By Ustad Soroush Mahallati – Translated by Sayyid Ali Imran

These are translations of classes delivered by Ustad Soroush Mahallati during the summer vacation on political philosophy and political jurisprudence. In this post, I have translated the first lesson from July 9th, 2025.

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Definition of “Millah”

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds. Peace and blessings be upon our Master and Prophet, Muhammad (ṣ), and upon his pure family.

Introduction

I extend greetings and salutations to all our dear colleagues. We have just passed through the days of mourning for Imam Husayn and the events of Ashura. I ask God to grant us ever-increasing success in this path, and to accept your efforts and mourning ceremonies in the best of ways!

As many of you are aware, over the past two years, we have held a summer series focused on political jurisprudence. Last year, we discussed the political theory of the late ‘Allama Na’ini. The year before that, we covered the political theory of Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Gharawī Iṣfahānī. Thankfully, the discussions on Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī were compiled and published, and they were well received by scholars and those interested in the field. We also hope that last year’s discussions on ‘Allama Na’ini will soon be ready and presented to our esteemed audience.

This summer’s classes continue with the same general theme, but from a different angle. The discussion is still about politics and governance, but this time, we are approaching the subject from a philosophical and rational perspective. To explore this topic from such a perspective, we turn to al-Fārābī, because in the history of Islamic thought and philosophy, there is essentially no philosopher—aside from al-Fārābī—who has extensively addressed the question of government and politics.

And although some later sages and philosophers did touch upon this subject, they did so in a fragmented and incomplete manner, lacking the comprehensiveness found in al-Fārābī’s writings. In fact, this level of comprehensiveness, as seen in al-Fārābī’s discussions, is not present in the works of subsequent philosophers such as Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) or Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā).

After al-Fārābī, theoretical philosophy saw significant development among Muslim philosophers. However, in contrast, practical philosophy not only did not grow, it weakened over time. Therefore, for our discussion on philosophy and governance, we have chosen to focus on al-Fārābī.

Moreover, even the contributions made by later philosophers on this topic have not added anything substantial to the intellectual foundation laid by al-Fārābī. Later thinkers essentially borrowed from him without advancing the discourse further. We will present some examples of this later in our sessions, including references from Ibn Sīnā and other philosophers, showing that their contributions were essentially limited to adapting and citing al-Fārābī’s views, without any significant additions.

Given these two considerations, any philosophical inquiry into politics will inevitably lead us to al-Fārābī—and thus, we have chosen to center our discussions around him.

Al-Fārābī’s Books on Political Philosophy and Governance

Al-Fārābī has authored several works on the subject of politics and governance. His first major work on this topic is al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah (“The Civil Politics”), in which he extensively discusses the issues of government and politics. Another significant work is Ārā’ Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah (“Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City”). In this book, too, he elaborates in detail on the structure of his ideal society—the Virtuous City—and explains how it differs from other types of government.

Al-Fārābī’s third work related to this topic is Fuṣūl muntaza‘ah (“Selected Aphorisms”), which also focuses predominantly on matters of governance and politics. Naturally, in his other writings as well, discussions on this topic appear from time to time depending on the context, but in these three works, the discussion is thoroughly developed and fully dedicated to the subject of governance.

However, in our current series, we have not based our discussion on any of these three primary texts. Instead, we have chosen a fourth book by al-Fārābī as the foundation for our discussions: Kitāb al-Millah. This book, however, is not as well known as the other three works.

Why Kitāb al-Millah Was Chosen

Why have we selected this book for our exploration of political philosophy?

This book possesses a particular feature and advantage that makes it uniquely suitable for our purposes. While al-Fārābī does indeed discuss government in this work, the main focus of his discussion is the role of religion in governance. In other words, this book’s central theme is religious government.

In our previous summer programs, we also explored the topic of religious governance, but we approached it through the lens of Islamic jurisprudence. With God’s help, this year, we aim to examine the same theme—religious governance—but from a philosophical perspective. And that is precisely the unique feature of Kitāb al-Millah.

Moreover, al-Fārābī begins this book by defining the term “millah”. Based on his definition, millah corresponds to religion in its general sense. In another context, he also uses it more narrowly to mean sharī‘ah. Therefore, the title Kitāb al-Millah can be understood as The Book on Religion.

Of course, this title alone is not sufficiently descriptive of the book’s actual content. Simply seeing this title does not immediately reveal that al-Fārābī is addressing the relationship between religion and politics. After all, one can discuss religion in many different contexts: philosophical, theological, social, or jurisprudential.

