Translator’s Introduction

The following is the translation of Shaykh Hobbollah’s discussion on the Ahl al-Bayt’s Position on the Islamic Conquests (both parts can be viewed here – Part 1, Part 2). Very little material exists in English that directly addresses the question of the Ahl al-Bayt’s position toward the early Islamic conquests. The discussions of this issue—whether in classical fiqh, medieval historiography, or modern Shi‘i theological works —are almost entirely confined to Arabic and Persian sources. As a result, English-speaking readers and students of Islamic thought often lack access to the arguments, evidence, and the vibrant inter-Shi‘i debates surrounding this topic.

This translation therefore serves an essential function: it makes these discussions accessible, preserves the nuance of the original arguments, and opens the door for a more informed engagement with a subject that is both historically sensitive and theologically significant.

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Part 1

Our subject today is the position of the Ahl al-Bayt toward the Islamic conquests, and in these two sessions I we will try to explore how they related to the conquests that took place in the earliest period of Islam. Before we begin I need to clarify what I mean by their position. What does “position” (mawqif) even mean here? We are not referring to their judgment on every action or every single event that took place during the conquests. Nor do we intend to assess the legitimacy of every behavior, order, or military action carried out. That is not the purpose of our discussion.

Rather, we are dealing with a two sided question. The first question asks whether the Ahl al-Bayt, peace be upon them, agreed with or participated in the conquests in such a way that would imply their approval of the very principle of offensive jihad (al-jihād al-ibtidāʾī). For if they had participated, and if we understand the conquests as a form of offensive jihad, then that participation would seem to suggest—according to the Imami understanding—that Islam does indeed contain a form of jihad unrelated to defending Muslim lands, one that instead involves entering the territories of others to take control or to spread the faith. Whether that notion is valid or not, however, is a jurisprudential discussion and it is not our concern here.

The second question—and this is the one we wish to address —is independent of whether offensive jihad is legitimate or not. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that offensive jihad is permissible and part of the Shari‘a. The question then becomes: did the Ahl al-Bayt approve of the conquests carried out by others? Or did they, for one reason or another, withhold their approval? Perhaps their disapproval stemmed not from a belief that offensive jihad is unlawful, but from other factors—such as their view that they themselves should have been at the forefront of these campaigns, and since others assumed that role, they could not endorse them; or perhaps because they saw that the timing of such wars were inappropriate, or that the Muslim community was not yet prepared to undertake campaigns of that scale, which might lead to grave errors and ultimately bring harm to Islam itself.

Hence, even if offensive jihad is accepted as a lawful and divinely sanctioned institution, the question that remains is whether the Ahl al-Bayt, peace be upon them, supported the historical conquests that occurred in their time, or whether—for one reason or another—they did not approve of them, did not endorse them, and did not consider them legitimate. Our inquiry here will focus on this issue.

The significance of this topic is far-reaching. Its effect is not limited to fiqh—and we are not doing fiqh here—but it also shapes how we understand the relationship between the Ahl al-Bayt and the caliphs, especially in the earliest period of Islam. Some might say—and I ask you to pay close attention to this point—that if we compare the language, tone, and behaviour of Imam Sadiq, Imam Baqir, and Imam Musa al-Kadhim, we find that their statements and conduct in defining the relationship with the Umayyad and Abbasid rulers reflects a language of isolation. There are clear instructions not to participate in their wars. There are even discussions about avoiding presence on the frontiers, even though guarding the frontiers is inherently defensive. Anything linked to the Umayyads and Abbasids is approached with caution.

From the time of Imam Baqir onwards we find an insistence—a firm tone—on creating a complete separation from those authorities. At the same time, we do not see any strong enthusiasm from these Imams for rebelling against the Umayyads or Abbasids. As is well known, for one reason or another there was no revolutionary zeal, and in some narrations they even criticised several of the uprisings that took place, especially in the second century hijri… So when I study Imam Sadiq and those who followed him, I see a clear insistence on training the Shi‘a to maintain their distance from the ruling authorities and tt the same time I do not see strong incentives pushing them toward revolt or uprisings in that era.

