By Ustad Soroush Mahallati – Translated by Sayyid Ali Imran

These are translations of classes delivered by Ustad Soroush Mahallati during the summer vacation on political philosophy and political jurisprudence. In this post, I have translated the fourth lesson from July 15th, 2025.

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The Views and Actions of the Virtuous Religion

In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

All praise is due to God, Lord of the worlds, and may peace and blessings be upon our Master and Prophet, Abū al-Qāsim al-Muṣṭafā Muḥammad (p).

We now begin the fourth session of the discussions related to Kitāb al-Millah. In this chapter, Farabi proceeds to elaborate and provide a more detailed explanation of the virtuous religion (millah fāḍilah). Previously, he had introduced the concept of the virtuous religion in a more summary and general fashion. Now, in this chapter, his aim is to expand, clarify, and systematically articulate the components of the virtuous religion.

In the previous discussion, Farabi defined the virtuous religion through the lens of identifying its source and origin, which is revelation. He clarified and explained that the efficient cause (ʿillat fāʿilī) of the virtuous religion is revelation itself. That is, the religion is taken directly from the Truth—God, Exalted is He, and it is God who, through revelation, grants it to the Prophet.

This was the focus of the previous chapter.

Section One: The Doctrines and Actions of the Virtuous Religion

In this chapter, the virtuous religion is defined in terms of the substantive content it contains. These are the teachings that exist within the true religion (dīn ḥaqīqī) — teachings that are necessary for attaining the ultimate goal, which is supreme felicity and true salvation. These teachings are the very truths and realities that the Prophet receives through revelation and transmits to the people.

From a classificatory standpoint, everything that the virtuous religion offers can be divided into two components: doctrines (āʿrā’), and actions (afʿāl).

This is the terminology Farabi has used in previous discussions as well — a terminology that corresponds to what we usually refer to in philosophy as theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. The same division that exists in philosophy also appears in religion: subjects related to the understanding of the created world, and those related to human conduct and behaviour.

In this section, based on the same classification, Farabi proceeds to explain the components of the doctrinal teachings presented in the virtuous religion.

In today’s reading, God willing, we will not require in-depth pre-discussion or background studies. The content is clear in intent, although the language is quite dense. Nevertheless, the passage is coherent and does not require external commentary for understanding.

Thus, the passage will be read at length, and I will read and explain the text, and once we complete the chapter, I will offer a few key reflections and clarifications that may be necessary.

Text of Kitab al-Millah:

و( ان) الارإ التى فى المله الفاضله منها آرإ فى إشيإ نظريه و آرإ فى إشيإ اراديه. فالنظريه ما يوصف الله تعالى به, ثم ما يوصف به الروحانيون و مراتبهم فى إنفسهم و منازلهم من الله تعالى و ما فعل كل واحد منهم, ثم كون العالم و ما يوصف به العالم و إجزاوه و مراتب إجزأه. و كيف حدثت الاجسام الاول و إن من الاول إجساما هى إصول سأر الاجسام( ثم) (التى) تحدث إولا و تبطل, و كيف حدثت سأر الاجسام عن التى هى من الاجسام إصول, و مراتب هذه, و كيف ارتباط الاشيإ التى يحويها العالم بعضها ببعض و انتظامها, و إن كل ما يجرى فيها عدل لاجور فيه, و كيف نسبه كل واحد منها الى الله تعالى و الى الروحانيين, ثم كون الانسان و حصول النفس فيه, و العقل و مرتبته من العالم و منزلته من الله و من الروحانيين, ثم إن توصف النبوه ما هى, و الوحى كيف هو و كيف يكون, ثم, ما يوصف به الموت والحياه الاخره, والسعاده التى يصير اليها الإفاضل و الإبرار والشقإ الذىيصير اليه الإراذل و الفجار فى الحياه الاخره. والضرب الثانى ما يوصف به الإنبيإ والملوك الإفاضل و الروسإ الإبرار و إئمه الهدى والحق الذين توالوا فى الزمان السالف, واقتصاص ما اشتركوا فيه والذىاختص به كل واحد من إفعال الخير, و ما آلت اليه إنفسهم وإنفس من انقاد لهم واقتدى بهم من المدن والإمم فى الاخره, و ما يوصف به الملوك الإراذل والروسإ الفجار المتسلطون من إهل الجاهليه وإئمه الضلال الذين كانوا فى الزمان السالف, واقتصاص ما اشتركوا فيه و ما اختص به كل واحد من إفعال الشر, و ما آلت اليه إنفسهم و إنفس من انقاد لهم واقتدى بهم من المدن والإمم فى الاخره, و ما يوصف به من فى الزمان الحاضر من الملوك الإفاضل و الإبرار وإئمه الحق, و ذكر ما شاركوا فيه من تقدمهم و ما اختص به هولإ من إفعال الخير; و ما يوصف به الروسإ الفجار و إئمه الضلال وإهل الجاهليه الذين فى الزمان الحاضر, واقتصاص ما شاركوا فيه من تقدم و ما اختصوا به من إفعال الشر و ما توول اليه إنفسهم فى الاخره. و ينبغى إن تكون الصفات التى توصف بها الإشيإ التى تشتمل عليها آرإ المله صفات تخيل الى المدنيين جميع ما فى المدينه من الملوك والروسإ والخدم و مراتبهم و ارتباط بعضهم ببعض و انقياد بعضهم لبعض و جميع ما يرسم لهم ليكون ما يوصف لهم من تلك مثالات يقتفونها فى مراتبهم وإفعالهم. فهذه هى الارإ التى فى المله.

In the virtuous religion, the doctrines it contains are of two fundamental kinds: some pertain to theoretical matters, while others relate to volitional or practical matters. The theoretical doctrines include what is said regarding God, the Exalted—His attributes, names, and descriptions—as well as what is affirmed about the spiritual beings, their hierarchical ranks, their states in relation to themselves, their positions in proximity to God, and the actions carried out by each one of them. This also includes an account of the origin of the world, the qualities attributed to it, the parts that comprise it, and the order of those parts. Furthermore, it explains how the first bodies came into being, and how among them are those bodies that serve as the foundational sources of all other bodies that are later generated and then perish. It details how these secondary bodies emerged from the primary ones, their order and hierarchy, and how the elements of the world are interconnected and arranged in harmony. All things that take place within the world, according to these doctrines, are manifestations of justice and are devoid of injustice. The doctrines also describe the relationship between each created thing and both God and the spiritual beings.