However, this particular book, which complements the discussions in al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah, specifically aims to explain the role of religion in realizing the Virtuous City. Thus, in the context of this book, millah should be understood to mean religion, especially in the political and civilizational sense that al-Fārābī envisions.

Overview of the Topics in Kitāb al-Millah

Let me give a brief overview of the themes and topics addressed in this book.

Unfortunately, Kitāb al-Millah does not contain an introduction from the author, i.e., al-Fārābī, which would allow us to understand the book’s overall structure and the author’s purpose. Instead, the book begins immediately with the definition of millah (religion), similar to his other works, and proceeds without any chapter divisions or titles provided by the author. Thus, the book begins under the title al-Millah and concludes without any internal sectioning or labelled divisions.

Due to this traditional writing style, common among many classical scholars, I feel it is necessary to offer an explanatory outline to help readers understand the content and structure of the book, especially for those who wish to follow these discussions or read the book themselves.

Broadly speaking, this book aims to establish the role of religion in governance and in the realization of the Virtuous City (al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah). One of the noteworthy aspects of this text is al-Fārābī’s social interpretation of religion. While in political theory, it is often stated that governance requires law, al-Fārābī does not merely discuss the necessity of law in the usual legalistic sense. Unlike other philosophers who approach it through the function of law, al-Fārābī’s framework is centred on religion as the foundational principle of the Virtuous City.

We will discuss this idea in more depth later, but for now, I will offer a general overview of the book’s topics.

When al-Fārābī speaks of religion using the term millah, he raises a key question: Where does religion originate? In response, he turns to the concept of revelation, stating that religion is based upon it. He then gives a concise philosophical explanation of the nature of revelation, offering insights into how a philosopher understands divine communication.

Once millah and waḥi are clarified, al-Fārābī proceeds to examine the relationship between religion and philosophy. Since he is a philosopher, he is concerned with clarifying how millah (in the sense of true religion or the Virtuous Millah) corresponds to philosophy.

He states that true religion closely resembles philosophy: just as philosophy has two parts—theoretical and practical—so too does religion. This raises an important question: How do the worldviews offered by religion and philosophy compare? What is the difference between philosophical wisdom and the religious worldview? Likewise, how does practical wisdom, which philosophers use to describe human behavior, compare to the legal and moral systems of religion? Al-Fārābī tackles these important comparisons in his book.

After presenting his outward (non-theological) analysis of religion, al-Fārābī introduces a new topic: the First Ruler (al-ra’īs al-awwal).

We will repeatedly encounter this term, al-ra’īs al-awwal, in al-Fārābī’s terminology throughout the coming lectures. He argues and reasons that the ideal ruler must have access to revelation, and that true leadership, if it is to be virtuous, must be based on divine revelation.

Then comes the question: What happens after the First Ruler passes away? In such a case, the matter of succession arises. Al-Fārābī offers a unique interpretation of the caliph (khalīfah).

According to him, the khalīfah must have a similar degree of access to the truth of revelation, just as the Prophet had. In other words, the role of the khalīfah is not that of a mujtahid relying on conjecture or probability. This specific understanding has led some to describe al-Fārābī as a Shia philosopher, since his interpretation of caliphate is incompatible with the Sunni tradition. God willing, we will explore this issue further in future sessions, especially al-Fārābī’s views on Imamate.

Now, al-Fārābī does not explicitly discuss specific Imams (e.g., the role of the Commander of the Faithful, Imam ʿAlī), nor does he present philosophical arguments in favour of them. That sort of discussion is not the domain of philosophy, and you will not find such arguments in al-Fārābī’s writings. However, in his various works, he does talk about the general concept of Imamate, outlining the characteristics necessary for the rightful leader. These qualities, in fact, closely align with Shia views on Imamate.

So, this is the second level of leadership after the First Ruler: the caliph, who must mirror the Prophet’s access to truth. But what happens when even this caliph is no longer available? In such a scenario, what becomes of the Virtuous City?

In the third stage, al-Fārābī introduces the role of scholars and jurists in administering society and preserving the Virtuous City. These scholars, whom he describes as “the righteous learned ones” (ʿulamā’ al-abrār), are responsible for managing society in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence.

For this reason, some have argued that al-Fārābī believed in the guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) during the occultation of the Imam. Of course, such an explicit term is not found in al-Fārābī’s works, but the structure of his philosophical framework is compatible with such a theory. We will revisit this subject later on.

