This academic year in the seminary, Ustad Soroush Mahallati is giving his Bahth al-Kharij of Usul al-Fiqh on the topic of I’tibariyyat (Conventional Realities). Below is the translation of the transcription of the first lesson from September 13th, 2025.

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Different Terminologies of Iʿtibārī (Conventional)

We thank God that once again we have been granted the success to continue our discussions. One of the topics that has emerged in the last decades within ʿIlm al-Uṣūl is the discussion of iʿtibāriyyāt (conventional or contingent realities). At first, in the works of some scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, such as the late Ākhūnd Iṣfahānī and the late Āqā Ḍiyāʾ al-ʿIrāqī, there were passing references to the conventional nature of certain matters and rulings in uṣūl. Then this discussion was followed up by their students and disciples, but only as a secondary or incidental issue within uṣūl al-fiqh.

More recently, however, this matter has been raised as an independent issue in the writings of a number of scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh: namely, what is a conventional (iʿtibārī) matter? What consequences follow from it? And what is the scope of iʿtibāriyyāt in uṣūl and in fiqh? Since in past years we did not examine this topic independently, this year we have decided that in these sessions — which will take place twice a week, on Saturdays and Sundays — we will pursue this subject. It is anticipated, God willing, that we will have around 45 sessions until the end of the year to complete this discussion.

In order to enter into the discussion of iʿtibāriyyāt in uṣūl al-fiqh, some preliminaries need to be taken into account. Indeed, the scope of iʿtibāriyyāt is very broad and extensive. Many of the subjects whose rulings we discuss in fiqh belong to the realm of iʿtibārī matters. From the beginning of fiqh, with the Kitāb al-Ṭahārah, until the end of fiqh, with the Kitāb al-Diyāt, these are generally matters of a conventional nature. Ṭahārah itself is an iʿtibārī matter, and so are the discussions all the way to diyāt.

Along the way, in these chapters there are numerous subjects: for example, in the discussion of marriage — nikāḥ itself is a conventional subject, divorce is a conventional subject, waqf is a conventional subject, waṣiyyah is a conventional subject. A vast range of topics such as bayʿ (sale), ijārah (leasing), muḍārabah (profit-sharing), muzāraʿah (sharecropping) — all of these are iʿtibārī.

In addition to these, all the rulings that are predicated upon these subjects are also entirely conventional. For rulings are either aḥkām taklīfiyyah or aḥkām waḍʿiyyah, and both are iʿtibārī. Obligation is conventional, recommendation is conventional, likewise prohibition, dislike, and permissibility — all of these are iʿtibārī rulings. Similarly, the aḥkām waḍʿiyyah such as ownership, slavery, freedom, guardianship — these too are iʿtibārī.

Thus, in fiqh, both in terms of subject and ruling, we are dealing with iʿtibārī matters. Consequently, in uṣūl al-fiqh we are also necessarily connected to these matters and discuss them. However, the great scholars in fiqh and uṣūl in the past generally did not address these discussions independently. Perhaps the first person who carried out a detailed and independent discussion on iʿtibāriyyāt was the late ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (may God have mercy on him). After Ākhūnd Iṣfahānī, he pursued this subject. He first authored a treatise on iʿtibāriyyāt, and after that treatise he wrote an extensive article on iʿtibāriyyāt within Uṣūl al-Falsafah wa-Rishad al-Riʾālīsm (The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism). In addition, in his noble tafsīr al-Mīzān, he raised the discussion of iʿtibāriyyāt on various occasions in the course of his wide-ranging discussions.

At present, I do not know of anyone among our scholars who has addressed this subject with such detail and precision, even though, in a general sense, the essence of the matter or certain aspects of it have been mentioned in the works of many scholars. Later, God willing, I will explain how this issue entered into ʿIlm al-Uṣūl — that is, I will present the history of the entrance of this discussion into uṣūl.

However, the first point I would like to highlight is that iʿtibārī is a technical term with multiple meanings. And so that confusion not occur in the discussion, it is necessary to distinguish the different meanings of iʿtibārī. Once this distinction is made, we can clarify what iʿtibārī means in ʿIlm al-Uṣūl. As for philosophy, iʿtibārī has several different usages, and those meanings in philosophy do not connect to the discussion in uṣūl. I will first explain the usage of iʿtibārī in philosophy, and afterwards, God willing, the usage of iʿtibārī in ʿIlm al-Uṣūl will be clarified, and the difference will become apparent.

