Book Review Session: “A Jurisprudential Analysis of Tashabbuh bil-Kuffar: With Emphasis on Symbolic Dress from Foreign Cultures”

This article presents a summary and critical overview of the book A Jurisprudential Analysis of Tashabbuh bil-Kuffār: With Emphasis on Symbolic Dress from Foreign Cultures, authored by Hujjatul Islam Husayn Mehdizadeh. The book, recently discussed in a scholarly review session at the Fiqhi Center of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) in Qom, explores the legal and cultural dimensions of imitating non-Muslims through clothing, adornment, and lifestyle symbols. Drawing on classical jurisprudential sources and contemporary debates, the work examines how Islamic law engages with issues of identity, cultural assimilation, and modernity, trying to offer a few systematic attempts to frame tashabbuh within the broader discourse of “Fiqh of Culture” and “Fiqh of Lifestyle.”

Authored by Hussein Mehdi-Zadeh, a researcher in Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), held in Qom, at the Fiqhi Center of the Ahl al-Bayt (a), on Wednesday, June 12, 2024 (23 Khordad 1403). Reviewer: Dr. Seyed Hossein Sharaf al-Din, Faculty Member at the Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute.

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Introduction

Strengths of the Research: The reviewer highlighted several strong points in the study: the novelty of the topic and the absence of prior research, at least within Imami jurisprudence; comprehensive investigation across both Sunni and Shia legal traditions (fiqh al-farīqayn); use of authentic and primary sources; extensive application of analytical and interpretive reasoning; well-organized structure; appropriate juristic language and style; and clear, fluent, and polished writing that meets methodological, editorial, and scholarly standards.

The work was described as a clear example of “Fiqh of Culture” and “Fiqh of Lifestyle”, and among the few juristic studies that establish a close link between legal discourse and lived cultural reality. As such, it has the potential to influence behavioral patterns and serve as a model for guiding cultural conduct.

Weaknesses of the Research: Among the weaknesses noted were digressions and verbosity, unnecessary repetition, and the inclusion of extraneous discussions. The reviewer also noted that the study is primarily driven by theoretical concerns, with insufficient emphasis on deriving practical and applicable outcomes. Furthermore, the author gave limited attention to the evolving transformations in lifestyle and dress that result from broader global cultural and social shifts under modernity and globalization—developments that carry significant implications and interpretive challenges for the juristic system and the scholarly community.

Overall Evaluation

Unfortunately, the subject under investigation has been surrounded and burdened by numerous considerations, precautions, conditions, and restrictions, to the extent that it has effectively lost its practical applicability and impact. As a result, one cannot expect the study to yield strong or actionable conclusions. In other words, the juristic and ijtihād-based dimensions of the work have been overshadowed by its research-oriented and academic preoccupations. (Some of the interpretive and inferential statements, and even certain claims that appear juristic (ijtihādī), lack genuine juristic rigor and validity.)

It was expected that, by the conclusion of the work, several clear jurisprudential principles or strategic guidelines would have been extracted—principles that could facilitate the process of issuing fatwas or formulating policy-based rulings. However, the points mentioned in the conclusion are minimal compared to the wide scope of the research.

Overall, one observes in the discussion of tashabbuh (imitation of non-believers) a tendency toward xenophobia, aversion, and antagonism toward non-Muslims, coupled with a call for cultural resistance against the dominant global culture—a kind of rigid cultural boundary-drawing and isolationism. Yet, such a total separation has never existed in reality and does not exist now. Believers and non-believers, at least by virtue of their shared human and existential traits, inevitably share a range of cultural commonalities.

Why does the author assume that adherence to a particular religion, such as Islam, must necessarily distance and distinguish a believer from all other human beings and societies, even in matters like clothing and appearance?

The most decisive conclusion derived from this research is the prohibition and impermissibility of using symbolic or exclusive garments of non-believers, such as the Christian cross, the Jewish beret (biretta), and perhaps items like neckties and bow ties, so long as they remain exclusive identifiers. However, several important qualifications are noted:

• Firstly, these items are not truly garments, but accessories associated with dress.

• Secondly, they are specific to elite classes within non-Muslim societies, not to the general populace.

• Thirdly, the prohibition applies only when a Muslim wears them within an Islamic society, not within non-Muslim societies.

• Fourthly, the prohibition is conditional upon accompanying factors—such as alignment with non-believers (tawallī al-kuffār), disavowal of Islamic culture, or similar contextual qualifiers.

Other conclusions of the study are likewise surrounded by so many conditions and constraints that they are difficult to ascertain in practice. As such, those responsible for promoting virtue and preventing vice (amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar) or officials in charge of public morality (ḥisbah) cannot effectively act upon these rulings or implement them.