These are the three main stages of leadership that al-Fārābī discusses.

A broader issue that arises here is this: How can fixed legal rulings—those found in the science of jurisprudence—serve the needs of governing a society, when governments must constantly respond to changing political and social conditions? Governance inevitably involves a wide range of shifting realities, and requires laws that can adapt to new contexts. So the central question is: How can a system based on fixed, immutable rulings manage a system that is inherently dynamic and fluid?

Al-Fārābī addresses this question by discussing how laws can evolve based on circumstances. This is one of the unique contributions of al-Fārābī’s discussions: he highlights the role of time and place in the transformation of laws and in shaping the process of ijtihād and deriving rulings.

In Kitāb al-Millah, al-Fārābī attempts to reconcile his philosophical positions, developed elsewhere, with the reality that governance must be grounded in divine law. He tries to bridge the gap and create coherence between philosophical principles and religious law.

Naturally, once we complete our study of his views and reasoning, the door will be open for critical engagement, evaluation, and even disagreement. But in this first stage, we aim to faithfully understand the author’s speech, to comprehend what al-Fārābī actually says, and to recognize the arguments he uses to support his views. We are not here to imitate or blindly follow.

So, in the beginning, we will avoid confrontational critique of al-Fārābī and his book, but later on, God willing, we will also address those areas of tension or debate.

As outlined above, in this book al-Fārābī follows a philosophical method, and much of the discussion is deeply philosophical in nature. Yet he is also very clear that philosophy must be employed to guide the practical governance of society and help us achieve the Virtuous City (al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah).

He builds a bridge from theoretical wisdom to practical wisdom, and then again from practical wisdom to fiqh, showing how these domains are interrelated and function together in a cohesive system. This is one of the distinctive features of al-Fārābī’s work in general, and particularly in this book: he presents a systematic synthesis of theoretical, practical, and legal thought, highlighting their interconnections in a clear and organized way.

This has been a brief introduction to the book and the discussions that lie ahead.

Now, with God’s help, we begin our reading of Kitāb al-Millah. This text is in al-Fārābī’s own words, and his style is dense and difficult. His Arabic is not the conventional Arabic of today, and his sentences are typically long and complex.

So I would like to prepare our dear companions in advance: this discussion requires patience and perseverance. Especially in the more difficult sections, both in terms of language and the precision of the arguments, the text will require effort and deep reflection.

Thus, I ask all our dear friends and colleagues to come to these sessions with the necessary readiness, and, God willing, with resilience and commitment, so that we can journey through these rich and demanding ideas together.

Discussion Methodology

Now, how will we approach our study of this text? When a specific text is the central focus of a discussion, there are generally two ways it can be presented and taught:

First Method: The discussion is limited strictly to the text itself. One explains only what is written in the passage—clarifying it, interpreting it, and ensuring that the audience understands what the author is trying to convey. And that’s it. This is one method. Many commentaries that have been written on classical texts follow this style, offering surface-level explanations to help readers better understand the wording of the original.

Second Method: The text is not only explained, but also analyzed. This means we consult other sources as well. If the author (in this case, al-Fārābī) has discussed this same topic in other works, those discussions are brought in and compared. We pay attention to the coherence and interconnection of various ideas, and the discussion is not restricted to just one text.

In our sessions together, I will aim to follow this second method: we will read Kitāb al-Millah, but also refer to al-Fārābī’s other major works that I have already mentioned—al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah, Fusūl al-Madanī, and Ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah. These will be used to clarify points that are only briefly mentioned in Kitāb al-Millah, and to elaborate on foundational ideas that may not be fully developed in this text. This is our chosen method.

One might ask: Is there already an existing commentary on al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Millah that we can use to support our understanding?

To the best of my knowledge, there is no existing commentary on Kitāb al-Millah. No one has written a detailed explanation or analysis of this work. So, with God’s help, we hope that by pursuing these discussions and eventually compiling them, we can fill this gap and provide a comprehensive, analytical commentary on this important book. For now, however, we must proceed without any prior commentary.

The late and noble teacher Ustad Heshmatpour (r) taught this text in fourteen sessions, about eight years ago, in the year 1396 SH. Audio recordings of those sessions are available today for those interested. Additionally, some students of that class have written transcripts, summarizing and explaining the lessons.¹

I believe that the notes of some of his prominent students are also accessible, and they may be found online for those who want to explore them. This is the most that currently exists in terms of support material for those who wish to study Kitāb al-Millah, and could be of use if needed.