In philosophy, as far as I know, there are three usages with three different meanings for iʿtibārī:

The first usage: iʿtibārī means something that does not have an independent existence (wujūd munḥāz ʿan al-ghayr), as opposed to something real (ḥaqīqī), which does have an independent existence. For example, the pen that is in your hand has an independent existence — that is, you can mentally remove all other entities, leaving only this pen’s existence, and there is no problem with that. That is called an existence that is independent of others (wujūd munḥāz ʿan al-ghayr). If something has such an independent existence, it is called ḥaqīqī.

Whereas something that does not have independence from others is called iʿtibārī. For example, the category of relation (maqūlah al-iḍāfah) — a relation cannot exist independently, apart from its two sides. This classification does not apply simply to jawhar (substance) versus ʿaraḍ (accident). Substance certainly has an independent existence, but accidents, too, can have independent existence. However, iḍāfah is not like this; it is one of the accidents whose existence is dependent on something else. Therefore, in this usage, an existence that is independent from others is called real (ḥaqīqī), while that which is not independent — like relation, which depends on its two sides, and which cannot be conceived without conceiving its two sides — that is called iʿtibārī. This is the first meaning.

The second meaning of iʿtibārī is in contrast to aṣālah (primacy or fundamentality). This is a terminology that arose in the discussion of aṣālat al-wujūd (the primacy of existence) in recent centuries. We say that existence is aṣīl (fundamental), in contrast to the iʿtibārī nature that belongs to quiddity (māhiyyah). Here too, the term iʿtibārī is employed. When it is said that māhiyyah is iʿtibārī, what is meant by the iʿtibārī nature of māhiyyah? This iʿtibārī is opposed to being real and fundamental, and by fundamental (aṣīl) is meant “that which is the source of effects.”

Thus, when we say existence is fundamental, it means that effects are predicated upon existence, not upon māhiyyah. In other words, when māhiyyah becomes clothed in the garment of existence, then due to its being existent, effects are predicated upon it. But māhiyyah itself may subsist in the realm of the mind without any effects being predicated upon it. For example, if we say “fire burns,” this burning is an effect that is predicated upon existence, otherwise the quiddity (māhiyyah) of fire may exist in the mind without any effect being predicated upon it.

Here, we are not in the position of proving or disproving anything, but only in the position of explaining what this terminology used by the experts means in that context. There, when it is said that existence is aṣīl and real, it means it is the source of effect; and when it is said that māhiyyah is iʿtibārī, it means that no effects are predicated upon māhiyyah. This is another usage. This second terminology, too, has no connection with our discussions of iʿtibāriyyāt in ʿIlm al-Uṣūl.

As for the third terminology: iʿtibāriyyāt in the sense of maʿqūlāt thāniyyah (secondary intelligibles). Secondary intelligibles themselves are of two kinds: philosophical secondary intelligibles (maʿqūlāt thāniyyah falsafiyyah) and logical secondary intelligibles (maʿqūlāt thāniyyah manṭiqiyyah). In general, secondary intelligibles are called iʿtibāriyyāt. In contrast to them are those things which are called ḥaqīqī (real).

So, in contrast to secondary intelligibles, what is it that is ḥaqīqī, and why are these considered iʿtibārī? Here in reality, the classification is being made upon a certain genus, namely concepts. Concepts are of two types: essential concepts (mafāhīm māhuwiyyah) and non-essential concepts (mafāhīm ghayr māhuwiyyah).

By essential concepts, we mean those concepts which sometimes have realization in the external world and effects are predicated upon them, and sometimes exist in the mind without effects being predicated upon them. These are the māhiyyāt (quiddities), which are, with respect to existence and non-existence, on equal footing.

Here, when it is said “concepts in contrast to iʿtibārī” — that is, essential concepts (mafāhīm māhuwiyyah) — in opposition to them are non-essential concepts (mafāhīm ghayr māhuwiyyah), which then become iʿtibārī.

