By Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Khechin^[1]

Translated by: Sayyid Burair Abbas | Reviewed, Edited, & Annotated by: Muhammad Jaffer

Introduction

Some contemporary scholars^[2] and researchers^[3] have argued that the khimār—which is the head covering—is not a religious obligation for Muslim women. Rather, it was an administrative measure imposed by the Islamic authority in the early days of Islam on free women for a specific wisdom: to distinguish free women from female slaves. Since the era of slavery has ended, and the existence of female slaves is no longer present in our time, there remains no justification for the head covering. In our opinion, this view is weak, and the evidence presented to support it lacks intellectual value. It does not hold up for long on the table of scientific research due to its fragility and its deviation from correctness in multiple aspects, as we will clarify below.

1. Endeavoring to Portray the Issue as An Area of Disagreement

To begin with, it is worth noting that the proponents of this opinion have tried to suggest that the issue is a matter of disagreement and that jurists hold two perspectives on it: some view the head covering as a religious obligation (tashrī’īi or mawlawī), while others see it as an administrative or governmental obligation (tadbīrī, ḥukūmī, or wilāyatī).^[4] By doing so, they aim to portray themselves as not contradicting scholarly consensus (ijmā’) and seek to mitigate the sheer ludicrousness of the opinion they have presented.

However, while we do not consider consensus (ijmā’) to be inherently authoritative in the context of the Qur’ān and Sunnah—and thus see no issue in contradicting it—we believe this portrayal is unfounded and lacks any precision. We have not identified anyone among the jurists who adopted the view that the obligation of the head covering is a circumstantial or administrative obligation. On the contrary, the apparent stance of all jurists is that the obligation is religious and was not a governmental prerogative.

Even if some commentators^[5] mention that the verse of the jilbāb in the Qurān—“That is more suitable that they will be known and not be abused” (Al-Aḥzāb: 59)—was revealed, according to the reasons for its revelation, to distinguish between female slaves and free women, this does not mean that we can attribute to them the claim that the ḥijāb of free women was a governmental ruling (ḥukm sulṭānī) rather than a legislative ruling (ḥukm tashrī’ī). Such a conclusion is not devoid of strangeness, farfetchedness, and attributing to these scholars what they did not say.

If you were to conclude—regardless of the weakness of this conclusion, as we will mention—from some of the narrations in this context, which distinguish between free women and female slaves, that the ruling on the head covering was an administrative ruling and not a legislative one, this does not justify attributing to those who cited these narrations in books of hadith, exegesis, or other sources that they advocate for the administrative nature of the ruling. This is especially true given that the verses and narrations indicating the legislative obligation of covering (al-sitr) are numerous. Even if a specific verse might not directly indicate that the ruling is legislative, there are other verses from which they could derive the legislative nature of the ruling.^[6]

2. Origin of the Obligation for the Covering of Women

If this has become clear, then at the outset of our discussion, we would like to remind the reader that the principle of covering for women—in contrast to exhibitionism (tabarruj)^[7] and promiscuity—is among the essential legislative requirements. This is not subject to doubt or debate by any of the Muslim jurists. Indeed, the general Muslim populace knows that Islam calls upon women to adorn themselves with modesty and chastity, and it prohibits them from immodesty and displaying their adornments, except to a specific group of people within a defined circle: their husbands, certain close relatives, and other women. This matter has its ethical and social philosophy, and it benefits women, men, and society as we have explained elsewhere.^[8] It is no secret that the Qur’an has given this issue, regardless of some of its limits and details, exceptional importance. It addresses the topic of women’s modesty in numerous Qur’anic verses—sometimes clearly and directly, and at other times indirectly:

Direct Quranic Verses:

A. The Verse of Jilbāb (Outer Garment):

“O Prophet! Tell your wives, your daughters, and the women of the believers to draw their outer garments (jalābīb) over themselves. That is more suitable so that they may be recognized and not harmed. And Allah is ever Forgiving and Merciful” (Quran 33:59). 

We will discuss this verse in detail later, God-willing.

B. The Verse Prohibiting the Display of Adornments:

“And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and guard their chastity, and not to reveal their adornments except what normally appears. Let them draw their veils (khumur) over their chests, and not reveal their adornments except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their fellow women, those bondwomen in their possession, male attendants with no desire, or children who are still unaware of women’s nakedness. Let them not stomp their feet, drawing attention to their hidden adornments. Turn to Allah in repentance all together, O believers, so that you may be successful” (Quran 24:31). 

Indirect Quranic Verses Highlighting the Principle of Modesty: 

A. The Prohibition Upon Seductive Speech:

“Do not be soft in speech, lest those with diseased hearts be tempted, but speak in a moderate tone” (Quran 33:32). 

The reasoning here is that if women are prohibited from softening their voices to avoid tempting men with diseased hearts, it follows a fortiori that they should also be prohibited from immodest adornment (tabarruj) and behaviors that provoke men. Anything a woman does which will lead to enticing men, arousing their desires, or attracting their attention is forbidden.

B. The Verse Regarding Elderly Women:

“As for elderly women past the age of marriage, who have no hope of marriage, there is no blame on them if they loosen their outer garments, provided they do not flaunt their adornments. But to remain modest is better for them. And Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing” (Quran 24:60). 

This verse addresses elderly women who no longer desire marriage, and whom men no longer desire. It permits them to relax their clothing slightly, provided they do not display adornments while emphasizing that maintaining modesty is still better for them. Logically, the removal of blame for elderly women in loosening their garments implies that there was blame prior to reaching this stage—blame rooted in the divine legislative ruling. Unfortunately, the prevailing societal attitude today contradicts the essence of this verse. We observe harsh criticism directed at elderly women if they modestly adjust their clothing, while young women are told, “There is no harm in it—you are still in the bloom of youth!”

3. The Evidence for the Obligation of Head Covering For Women

The core discussion revolves around defining the limits of the required modesty for women: does it extend to covering the head, hair, and neck, or is this not part of the obligatory covering?

The answer: The obligation to cover the head and hair is firmly established. Multiple proofs from the Qur’ān, riwāyāt, and sīrah can be cited. However, we will focus on the verse of the khimār:

“And tell the believing women to lower their gaze, guard their chastity, and not to reveal their adornments except what normally appears. Let them draw their veils (khumur) over their chests…” (Qur’ān 24:31). 

The khimār refers to the head covering^[9], and the jayb (pl. juyūb) is the neckline or chest opening. Women were commanded to “draw their khumur over their juyūb” because, in pre-Islamic Arabia, women would drape the ends of their head coverings over their shoulders, leaving their necks and upper chests exposed. The verse was revealed to correct this practice. Notably, the verse does not explicitly command women to “wear the khimār,” but rather assumes its existence as a given and instructs them to adjust it properly to cover their chests. This implies that the khimār was already recognized as a customary covering, and the verse sought to refine its use by also using it to cover the bosom.