Another point to mention is that this book is not particularly long. It is around 25 pages, and can be considered a short treatise. I think that for our purposes, given the depth of explanation and analysis we plan to engage in, especially in relation to al-Fārābī’s other works, we will probably need approximately 25 sessions to complete it.

Accessing the text is not difficult. The book has been published in different editions. One edition was edited and published by the esteemed Iraqi scholar Dr. Muhsin Mahdi, and is available online in electronic format.

Additionally, a few years ago, Kitāb al-Millah was published in a peer-reviewed academic journal. Friends interested in this version can obtain it either as a published book or as part of the sixth issue of the journal “Quarterly Journal of Political Science.”

So, Kitāb al-Millah is about 25 pages in total, and with the help and power of God, we are now beginning this important intellectual journey.

The Personality and Historical Context of al-Fārābī

Before concluding this introduction, it may be appropriate to speak briefly about the personality and era of al-Fārābī. However, in principle, those who are accompanying us in this discussion likely already have access to this biographical information, or can easily obtain it, so there’s no absolute need for me to go into detail here.

In any case, Islamic philosophy begins with al-Fārābī, who is famously known as the Second Teacher (al-Muʿallim al-Thānī), following Aristotle, who was known as the First Teacher. Great thinkers such as Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Ibn Sīnā, and later philosophers all drew from the foundations of Fārābī’s philosophy and learned their wisdom through his teachings.

Interestingly, in terms of historical period, he lived during the 3rd century AH, which is the era of the Minor Occultation (al-Ghaybah al-Ṣughrā). To make this clearer in our minds: if you want to understand the context in which these discussions were taking place, you must go back even before the time of Shaykh Mufīd and Shaykh Ṭūsī, all the way to the period of the Minor Occultation.

The Minor Occultation began in 260 AH and lasted until 329 AH, totalling 69 years, after which the final appointed deputy of the Imam (a) passed away, and the Major Occultation (al-Ghaybah al-Kubrá) commenced. Keep these two dates—260 and 329—in mind, as they help us place al-Fārābī’s life in context.

According to most sources, al-Fārābī was born in 257 AH, just three years before the start of the Minor Occultation, and he died in 338 AH, which is nine years after the end of the Minor Occultation. So, we can say that his life and intellectual activity coincided with that pivotal era.

His scholarly career was mainly spent in Baghdad and later in Damascus. These general facts may be helpful as we begin to engage more deeply with the text.

Definition of Millah

Now, with that introduction concluded, let us turn to the first section of the book, where al-Fārābī opens Kitāb al-Millah with a definition of the term millah. We begin our discussion from exactly where he does:

الملة هی آراء و أفعال مقدّرة مقیّدة بشروط یرسمها للجمع رئیسهم الأوّل، یلتمس أن ینال باستعمالهم لها غرضاً له فیهم أو بهم محدوداً، و الجمع ربما کان عشیره، و ربما کان مدینة أو صقعاً، و ربما کان أمة عظیمة و ربما کان أمماً کثیرة.

“Millah is a set of beliefs and actions that are prescribed and constrained by certain conditions, which are drawn up for a group of people by their First Ruler, who seeks—through their adherence to these opinions and actions—to achieve a specific objective concerning them or through them. This group may be a tribe, a city, a region, a great nation, or even multiple nations.”

This passage gives us a foundational definition of millah. Al-Fārābī sees millah as a combination of beliefs and deeds. The beliefs here refer to intellectual doctrines falling under the domain of theoretical philosophy, such as:

• Does the universe have a creator?

• Does it have a purpose or final cause?

• Is there order or chaos in creation?

These kinds of questions are part of a millah, and what we today would call a worldview (jahān-bīnī).

The second component of millah consists of moral directives and legal rulings—those that fall under practical philosophy. These actions are predefined and structured, meaning their scope and boundaries are clearly delineated.

He uses the phrase:

“مقدّرة مقیّدة بشروط”

“prescribed and constrained by certain conditions”

That is, these rulings and prescribed actions are subject to certain conditions. For instance, Islamic duties and commandments come with general conditions like reason (ʿaql) and capability (qudrah). If someone lacks these conditions, then obligations are lifted from them.

Other conditions relate to specific acts:

• Fasting is conditional upon health,

• Hajj is conditional upon financial and physical ability (istiṭāʿah).