What are non-essential concepts? For example, those concepts whose very aspect is that of having external instantiation, such that this externality and predication of effects cannot be stripped away from them. From māhiyyah such a thing could be stripped: we could conceive māhiyyat al-insān (the quiddity of man) as realized externally or as not realized externally. This is what māhiyyah is. But some concepts are such that their very aspect is to have external instantiation, such as wujūd (existence).

And the difference between existence and quiddity lies precisely here. We place wujūd in contrast to essential concepts, and regard it as belonging to another category. The general title of this category, in contrast to essential concepts, is iʿtibāriyyāt.

Thus, those like Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā) who would say “existence is real (ḥaqīqī),” in this terminology would say “existence is iʿtibārī,” because it belongs to the philosophical secondary intelligibles. And philosophical secondary intelligibles, in contrast to essential concepts, are iʿtibārī. Here, they do not mean the real existence itself. There, when we said “existence is aṣīl,” we meant it is a reality whose essence is effect. But here, when we say the concept of existence is iʿtibārī, we mean it belongs to the secondary intelligibles.

So, these are two distinct terminologies applied to two different subjects.

Some things, unlike wujūd, which must always have instantiation in the external world and upon which effects are predicated, can never have instantiation in the external world. Māhiyyah could have instantiation and could also lack it — it was on equal footing — but wujūd must always have an external, concrete instantiation. In contrast to that, we have ʿadam (non-existence). Can you conceive of the concept of non-existence or not? Certainly, we do conceive the concept of non-existence. Just as wujūd was among the maʿqūlāt thāniyyah falsafiyyah (philosophical secondary intelligibles), so too the concept of ʿadam is counted among the philosophical secondary intelligibles.

These philosophical secondary intelligibles are themselves one part of the iʿtibārāt, in contrast to the logical secondary intelligibles (maʿqūlāt thāniyyah manṭiqiyyah). Logical secondary intelligibles, too, are a part of the iʿtibāriyyāt, and all of these stand in opposition to the essential concepts (mafāhīm māhuwiyyah).

Is the universal (kullī) conceived in the mind or not? Is a thing in the external world qualified by universality (kulliyyah) conceptually or existentially? Or is universality only and exclusively an attribute of concepts in the mind? What is kullī? It is that concept which has the capacity to apply to many instances. This capacity of applicability belongs to concepts in the mind, and the absence of such applicability is also a characteristic of a concept.

Everything that is discussed in logic belongs to this category. The difference here is that these are concepts which have instantiation only and exclusively in the mind. Universality, genus (jins), differentia (faṣl) — these do not have realization in the external world. Otherwise, something that had been assumed to be mental would become external, and that is impossible (lā yanqalib). These too are called iʿtibāriyyāt.

With this terminology, concepts are divided into two categories: essential concepts (mafāhīm māhuwiyyah), which are called ḥaqīqī (real), and iʿtibārī concepts with the characteristics I have just described. I emphasize again: here we are explaining the terminology. It is possible that someone might have objections to the classification, or to some of its divisions, or to some of its instances — that is another discussion altogether. But in philosophy, this is the terminology, and these are the words that have been employed.

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī presented this discussion in various places in his works, but in my view the best place he addressed this issue is in the book Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah, chapter ten of stage eleven, which is on knowledge (ʿilm). In the copy of the book I have from long ago, on page 256, he writes: “al-faṣl al-ʿāshir: yanqasim al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī ilā ḥaqīqī wa iʿtibārī.”

Acquired knowledge is divided into ḥaqīqī and iʿtibārī.

As for the ḥaqīqī, he states:

The ḥaqīqī is the concept (mafhūm) that sometimes exists in the external world, and its effects are predicated upon it, and sometimes exists in the mind, and its external effects are not predicated upon it.

Here the intended meaning of mafhūm is “conception” (taṣawwur), not judgments (taṣdīqāt). Conceptions are divided into two categories. Since he says they are two categories, that means they are restricted to the maqūlāt (categories), because it is māhiyyāt that are classified under the categories — whether substance (jawhar) or accident (ʿaraḍ). Thus, in reality, all the ḥaqīqī concepts in this terminology amount to the categories, and nothing more. We do not have other essential concepts outside of the categories.