To substantiate this claim, that the accumulation of considerations and conditions has hindered the attainment of practical outcomes, the reviewer provides several examples:

1. The Concept of “Tashabbuh bil-Kuffār”: This concept is introduced broadly and unqualifiedly in the title of the treatise—implying imitation in all matters—but later becomes restricted specifically to clothing, and more narrowly, to distinctive or symbolic clothing. Perhaps the author’s justification is that since such differentiation was not explicitly made in classical jurisprudential sources, he was obliged to follow that pattern. Subsequently, ornamentation and adornment were also included under the category of dress and appearance.

2. The Concept of “Tashabbuh”: The notion of tashabbuh itself has been restricted by numerous conditions and qualifications:

• Tashabbuh is a socially defined (ʿurfī) concept — and therefore, it is variable, subject to temporal and spatial circumstances.

• It is a context-dependent (iqtiḍā’ī) matter, meaning it has the capacity to alter primary rulings — for instance, if an act constitutes a violation of norms (mukhālafat al-ʿurf), it becomes haram, otherwise it remains permissible.

• The validity of tashabbuh does not depend on intention, awareness, or deliberate will; rather, it concerns the act itself, not the intention of the doer.

• At the same time, tashabbuh entails a degree of artificiality and imitation, accompanied by some level of awareness.

• It has two types: negative and positive — and the discussion in this book concerns only the negative type.

• It is a graded (tashkīkī) concept — it can apply to broader or narrower degrees.

• It cannot be established by a single isolated act; the behaviour must be repeated for tashabbuh to truly apply.

• Tashabbuh in any given matter remains valid only as long as the imitated practice or appearance remains distinctively associated with non-believers. If such an association ceases — for example, suits and trousers in Iran or neckties in some Arab countries — wearing them no longer constitutes blameworthy imitation.

• For tashabbuh to hold, the act must involve affiliation with non-believers or imitation of their culture as such, representing submission to the dominant culture of disbelief or foreignness.

• The act must not fall under secondary legal exceptions such as necessity, harm, hardship, or coercion, since in these cases the tashabbuh ruling does not apply — for example, circumstances like taqiyyah (dissimulation), wearing clothing for protection from cold or heat, or dressing for religious drama, film, or theatre performance.

The reviewer further notes an ambiguity in the main narration repeatedly cited throughout the work — “Man tashabbaha bi-qawmin fa-huwa minhum” (“Whoever imitates a people is one of them”) — questioning why this hadith has been exclusively interpreted as referring to outward appearance, clothing, or adornment. It would have been appropriate if, at the end of each section, the author had summarized his own chosen definition of the key concept, clearly identifying its primary and secondary qualifiers.

3. The Concept of “Kāfir”: Although the title of the treatise refers to “Tashabbuh bil-Kuffār”, the term kuffār in the text has been greatly expanded beyond its conventional meaning, extending to include all others and outsiders to the Islamic community.

For example, the term has been applied to:

• Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book),

• Mushrikūn (polytheists),

• Munāfiqūn (hypocrites),

• Majūs (Zoroastrians),

• Ghālīs (extremist sects),

• Khawārij,

• Nawāṣib,

• Idol worshippers,

• Materialists and atheists,

• The Umayyads and Abbasids,

• Non-Arabs (ʿAjam),

• Satans,

• Immoral or corrupt individuals,

• Arrogant and oppressive groups,

• Deviant Sufi sects,

• People of the Fire (ahl al-nār),

• Those embodying pre-Islamic (Jāhilī) culture,

• The people of Lot,

• Pharaoh, Qārūn, the enemies of God,

• and generally, adherents of corrupt and decadent Western or Eastern cultures, and all those outside the Sharia of Islam and the way of the faithful and pious.

The implication is that Muslims must avoid distinctive dress or symbols associated with any of these groups, where there exists a legitimate concern (khawf) of tashabbuh. The reviewer concludes that it would have been preferable to classify these many diverse groups according to a set of shared characteristics, rather than listing them individually.

4. The Concept of “Ruling” (Ḥukm): It has been stated that the primary ruling (aṣl al-awwalī) concerning tashabbuh is permissibility (ibāḥah). Elsewhere, it is said that tashabbuh, from a legal standpoint, can fall under any of the five rulings (aḥkām al-khamsah — obligatory, recommended, permissible, disliked, forbidden). In another place, the author claims that its initial ruling is dislike (karāhah), but when tashabbuh involves violation of religious norms, transgression of the moral code of the believers, disavowal of Islam, or allegiance to the disbelievers, it becomes haram. Elsewhere again, it is mentioned that the identification of tashabbuh in each era is determined by the prevailing social norms, and that its ruling falls under governmental decrees (aḥkām ḥukūmiyyah) — apparently conditional upon the existence of an Islamic government or the authority of a legitimate jurist (ḥākim shar‘ī).