Additionally, the latter part of the verse—”and let them not stomp their feet to draw attention to their hidden adornments”—explicitly forbids even subtle actions (like stomping feet) that might reveal hidden adornments (e.g., ankle bracelets) and attract male attention. If women are prohibited from such minor acts to avoid temptation, how much more grave would it be for them to appear in public with uncovered hair cascading over their shoulders?

In any case, no one disputes that Islam mandated the khimār for women in its early era, and Muslim women historically adhered to this. However, the claim being made is that this ruling applied only to free women and excluded female slaves. Proponents argue that the obligation for free women was an administrative or situational ruling tied to its historical context (e.g., distinguishing free women from slaves), not a permanent legislative obligation. They assert that such administrative rulings can change with time and circumstances, in contradistinction to legislative rulings which adhere to the principle: ”that which is permissible of Muḥammad will remain until the Day of Judgement, and that which is impermissible of Muḥammad will remain forbidden till the Day of Judgement.”^[10] This is the argument we will address next.

4. The Head Covering as an Administrative Ruling: Presentation and Critique

First and foremost, we must clarify—before addressing the aforementioned question—that the Qur’anic verses mandating the khimār (which includes covering the head), such as:  “Let them draw their veils (khumur) over their chests…” (Qur’an 24:31), are unrestricted and general in two ways:

1. In terms of categories of women: the ruling includes both free women and female slaves.
2. In terms of time: the ruling transcends all eras and is not limited to a specific period.

According to the widely accepted principle, the default nature of rulings is legislative.^[11] Thus, interpreting this ruling as administrative—even if hypothetically plausible^[12]—requires a contextual indicator that affirms this (qarīnah).

The same applies to the verse:  “O Prophet! Tell your wives, your daughters, and the women of the believers to draw their outer garments over themselves. That is more suitable so that they may be recognized and not harmed. And Allah is ever Forgiving and Merciful” (Qur’an 33:59).

The phrase “women of the believers” (nisā’ al-mu’minīn) is inclusive of both free women and slaves. Restricting it to free women—as some have claimed^[13]—is weak due to the lack of convincing evidence to substantiate this. This verse establishes the obligation for women to wear the jilbāb.^[14] As Shaykh al-Tūsī explains: “The term ‘jalābīb’ (pl. of jilbāb) refers to a woman’s head covering, which veils her chest and head when she goes out for a necessity.”^[15] This is further corroborated by the historical account from Umm Salamah about the circumstance of revelation for this verse:  “When the verse ‘Let them draw their outer garments over themselves’ was revealed, the women of the Anṣār emerged as if crows were on their heads due to their dark garments.”^[16]

How, then, can we justify limiting the unrestricted scope of these two verses—and others like them—to free women alone, excluding female slaves? Or, put differently: What evidence supports the claim that this ruling is time-bound rather than universal?

Proponents of this view rely on two arguments to substantiate their claim:

A. The Verse of the Jilbāb and Its Implications

Proponents of the administrative ruling claim that the verse itself—without relying on external evidence—supports their argument. They assert that the verse justifies wearing the jilbāb with Allah’s words:  “That is more suitable so that they may be recognized and not harmed”(Qur’an 33:59).  They interpret this to mean that the command to wear the jilbāb was solely to distinguish free women from female slaves, thereby protecting free women from harm.

We ask these proponents: Where in the verse itself do you find any reference to free women and slaves? The verse contains no such distinction.  Now you may ask, how then should we understand the reasoning supplied in the verse?

The answer is that the reasoning explains the command to wear the jilbāb. The intended meaning is that by wearing the jilbāb, a woman is recognized as a “chaste, devout believer,” thereby deterring harassment. Her modest attire distinguishes her from women who are not chaste or committed to modesty. The jilbāb signals her religious identity—as emphasized in the opening of the verse (“women of the believers”)—and protects her from harm.

This distinction between chaste and unchaste women existed at the time of the verse’s revelation (in Medina’s diverse society, which included devout Muslim women, hypocrites, Jewish women, and others) and persists in every era. The verse was revealed in a context wherein women faced harassment, and the jilbāb served to identify them as morally upright believers who reject indecency.

The wisdom behind the hijab is to protect women by signaling their chastity and deterring immoral behavior. This purpose remains relevant today. A man driven by unrestrained desires will target women who appear receptive to his advances, while a woman in proper ḥijāb—worn with conviction and adherence to modesty—clearly communicates her refusal to tolerate harassment. Her attire reflects her inner piety and serves as a barrier against indecent interactions.

If you were to ask young men who harass women, “Who are you more likely to target?” they would immediately respond: “Women without ḥijāb.” They perceive the ḥijāb as a deterrent, dissuading them from approaching or harassing a woman who visibly upholds her dignity.

Conclusion on the Qur’ānic verse

There is no basis in the verse itself, directly or indirectly, for the claim that head covering was meant to distinguish free women from slaves. The most contextually accurate interpretation—supported by the relationship between the ruling and its objective—is that the verse emphasizes modesty as a shield against harassment. By fully covering herself, including her head, a woman identifies herself as a chaste believer, deterring others from harming or harassing her.

B. A Critical Examination of Narrations

This is the primary basis relied upon by those who argue that the obligation of head covering is administrative or situational. The narrations used to support this claim can be divided into two categories:

The First Category: Narrations from Some Companions and Followers

We will focus on two narrations:

1. It is reported that Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb ordered female slaves to uncover their heads^[17] and would punish them if they did not.^[18] It is also reported that his female slaves would serve guests with their heads uncovered.^[19]

Even if this report is authentic, it cannot be used as evidence because it reflects ‘Umar’s personal ijtihad and opinion.^[20]  As is well known, ‘Umar had numerous ijtihādāt and according to most Islamic schools of thought, his personal opinions do not constitute binding religious evidence. Moreover, he enforced this ruling in his capacity as a ruler, not as someone implementing a specific verse or prophetic Sunnah.

2. Mujāhid ibn Jabr (21-104 AH), and possibly others, are reported to have said that the command to wear the jilbāb and khimār was intended to distinguish free women from female slaves, thereby protecting free women from harassment by immoral men. In Tafsīr al-Tabarī, Mujāhid is quoted as saying:  “Women would go out, and some immoral men would harass them on the streets. Free women were ordered to wear veils (al-qinā’) over their heads so that they would not be harassed like female slaves.”^[21]

Our Objections to This Interpretation:

First Objection:

The meaning attributed to Mujāhid or others—that the verse was meant to distinguish free women from female slaves —was not narrated from the Prophet (peace be upon him). Rather, it is his/their own personal opinion. Mujāhid and others like him do not constitute binding religious evidence. It is possible that they misunderstood the verse and assumed it aimed to distinguish free women from slaves.

Second Objection: 

In fact, we can say that these narrations, which present the mentioned reason for revelation, are rejected and invalid. Why? Because their implication is that Allah Almighty intended for free women to cover themselves to distinguish them from slaves, thereby protecting free women from harassment. This suggests—or at least implies—that the harassment of female slaves is not disliked by Allah or does not hold the same importance to Him. Alternatively, one could say that this reasoning implies that Allah is not protective of female slaves, but only of free women!