So, millah outlines these conditions related to both ethics and rulings. According to al-Fārābī, these beliefs and actions are formulated by the First Ruler (al-raʾīs al-awwal) of each society or community.

The Purpose of the Millah

So what is the purpose (gharaḍ) of this millah? According to al-Fārābī, the First Ruler proposes and outlines the boundaries of the millah in order that people, by employing its rules and implementing its commands and actions, can arrive at the purpose intended by that leader.

But what is this purpose? Al-Fārābī distinguishes between two types of objectives (gharaḍ) that the ruler may have:

1. غرض فیهم (a purpose within them)

2. غرض بهم (a purpose through them)

Sometimes the goal of the millah or religion is a moral-spiritual purpose to be realized within the people themselves. For example, the purpose might be to bring about ethical purification (tazkiyah) among the people. The Qur’an says:

{قَدْ أَفْلَحَ مَن زَكَّاهَا} – “Indeed, he succeeds who purifies it [the soul].” (91:9)

In this case, the First Ruler seeks to bring about an inner transformation of the community—that is, the purpose is for them (fī-him).

But at other times, the ruler’s goal is not within the people, but through them (bi-him). That is, the people are a means to achieve a separate goal that the ruler himself has. For example, a ruler may exploit the masses to attain power, wealth, or dominance. In this case, the objective is not their purification or betterment; rather, it is his own personal gain—a غرض بهم (goal achieved through them, not for them).

So al-Fārābī alerts us to this distinction: not every religion or millah is designed for the sake of the people; in fact, it may be instrumentalized for someone else’s ends. The group for whom these beliefs and actions are formulated can vary widely:

• Sometimes, the scope of the millah is as small as a tribe (ʿashīrah).

• At other times, it could be a city (madīnah).

• Or it could be a region or province, what we might today call a state or district (ṣuqaʿ).

• It may even extend to a single large nation (ummah ʿaẓīmah) or multiple nations (umam kathīrah).

It makes no difference what the size of the group is—the First Ruler, standing at the top, directs that group using these beliefs and actions to achieve one of the purposes just mentioned. He expects the people to live by those principles.

This, in short, is al-Fārābī’s definition of millah.

Let’s now revisit the key part of al-Fārābī’s original definition:

الملة هی آراء و أفعال مقدّرة مقیّدة…

“Millah is a set of beliefs and actions that are prescribed and constrained…”

So the millah has two parts:

1. آراء (āʾrāʾ) – Beliefs: These include theological and cosmological doctrines (e.g., Does the universe have a creator? Is there a final purpose to existence?). We might call this the creedal or epistemic component.

2. أفعال (afʿāl) – Actions: These refer to practical matters—rituals, moral actions, legal rulings—what we would call the jurisprudential and ethical component.

These actions are:

مقدّرة مقیّدة

prescribed and constrained

Each one has specific parameters and conditions:

• In fiqh, for example, the rules of prayer come with certain limitations and prerequisites (e.g., purity, time, direction).

• In ethics, such as the rule concerning lying (kidhb), there are conditions and exceptions. Are there cases where lying is permissible? All of these are measured and delimited within the structure of the millah.

• In social and legal rulings, such as transactions (muʿāmalāt), questions arise:

  • Are contracts binding (luzūm) or non-binding (jawāz)?

  • Are some contracts compulsory, like marriage (nikāḥ) or sale (bayʿ)?

  • Under what conditions can a contract be nullified or revoked?

All of these actions are part of the millah and are restricted by specific conditions, some of which are universal (e.g., reason, ability) and some specific to individual acts.

The First Ruler (الرئیس الأول)

This millah is delineated and prescribed “یرسمها للجمع” – for the collective – by the First Ruler (رئیسهم الأول). That is, it is this First Ruler who formulates and presents the millah or religion for the people. The phrase “یرسمها للجمع رئیسهم الأول” indicates that the First Ruler is the one who constructs and defines this path for the group.

By “First Ruler,” we mean the ultimate leader, the one above whom no higher authority exists – all others are subject to his rule. He is the originator of the religion and the architect of its order.

The phrase “یلتمس أن ینال” means that he seeks to attain something by means of this millah. He intends that through the implementation of the beliefs and practices of this system, a specific goal or purpose will be realized.

In other words, this First Ruler has a particular aim or objective in mind, and he seeks to reach that “باستعمالهم لها” – through their application of it.