5. The Concept of “Clothing or Dress Items” (that through which imitation is realized): This category includes coverings of the body and limbs, such as:
hats, neckties, rings, necklaces, bracelets, wristbands, contact lenses, shoes, or sandals. It also includes gender-specific clothing, such as men wearing women’s attire or vice versa, the growing or shaving of beards and mustaches (as associated with Zoroastrians or certain Sufi sects), the use of particular colours (e.g., red), and specific materials (e.g., silk or brocade for men).

It further extends to outfits that display arrogance, vanity, or immorality, such as clothing worn for show or pride, or garments exclusive to certain deviant religious sects, like the cloak, woollen robe, or patched garment (khirqah, sufī garb) of certain Sufis. It also includes garments decorated with numbers, letters, or obscene symbols, for instance, the number 666, which is associated with Satanic symbolism; the use of the turban and under-chin wrapping (taḥt al-ḥanak), which are symbols specific to scholars; and other similar cases.

Additional negative constraints are also mentioned for Muslim attire, including that clothing should:

• not be garments of fame or notoriety (libās al-shuhrah),

• not contradict dignity or propriety (murū’ah),

• not oppose the customs of the devout and Muslim community,

• not symbolize arrogance or vanity,

• not represent tabarruj (ostentatious display) or self-exhibition,

• not be vulgar or a means of spreading corruption,

• not cause material or moral harm,

• not be an instance of extravagance or waste (isrāf, tabdhīr),

• not violate modesty (‘iffah, ḥayā’) or provoke sexual temptation among non-maḥrams, for example, clothing that is tight, transparent, gaudy, or excessively colourful, etc.

6. The Concept of “Objective” (Hadaf): Regarding the purpose of Islam’s prohibition against tashabbuh bil-kuffār, whether in general matters or specifically in dress, various explanations are given, including:

• Preservation of the originality and independence of Islamic culture, especially in the domain of attire;

• Safeguarding the dignity and honour of the Muslim community and believers;

• Protection of society from cultural pollution and deviation;

• Fear that external symbols of dress (the outer layer of culture) may eventually influence internal beliefs and values (the core of culture);

• Avoiding alignment with the enemies of Islam, and thus preventing the strengthening of their morale;

• Implementation of the Qur’anic principle of “lā taḥsabanna lill-kāfirīn sabīlan” (no authority for the disbelievers);

• Demonstrating disavowal (tabarrī) of disbelievers;

• Actualizing the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil;

• Warning believers against self-degradation and moral dissolution;

• Avoiding humiliation of believers and the Islamic society;

• Rejecting shirk, tyranny, and their manifestations;

• Maintaining distance from foreigners and alien influences;

• Cultivating a sense of negative guardianship (walāyah manfiyyah);

• Acting upon the principle of love and hatred for the sake of God (ḥubb wa bughḍ fī Allah);

• Distinguishing the Islamic lifestyle from others;

• Preventing both material harm (e.g., strengthening the economy or markets of non-believers) and spiritual harm to the Muslim community;

• Avoiding assistance in sin (i‘ānah ‘alā al-ithm);

• and avoiding the promotion of non-Muslim symbols and rituals.

Some of these aims—such as the injunction to avoid i‘ānah ‘alā al-ithm—are ambiguous and require more precise operational definitions to be applicable in practice.)

7. Neglect of “Contemporary Transformations”: The reviewer notes that the author has not adequately considered the transformations of the modern era, an age defined by the dominance of modernity and postmodernity, the expansion of communication, and intense cultural interactions between societies, where cultures easily penetrate each other’s protective boundaries. This is an era of hybridization and cultural syncretism, where the lines between “self” and “other” have become blurred; an era of secular predominance, in which the authority of religion in guiding public culture and social institutions has significantly weakened.

It is also the age of media dominance, where global media platforms—satellite television, the internet, and social networks—play a decisive and unmatched role in shaping, promoting, and legitimizing lifestyles and aesthetic norms, including those related to dress and appearance. We live in the age of the culture industry and the clothing industry, where industrial centers, driven by economic profit, produce and market various types of apparel, transforming clothing—like other material commodities—into a consumer good with market value.

Furthermore, it is an era of widespread commercial exchange between societies, where goods circulate across nations through global export and import networks, and an era of globalized lifestyle patterns, including fashion, beauty, and ornamentation, leading to the diminishing authority of traditional, ethnic, national, regional, and religious customs.

It is also an age where the symbolic function of clothing has greatly weakened: Unlike in the past, clothing is no longer a stable marker of ethnic, national, or religious identity, except in the case of specific garments such as the robes of religious scholars or those still representative of a particular ethnicity, which are usually worn on special occasions or in specific settings. Similarly, certain women’s garments, like the chador, still retain their status in Islamic countries as symbols of religiosity, and there remains a strong commitment to their observance.