Additionally, the doctrines explain the constitution of the human being, the emergence of the soul in the human, the nature and level of the intellect, its rank in the cosmos, and its position in relation to God and the spiritual beings. It also includes an exposition on prophecy: what it is, the reality of revelation, how it occurs, and the manner in which it is received. It discusses what is said about death, the afterlife, and the happiness to which the virtuous and the righteous ultimately arrive, as well as the wretchedness that awaits the ignoble and the wicked in the afterlife.

The second category consists of practical or volitional doctrines. These include descriptions of the prophets, the virtuous kings, the righteous rulers, and the rightly guided Imams of truth who lived in ages past. It recounts the common actions of goodness that united them, what each was uniquely known for, and the final state of their souls—and the souls of those nations and cities that followed and emulated them—in the next world. It similarly addresses the corrupt kings, the wicked rulers, and the misguided leaders of the pre-Islamic era and earlier times. Their evil actions are recounted, both what they shared and what each did uniquely, as well as the ultimate fate of their souls and of those who submitted to them and adopted their path.

The same is done for present-day figures: it includes what is said of today’s virtuous kings, righteous rulers, and Imams of truth—what they share with their predecessors and what distinguishes them in their acts of virtue—as well as present-day tyrannical rulers, wicked leaders, and the people of ignorance, analyzing both their shared and unique evil actions and the end that awaits their souls in the hereafter.

The descriptions used for all these matters—whether regarding theoretical truths or models of conduct—must be crafted in such a way that they imprint in the minds of the citizens a vivid and imaginative understanding of the city, its kings, leaders, servants, and the ranks they occupy. They must capture how all members of the city are related to and follow one another, with all social roles and functions portrayed through images and examples that serve as practical models for citizens to imitate in their positions and behaviours. These, then, are the doctrines that constitute the content of the virtuous religion.

Let us examine the statement: “Indeed, the views found in the virtuous religion concern either theoretical objects or volitional objects.” The views within the Virtuous Religion —that is, the true religion, one derived from divine revelation and entrusted to the Prophet—are categorized into two parts. Some pertain to theoretical matters, which deal with the nature of things as they are, and others to volitional matters, that is, matters related to willful human action. In other words, the realities discussed in the virtuous religion are of two types: either they describe the structure of existence (i.e., theoretical objects), or they concern human behaviors and acts that come into being through the exercise of will. This is a foundational division. At times, we are concerned with describing things as they exist—the realm of theory. At other times, we concern ourselves with behavior—that is, volitional objects that only exist when enacted through human will. These are what we call actions. Thus, the division of things into theoretical and volitional forms the basic structure of discourse within the virtuous religion.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Views and Worldview

The first division involves views related to theoretical objects, which are also referred to as theoretical philosophy. In this realm, be it in philosophy or the teachings of the virtuous religion, what topics are discussed under this first category?

1. Describing the Exalted Truth (God)

The first topic is “the theory concerning what God—the Exalted—is described with”. Farabi enumerates topics found in the first section of the virtuous religion’s discourse: namely, the descriptions related to the Divine. This includes all the attributes with which God is described: affirmative attributes (ṣifāt thubūtiyyah), negative attributes (ṣifāt salbiyyah), those pertaining to His essence, and those pertaining to His acts. This forms the foundational theological discourse.

2. Describing the Spiritual Beings (Intellects)

The second topic begins with “then what the spiritual beings are described with, and their ranks”. After discussing the attributes of God, the discourse turns to the immaterial beings, often referred to as spiritual beings (rūḥāniyyūn) or intellects (ʿuqūl), sometimes also described as angels. The discussion addresses what these beings are, what characteristics they have, and the different levels or ranks among them.

There are three areas of inquiry regarding these immaterial entities:

1. Their own essence: This involves examining their reality as such—beings that are immaterial, not connected to matter—and the characteristics that pertain to them in themselves.

2. Their proximity to God: The second line of inquiry concerns their relation to the Divine. Since these beings exist in a hierarchical order, some are closer to God while others are more distant. This recalls the ten intellects in Peripatetic philosophy, where each level of intellect or angel differs in rank. Some angels are more exalted than others, and this hierarchical proximity to the Divine is a subject of philosophical-theological analysis.

3. Their function in the cosmos: The third area of inquiry concerns the roles that these spiritual beings play in the created order. What responsibilities are assigned to each of them? What role does ʿIzrāʾīl (the Angel of Death) fulfill? What is the duty of Isrāfīl (the Angel of the Trumpet)? Each of these beings has a function within the system of creation.

Thus, after discussing the description of the Divine, the discourse turns to immaterial beings in three respects: their inner essence, their rank and relation to God, and their specific function in creation. As Farabi puts it: “then what the spiritual beings are described with, and their ranks, in their essence (fī anfusihim), in their stations (fī manāzilihim) from God the Exalted, and in the action of each one of them (fī fiʿl kull wāḥid minhum)”—that is, what task each of these beings or angels fulfills in the cosmic order. The structure is clear: first, the Divine; then, the immaterial intelligences.

3. Description of the World and Its Features and Levels

“Then the state of the world and what the world is described with.” After addressing the existence of the world, we are dealing with a complete coming-into-being (kawn tāmm). The discussion now shifts to the existence of the world itself—meaning that everything besides God has actualized—and to the levels of beings lower than the spiritual entities. “And what the world is described with” refers to the attributes of the world, which is of course lower than the intellects and the angels. What descriptions apply to it? From the perspective of contingency, from the various levels of dependence on matter, there is the soul, there is matter, and similar matters. “And its components”—what are the parts of the world? For example, this world in which we live: what different parts does it consist of? In the terminology of the past, there are spheres (falak), elements (ʿunṣur), and so on. “And the ranks of its parts”—even these parts of the world have levels. For example, minerals are among the parts of this world, plants are part of this world, animals are part of this world, and each of these has levels. There are minerals, plants, animals, humans, and then the levels that exist within the human being himself. This, too, is a subject within the study of the world.