Thus, this ḥaqīqī concept that we speak of here is intended as māhiyyah. As he says:

It is the quiddity (māhiyyah) predicated of a thing in answer to the question, “What is it?”

Here we call it ḥaqīqī. But in the discussion of aṣālat al-wujūd, from another aspect, we call it iʿtibārī, because there effects are not predicated upon it. Here, however, we are not concerned with effects.

“wa huwa immā min al-mafāhīm allatī ḥaythiyyat maṣādiqihā ḥaythiyyat annahu fī al-khārij, mutarattib ʿalayh āthāruhu, falā yadkhul al-dhihn allatī ḥaythiyyatuhā ḥaythiyyat ʿadam tarattub al-āthār al-khārijiyyah… aw ḥaythiyyat annahu laysa fī al-khārij ka-l-ʿadam…”

And this iʿtibārī is in opposition to ḥaqīqī. In contrast to ḥaqīqī, it is either from those concepts whose aspect of instantiation is that they exist in the external world and their effects are predicated upon them — thus not including those concepts whose aspect is that no external effects are predicated upon them, or from those concepts whose aspect of instantiation is that they exist in the mind, like ʿadam (non-existence). This latter becomes the logical secondary intelligibles (maʿqūlāt thāniyyah manṭiqiyyah).

And with the specific terminologies they use — which we will not enter into now — they say: is the predication (ʿurūḍ) in the mind, and the qualification (ittiṣāf) in the mind? Or is the predication in the mind but the qualification in the external? These are simply different formulations of the same point about philosophical and logical secondary intelligibles.

Here, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī pauses in this same book, and of course in his Ḥawāshī ʿalā al-Asfār (marginalia on al-Asfār) he also pursued this discussion in detail: namely, how these concepts arise in the human mind. From where does the concept of wujūd come? You say that what exists externally cannot itself come into the mind. Then is it from māhiyyah? But it is not. Or from where does ʿadam (non-existence) come? How does the mind construct these?

This is one of the distinctive contributions of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophy: that before him — as far as we know — this issue was not raised in philosophy: namely, from where these concepts and these conceptions originate, and how the mind acquires them. ʿAllāmah posed this question, analyzed it, and in this very place that I cited and from which I read the passage, he subsequently raised this point: from where do the iʿtibāriyyāt arise? But since this has no relation to uṣūl or to the kind of iʿtibāriyyāt we are pursuing, we will not enter into it here.

After this threefold division of the terminologies of iʿtibārī, which I have explained, there is, in contrast to them, another terminology. This is a terminology that has only recently been born. Those three meanings of iʿtibārī can be found in the philosophical works of our scholars. But this terminology, which we now want to discuss, and this meaning of iʿtibārī, is new. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī was the one who introduced it into philosophy.

In this same book, just two pages later, he states that there are additional meanings for iʿtibārī. Altogether, there are three that I mentioned, but he adds another, which makes them four in total. Three of these have precedents in philosophy, while this last one is his own addition. He defines it as follows: “al-maʿnā al-taṣawwūrī aw al-taṣdīqī alladhī lā taḥaqquq lahu fīmā warāʾ ẓarf al-ʿamal.”

That is: the conception (taṣawwur) or judgment (taṣdīq) that has no realization beyond the sphere of action.

This is his definition of iʿtibāriyyāt. Later he also wrote an independent treatise dedicated to this, and in Uṣūl al-Falsafah wa-Rishād al-Riʾālīsm he devoted an article to it. His definition is that iʿtibāriyyāt are conceptions and judgments which come into being within the sphere of action — meaning that human beings, in accordance with the relations and behaviors they have with one another, create and generate these concepts.

How is it that a human being creates and generates a concept — that we ourselves make these concepts? ʿAllāmah provides an analysis of this type of iʿtibāriyyāt. For now, I am only indicating this, and later on, God willing, we will discuss this matter in detail.

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s general view is that there are certain ḥaqīqī concepts which exist in nafs al-amr (objective reality). We then take those ḥaqīqī concepts and overlay them onto some of the actions that we perform. This is the process that takes place in metaphor (istiʿārah).