Finally, it is an age of fashion fluidity, where most clothing, adornment, and decorative trends are rapidly changing. Fashion by its very nature, is dynamic and constantly in flux, influenced by a variety of environmental and psychological factors. In the world of fashion, the focus has shifted toward psychological, aesthetic, pleasure-seeking, consumerist, and leisure dimensions, rather than the cultural, sociological, or religious aspects.

Interestingly, even among Christian youth (except their clergy) and many Jews, certain symbolic items such as the cross or braided hairstyles traditionally associated with Jewish identity are now used more as accessories or forms of beauty and self-expression, rather than as signs of religious affiliation.

Final Remarks and Recommendations

A number of points—though not in strict logical sequence—are worth noting: Based on the above, it becomes evident that establishing similarity (mushābahah) is not an easy matter. In many cases, similarities arise not from deliberate imitation, but from the universal influence of the dominant global cultural discourse that affects all societies alike. The contemporary social norms of believers also do not express significant sensitivity toward such issues.

Even in our own country—where cultural policy carries strong ideological and moral dimensions—attention is often limited to the superficial layers of culture, such as symbols, behaviors, products, and artifacts, rather than to deeper levels of meaning. Moreover, one should not overlook the role of time and place and the changes in social norms, customs, and rational practices (‘uqalā’ī conduct). It is clear that clothing has both stable and variable aspects, and its variable dimensions naturally change over time and across contexts—a topic extensively discussed by Shahid Murtaza Mutahhari in volume 21 of his Collected Works, under the title “Islam and the Requirements of the Time.”

Similarly, the argument based on the change of the Qiblah and the claim that Islam showed a strong sensitivity toward resembling the Jews is not entirely justified. The command to face Jerusalem in prayer at the beginning of Islam appeared to be legislated as a permanent and divinely fixed ordinance, while the Jews exploited this command as a pretext for mockery and criticism against the Prophet (p) and the early Muslims.

Another important reminder is that tashabbuh, as the author himself notes, is not an independent or absolute legal cause (‘illah tāmmā) for a ruling, but rather gains its legal weight in connection with secondary factors—such as when external imitation extends into internal belief, or when it indicates allegiance to disbelievers or disavowal of Islamic culture.

Furthermore, tashabbuh, like taqlīd (emulation), is not devoid of rationality. At times, a believer may prefer a certain style or fashion used by non-Muslims for practical or aesthetic reasons, without any religious compromise:

• Mere similarity in clothing does not equate to loyalty or affection toward non-believers.

• Mere imitation does not constitute obedience or submission to them.

• It also does not necessarily entail material or spiritual harm to the Muslim community, nor does it amount to assisting in sin.

• Nor does it imply the superiority of non-Muslim culture, since similarity in outward form does not automatically lead to similarity in belief, value, or worldview.

It should also be noted that in nearly every country today, certain professional uniforms are used commonly and universally, for example, the uniforms of doctors, nurses, flight attendants, Red Cross and Red Crescent staff, police officers, and so on. Even if these originated under Western or non-Muslim cultural influence, they cannot reasonably be considered blameworthy forms of tashabbuh.

Moreover, non-believers should not be viewed as a single, monolithic community with one unified culture, custom, or lifestyle. Not all of them are hostile toward Islam or Islamic culture:

• some are indifferent,

• some maintain strong relations of cooperation or coexistence,

• and some live under the protection (dhimmah) of Muslim societies.

Thus, they cannot generally be regarded as “enemies of God”, such that their attire should automatically be labelled libās al-a‘dā’. Likewise, adopting Western practices often stems merely from civilizational and technological aspects, and therefore should not be considered tashabbuh bil-kuffār, even if the majority of those societies are, from a theological standpoint, non-believers.

Recommendations: It is recommended that the honourable author refer to Shahid Mutahhari’s Notes, volume 6, particularly his discussion on religious symbols (sha‘ā’ir), to extract key indicators distinguishing Muslim modes of dress and adornment from those of others, and to formulate these into a conceptual model. Likewise, consulting sources that document the practical conduct (sīrah ‘amaliyyah) of the Infallibles (a) would also be beneficial in this regard.

A second important recommendation is to give due consideration to the conditions of time and place and the ongoing transformations in dress and appearance, which must not be neglected in contemporary juristic reasoning or in providing guidance for modern believers and communities.

This awareness of historical and contextual change should, as a matter of principle, inform all juristic interpretations related to lifestyle and guide the faithful in all dimensions of their lived experience.

Wa’l-ḥamdu lillāh rabb al-‘ālamīn.