The continuation of our discussion about the world is: “and how the first bodies came into being.” The phrase “al-ajsām al-awwal” refers to the first bodies—how did these primary bodies come into being? Here, the discussion turns to the simple elements (ʿanāṣir basīṭah), from which the compound bodies emerge, and the spheres, too, actualize from them. “And that among the first bodies are bodies which are the sources of the rest of the bodies”—among these first bodies that have come into being, there are those which are the origin of all other bodies, meaning that the other bodies are formed from them. In essence, this indicates that some of these are simple substances, and some are composite, made up of those simple substances. Among the topics relevant to cosmology is: “then those which are formed first and are then nullified.” Among these very bodies, there are some that come into being and are subsequently destroyed. Some bodies are of this nature.

It seems that Farabi is alluding to the view that among bodies, there are some that “come into being first and then perish”—such as the celestial spheres—which are eternal, while the simple elements are not of this kind. “And how the other bodies came to be from those that are the principles of the bodies”—how do the other bodies emerge from those primary bodies which are their sources? In other words, how are composites generated from the simple elements? “And the levels of these”—what are the levels among these composites? This is also a matter discussed in cosmology.

The Question of the Interrelation of the World’s Parts

“And how”—this is another chapter in the understanding of the created order, namely, how things are connected in the system of creation? What is the coherence among the components of creation? “And how”—again, among the issues discussed in the Virtuous Religion is the question: “and how the things contained in the world are connected to each other and their organization.” The entities that the world encompasses, those which constitute this created system—how are they interrelated, and what kind of order binds them together?

Justice In the Creation and Ordering of the World

Again, among the issues we must recognize—among the theoretical positions taken by the religion of the virtuous religion—is the question of justice in the act of creation and in the cosmic system: “and that everything which occurs within it is justice, not injustice.” One of the fundamental principles is that everything that takes place in the order of creation is just; there is no injustice in this system. In fact, this is the same major philosophical discussion surrounding divine justice in the natural order. One of its corollaries is the proposition that no evil exists in this system. In this context, the term “injustice” includes what we call “evil.” This, too, is among the essential topics in understanding the world.

How the Various Levels of Beings Relate to God and to the Immaterial Beings

Another issue we find in the virtuous religion is: “and how each of these is related to God, the Exalted, and to the spiritual beings”—each of these things, or rather, each of the levels of beings, what relation do they have with God, and what relation do they have with the spiritual beings, that is, the angels and the intellects—those who govern the affairs of the world and carry out divine management? Understanding the connection between these created beings and the Exalted God, and their connection with the spiritual beings, the immaterial ones, the angels—this too is a topic. These are all matters pertaining to cosmology.

If we wanted to divide it broadly, the first topic is about God, the Exalted; the second topic is about the immaterial beings and angels; and the third is about the structure of the world, which itself includes many complex and diverse issues that have been listed. These are the three main discussions.

4. The Nature of the Human Being and Its Qualities

The fourth topic concerns the human being: what is the human being? What is the reality of the human being? What characteristics does the human soul possess? What are the features and properties of the intellect in the human being? How far can the human being ascend through the intellect? The phrase “thumma kawn al-insān” (then the being of the human) refers to a discussion about the existence, nature, and reality of the human being. “Wa ḥuṣūl al-nafs fīhi” refers to the fact that the soul is present within the human. The human is distinct from both the angels—who are immaterial—and from purely material beings. The human possesses both soul and spirit. “Wa al-ʿaql”—this phrase is grammatically connected (ʿaṭf) to the previous one about the soul. Thus, the full expression “kawn al-insān wa ḥuṣūl al-nafs fīhi wa ḥuṣūl al-ʿaql” means: the being of the human, the presence of the soul within him, and the presence of the intellect. We are now interpreting “the intellect within the human”—that is, we are discussing that power within the human which allows for cognition. Earlier, he had discussed the immaterial intellects and their levels (in the section on spiritual beings), but here we are speaking of a different intellect—the rational faculty within the human being, not the separate immaterial intellects or angels.

Then comes the next phrase: “wa martabatuhu min al-ʿālam wa manzilatuhu min Allāh wa min al-rūḥāniyyīn”—this refers to the level and status of the human intellect within the order of creation, in relation to God, and in relation to the immaterial spiritual beings. As was discussed earlier, intellect has levels. So this particular intellect within the human—what status does it occupy in the hierarchy of existence? What relationship does it have with God? What relationship does it bear to the angels and other immaterial beings? This touches on the classic philosophical discourse on the “active intellect” (ʿaql faʿʿāl), and its link with human cognition and prophecy.

5. Prophethood and Revelation and Its Modality

From here, the anthropology discussion leads us naturally into the topic of prophethood, which is the next chapter: “thumma an tuwaṣaf al-nubuwwah mā hiya”—then, prophethood is to be described: what is it? What is its essence? “Wa al-waḥy kayfa huwa”—what is the nature of revelation? “Wa kayfa yakūn”—and how does it occur? In other words, there are two separate discussions regarding revelation: the first, “kayfa huwa”, addresses the essence of revelation—what is it, in its nature? The second, “kayfa yakūn”, asks: how does revelation come into being, how is it actualized? The first is essentially an epistemological inquiry—how can we know what revelation is? The second examines the metaphysical conditions under which revelation actually takes place. Both belong to the discourse on prophethood.

Thus, the sequence so far is: a discussion of God, then the immaterial beings, then the cosmic order, followed by human beings, and then prophethood and revelation.

6. Resurrection and the Afterlife

One further subject remains within these theoretical discussions: the matter of the Hereafter. What is death? What is life in the hereafter? What kind of felicity awaits those who attain salvation? What kind of wretchedness befalls those who are condemned in the next world? This concludes the chapter on theoretical knowledge.