We seek refuge in Allah from such a notion and disassociate ourselves from attributing this to Allah Almighty. Harassment is unacceptable whether directed at free women or slaves. If the harassment of women necessitated the command to wear the hijab, then it should apply to both free women and slaves, not just free women. How could it be otherwise, especially when a significant number of female slaves at that time were mothers of children belonging to revered Islamic figures? In fact, several of our Imāms (peace be upon them) were the sons of female slaves. Were these women commanded to uncover their hair to distinguish them from free women, thereby allowing immoral men to harass them?!

We are astonished that proponents of this claim—or others—could attribute such a notion to the Divine Legislator. This reasoning demeans the humanity of female slaves, disrespects their dignity, and establishes an illogical and unjustified distinction between them and free women.

The Second Category: Narrations from the Ahlulbayt (a)

This category consists of narrations from the Ahlulbayt that explicitly state that female slaves were prohibited from wearing the qinā’ so that they could be distinguished from free women. These narrations are considered the most important strain of evidence for proponents of the aforementioned claim. If these narrations are authentic, they could support the interpretation presented earlier by the proponents. Below are the key narrations from this category:

The First Narration:

Reported by al-Barqī in al-Maḥāsin, from his father, from Yūnus ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, from Ḥammād ibn ‘Uthmān, from Ḥammād al-Laḥḥām, who said:

“I asked Abū ‘Abdillāh Imām al-Ṣādiq (a) about a female slave covering her head with a qinā’ while praying. He said: ‘No. My father [Imam al-Baqir (a)], if he saw a slave girl praying in a qinā’ would strike her so that free women could be distinguished from slaves.^[22]

This narration is also reported by al-Ṣadūq, from his father, from ‘Alī ibn Sulaimān al-Rāzī, from Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Naṣr al-Bazanṭī, from Ḥammād ibn ‘Uthman, from Ḥammad al-Khādim.^[23]

The Second Narration:

Also reported by Al-Ṣadūq, from his father, who said:

“Aḥmad ibn Idrīs narrated to us, saying: Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsā narrated to us, from ‘Ālī ibn al-Ḥakam, from Ḥammād al-Khādim, from Abu ‘Abdillāh Imam al-Ṣādiq (a), who said: ‘I asked him about a female slave covering her head with a qinā’ during prayer. He said: “Strike her so that free women can be distinguished from slaves.”’^[24]

The Third Narration:

Al-Shahīd al-Awwal said in Al-Dhikrā:

“’Alī ibn Ismā’īl al-Mīthamī reported in his book, from Abū Khālid al-Qammāṭ, who said: ‘I asked Abu ‘Abdillāh Imam al-Ṣādiq (a), about a female slave covering her head. He said: “If she wishes, she may do so, and if she does not wish, she may refrain. I heard my father (Imām al-Bāqir, peace be upon him) say: ‘They (female slaves) would be struck and told: Do not imitate free women.'”‘”^[25]

The Argument Based on These Narrations

The argument derived from this group of narrations can be summarized as follows: Even if the first and second narrations specifically mention prayer, it is not farfetched to say that the ruling requiring female slaves to remove their head coverings is not limited to prayer. Rather, it is general and applies outside of prayer as well, including in the presence of non-maḥram men. This generalization is supported by the universality of the reasoning provided in the narrations, such as the statement:  “so that free women can be distinguished from slaves”.

The need to distinguish between free women and slaves is not limited to prayer. The reason the question focused on wearing the qinā’ during prayer is that there was a possibility that prayer might have a special allowance for female slaves to cover their heads. This implies that female slaves were prohibited from wearing the qinā’ outside of prayer, and the narrator inquired about the ruling during prayer, as it was possible that the prohibition did not extend to prayer. The Imam’s response, however, prohibited head covering even during prayer, based on the reasoning of distinction. This is further supported by the fact that the third narration does not specifically mention prayer.

Critical Observations on These Narrations

We raise several observations regarding the use of these narrations as evidence:

First Observation: Weak Chains of Transmission 

The First Narration: Its weakness lies in the lack of reliability of Ḥammād al-Laḥḥām.^[26]

If Ḥammād al-Khādim – also mentioned in the narration of ‘Ilal – is the same as Ḥammād al-Laḥḥām, as is plausible^[27], and there has been some error in the name (due to transcription), then the issue is clear that these two narrations are unreliable. However, if he is a different person, then he is unknown (majhūl) and the narrations therefore still lack probativity.

The Second Narration:

 The reason for its weakness is the ambiguity of Ḥammād al-Khādim, as previously explained.

The Third Narration:

This narration, reported by al-Shahīd al-Awwal in Al-Dhikrā from the book of ‘Alī ibn Ismā’īl al-Mīthamī, cannot be relied upon, nor can other narrations that al-Shahid exclusively reported from al-Mīthamī’s book.^[28] This is not due to a lack of reliability of al-Mīthamī himself, as Sayyid al-Khūī has indicated.^[29] In fact, al-Mithami’s reliability is plausible because his traditions are narrated by Ṣafwān, one of the three narrators who only report from reliable sources. This is a significant indication of his reliability. Additionally, al-Mīthamī was a well-known figure, and his biography mentions that he authored books and narrations. Moreover, there is no criticism of him in historical sources, which is another sign of his reliability, as we have explained elsewhere. Furthermore, Abū Khālid al-Qammāṭ, the narrator in this chain, is also considered reliable.^[30]

The reason for not relying on this narration is that al-Shahīd al-Awwal’s chain of transmission to al-Mithami’s book is entirely unknown. If he obtained the narrations directly from the original source (as is plausible), given that these narrations are not found in other hadith sources, the question arises: What was his chain of transmission to this source? If he accessed it through wijādah (finding the manuscript),^[31] then we still do not know the condition of that manuscript or whether it is trustworthy.

Second Observation: Perhaps the Most Critical 

In summary: even if we grant the authenticity of these narrations and accept that they indicate the mentioned ruling was meant to distinguish free women from female slaves, and that the ruling applies broadly—even in the presence of non-maḥram men—where is the evidence that the obligation for free women to wear the qinā’ is not rooted in divine legislation?

This inferred conclusion is strange, as the apparent meaning of the narrations is that the ruler prohibited female slaves from wearing the qinā’ to prevent them from imitating free women. Thus, this prohibition itself should be the governmental ruling, not the obligation for free women to wear it. How, then, can one claim that obliging free women to cover their heads was merely to distinguish them from slaves, rather than being a divine legislative obligation?

There is no evidence for this claim. On the contrary, the opposite is true:

– The prohibition on female slaves from wearing the qinā’ is the governmental ruling.

– The obligation for free women to cover their heads remains a legislative ruling, unrestricted by time or context.