So, “یلتمس أن ینال باستعمالهم لها غرضاً له” means that the ruler hopes to achieve a specific purpose for himself by having the people act upon this system. He hasn’t offered the millah arbitrarily or without aim; rather, he clearly has a goal in mind. His objective may fall into one of two types, as previously mentioned:

“غرضاً له فیهم أو بهم محدوداً”

“A defined purpose for him either within them or through them.”

That is:

• The goal may be for the people themselves, such as their moral purification, acquisition of knowledge, or achievement of spiritual perfection.

• Or the goal may be through the people, meaning he uses the people as instruments to reach his own ends, such as political power, domination, or material wealth.

Thus, the First Ruler may either be truly benevolent, aiming for the flourishing of the people, or exploitative, pursuing personal or political interests through them.

Since al-Fārābī began by saying “یرسمها للجمع رئیسهم الأول” – the First Ruler prescribes it for the group – it is important to clarify who this group (جمع) is.

Al-Fārābī explains:

“و الجمع ربما کان عشیرة و ربما کان مدینة أو صقعاً، و ربما کان أمة عظیمة و ربما کان أمماً کثیرة.”

“The group may be a tribe, a city, a region, a great nation, or multiple nations.”

So, the millah may be formulated for:

• A small group like a tribe

• A city or urban population

• A province or territory

• A single nation

• Or even many nations across the world

For example, religions with a universal claim (like Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) fall into the last category. Their laws and teachings are meant for “umam kathīrah” – numerous communities and nations, not restricted to any one ethnicity or state.

These first four lines of al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Millah serve as a precise definition of the word “millah”. This was necessary for two reasons:

1. The book is called Kitāb al-Millah, and thus, the concept needs to be clearly defined from the start.

2. All the subsequent discussions in the book revolve around this central concept.

This introductory passage by al-Fārābī is fairly clear, and doesn’t require much elaboration. However, I will offer a few clarifying points for completeness.

Difference Between the Arabic “Millah” and Its Persian Usage

The first point to note is that the meaning of “millah” as used here reflects its classical Arabic sense, not the modern Persian one.

In modern Persian, when one says “millat-e Irān” (the nation of Iran), they mean the people of Iran. But in classical Arabic, millah does not mean people; it means religion or religious system.

This is the meaning al-Fārābī intends here – millah as a complete system of beliefs and actions, religious in nature. Al-Fārābī frequently uses three interrelated terms in this work, each with its own conceptual scope:

1. Millah (ملة) – Religion or revealed law

2. Ummah (أمة) – People or community

3. Dawlah (دولة) – State or political authority

These three form a conceptual triangle, and al-Fārābī will spend much of the book analyzing the relationships between them.

The Use of the Term Millah in Islamic Texts

Now, the word “millah” appears frequently in Islamic texts, both in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. For example, in the verse from Surah Āl ʿImrān:

“فَاتَّبِعُوا مِلَّةَ إِبْرَاهِيمَ حَنِيفًا”

So follow the Millah of Abraham, the upright one.

Here, millah refers to the religion of Prophet Ibrāhīm (a). In this context, it clearly means “dīn”, or the divine religion followed by Ibrāhīm. However, in the Qur’an, the term millah is used not only for the true religion, but also for false or deviant belief systems. Similarly, the word “dīn” can be applied to both truth and falsehood. For example:

“لَكُمْ دِينُكُمْ وَلِيَ دِينِ”

To you your dīn, and to me mine.

Here, even false beliefs are labelled “dīn.” Thus, in Qur’anic usage, the terms “dīn” and “millah” can encompass both valid and invalid systems of belief and practice. Another example from the Qur’an is when Prophet Yūsuf refers to the disbelievers:

“مِلَّةَ قَوْمٍ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ”

The millah of a people who do not believe in Allah.

Here, millah is used in reference to a disbelieving nation, which clearly shows that the word is not restricted to divine religions.

Likewise, in Surah Aʿrāf (7:88), the opponents of Prophet Shuʿayb say:

“لَنُخْرِجَنَّكَ يَا شُعَيْبُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مَعَكَ مِن قَرْيَتِنَا أَوْ لَتَعُودُنَّ فِي مِلَّتِنَا”

We will surely expel you, O Shuʿayb, and those who have believed with you from our town, unless you return to our millah.

Here, millah again refers to the false belief system of the disbelievers. Even they describe their creed or worldview as a millah. So, the word millah is used to mean “religion” in a general sense, regardless of whether the religion is true or false.