The original phrasing is: “thumma mā yūṣafu bihi al-mawt wa al-ḥayāt al-ākhirah wa al-saʿādah allatī yaṣīru ilayhā al-afāḍil wa al-abrār”—then, the matter of death is to be described, along with the life of the hereafter, and the felicity that the virtuous and the righteous attain. What kind of felicity is this? On the opposite end, there is the discussion of: “wa al-shaqāʾ alladhī yaṣīru ilayhi al-arādhil wa al-fujjār fī al-ḥayāt al-ākhirah”—and the misery to which the vile and the wicked are consigned in the afterlife. What is the nature of this misery?

These discussions all pertain to the worldview and to understanding the totality of the order of existence—from origin to return (maʿād). It covers both the origin and the end, and, in between, the matters of existence, the world, and the nature of the human being.

There are some further notes here that I will set aside for now. I will compile them for you at the end and present them in summary form.

Chapter Two: Our Knowledge of Human Beings

In contrast to the previous discussions—which pertain to understanding the reality of the order of existence from its origin to its end—there is another chapter presented in the virtuous religion, and this second part is concerned with the kind of knowledge we possess about human beings. However, this is not philosophical knowledge of the kind discussed in the previous chapter, such as the section on “the nature of the human being, the presence of the soul, and the intellect.” That earlier discourse was philosophical, aiming to delve into maʿrifat al-nafs—the metaphysical understanding of the soul. Here, by contrast, the focus is not on the abstract essence of the human being but rather on the human being as a social and historical entity. It is this kind of human being that we seek to understand.

Human beings throughout history have displayed a great variety. Some individuals have been prophets and divine messengers, or virtuous rulers and rightful leaders, and on the opposite end, others have been false leaders, tyrants, and misguided figures. Some of these figures belong to the past, while others are still present today. To know these individuals—their lives, their influence, and the transformations that have occurred across history—is also a vital part of religious discourse. Just as we find in the Qur’an an abundance of verses recounting these stories—for example, the story of Pharaoh, of Musa, or of Bani Isra’il —these narratives constitute an essential aspect of our religious knowledge.

In this section, the kinds of opinions under discussion are those that pertain to volitional and active realities—what these individuals did. We aim to understand their actions, not to determine what we ought to do (that will be discussed later). This is about their deeds and how they shaped human history.

Part One: Topics Related to Prophets and Virtuous Leaders

1. The Attributes of the First Ruler in the Virtuous City

The second category of opinions recognized in the virtuous religion is divided into several parts. First, we wish to understand the attributes of the ruler within the virtuous city: what characteristics and traits do such leaders possess? The text states: “mā yūṣaf bihi al-anbiyāʾ wa al-mulūk al-afāḍil wa al-ruʾasāʾ al-abrār wa aʾimmat al-hudā wa al-ḥaqq alladhīna tawālū fī al-zamān al-sālif”—we wish to study the prophets, the noble kings, the righteous leaders, and the Imams of guidance and truth who appeared successively in previous times. This entails a kind of historical reflection—an examination of past figures who led with virtue and divine guidance.

2. Common and Unique Traits of Virtuous Leaders

The second matter discussed in this section is: “wa iqtiṣāṣ mā ishtarakū fīhi wa alladhī ikhtaṣṣa bihi kull wāḥid min afʿāl al-khayr”—that is, we must identify both the common attributes shared by these prophets and leaders and also what was unique to each one in terms of virtuous action. The aim is to analyze and articulate the specific characteristics that were collectively shared by all prophets and just leaders—for instance, divine guidance, moral integrity, and, as some Qur’anic verses state, infallibility. At the same time, we examine the distinctive roles and missions of each figure—what made Prophet Ibrahim distinct, or Prophet Nuh, or Prophet ʿIsa? The Qur’an itself distinguishes these roles and highlights their differing missions. This differentiation constitutes the second dimension of this inquiry.

3. The Outcome and Afterlife of Prophets and Their Followers

The third element is stated as: “wa mā ālat ilayhi anfusuhum wa anfus man inqāda lahum wa iqtadā bihim min al-mudun wa al-umam fī al-ākhirah”—that is, what was the ultimate fate of these prophets and the communities and individuals who followed and emulated them, across different cities and nations, in the Hereafter? Ultimately, these individuals and communities had an end, a final destination. What was the consequence of their actions? What was their status and outcome in the next life?

To summarize the breakdown of this second category, we can list its three components:

(a) mā yūṣaf bihi al-anbiyāʾ – the descriptions and attributes of prophets and virtuous leaders;

(b) iqtiṣāṣ mā ishtarakū fīhi wa alladhī ikhtaṣṣa bihi kull wāḥid – the shared and distinct traits of their virtuous actions;

(c) mā ālat ilayhi anfusuhum wa anfus man inqāda lahum… fī al-ākhirah – their end and the fate of their followers in the afterlife.

Together, these three dimensions allow for a complete portrait of how the virtuous leaders of the past were understood, what moral and practical legacies they left, and how their actions resonated in both worldly and eschatological terms.

Second Discussion: Concerning the Corrupt Leaders and People of Misguidance and Ignorance

In contrast to the previous chapter, there is a subsequent chapter titled “and what is said about the base kings (al-mulūk al-arādhil)”—this comes directly as the counterpart to the earlier phrase “what is said about the prophets and the virtuous kings”. Here, it reads: “and what is said about the base kings, the wicked rulers, the tyrannical leaders from the people of ignorance, and the imams of misguidance who held power in former times.” Just as we earlier sought knowledge about the prophets and rightful leaders of the past, now, in this next section, we must come to know the base kings and wicked leaders—those tyrants and transgressors who, being from the people of ignorance, were the imams of misguidance and had power and authority in past ages.

Following this, the text continues: “and an account of what they shared in common, and what was specific to each one of them in their evil actions”—this is the second part. Then, “and what became of their souls and the souls of those who followed them”—that is the third part.

Just as the first discussion about the prophets and divine leaders had three focal points—the knowledge of their person, the knowledge of their common and distinguishing traits, and the knowledge of their ultimate outcome in the hereafter—so too does the discourse on corrupt leaders contain three discussions:

The first: “what is said about the base kings”—their descriptions, characteristics, and traits.