There is a vast difference between claiming that head covering for free women was obligatory only to distinguish them from slaves (an administrative ruling) and arguing that prohibiting slaves from wearing the qinā’ was meant to prevent them from imitating free women (as the narrations explicitly state).  Only the second interpretation aligns with the narrations, not the first.

A hypothetical objection: What you mentioned is that the governmental ruling is not to obligate the free woman to wear the headscarf, but rather to prevent the slave woman from wearing it; this is extremely farfetched. This would mean that the slave woman, in the original religious law, is obligated to wear the headscarf, but there is a sovereign prohibition that forbids her from doing so. Is it conceivable that the Imām (a) would prevent or forbid what Allah has made obligatory?

Response:

This objection can be rebutted in two ways:

1. Scholarly Opinion on Administrative Authority: Some scholars argue that a ruler has the authority to issue temporary administrative prohibitions even on matters Allah has legislated, provided they are situational and time-bound.^[32]

2. No Obligation on Slaves in the First Place: It is possible that female slaves were never obligated to cover their heads under divine law. This is supported by narrations cited by proponents of the administrative ruling, such as:

– The narration from al-Mīthamī: “If she (a slave) wishes, she may do so; if she does not, she may refrain.”

– The narration from Abū Baṣīr, who reported that Imām al-Ṣādiq (as) said:

“A boy must fast when he reaches puberty, and a girl must fast and wear the khimār when she menstruates—except for a female slave, who is not required to wear the khimār unless she chooses to. However, she must fast.”^[33]

This indicates that the legislative ruling for female slaves is optional, not obligatory. This could be understood as a legislative concession for slaves, similar to other leniencies in Islamic law for slaves and servants.^[34]

Summary:

The narrations concerning female slaves contain two key themes:

1. Prohibiting them from covering their heads.
2. Granting them the choice to do so.

This duality is the strongest evidence that the prohibition was an administrative ruling, specifically targeting female slaves to prevent them from covering their heads. Later, this prohibition was lifted, and they were given the option to cover their heads if they wished.

This is evident in the narration from al-Mīthamī, where Imām al-Ṣādiq (a)—assuming the narration is authentic—reported that his father (Imām al-Bāqir {a}) would strike female slaves for wearing the qinā’. However, Imām al-Ṣādiq(a) then granted them the choice, saying: “If she wishes, she may do so; if she does not, she may refrain.”

This indicates that the prohibition on covering their heads was a past ruling, transmitted from his father, Imām al-Bāqir (a). Imam al-Ṣādiq (a) did not enforce this prohibition in his time, suggesting that the need for distinction between free women and slaves had diminished by then.  The change in ruling over time clearly points to the fact that the earlier prohibition was a situational ruling (ḥukm ẓārfī), tied to specific historical circumstances, rather than a timeless divine obligation.

Third Observation:

Even if we accept the unrestricted applicability of these narrations in the first sense mentioned earlier—i.e., the permissibility of uncovering the head outside of prayer—we cannot extend this permissibility to the second scenario, which involves uncovering the head in the presence of non-maḥram men. While some narrations are unrestricted, others are specific and condition the permissibility of uncovering the head on the absence of non-maḥram men.

For example, consider the authentic narration from Muḥammad ibn Ismā’īl ibn Bazī’ who said:

“I asked Abū al-Ḥasan al-Riḍā (a) about slave women who have borne children (ummahāt al-awlād): Are they allowed to uncover their heads in the presence of men? He said: ‘They should cover their heads.'”^[35] This indicates that the permissibility granted by Islamic law^[36] for female slaves to uncover their heads during prayer is a form of concession for them or a devotional act (ta’abbudī) limited to its specific context.

This observation is valid. However, it might be argued that this authentic narration only establishes the obligation for ummahāt al-awlād to cover their heads, not all female slaves. The likelihood of this ruling being specific to mothers of children is very strong, as they were often closer to freedom in their status, a well-known concept in Islamic jurisprudence.

Fourth Observation:

The content of these narrations is questionable, and their interpretation must be left to the experts. The insistence on distinguishing between female slaves and free women in these narrations revolves around two possibilities:

First Possibility:

The narrations aim to establish that head covering is intended to distinguish free women from slaves, thereby protecting free women from harassment and harm by immoral men.

However, this interpretation is far from the apparent meaning of these narrations. The narrations specifically address female slaves covering their heads during prayer, a context where harassment by immoral men is unlikely. This is because female slaves would typically pray either:

1. In their master’s home (the more common scenario).
2. In mosques.

In both cases, it is unlikely that immoral men would harass them.

Second Possibility:

The narrations aim to create and reinforce a class distinction between female slaves and free women, preserving the social hierarchy between them. This is supported by the third narration, which states that female slaves were struck to prevent them from imitating free women. This implies that imitation itself is inherently disliked, not merely the consequences of free women being harassed due to a lack of distinction. Otherwise, why would female slaves be struck for covering their heads during prayer?

This meaning—creating a class distinction—is inherently contrary to the teachings of Islam, which advocate for the dissolution and eradication of such oppressive class systems. This raises suspicion about the authenticity and intent of these narrations.  Given these points, we have no choice but to reject these narrations. 

However, this observation might be countered by arguing that even if such a distinction (between free women and slaves) were proven to be intended, its purpose would neither be to protect free women from harassment nor to enforce a class divide. Instead, it would serve a third purpose – a social-organizational distinction. Uncovering the heads of female slaves would signal to others interacting with them that they are slaves—indicating they have no autonomy over their own affairs, cannot manage their possessions, and cannot consent to marriage without their master’s permission.

The claim that “class hierarchy is unrelated to the Legislator’s intent and only pertains to the actions He imposes on His servants”—and that formal distinctions in dress between free women and slaves would practically entrench an odious class reality—is weak and refutable. This is because the distinction is merely formal and superficial, not rooted in a rule that slaves must wear inferior clothing while free women wear luxurious garments. Nor does it imply, from a religious perspective, any superiority of free women over slaves in terms of divine justice, morals, or values. Considering the above, it becomes clear that the obligation for free women to cover their heads is a legislative ruling, not a governmental administrative order. This ruling remains in force, especially since its wisdom or underlying rationale (e.g., modesty, dignity, and societal harmony) persists and remains relevant across time.

5. The Exclusion of Female Slaves from the Obligation of the Khimār: Bridging Understandings

This final point of the discussion is crucial, as it sheds light on the nature of the Islamic ruling related to the khimār (i.e., whether it is legislative or administrative).  At the outset of this point, we note that proponents of the view that the khimār is a legislative obligation and not an administrative one often argue that uncovering a woman’s hair inherently provokes desires. Therefore, the obligation to cover the head cannot be situational or temporary, as the provocation of desires is a constant and enduring reality.