Now the question arises: In this book, did al-Fārābī define millah specifically as the true religion, or did he use it in the general sense?

Let’s refer again to his definition:

“الملة هي آراء مقدرة مقيدة بشروط يرسمها للجمع رئيسهم الأول.”

Millah is a set of beliefs and actions that are prescribed and constrained by certain conditions, which are drawn up for a group of people by their First Ruler…

From this phrasing, it is clear that al-Fārābī is offering a general definition of millah. He does not condition this definition on whether the religion is true (ḥaqq) or false (bāṭil), nor does he make reference to its moral or theological validity. In this general formulation, millah refers to any structured system of beliefs and rules, with conditions, delivered by a First Ruler to a people. This could be:

• A divine religion, revealed by God and conveyed by a prophet through revelation, or

• A human-made ideology or belief system, which might be entirely man-made or falsely claimed to be divine.

Therefore, al-Fārābī’s definition accommodates both religions with authentic divine origin and fabricated systems that lack divine backing. He gives no explicit indication here that he is talking solely about Islam or any other true religion.

However, in later sections of his work, whenever al-Fārābī intends to discuss the true religion, he uses a more specific term – “al-millah al-fāḍilah” (the virtuous religion). This shows that when he means the true religion, he qualifies the term millah and does not leave it ambiguous.

For instance, on the same page, near line 9, he writes:

“وتكون تلك الملة فاضلة”

And such a millah would be virtuous.

And on the next page, line 8:

“ما يُقدَّر من الأفعال والآراء في الملة الفاضلة يُحدد عن طريق الوحي.”

What is prescribed of actions and doctrines in the virtuous millah is determined through revelation (waḥy).

So when prophetic revelation becomes central to the formulation of the millah, it is then distinguished as “virtuous.”

He continues:

“الآراء التي في الملة الفاضلة…”

The doctrines found in the virtuous millah…

And again:

“فهذه جملة ما تشتمل عليه الملة الفاضلة.”

So this is a summary of what the virtuous millah encompasses.

And further:

“فالملة الفاضلة شبيهة بالفلسفة، والمهنة الملكية ترجع إلى هذه الملة الفاضلة.”

The virtuous millah is akin to philosophy, and the royal profession (governance) is aligned with this virtuous millah.

So the distinction is clear:

• “Al-millah” by itself is a general term.

• “Al-millah al-fāḍilah” refers specifically to the true, revealed religion, harmonized with reason and ethics.

So, it must be noted that the initial interpretation that al-Fārābī presents of the millah is a general interpretation, because he wants to explain that there are multiple types of millah, meaning that there are various systems of beliefs and laws (āyīn-hā, or religious paths). Among these, some serve as the foundation for the virtuous city (al-madīnah al-fāḍilah). That is: we require a virtuous millah for a virtuous city.

But aside from the virtuous city, there are other types of cities, which he will later classify. Among these are the ignorant city (al-madīnah al-jāhilah) and the deviant city (al-madīnah al-ḍāllah). He explains the various kinds of cities, but their problem is that they are not based on a virtuous millah.

To reach a virtuous ummah and to possess a virtuous city, one must first have a virtuous worldview, which he refers to as the virtuous millah.

The Descriptor “Fāḍilah” (Virtuous)

With God’s help, in the next session I will explain how the term “fāḍilah” (virtuous) functions in al-Fārābī’s thought as a descriptor for multiple domains:

• Virtuous politics (siyāsah fāḍilah)

• Virtuous ruler (ra’īs fāḍil)

• Virtuous city (madīnah fāḍilah)

• Virtuous millah (millah fāḍilah)

What does “being virtuous” actually mean in these contexts? What specific interpretation does al-Fārābī offer for this term, which he applies across all these concepts? InshāʾAllāh, I will present this topic in the coming discussions.

In any case, al-Fārābī first provides a general definition of millah, but later he delves into specific discussions about the virtuous ruler, the virtuous polity, and so on. Occasionally, he contrasts between al-millah aṣ-ṣaḥīḥah (the correct religion), and al-millah al-fāsidah (the corrupt religion), meaning the true creed and law system versus the false or flawed one.

For example, in his work Ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah (Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City), he addresses the question of why some cities are ignorant (jāhilah) or deviant (ḍāllah). He writes:

The ignorant and deviant cities emerge because their millah is based on certain ancient, corrupt opinions.

