct class; rather, the people rule over themselves. Al-Fārābī continues with a detailed explanation on the next page. Then he says:

“This city among their cities is the wondrous city (al-madīnah al-muʿjibah) and the city of happiness (al-madīnah al-saʿīdah).”

Among all the cities he discusses, he praises this one most highly.

He then compares it to other societies:

• Its methods of procreation and marriage are diverse.

• People choose freely based on their own desires.

Most importantly, he makes a critical observation: In this society, knowledge, culture, and literature flourish greatly due to the freedom that exists. He writes:

“There exists in this society philosophers, orators, and poets in every domain.”

In such a society, wisdom, philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry thrive. In contrast, other societies lack this kind of intellectual and cultural growth because they lack freedom.

He even notes that this city may benefit from elements of the virtuous city (madīnah fāḍilah). Thus, even though it is not the ideal, it can still attain:

• Meaningful life,

• High levels of flourishing, and

• The presence of people who reach the heights of perfection.

Of course, some individuals may also fall into degeneracy, because the freedom allows for both.

For us, it is important to recognize that although al-Fārābī’s primary concern is with the virtuous city, he is also deeply aware of the practical limitations of realizing such a utopia. Since the conditions for the madīnah fāḍilah are often absent or extremely difficult, we must explore:

• Alternative models of governance,

• Other ways of life, and

• Societies that still possess significant value, even if they are not ideal.

Al-Fārābī, therefore, presents the City of the Free (madīnat al-aḥrār) as one such valuable model.

ʿAllāmah Shaʿrānī’s Attention to al-Fārābī’s Views on Freedom and Cultural Growth

This is a good moment to mention a point we will expand on in the future, inshāʾAllāh. That is: although al-Fārābī laid out important philosophical foundations and presented critical theories, his ideas have largely gone unnoticed by later Muslim thinkers.

However, there is one exceptional figure among our scholars who paid serious attention to al-Fārābī’s views, and that is the late ʿAllāmah Abū al-Ḥasan Shaʿrānī, a prominent and more recent scholar based in Tehran. He authored many valuable works and trained great students, including ʿAllāmah Ḥasan-Zādah Āmulī and ʿAllāmah Jawādī Āmulī.

In his commentary on Kashf al-Murād (a commentary on al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī’s version of Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād), Shaʿrānī not only translated and explained the text, but also added his own important insights.

Let me read a passage from page 420 of his Kashf al-Murād:

“The very nature of the human being necessitates free will. If a human is forced, then no truly human action can be issued from him, and the purpose of his creation will not be fulfilled. Furthermore, no science, craft, or art can thrive [without freedom]. Therefore, God has granted human beings freedom in action and merely guided them through command, prohibition, encouragement, and warning. That is, human freedom is not revoked. Rather, people are advised and warned so they can choose the path of felicity—but action is not imposed upon them.”

He then supports this idea with the Qur’anic verse:

“So that he who perishes does so clearly [with proof], and he who lives does so clearly.” (Qur’an 8:42)

And he states:

“Today we can observe clearly that al-Fārābī, in al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, has demonstrated that science, ethics, and arts flourish in the communal city (madīnat al-jamāʿah)—not under oppressive kings or tyrants who are accustomed to committing injustice.”

In other words, in dictatorial systems, there is no opportunity for people to grow or flourish. There is no intellectual or scientific progress, because all of that depends on the presence of freedom. So ʿAllāmah Shaʿrānī strongly endorses this link between freedom and intellectual development, and he explicitly references al-Fārābī’s theory to support his point.

There’s another key point that I want to note here. According to ʿAllāmah Shaʿrānī, the virtuous city can only be realized if there is a Maʿṣūm at the helm. If we have access to a Maʿṣūm Imām, then it is possible to establish the ideal virtuous city. But if no Maʿṣūm is present or accessible, then the virtuous city becomes impossible to achieve, because its ruler would lack the necessary perfection and qualifications.

So what comes next in the absence of the virtuous city?