The second: “an account of what they shared in common, and what was specific to each one”—that is, the common qualities and distinguishing aspects among the wicked rulers.

The third: “and what became of their souls”—their final end, the outcome of their affairs, their fate, and that of their followers—those who imitated them or adhered to their leadership—from the people of the cities and various nations. “What became of them in the hereafter”—what was their fate in the world to come?

This, then, is the second discussion: first the prophets and rightful leaders, and then the corrupt and wicked rulers.

Third Discussion: The Attributes of the Righteous and the Wicked Leaders in the Present Age, Their Commonalities, Distinct Features, and Ultimate Outcomes

We now continue with the third discussion. In the previous two discussions, we addressed matters related to the former times—both the prophets in former times and the corrupt rulers in former times. Now, in this third chapter, the discussion pertains to the present age. The text introduces this with the phrase: “and what is said about those in the present time among the virtuous kings, the righteous, and the imams of truth.” The same three elements discussed in each of the previous topics will be repeated here—namely, recognition of their person, identification of their common and distinctive traits, and knowledge of their ultimate end. Of those we discuss in the present era, some are among the virtuous kings, and some are among the wicked leaders. Thus, as there were six discussions before—three pertaining to the prophets of the past and three about the corrupt leaders of the past—there will be six here as well: three for the righteous individuals who lead today, and three for the unworthy individuals who have attained leadership today, making a total of twelve discussions overall.

The text states: “and what is said about those in the present age among the virtuous kings, the righteous, and the imams of truth; and an account of what they share with their predecessors and what is distinctive to them in their good actions.” That is, these virtuous leaders and imams of truth—how do they resemble their predecessors? And what are their distinguishing characteristics? Then, “and what is said about the wicked leaders, the imams of misguidance, and the people of ignorance.” You will note here that the author does not explicitly bring up the final end of these individuals in this phrasing, but immediately transitions to the next section, which concerns the corrupt leaders and imams of misguidance in the present age. These individuals, too, must be understood. The author proceeds with “an account of what they share with their predecessors”—that is, what common traits do the imams of misguidance in our own time share with those who came before? “And what is distinctive to them”—what are the specific features that set this current generation of corrupt leaders apart? Both their shared and distinctive traits “from among the evil actions, and what their souls will return to in the Hereafter”—in other words, what fate awaits them in the world to come?

This is the collection of discussions that the author brings forth in this section. As you can see, the central focus is on leaders—both virtuous and base—exploring these various dimensions. Now, the author adds an important point: “And it is necessary that the qualities used to describe the things encompassed by the views of the ‘mil–la’ (divinely-guided community) should be such that they conjure in the minds of the citizens everything within the city—from the kings and leaders, to the servants, their ranks, the interrelations between them, the submission of some to others, and all that is ordained for them—so that what is described for them may become, through these representations, patterns they follow in their ranks and actions. These are the doctrines within the mil–la.”

In this concluding section, Farabi emphasizes that all the various human traits that exist among people must be comprehensively and holistically understood. That is, the citizens—all the people living within the city—must be aware of everything within the city. Not only should they know the kings and leaders, but also “the servants and their ranks, and the interrelations between them.” Everyone who is part of this system, this societal order, has some form of connection with leadership. Some individuals submit to others. There are norms and customs that exist between them. All of this must be recognized—how the system of governance works, the interactions among rulers, their conduct—all must be known.

“So that what is described for them from these representations may become models they follow in their ranks and actions.” That is, we must have a precise understanding of the past so that today, from those past descriptions and the knowledge we have inherited, we may extract exemplars and models to emulate. We are in need today of reaching such a roadmap—a pattern of guidance—based on historical insight.

The phrase “so that what is described for them from these representations”—pay attention to the grammatical structure here: the descriptions and historical data are to become for us representative models. That is, they should serve as exemplars and patterns: “so that what is described for them from these, becomes representations”—not “those representations,” as if already known or fixed. “Those” refers to historical descriptions and information, which are to become examples for us—models to be followed: “that they may follow them in their ranks”—so that they may draw upon these examples in various aspects of their lives and actions. And we are in need of precisely such insights.

Thus, we must not be content with abstract philosophical or metaphysical knowledge alone. Rather, we must study the social realities and diverse historical transformations that have taken place throughout time in order to find a path for our own lives today. These are the doctrines that exist within the mil–la. That is, religion offers human beings such insights: just as it gives us awareness about the order of creation and divine laws, so too does it provide us with awareness regarding historical transformations. Through this knowledge of history, we are able to discover models for our own lives, based on those prior experiences, to draw lessons from past history, and to derive admonitions and insights.

Reflections on Farabi’s Discussion on Religious Worldview and the Doctrines of the Mil–la

Now that we’ve read through the full passage, and you are likely feeling fatigued, I will now offer some reflections on key points contained within the text. Some of what is discussed pertains to interpretive ambiguities or possible differences in reading certain phrases, but I will not dwell on those here. What matters is the core content. While it is true that certain sentences could be read differently or rendered with alternative meanings, such variations do not result in any significant divergence in substance. For example, on page 45, line five, we encountered the phrase: “ثم کون الإنسان و حصول النفس فیه و العقل و مرتبته من العالم و منزلته من الله و من الروحانیین”—one of the theoretical issues addressed within the millah is the nature of the human being, and the way the soul comes to be realized in the human, along with the intellect. The phrase “و مرتبته” we read as referring back to the intellect (i.e., its rank), but one could just as easily return the pronoun to the human being himself. That is, the discussion involves the human being, the realization of the soul and intellect within him, his rank within the cosmos, and his station in relation to the Divine and to the spiritual beings. My point is that while there may be small differences in how one reads certain details, they do not affect the broader arguments being advanced here, and so I will not fixate on these minor divergences.

First Point: Two Questions on Farabi’s Theology and His Maximalist View of Religion

A broader point arises from this discussion, which is that Farabi is here offering his own definition and conception of the virtuous religion. Specifically, he presents an account of what religion entails. This is, in essence, Farabi’s religious epistemology. In the first section, religion is presented in a descriptive fashion—covering the realities embedded within the created order and those within the human being and his actions. What we see is that Farabi takes a highly expansive approach to religion; in contemporary terms, one could say he adopts a maximalist conception of religion and interprets it accordingly.