However, this argument has been countered with the following response:

*”If the general uncovering of a woman’s hair were truly a cause of provocation and the spread of corruption in Islamic society—and if this were the reason for obligating Muslim women to cover their hair—then the Prophet (s) and the Imams (a) would not have allowed a large number of female slaves in Muslim society to appear in public without covering their hair.”^[37]

We comment on this as follows:

First Point:

A woman’s hair is undoubtedly a source of beauty and an element of attraction for men. This is an undeniable reality, as it is something tangible. In fact, some narrations state: “Hair is one of the two beauties.”^[38] Therefore, the command to cover it serves to close a door to provocation, just as the prohibition of seclusion between unrelated men and women or the prohibition of handshaking (according to the well-known view) aims to close such doors.

Second Point: 

The command for female slaves to uncover their hair, or the permissibility granted to them to do so, does not negate the fact that hair is, in principle, an element of beauty, attraction, and provocation. However, despite this, uncovering was permitted for them due to a specific wisdom or benefit that necessitated it. This benefit or wisdom is tied to one or more of the following reasons, which may collectively or individually explain this distinction:

First Reason:

To prevent female slaves from imitating free women. This is not from the perspective of entrenching a class divide or protecting free women from sexual harassment while neglecting slaves, as both these explanations are invalid, as previously discussed. Rather, it is from the perspective of a systemic need to distinguish between the two groups (slaves and free women).

The wisdom behind this distinction—based on the legal and social considerations mentioned in the commentary on the fourth observation in the previous section—is what permitted an exception to the general rule of covering. It allowed female slaves to uncover their hair due to the specific societal and legal context of their status.

Second Reason:

The benefit of easing the burden on female slaves. Their living conditions required them to work and serve in households, including attending to guests. This necessitated that they not be secluded in private quarters, as was often the case with free women. Instead, they were constantly present amidst men and others, performing tasks such as serving food, cleaning, washing, and meeting the needs of the household’s men and women.

Female slaves were in constant motion, moving in and out of rooms, serving everyone in the household. Many of those they served—whether inside or outside the home—were not individuals for whom it was permissible to look at them (non-maḥram). Therefore, imposing on them the same strict requirements of modesty that free women were obligated to observe would have been burdensome and difficult for them. Out of compassion for their situation, the Divine Legislator granted them the concession of not covering their heads, as “He has not placed upon you in the religion any hardship” (Qur’an 22:78). 

This is similar to the view held by some Muslim jurists^[39] that a male slave of a free woman—especially if he is a eunuch or castrated —is considered her mahram and thus, it is permissible for him to look at her hair. They base this on the Qur’anic verse:  “Or those ˹bondpeople˺ in their possession” (Qur’an 24:31).  

Shaykh al-Tūsī mentioned this as a valid perspective on the issue, although he preferred the opposing view—that a male slave is not a mahram—and considered it more consistent with the general principles of the school of thought. If it is said: Did you not previously state that Allah is protective, and that His protectiveness would not allow female slaves—like free women—to uncover their hair? How, then, does this concession for female slaves align with His protectiveness?

Response: What we objected to earlier, based on Allah’s protectiveness, was not merely the permissibility for female slaves to uncover their hair. Rather, it was the implication that only free women were obligated to wear the khimār to protect them from harassment by immoral men while suggesting that it was acceptable for female slaves to be harassed. There is a vast difference between these two matters.

Third Reason:

 During that era most female slaves were non-Muslims, having been brought into Muslim society through captivity. As is well known, non-Muslim women, by default, did not adhere to the khimār, especially not in the Islamic manner. It is also established that Islam allowed the People of the Book to continue practicing their own religious laws, rituals, and customs.^[40]

The principle of distinguishing non-Muslims from Muslims in dress and appearance is a well-known and discussed topic in Islamic jurisprudence, supported by numerous narrations. We have explored this issue in our book Al-Qawa’id Al-Nazima li-Fiqh Al-‘Alaqah Ma’a al-Akhbār (The Regulatory Principles of Jurisprudence on Relations with Others), which may be referenced for further details.

Based on this, the prohibition on female slaves wearing the qinā’ was not for the purpose of distinguishing them from free women or because the ḥijāb was not obligatory in Islamic law. Rather, it was to prevent non-Muslim women from imitating Muslim women. This is supported by the narration from al-Mīthamī in Dhikrā al-Shī’a by al-Shahīd al-Awwal, which states:  “They (female slaves) were struck and told: ‘Do not imitate free women.’

If the claim is accurate that “one of the conditions imposed by early Muslims on the People of the Book was that their women uncover their legs and feet to avoid imitating Muslim women,”^[41] then the matter becomes clear: the prohibition was to distinguish non-Muslim women from Muslim women and prevent them from imitating Islamic dress specific to Muslim women.

It is worth noting that we do not endorse such measures today, as we have argued elsewhere^[42] that distinguishing Muslims from non-Muslims in dress and preventing imitation is an administrative ruling, not a legislative one.

Critical Observation:

However, it must be noted that many female slaves at that time were also Muslims—either because they had embraced Islam themselves or because one of their parents had converted to Islam. According to the principle of “following the higher status of the parents”, the child’s religious status follows that of the parents. Moreover, some of the narrations mentioned earlier specifically address female slaves covering their heads during prayer, which indicates that the discussion includes Muslim female slaves.^[43]

Fourth Reason:

The temptation posed by female slaves in the early Islamic period was far less than that posed by free women. This is because the physical characteristics of female slaves—stemming either from their ethnic origins or the harsh living conditions they endured, such as poverty, hard labor, and lack of resources—prevented them from beautifying themselves or showcasing their charms.

Female slaves were constantly occupied with work and service, leaving little time or means to care for their appearance or highlight their physical attractiveness. As a result, they were generally not as alluring or provocative as free women. It is therefore reasonable that Islamic law would show leniency toward female slaves in ways it did not for free women.

Even today, despite the end of the era of slavery, we find that certain groups of working women employed as domestic helpers in households—common in many Arab and non-Arab countries—are often unveiled. Yet, due to their circumstances and living conditions, they do not generally constitute a significant source of temptation, except in specific cases and under particular conditions. However, this reasoning is not universally applicable, as beautiful and renowned female slaves entered the Islamic world during the early Islamic period, particularly with the conquests of regions known for the beauty of their women. During this time, the permissibility of female slaves uncovering their hair was a topic of discussion.

The first three reasons may not individually serve as the complete rationale for the ruling granting leniency to female slaves, such that the ruling would depend entirely on their presence or absence. Rather, it is likely that their combined effect played a role in the concession and the suspension of the primary ruling in this matter, which is the obligation to cover the head.

6. The Head Covering is The Dividing Line Between Two Behavioral Paths

At the conclusion of this discussion, it is essential to highlight a practical reality—not merely a theoretical one—which is that the head covering represents, in real-world terms, a clear boundary between two behavioral paths for women:

1. 1. 1. 1. The path of immodesty.
         2. The path of modesty and chastity.

We observe that when a woman removes her head covering, she has practically chosen the path of exhibitionism (tabarruj)—a path that descends incrementally into moral degradation. This decline does not stop at specific limits or boundaries. In our time, this degradation has reached a point where women have become objects of temptation, their bodies commodified in a “new slave market,” and their nudity, indecency, and immodesty normalized.^[44] These acts no longer provoke objection or criticism and are no longer seen as diminishing their dignity. Meanwhile, their ḥijāb and modesty are scrutinized under a spotlight, framed as evidence of the “oppression” and “enslavement” they endure!