For example: we have an external lion, which is the animal lion. We also have Zayd. In nafs al-amr and in reality, Zayd is not a lion — that is, the definition and limits of “lion” do not apply to Zayd. But what happens in metaphor is that we lift that concept from its real instance and place it upon another instance which is not the true instance. Later, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī discusses why we do this and what the reason for it is.

Here he gives another example. He says one of the iʿtibārī concepts — in this meaning — is riyāsah (leadership). We say: Zayd is a leader (raʾīs). Where did this come from? Leadership is an iʿtibārī matter. Ownership (milkīyyah) is an iʿtibārī matter. Zayd is a leader. Zayd is an owner.

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī explains: you see that human beings and animals have a head (raʾs). We then say that Zayd too is a head — but in relation to what? In relation to the body of society. How is it that Zayd became the head? He says: what property and characteristic does the head have in relation to the body? The head is the command center in relation to the limbs. If the head is severed, the body can no longer have any movement at all. The command center is located there. If the hand is cut off, the person can still survive. If the foot is cut off, the person can still survive. But the head has this peculiarity — that it is the source and origin of command.

This role that the head has in relation to the body is metaphorically transferred to the person of the leader. We imagine society as though it were a body, and the leader as that “whole head” which is placed there — such that if the head is not present, then nothing else remains in its proper place. We iʿtibār (posit) this.

According to him, these iʿtibāriyyāt are: “maʾāl al-iʿtibār bihādhā al-maʿnā ilā istiʿārat al-mafāhīm al-nafs al-amriyyah al-ḥaqīqiyyah bi-ḥudūdhihā li-anwāʿ al-aʿmāl allatī hiya ḥarakāt mukhtalifah wa-mutaʿallaqātihā li-l-ḥuṣūl ilā ghāyāt ḥayawiyyah maṭlūbah.”

That is: the outcome of iʿtibār in this sense is the borrowing of real concepts, which exist in objective reality with their definitions and limits, and transferring them onto types of actions — which are various movements and their objects — in order to attain desired vital ends.

Of course, there are specific details in this definition, but since today I only want to present the topic in general terms as an introduction, I will not enter into the restrictions of the definition now.

The subject that is discussed in uṣūl, in fiqh, in law, and in ethics belongs to this fourth category. And this terminology is different from the philosophical usage of iʿtibārī. So do not think that the iʿtibāriyyāt which we are discussing here are related to aṣālat al-wujūd and aṣālat al-māhiyyah, or that they are related to philosophical secondary intelligibles. No. These are a set of concepts which come into being within the sphere of action, in human social relations, for the sake of particular objectives and specific ends. Whether such things truly exist or not, and how these concepts are created — that is a discussion which, God willing, we will address later.

This was the first introduction: that, in summary, there are multiple terminologies. The three philosophical usages I mentioned have precedent, but the terminology we are discussing today — namely, iʿtibāriyyāt in ʿIlm al-Uṣūl — is not related to those philosophical usages.

Another introduction we will, God willing, discuss tomorrow, and after that, we will enter into the main discussion. That introduction is: how did the discussion of iʿtibāriyyāt enter into ʿIlm al-Uṣūl? For now, what is clear is that it has entered. For example, if you look specifically at ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s marginal notes on Kifāyah (Ḥāshiyat ʿalā al-Kifāyah), you will see that ʿAllāmah, line by line, raises objections and comments: “this is from the iʿtibāriyyāt.” He repeatedly makes this point.

At one point in my youth — perhaps forty years ago, when ʿAllāmah’s Ḥāshiyah ʿalā al-Kifāyah had just been published — I read through this book once, and I prepared a list of issues in ʿIlm al-Uṣūl in which ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (may God have mercy on him) wrote in his marginalia that such-and-such matter is iʿtibārī, and for which he indicated what consequences follow.

Unfortunately, I do not know whether I still have that old list or not. But my point is this: the matter that is being discussed here in ʿIlm al-Uṣūl — as presented by him, and also raised by some of the great scholars before and after him — is something different from those earlier philosophical usages.

So, the second introduction, which I will, God willing, present tomorrow, is how this issue entered into ʿIlm al-Uṣūl.

And may God’s blessings be upon our master Muḥammad and his pure progeny.