However, this gives rise to two important questions regarding Farabi’s view. These are not questions that can be resolved by the passage itself; they require recourse to Farabi’s other philosophical foundations.

First Question: Can a Maximalist View of Religion Be Universally Applied to All Religious Traditions?

The first question is this: Farabi appears to take a single, fixed view of what religion is, and when he discusses the virtuous religion, he does not appear to be referring solely to Islam. Instead, he puts forth a rational discourse on religion and revelation that seems to encompass all prophets and divinely-revealed traditions. If that is the case, can we then say that this expansive, maximalist conception of religion is in fact applicable to all heavenly traditions? That is: can we truly demonstrate that the religion of Abraham included all the detailed components listed here? Or that Moses’ tradition incorporated every one of these metaphysical and cosmological elements? How can such a claim be proven?

There are two possible approaches:

1. Rational Demonstration: One could attempt to construct a rational argument showing that in every virtuous religion, these elements must necessarily be present. That is, one would try to prove, philosophically, that the nature and roles of angels, their ranks, and their specific responsibilities must be clearly explained in every divinely-revealed tradition. Or that every aspect of the cosmos—including its simple and composite elements and their interactions—must be laid out within these religious teachings. But can this really be proven? It seems rather difficult. Farabi, at most, affirms that final human happiness requires divine revelation. But are all these detailed descriptions that he offers here necessary for the attainment of final happiness in all times and places? Are all prophets therefore obliged, as a rational necessity, to provide such exhaustive metaphysical descriptions? That conclusion does not appear to follow clearly from reason alone.

2. Historical-Comparative Analysis: The second approach would be to examine the historical data and teachings of previous virtuous religions—such as the traditions of Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus—and attempt to demonstrate that the elements Farabi enumerates here are indeed shared among them as common principles. Yet even this route appears closed to us, because we simply lack the detailed knowledge of these past religious communities. Of course, the Qur’an confirms the legitimacy of past virtuous mil–las and divine scriptures, and implies that there was a certain level of harmony among them. But whether the precise teachings described in the Qur’an or in Farabi’s writings fully existed in those earlier traditions is another matter. Based on the historical texts we currently have access to, we cannot conclusively prove this. For that reason, the most we can do is affirm that a certain minimum set of teachings—those essential for human salvation at any time—can be rationally affirmed to exist within every virtuous religion. But beyond this minimal core, the broader scope of content remains uncertain. We cannot make sweeping claims about the universality of these elements unless the Qur’an explicitly affirms their presence in prior communities.

Second Question: Ambiguity in Whether Religion Encompasses Cosmological Theories of Creation, Elements, and Bodies

The second question that arises is this: Even setting aside previous virtuous religion, and turning our attention now to Islam—where we have at our disposal a definitive revealed text—it should, in principle, be easier to assess the scope and content of religion. But now the issue is this: of all the things Farabi has listed in his exposition, can all of them truly be considered part of religion? Have all these matters been clarified within our sacred text, the Qur’an? Did the Messenger of God (p) explain all of these issues?

For example, Farabi begins with a description of God the Exalted, then proceeds to describe the angels from various angles, then moves on to the cosmos, its parts, and their ranks. He includes questions such as: “How did the primary bodies (al-ajsām al-awwal) come into being?”—a discussion that past philosophers connected to the simple elements (like fire, water, air, earth) and the celestial spheres (aflāk), all of which they regarded as primary bodies. Then comes the claim: “From these primary bodies are derived those bodies which are the principles of all other composite bodies.” So there exist simple elements that serve as the primary matter for all elemental composites. But now the question is: Can we, based on the textual sources we have that are definitively connected to revelation, ascertain what these primary elements were? And how did the composites come into existence from them?

Consider, for instance, the Qur’anic statements that everything was created from water, or the verse “then He turned to the heaven while it was smoke”—what exactly does this “smoke stage” refer to in the order of creation? Do these stages correspond to what the philosophers describe regarding the emergence of simple elements or the spheres? Is there complete concordance between these philosophical theories and the Qur’anic cosmology?

It seems that Farabi is operating here under the influence of a philosophical system—one inherited from the Greeks—which he adopts as a framework and uses to assert that revelation must clarify such matters. Thus, he moves forward and mentions, for example, that in the celestial spheres there is no tearing or mending, but among the elemental bodies, change and corruption occur—“then those which first come to be, also pass away”—meaning that composite elements are perishable, unlike the eternal spheres.

He continues: “And how the other bodies came into existence from those which are their principles.” Farabi asserts that religion must explain all of this. But if religion is indeed responsible for explaining such matters—or even if we say that religion has explained them—can we truly extract these details from the revealed texts? That is one problem. Secondly, is the nature of such subjects even religious? Does the human being require revelation and prophets to come and explain the number of elements, their types, and how they combine—whether based on classical natural philosophy or modern science? Must religion bear the responsibility of detailing such matters?

These are not trivial questions—they remain opaque to us even today. It appears that the particular philosophical system Farabi believed in has shaped his portrayal of the content of religion in ways that are tailored to match that very system.

Second Observation: The Problem of Including Present-Day Rulers Among the Scope of Religious Judgment

A second important issue arises here. When Farabi transitions to the second section—where he describes the prophets and virtuous rulers (mulūk al-afāḍil)—he then proceeds to describe the base rulers (mulūk al-arādhil) and the imams of misguidance from previous times. This makes sense: in the Qur’an, there are verses about past prophets and tyrants—such as Pharaoh, Nimrod, and others—so we have some textual familiarity with them.

But then he adds: “and those in the present time who are described among the virtuous rulers and the righteous, and the imams of truth, mentioning what they share with their predecessors and what they are uniquely characterized by in terms of virtuous acts. Likewise, those who are described among the wicked leaders, the imams of misguidance, and the people of ignorance who exist in the present era.” He continues by asserting that religion must offer a clear portrayal of contemporary rulers—both the virtuous and the depraved.