I do not claim an absolute logical necessity between removing the head covering and full-blown exhibitionism. However, empirical reality overwhelmingly demonstrates what we might term a strong social correlation. Rarely do we find a woman who abandons her head covering remain committed to the required modesty for the rest of her body, avoiding the trap of forbidden tabarruj. Thus, it is incumbent upon researchers and jurists to consider this reality when issuing opinions on the matter. Otherwise, they risk unintentionally providing excuses for those who seek to find loopholes within religious law and its ethical dimensions.

Footnotes

^[1] An Islamic scholar and professor of advanced studies in the seminary, with multiple works, from Lebanon. The original article can be accessed here: https://tinyurl.com/2es5zhn9

^[2] This opinion was presented by some researchers and writers from Egypt, Syria, and other countries, and most recently by a Shi’ite scholar residing in Canada, by the name of Sayyid Hosseini Nassab: http://hoseini.org/mystery%20of%20hijab.pdf

^[3] TN: This line of reasoning has also been discussed by Arif Abdulhussein in his article entitled “Approaches to Female Covering in Sharia” found here: https://www.shaykharif.com/blog/hijab (cf. his section entitled “An Existential Approach to Female Covering”).

^[4] TN: A rule which is legislative/religious is one that is divinely ordained and is considered static. Meanwhile, a rule which is administrative in significance is one which was ordained by the Holy Prophet or the Imams for the sake of certain societal interests (al-maṣlaḥah) and can be changeable in accordance with social circumstances.

^[5]  See: Tafsīr al-Qummī v.2, pg.196; https://lib.eshia.ir/12015/2/196

al-Tabarsī in Jawāmi‘ al-Jāmi‘ v.3, pg.81 https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/12017/3/81; Majma‘ al-Bayān v.8, pg.181 https://lib.eshia.ir/12023/8/181

^[6] TN: An entire anthology in Arabic has been written under the supervision of Dr. Haidar Hobbollah on the topic of ḥijāb, which can be accessed here: https://tinyurl.com/29f8ecu5

^[7] In jurisprudential terms, “tabarruj” is the act of a woman displaying her beauty in a manner that is considered excessive or attracting undue attention, contrary to Islamic modesty standards. Therefore, a possible translation could be “ostentatious display of beauty” or “indecorous exhibition of charms.”

^[8] Refer to our book: Ilayki Ya Ibnati: Risālah Abawiyyah Ḥawl al-Ḥijab wa Ḥijāb al-Mawḍah.

^[9]As linguists say, Ibn al-Anbārī (d. 328 AH) mentioned in al-Ẓāhir fi Ma‘ānī Kalimāt al-Naṣṣ v.1, pg.306: “The word khimār is named as such because it covers the hair.” https://ito.lib.eshia.ir/80545/1/306

Also see: Al-Tha‘labi, Fiqh al-Lughah wa Sirr al-‘Arabiyyah pg.222.

Jurists also adopted this view. Al-‘Allama al-Hilli in Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha v.2, pg.12 said: “The khimār is a veil because it covers the head.” https://lib.eshia.ir/10075/2/12

In narrations from Ahl al-Bayt, wiping over socks and the khimār is prohibited. For example, in a narration from al-Maysar ibn Thawbān, he said: “I heard ‘Alī (peace be upon him) say: ‘The Book (Qurān) has preceded (prohibited) wiping over the socks and the khimār.'” Tafsīr al-‘Ayyāshī v.1, pg.297. https://lib.eshia.ir/12013/1/297

In contrast, Sunni narrations report that the Prophet (peace be upon him) wiped over the socks and the khimār. See: Sahih Muslim v.1, pg.231. http://lib.efatwa.ir/42175/1/231

^[10] This is a well-established principle, as documented in the authentic narration of Zurārah, where he asked Abū ‘Abdillāh (peace be upon him) about what is permissible and forbidden. He replied: “The permissible of Muḥammad (peace be upon him) is always permissible until the Day of Judgment, and his forbidden is always forbidden until the Day of Judgment; nothing else will replace it.” Al-Kāfī (v.1, pg.58). https://lib.eshia.ir/11005/1/58/19

^[11] The primacy of legislation in religious ordinance is a matter of scholarly debate, which we discussed in detail in our book Ab‘ād al-Shakhṣiyyah al-Nabawiyyah.

^[12] It is clear that governmental rulings issued by the Prophet(s) or the Imām in their capacity as governors differ from legislative rulings conveyed by the Prophet from God. Thus, there is no concept of governmental rulings for God Himself. However, divine rulings can sometimes be circumstantial or issued as specific external cases, which require supporting evidence.

^[13] Ibn Taymiyyah states: “His (Allah’s) statement: ﴾Tell your wives, your daughters, and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks over themselves﴿ is evidence that the command for ḥijāb was specifically for free women, not slave women. This is because He mentioned ‘your wives and daughters’ but did not include ‘what your right hands possess’ (slave women), nor ‘the slave women of your wives and daughters.’ Then He said: ﴾and the women of the believers﴿ excluding slave women from this designation.” Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā v.15, pg.448. https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/content/22/1616/

This argument is refuted by the fact that there is no need to restrict the general statement ﴾and the women of the believers﴿. The evidence he cited—namely the verse ﴾and they should not reveal their adornments except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their women, or what their right hands possess﴿—is inconclusive.  The specification of free women in this verse is based on specific contextual evidence and does not necessitate interpreting all references to nisā’ (women) in other contexts as exclusively free women. Many scholars, such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Karakī (Jāmi‘ al-Maqāṣid 12:33) https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/71611/12/33, al-Shahīd al-Thānī (Masālik al-Afhām 7:46) https://lib.eshia.ir/10151/7/46, and al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (Mafātīḥ al-Sharā’i‘ 2:376) https://lib.eshia.ir/86886/2/376 interpreted nisā’ inclusively as referring to all women, free and enslaved alike.

^[14] Al-Farāhīdī (d. 175 AH) defined jilbāb in Kitāb al-‘Ayn(v.6, pg.132) as: “A garment wider than the khimār but less than the ridā’, used by women to cover their heads and chests.” https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/20006/6/132

^[15] Al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qurān v. 8, pg.361. https://lib.eshia.ir/86469/8/361

^[16] In Sunan Abī Dāwūd v.2, pg.269, https://dorar.net/hadith/sharh/28337. It is narrated that when the verse was revealed, Umm Salamah reported: “The women of the Ansar came out as if crows were on their heads due to their tranquillity, wearing black cloaks.”