That is: when the worldview, the system of beliefs, the laws, and the ethics underlying a religion or ideology are corrupt, the resulting society becomes an ignorant or deviant city.

He goes on to give examples of these false ideas (ārā’ fāsidah) that infiltrate a millah. For example:

Among them are those who say: ‘We see that all existing things are in opposition and contradiction.’

This view—seeing all of existence as fundamentally contradictory—is one example of a corrupt idea that, according to al-Fārābī, cannot ground a sound worldview or a just city.

Similarly, in his important work Kitāb al-Ḥurūf (The Book of Letters), al-Fārābī refers again to the notion of a corrupt millah (millah fāsidah) based on false opinions (ārā’ kādhibah) in contrast to a true and correct millah (millah ṣaḥīḥah) in philosophy. This discussion appears around page 154 of Kitāb al-Ḥurūf.

I think this much is sufficient for our first session. We’ve now read several lines from the original text and clarified how al-Fārābī uses the term millah—both in its general and its specific meanings.

God willing, we will continue our discussion in the next session.

The Difference Between “Fīhim” and “Bihim” in the Purpose

There is one point I forgot to explain, which I will now add so that it will not need to be repeated in the next session.

Given that we interpreted the term millah in the opening passage of al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Millah in its general sense—i.e., any system of belief or doctrine, whether true or false—then we will not face any difficulties in explaining what the purpose of the millah is.

Al-Fārābī had written:

who seeks—through their adherence to these opinions and actions—to achieve a specific objective concerning them or through them. 

According to al-Fārābī, the intent or goal (gharaḍ) that the first ruler has in presenting the millah sometimes lies within the people themselves—fī-him—and sometimes it is a purpose that is realized through the people—bi-him.

In my view, this phrasing reflects the diversity of millahs, religions, ideologies, and worldviews that exist.

Sometimes, the leader wants to serve the people through the millah—the goal is realized in the people. For example, he wants the people to live with justice, to experience well-being, to lead lives filled with ethics—in such cases, the purpose is for them, i.e., it is oriented toward the people and the society (al-jamʿ wa’l-raʿiyyah).

At other times, the leadership is corrupt, yet it still falls under the general definition of millah. A person may establish a creed or system (maktab) as a means of domination, to monopolize power, or to concentrate benefits upon himself. Here too, we are still speaking about millah in its general sense—a system of beliefs and actions. But the difference is that the ruler’s objective is not for the people, but rather through them: he uses the people, exploits them, appropriates their wealth to serve his own interests.

This does not mean that in every millah there is always either a fī-him or bi-him dynamic. This is not a strict dichotomy, but rather a range of variation (tanwīʿ, not taqsim). Some millahs have a purpose that is actually for the people and materializes within them. At other times, the millah is presented simply to attain power, and the people are just a means.

Interpreting the distinction this way is easier, clearer, and more straightforward than some other interpretations which attempt to treat both fīhim and bihim as subdivisions of gharaḍ within true religion (millah ḥaqq). That was one clarification I wished to offer.

The Technical Term Millal wa Niḥal

Another point that just came to mind relates to the well-known technical term: al-Millal wa’l-Niḥal (Religions and Sects). In such works—like classical heresiographies—millal usually refers to real, divinely-revealed religions, such as Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, which are associated with authentic divine prophets.

On the other hand, niḥal refers to fabricated or false creeds—non-divine ideologies or invented sects. So in that framework, niḥal stands in contrast to millal, and many books have been written under the title al-Millal wa’l-Niḥal.

But al-Fārābī does not use the term millah in contrast to niḥlah here. Rather, he uses millah in its broad, inclusive sense, which even encompasses false creeds. Because for him, millah refers to any doctrinal or legislative system, true or false.

This is another clarification regarding the passage we read at the beginning of Kitāb al-Millah. Once again, I apologize to you and bid you farewell.

Wa ṣallā Allāhu ʿalā Sayyidinā Muḥammad wa Ālihi al-Ṭāhirīn.

1. Translator’s Note: Hearing Ustad Soroush Mahallati mention this point brought back a lot of memories and nostalgia. I was reminded of the time when Marhum Ustad Heshmatpour was giving these classes in Qom, it was in an institute called the House of Ethics. Before Kitab al-Millah, Ustad Heshmetpour was going through the book Kitab al-Dhari’ah of Raghib Isfahani, which was my first exposure to this specific work of Raghib, and I was able to follow many of these classes regularly. The audio recordings for these lessons can still be accessed on the Telegram channel of the institute.