Certainly, it is true that we must come to recognize the rulers of our own time, in order to discern our obligations regarding cooperation with them, or avoidance, or even resistance. This is a sound principle. However, to claim that the explanation and identification of such figures in every era is the task of religion—that it was the role of religion in the time of the Prophet (p), and continues to be its role in every later era—this is a very difficult assertion to prove. In my view, one cannot establish such a claim so easily or comfortably.

Third Point: Ambiguities in Farabi’s Wording—Is Religion Responsible for Proving God’s Existence or Merely Describing His Attributes?

These are the overarching ambiguities that exist in Farabi’s general discourse. But beyond these broader issues, we also encounter ambiguities in some of his specific phrases. Take, for example, the very sentence we read earlier: “Verily, the views contained within the virtuous religion include views regarding theoretical matters and views regarding practical matters.” He then proceeds to elaborate on the theoretical views that are part of the virtuous religion. First: those pertaining to what God the Exalted is described with. Second: those pertaining to what the spiritual beings are described with. Third: the existence (kawn) of the world.

Regarding the first category—“what God the Exalted is described with”—this refers to His attributes, whether negative (i.e., via negation) or affirmative (i.e., via affirmation), and other such descriptions. Farabi says that religion offers these descriptions. But this raises a question: does religion only engage with the attributes and names of God, or does it also concern itself with the proof of God’s existence? Is the demonstration of the Divine a concern of religion or not?

Then he moves on to “what the spiritual beings are described with,” which refers to the angels and other immaterial entities. Here too, one must ask: is religion merely describing these beings, or does it also undertake to prove their existence? Because description (waṣf) is a secondary matter—it presupposes prior establishment of existence.

When Farabi reaches the third stage, “then, the existence of the world,” the topic becomes the actual realization of the world’s existence, followed by the description of its attributes. In other words, first comes kawn al-ʿālam—the world’s coming-into-being—and then comes discussion about the features and qualities of this world.

But now the question arises: why is it that in this sequence of three, only in the third is the coming-into-being (kawn) explicitly addressed? In the first two, it is not. What difference does this signify? Could Farabi be implying that the question of God’s existence—whether God exists—belongs to a body of knowledge prior to the virtuous religion? That it falls under the purview of philosophy rather than religion? That only after we accept, via philosophy, that the world has a Creator or Source, does religion begin—and therefore, proving God’s existence is not part of religion’s role?

If this is true of the first matter, what about the second—i.e., the angels? Must their existence also be proven outside of religion? Or does Farabi intend something broader: that even the statement “God is existent” is, in fact, a description, just like saying “God is All-Knowing,” “All-Powerful,” or “Merciful.” In this view, the very assertion of God’s existence is also a form of attribution—and therefore, falls under the category of descriptions rather than proofs.

If this is what he means, then we should not confine the notion of “descriptions” merely to theological or philosophical terminologies like negative and affirmative attributes. Rather, all such statements—whether that God exists or that He is characterized by such-and-such qualities—are forms of waṣf.

These phrases of Farabi, then, are open to various interpretations and must be unpacked based on underlying philosophical foundations. That concludes our commentary on this part of the discussion.

Part Two: The Actions of the Virtuous Religion (i.e., Religious Practices)

Now we have a short amount of time left, so let’s use it to read the next portion of Farabi’s text. As we said earlier, millah fāḍilah refers to religion or a sacred tradition, and a portion of it consists of opinions or doctrines which describe certain realities. These realities might pertain to the origin of existence, the Day of Judgment, revelation and prophethood, or the fate of human beings. This entire first section was concerned with those opinions and how they describe ultimate realities.

But now we enter the second part: religion also addresses human actions. That is to say, it instructs us on what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided. This is where religion takes on a prescriptive role—it gives commands and prohibitions. It doesn’t merely tell us what is; it tells us what should be done. Hence, this part of religion moves from the descriptive to the normative, from epistemology to practice, from ontology to ethics and law.

Text of Kitāb al-Millah

و أمّا الأفعال فأوّلها الأفعال و الأقاویل التي يعظّم اللّه بها و يمجّد، ثمّ‌ التي يعظّم بها الروحانيّون و الملائكة، ثمّ‌ التي يعظّم بها الأنبياء و الملوك الأفاضل و الرؤساء الأبرار و أئمّة الهدى الذين كانوا فيما سلف، ثمّ‌ التي يخسّس بها الملوك الأراذل و رؤساء الفجّار و أئمّة الضلال ممّن سلف و تقبّح به أمورهم. ثمّ‌ التي يعظّم بها من في الزمان من الملوك الأفاضل و الرؤساء الأبرار و أئمّة الهدى و يخسّس من في الزمان من أضدادهم. ثمّ‌ من بعد هذا كلّه تقدير الأفعال التي بها تكون معاملات أهل المدن، إمّا فيما ينبغي أن يعمله الإنسان بنفسه و إمّا فيما ينبغي أن يعامل به غيره، و تعريف العدل في شيء شيء من هذه الأفعال. فهذه جملة ما تشتمل عليه الملّة الفاضلة.

Explanation and Analysis of the Text

First Category of Actions in the Virtuous Religion: Actions Related to Doctrinal Beliefs

1. Glorification of God the Exalted

In this second part of Farabi’s classification, he outlines several tiers. He begins by saying: «و أما الأفعال» — that is, the actions and deeds which are explained within the virtuous religion. «فأوّلها» — the very first among these actions to be clarified are: «الأفعال و الأقاویل التي یعظِّم اللّه بها و یُمجَّد» — the actions and utterances by which God the Exalted is glorified and praised. For example, when we perform prayer, it is an act of worship meant to magnify and honor the Lordship of God. The recitations recited during prayer are also acts of devotion directed toward God. Among these are bodily acts such as prostration, which represents the ultimate form of humility and veneration before the Divine. Thus, this first tier includes all those rituals, actions, and utterances that serve to glorify God.