Tafsīr al-Qurān by al-Ṣan‘ānī v.3, pg.123. http://shiaonlinelibrary.com/%D8%A7%

^[17] In Muṣannaf ‘Abd al-Razzāq v.3, pg.135

Ibn Jurayj narrated that ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb prohibited slave women from wearing jilbāb to resemble free women. Ibn Jurayj further mentioned that ‘Umar reportedly struck ‘Aqīlah, a slave woman of Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī, for wearing a jilbāb. http://shiaonlinelibrary.com/%D8%A7%

^[18]  “‘Umar used to whip slave women who wore veils or cloaks and would say, ‘Are you trying to resemble free women?!’”  Refer to Tafsir al-Sam‘ānī v.4, pg.307

^[19] Anas ibn Malik reported: “‘Umar’s slave women used to serve us with their heads uncovered, their breasts exposed.” Al-Bayhaqi, Al-Sunan al-Kubra v.2, pg.227 https://dorar.net/hadith/sharh/116868

^[20] Al-‘Allamah al-Hilli commented in Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha v.1, pg.93 https://lib.eshia.ir/10182/1/93

on the caliph’s actions, saying: “It is permissible that his action was based on his personal reasoning.”

^[21] Al-Tabarī narrated with his chain of transmission from Mujāhid regarding the verse: “…to draw their cloaks (jalābīb) over themselves” (Al-Aḥzāb: 59), that they would cover themselves with their cloaks so that it would be known they were free women, and thus no immoral person would harm them with offensive words or suspicion. Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āyi al-Qur’ān.

He also said: Ibn Ḥumayd narrated to us, saying: Ḥakam narrated to us from ‘Anbasah, from someone who reported to him, from Abū Ṣāliḥ, who said: “When the Prophet (peace be upon him) arrived in Medina, he had no settled residence. The wives of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and other women would go out at night to relieve themselves. Some men would sit along the path to chat, so Allah revealed: ‘O Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks over themselves’ (Al-Aḥzāb: 59), meaning they should cover themselves with their cloaks so that the slave woman could be distinguished from the free woman.” Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āyi al-Qur’ān

https://quranpedia.net/book/1397/20/331

^[22] Al-Mahasin v.2, pg.318. https://lib.eshia.ir/15101/2/318

^[23] ‘Ilal al-Shara’i‘ v.2,pg.345. https://lib.eshia.ir/10107/2/345

See also Wasail al-Shi‘a v.4, pg.:411, Chapter 29, Section on the Clothing of the Muṣallī, Hadith 9

https://lib.eshia.ir/11025/4/411

^[24] ‘Ilal al-Shara’i‘ v.2, pg.345.  https://lib.eshia.ir/10107/2/345

^[25] Dhikrā al-Shi‘a v.3,pg.10. https://lib.eshia.ir/10184/3/10

^[26] This was explicitly mentioned in Al-Hada’iq al-Nadhira v.7, pg. 18 https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/10013/7/18

and explained by Sayyid al-Khūī in Mu‘jam Rijal al-Hadith 7:253. https://lib.eshia.ir/14036/7/253

^[27] Commenting on a narration from ‘Ilal in one version, the term al-lihām is used. Wasā’il al-Shīa v.4,pg.411 https://lib.eshia.ir/11025/4/411

^[28] Al-Shahīd Al-Awwal narrated several reports from al-Mīthamī that are not found in sources other than Al-Dhikrā. For example, Al-Dhikrā v.1, pg.116; v.2, pg.71 and 432. https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/10184/1/116 https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/10184/2/71

^[29] Sayyid al-Khuʾī stated: “Al-Najāshī said: ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Shuʿayb b. Maytham b. Yaḥyā al-Tammār, Abū al-Ḥasan, a client of Banū Asad, was a Kufan who later settled in Basra. He was among the prominent theologians (mutakallimīn) of our group. He debated with Abū al-Hudhayl and al-Naẓẓām. He authored discussions and books, including Kitāb al-Imāma, Kitāb al-Ṭalāq, Kitāb al-Nikāḥ, Kitāb Majālis Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, and Kitāb al-Mutʿah. Al-Shaykh said: ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Maytham al-Tammār, Maytham being among the eminent companions of Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī (peace be upon him), was the first to articulate the Imāmī doctrine and authored a book on imāmah called al-Kāmil. He also authored Kitāb al-Istiḥqāq. May Allah be pleased with him.” Muʿjam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth v.12, pg.300. https://lib.eshia.ir/14036/12/300

Sayyid al-Khuʾī, commenting on a narration in which al-Mīthamī appears in the chain, noted: “The chain is flawed, even though it has been described as reliable (mawthūqah) in some views, as ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl, despite being a prominent theologian who authored a book on imāmah according to al-Shaykh and al-Najāshī, has not been explicitly praised or authenticated. The only link is his narration by Ṣafwān, one of the ‘group of consensus,’ but we have clarified repeatedly that their narration does not establish reliability.” Mawsūʿat al-Imām al-Khuʾī 30:55. Also see 33:204.

https://lib.eshia.ir/71334/30/55

^[30] Al-Najāshī authenticated him. Rijāl al-Najāshī, pg.452. https://lib.eshia.ir/14028/1/452

^[31] TN: Al-wijādah within the terminology of ḥadīth studies implies that an author found an earlier manuscript in which a narration was mentioned although he had no connection with the writer nor a writ of transmission (al-ijāzah) to narrate that ḥadīth. Most jurists do not consider such narrations probative within fiqh (cf. https://ar.wikishia.net/view/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9).

^[32] As we explained in Abʿād al-Shakhsīyya al-Nabawiyya, pg.180. https://archive.org/details/library-elhamma-3882022/page/180/

^[33] Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām v.4, pg.327. https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/10083/4/327

^[34] TN: Dr. Mohammad Soroush Mahallātī has discussed some of these concessions for slaves as it pertains to ḥijāb in more depth in this Persian article of his: https://tinyurl.com/4exz2sfs

^[35] al-Kāfī v.5, pg.525. https://lib.eshia.ir/11005/5/525

^[36] Al-Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī said in Jāmiʿ al-Maqāṣid: “Similarly, it is not obligatory for a female slave (ʾamma) to cover her head, as agreed upon by scholars except for a minority view.” v.2, pg.98.

https://lib.eshia.ir/10086/2/98

^[37] Refer to the official website of Sayyid Riḍā Hosseini Nasab: http://www.hoseini.org/Esteftaat-arabi.asp#H9

^[38] Al-Ṣadūq stated in Man Lā Yaḥḍuruhu al-Faqīh : “The Imām (peace be upon him) said: ‘When one of you seeks to marry, inquire about her hair just as you inquire about her face, for hair is one of the two beauties.’”  v.3, pg. 383. https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/11021/3/383

This is also narrated in Daʿāʾim al-Islām v.2, pg.196.  https://lib.eshia.ir/71542/2/196

In an authentic narration from ʿAbd Allāh b. Sinān regarding the diyyah for removing a woman’s hair, the Imām (a) said: “…The hair of a woman and her virginity are both integral to her beauty.”  Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām 10:262. https://lib.eshia.ir/10083/10/262

^[39] Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī stated: “If a woman owns a male slave, whether intact or castrated, does he become a maḥram such that it is permissible for her to be in seclusion with him or travel with him? There are two views:

The first, which appears to be the prevailing one, is that he does become a maḥram based on the verse: ‘…and not to reveal their adornments except to their husbands… or what their right hands possess’ (al-Nūr: 31). The verse prohibits women from revealing their adornments except to those mentioned, including slaves. It is narrated that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) entered upon Fāṭima while she was unveiled. She sought to cover herself, but he said: ‘Do not worry; it is your father and your servant.’ In another narration: ‘…your father, your husband, and your servant.’