According to Shaʿrānī, after the failure of establishing the virtuous city, the next best model is the City of the Free (madīnat al-aḥrār). And this is the model he recommends for the era of the occultation of the Imām. He goes into detail explaining al-Fārābī’s words, and inshāʾAllāh, at a more appropriate time and occasion, we will explore this issue in greater depth.

Al-Fārābī himself also addressed this issue. What should be done when the First Ruler is not divinely guided, and is therefore subject to error?

InshāʾAllāh, we will return to this question later. For now, I just wanted to highlight:

• The breadth of al-Fārābī’s vision,

• The variety and nuance in his classification of political systems, and

• The way he prioritizes and distinguishes among these types of governance.

This was the second point I wanted to add to complete our discussion of al-Fārābī’s classification of governments in Kitāb al-Millah.

It’s important for friends to know that this discussion is part of a broader and ongoing philosophical inquiry that al-Fārābī addresses in other works as well, and we hope to explore it more thoroughly in the future, inshāʾAllāh.

Point Three: Reframing al-Fārābī’s Classification Through the Lens of Religious vs. Secular Governance

The third and final point I wish to share – please excuse the length of the discussion – is one I hope you’ll bear with me on. If anyone feels tired, you’re free to listen to this audio in smaller segments, since we’re covering these lessons every other day. So, thank you for your patience!

Al-Fārābī’s fourfold classification of governance, as presented in Kitāb al-Millah, can be restated in this way:

Governments are either religious or non-religious. That is, a government either concerns itself with ultimate felicity and spiritual aims, or it does not. If it does not, then its focus is purely material—for example: ensuring proper nutrition, health care, education, employment, housing, or physical security for its citizens.

These are good and necessary worldly aims, but they do not go beyond the scope of material well-being. Al-Fārābī called such a society the “ignorant city”. As I mentioned earlier, this term represents a government that focuses only on the outward, worldly aspects of human life, with no concern for the spiritual destiny of its people.

In contrast, some governments do consider spiritual aims and strive for higher ends. Now, among religious governments, those that claim to pursue spiritual or eternal felicity, al-Fārābī identifies three types (corresponding to his other three categories). So we can restate his fourfold typology as follows:

• One non-religious (secular) government: the ignorant state (jāhilah)

• And three types of religious governments, all of which claim to pursue ultimate human felicity.

The Three Types of Religious Governance According to al-Fārābī

1. The first type is a genuinely virtuous religious government—one that truly seeks and realizes human happiness. Its leadership and structure are oriented toward real spiritual goals, such as we find when the Prophet or the Imāms themselves are at the helm. In such cases, there is no deception, no misguidance, and no conflict between political rule and moral/spiritual aims.

2. The second type is also a religious government, in the sense that it claims to pursue ultimate felicity. However, despite having good intentions, it errs in its understanding of what saʿādah truly is, or how to achieve it. Because of this misguidance, the rulers—though sincere—end up leading people toward destruction rather than salvation. Al-Fārābī calls this the “misguided state”.

3. The third type is a government that uses the language of religion—it declares religious and spiritual goals—but it does so as a cover for manipulation and deceit. The rulers do not actually believe in the values they promote. Instead, they use religious slogans to gain power, wealth, and influence. This is the “delusive state”, marked by hypocrisy, deception, and self-interest.

So again, to summarize the four:

• The ignorant state is secular/materialist—concerned only with worldly needs like safety, prosperity, and comfort.

• The virtuous state is religious and genuinely seeks true happiness.

• The misguided state is religious in language and intent, but misinformed in practice.

• The delusive state is religious in appearance but insincere in motive.

According to al-Fārābī’s terminology, the first is secular, and the other three are religious, but only one is truly righteous and functional.

In the ideal case, when a prophet or infallible Imām leads, there is no deceit or error—the city is truly virtuous. But when error enters—due to ignorance, or when manipulation enters—due to political ambition, even religiously-styled governments may fall into misguidance or hypocrisy.

This framing helps us better understand al-Fārābī’s political philosophy and his views on the religious vs. secular nature of governance. It also allows us to reframe future discussions with more clarity and relevance to modern concerns. I am deeply grateful for your time, attention, and patience.

Wa al-salāmu ʿalaykum wa raḥmatullāhi wa barakātuh.