2. Glorification of the Angels

The second tier is: «ثمّ التي یعظّم بها الروحانیّون و الملائکة» — that is, the actions and statements through which the spiritual beings and angels are honored. A monotheistic human being, in addition to venerating God, is also expected to show reverence to the agents of divine command — the angels and other immaterial beings (mudabbirāt al-amr) who carry out God’s orders. For instance, the taking of souls is carried out by certain angels. Hence, honoring these spiritual beings is part of the religious life. This constitutes the second category.

3. Glorification of Righteous Leaders (Divine Prophets and Imams of Guidance)

The third category pertains to the veneration of divine prophets: «ثمّ الذي یُعظّم بها الأنبیاء». What is our duty regarding the prophets? What obligations do we have towards them? «و الملوک الأفاضل و الرؤساء الأبرار و الأئمّة الهدي الذین کانوا فیما سلف» — this includes the prophets and other noble figures who lived in the past. In the Noble Qur’an, when the topic of faith is discussed, belief in God is emphasized, but so is belief in the angels and the prophets of the past. A true believer must affirm all of these together.

4. Contempt and Disavowal of Vile Leaders and Wicked Imams

Opposing the prophets and the virtuous leaders are those who are among the base kings and leaders of the wicked from the past. What is our obligation towards them? «ثم التي‌ یُخسّس بها الملوک الأراذل و رؤساء الفجّار و أئمّة الضلال ممّن سلف» — these are the leaders of misguidance from past generations. While the earlier actions were described as to glorify, here the verb is «یُخسّس», which in Arabic is the semantic opposite of «یُعظّم». It denotes belittlement and degradation. The appropriate actions in relation to these corrupt and oppressive figures include invoking curses upon them, disavowing them, distancing oneself from them. This is the meaning of «یخسّس»: to hold them in contempt, to denounce and disassociate from them. «و تقبّح به أمورهم» — that is, to find their actions blameworthy and reprehensible. This includes sayings and deeds through which we express condemnation of the corrupt ones.

5. Glorification of Virtuous Leaders and Condemnation of Corrupt Leaders in the Present Time

Another issue follows: «ثمّ التي یعظّم بها من في الزمان من الملوک الأفاضل و الرؤساء». In the third tier earlier, we spoke of venerating the prophets and noble kings «الذین کانوا فیما سلف» (those who were in the past), but here in the fifth tier, it refers to the glorification of «من في الزمان» (those in the present time) — not «فیما سلف» (those who passed). That is, those virtuous kings, righteous leaders, and Imams of guidance who live in our time. At the same time: «و یخصص من في‌ الزّمان من أضدادهم» — in contrast, here we do not glorify but خصّص, which entails vilification, cursing, and dishonoring those who are the opposites of the Imams of purity. This too must be clarified within the virtuous religion.

These, then, are our moral duties: toward God, toward the divine prophets, and toward other individuals before whom we must take either a positive or negative stance.

Second Category of Actions in the Virtuous Religion: Acts Pertaining to the Self and to Fellow Citizens in the Virtuous City

After all of the above, it becomes necessary to clarify the duties regarding actions in the virtuous religion. «ثم من بعد هذا کلّه تقدیر الأفعال التي بها تکون معاملات أهل المدن» — this refers to the acts that structure interactions among the citizens of the city, people who live together in shared society. What kinds of actions and behaviors are appropriate in their interactions with one another? These inter-human relationships within a single city must be clearly delineated in the virtuous religion — and the virtuous religion indeed does this. This legislation or ordering of actions is of two types:

First, there is the ordering of actions that relate to the individual himself — that is, obligations that one has toward oneself. For example: Can a person end his own life? Or is preserving one’s life a binding obligation? These are duties that pertain to one’s relationship with oneself. «إمّا فیما ینبغي أن یعمله الإنسان بنفسه»

The second part is: «و إمّا فیما ینبغي أن یعامل به غیره» — what actions are appropriate in relation to others? For example, what kinds of speech are permissible or impermissible in interaction with others? In economic transactions, how should trade and exchange be conducted? In the broader sense of muʿāmalāt, how should matters such as the establishment of a family or social contracts be regulated?

The Centrality of Justice in Actions and Its Definition through Religion

An even more important point is that in all of these matters, it must be clarified: within the realm of actions, what is justice? «و تعریف العدل في شيء من هذه الأفعال» — that is, in these actions, whether in relation to oneself or to others, what constitutes justice? This is a critical issue that Farabi raises here. He assigns the definition of justice to religion itself. It is evident that once you have accepted that the legislation of actions is the responsibility of religion — meaning that the permissibility or impermissibility of every action is determined by revelation conveyed through the Prophet — then, necessarily, you have also accepted that what constitutes justice in every behavior, and what contradicts it, is also to be defined through this same religious framework. The definition of justice thus falls within the scope of this virtuous religion.

«فهذه جملة ما تشتمل علیه الملّة الفاضلة» — This is the complete summary of what the virtuous religion encompasses. That is, the millah fāḍilah covers all of these dimensions — both in the realm of beliefs and in the realm of actions. The above is the list that Farabi presents as a summary of the content of the virtuous religion.

Now, you already have a sense of the structure and order of the discussions in Farabi’s Kitāb al-Millah. At the outset, Farabi discusses the concept of religion and the need for it. Then, he presents the virtuous religion, followed by an explanation of the origin of the virtuous religion — that is, revelation. And now, he has explained what the virtuous religion includes — that is, the content of this religion in terms of both doctrine and action.

In today’s session, we were able to read a greater portion of the text because the material was clearer and required less detailed elaboration. Now, what we must discuss in the next stage — God willing — is the following: Is there truly a difference between millah and dīn? Do millah, dīn, and sharīʿah differ from one another, and if so, how? After that, we will turn to the question of what relationship the virtuous religion has with philosophy. Farabi presents very serious discussions on the relation between millah and philosophy — particularly regarding the distinction between what the human intellect perceives on its own, and what the Prophet conveys through revelation. What kind of separation or correspondence can be drawn between the two? These are the topics that — with God’s permission — we will continue to explore in the upcoming sessions.

Wa al-salāmu ʿalaykum wa raḥmatullāhi wa barakātuh.