The second view, which aligns more closely with the school’s teachings, is that he does not become a maḥram. This is a stronger opinion. According to our scholars’ interpretation of the verse, ‘what their right hands possess’ refers specifically to female slaves, not male ones.” al-Mabsūṭ 4:161. https://lib.eshia.ir/10036/4/161  Also see al-Khilāf 4:249. http://shiaonlinelibrary.com/%

^[40] As we elaborated in al-Qawāʿid al-Nāẓima li al-ʿAlāqa maʿa al-Akhbār.

^[41] Iqtidhāʾ al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm. Pg.59. Also cited by al-Albānī in Jilbāb al-Marʾah al-Muslimah. Pg.82.

https://archive.org/details/aub_

^[42] Abʿād al-Shakhsīyya al-Nabawiyya.

^[43] Except if it be said, commenting on this point: What has been mentioned about the slave girl being able to pray without a veil on its head does not suffice to prove the claim, because what has been mentioned in prayer may have the possibility of being specific to the covering of a woman in prayer, and it is known that her covering and ḥijāb in prayer may differ from her covering and hijab outside of prayer (for example: the covering in prayer does not require it to not outline and define the woman’s features, unlike the covering in front of men, where this is required, and the covering in prayer does not require it to not be an adornment in itself, but the covering in front of strangers does require this…). The evidence for the existence of specificity in the covering in prayer is that we find in the reports in this chapter that a free woman is also allowed to remove the head covering during prayer, among them: the authenticated report of ‘Abdullāh ibn Bukayr, from Abū ‘Abdīllāh (peace be upon him) who said: “There is no harm for a free Muslim woman to pray while her head is uncovered.”

In another narration of Ibn Bukayr, from Al-Ṣādiq (peace be upon him) who said: “There is no harm for a Muslim woman to pray while not having a veil on her head.”

Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām 2:218 https://lib.eshia.ir/10083/2/218.

These are the two narrations regarding the permissibility of a Muslim woman’s head being uncovered during prayer, which, due to their apparent contradiction with other evidence and the consensus of jurists, must be reconciled. The late Shaykh Tusi has provided responses to these narrations, some of which seem non-standard.

However, one response given by Shaykh Tūsi to the first narration, which seems plausible, is: “It is also possible that what is meant by her praying without a head covering is when she is wearing a garment that covers her from head to toe.”

He intends to convey that this ruling is situational, as in some narrations, a head covering (mukhanna) is recommended for better modesty. This might create the misconception that the head covering, in addition to the cloak, is a condition. To dispel this misconception, the Imam clarified that the head covering is not a condition, and its absence does not contradict the requirement of covering during prayer. This is similar to the situation where men usually pray in pants, and one might mistakenly think that wearing pants is a requirement for prayer. If someone asks whether it is valid to pray without pants, the Imam would reply affirmatively, not meaning that one can pray naked, but rather that the pants are not specifically required as long as proper covering exists.

Another answer to this narration, in contrast to the second narration, is the absence of the term “free” (hurrah), which suggests that it could refer to a slave woman (amma), where having her head uncovered might not be an issue.

However, this response is not correct because referring to the rare case of a slave woman is not appropriate. Even though slaves existed at that time, they were less common than free women (hurrah), and besides, wars were not frequent enough to result in a large number of slaves, and those who were slaves were often freed relatively quickly. Therefore, this narration applies to free women, not slaves.

Shaykh Tūsi also offers two shared responses to both narrations: one is to interpret the narrations as referring to a young girl (saghira), and the other is to interpret them as referring to a situation of necessity (darurah). Both of these answers are weaker than the previous one because a woman is compared to a man. Just as it is not acceptable to interpret the term “man” as referring to a young boy (saghir) in this context, it is equally inappropriate to interpret “woman” as referring to a young girl.

The interpretation of necessity also refers to a rare situation, as although poverty was widespread in the early days of Islam, the issuance of these narrations happened during the Abbasid era, when Muslims were not generally in a financial situation where they would lack covering for prayer.

Naturally, this is only in the absence of a stranger, so the focus here is not on the veil in relation to the foreign onlooker, as is assumed in the discussion. We are not in a position to adopt or reject the opinion that a free woman may uncover her head during prayer, as the discussion and investigation of that is left to its appropriate place.

Furthermore, Two other ways to reconcile these narrations can be suggested:

One is that the term “prayer” (salah) is used in a shared sense, as it refers to both formal prayer (salāt) and supplication (du’a) in the Qur’ān, in language, and in the narrations. Therefore, the prayer in these two narrations could be interpreted as referring to supplication, even though the apparent meaning is formal prayer. In supplication, while one is conversing with God and should show respect, having an uncovered head is not an issue.

Another possibility is based on various narrations in both general and specific sources, which mention that if a slave woman tries to resemble a free woman, she may be punished. Imām Al-Ṣādiq (a) states that his father struck a slave woman and said she must distinguish herself from a free woman. This raises the question of whether a free woman should be punished if she prays with her head uncovered, making the term “no problem” in the narration mean “no punishment.” For example, in the narration of ‘Ali ibn Yaqtīn, where a woman forgets to perform a ritual act (tawaf) in Mina, and performs it later in Makkah, the Imam says, “There is no problem” for her to complete the ritual. The ambiguity here is whether a sheep needs to be slaughtered for her, and the Imam replies, “No problem,” meaning no sacrifice is required. Similarly, the Imam’s statement that a free woman can pray with her head uncovered indicates that there is no punishment, but whether the prayer is valid or invalid is a separate issue not addressed in the narration.

(From the series of lectures of the late Ayatullah Mūsa Shobeyri Zanjani).

^[44] TN: A cursory consideration of different social media platforms – particularly – Instagram, dating apps, porn sites, OnlyFans, and other kinds of apps which promote, support, and operate their businesses based on promiscuity and nudity of women and the psychology of male gaze will suffice to demonstrate this point. These sites are designed to manipulate women to reveal their skin, incite immorality, and call upon predators, perverts, and womanizers to normalize such behavior in the name of liberation and empowerment. The sad reality is it is corrupting even young children and teens – especially girls who suffer from self-esteem due to inflated beauty standards and glorification of promiscuity. In this milieu, women who adopt ḥijāb or modest clothing (among non-Muslim women) and criticize such degenerative acts are targeted and deemed as oppressed.