But when I study the statements and conduct of the earlier Imams—at least from the point of view of those who raise this argument—I find it much less pronounced. I do not find the kind of decisive instructions from Imam Ali, for example, commanding his followers to cut ties with the authorities of his time. In the era of the first caliphs there is nothing comparable, in tone or severity, to what we later find from Imam Sadiq and those who came after him, and this requires study. It is possible—historically speaking—that the Ahl al-Bayt were content with specific conquests in certain periods and maintained some level of communication with the authorities regarding those while urging complete separation from the authorities in other periods, even in matters related to the conquests themselves.

The question of whether the Ahl al-Bayt approved of the conquests—especially the conquests of the earliest Islamic period—is a topic that jurists have addressed. I will later explain why the jurists involved themselves in such a matter and what their connection to this issue is. But in the modern period, this topic has been examined within the Imami community from a historical–theological angle. The jurists approached it from a fiqh angle, but modern researchers have dealt with it from a historical angle with theological implications.

Shi‘i scholars today are divided into two groups on this matter:

Two Opinions

The First Group – Those who believe the Imam did not approve

The first group says that it is impossible for the Ahl al-Bayt to have participated in the conquests, even in the earliest Islamic period. They argue that it does not befit their status, their rank, or their Imamate to operate under the command of others. And they claim that there is no evidence that the Ahl al-Bayt approved of these conquests, blessed them, directed them, or supported them. This group rejects the idea completely. In fact, some contemporary figures from this group in have claimed that anyone who understands the foundations of Shi‘i theology knows that participation of the Imams in conquests under the authority of the caliphs is impossible.

Here we should note a conversation narrated by Shaykh Ali Kurānī between himself and Sayyid Ali Milānī. Kurānī, in his book Qirāʾah Jadīdah lil-Futūḥāt al-Islāmiyyah, mentions that after completing a section arguing for the Ahl al-Bayt’s approval and participation in the conquests he presented it to Sayyid Milānī for comment who responded: “No one familiar with Shia theology could accept it; and as for permission, there is no proof for it.”¹

It’s clear to see from such comments that this issue is strongly intertwined with theology. From a theological standpoint, this group argues it is impossible to accept that Imam Ali acted under the authority of someone else. This group—which rejects the Imam ever participated or gave permission, had some supporters who then tried to downplay the conquests themselves. We find that supporters of this group often describe the conquests as massacres, raids, worldly endeavors,² containing many errors here and there, with violations of covenants, and so on. Perhaps because they did not find proof for Ahl al-Bayt’s participation, or because they had ruled out the idea of their participation or their permission, they began emphasizing the negative aspects of the conquests.

The Second Group – Those who believe the Imam approved

The second group also approached the topic historically and theologically, but they strongly defended the idea that the Ahl al-Bayt participated in the conquests—even if only by guidance, not necessarily as soldiers under someone else’s command. They argued that the Ahl al-Bayt approved of the conquests and gave permission for them.

For this second group, the conquests are a point of pride. When they speak about them, even though they acknowledge certain criticisms, they still maintain that the conquests were an honour for the Muslims. Some among them even attributed many of the early achievements of the conquests to Imam Ali and his companions. A number of them focused in particular on the conquest of Iran and Persia. I do not know why the focus is often there, although it seems they want to argue that the conquests of Persia was not due to Umar, but to Imam Ali —that the conversion of the Persians and the lands of the East came through the blessing, efforts, planning, and presence of Imam Ali and the actions of his supporters on the battlefield.

I ask you to pay close attention because this is a highly sensitive topic that is deeply connected to sectarian dynamics and to theological discourse.

So we are looking at two splits on this topic – firstly a split amongst the jurists, and secondly a theological-historical divide among modern Shia researchers. Some reject outright the idea of participation and consider the very notion of participation to contradict the foundational principles of Imami theology. Others, however, argue firmly for some form of participation—one way or another—and they champion the involvement of the supporters of Imam Ali, taking pride in the conquests.

When examining this topic, we are dealing with a tension between doctrinal concerns and historical analysis. At times you find people working on history who are actual historians, and at times you find a theologian wearing the robe of a historian and engaging in historical research. This is something we often see in matters of this kind among almost all faiths [when there is a clash between history and dogma]. And we should avoid approaching this topic in a careless way.

So now—whether among the major jurists throughout history or among the researchers engaged in historical study—there is a split in opinion and all my discussion here will focus on the Imami Shia reading of the issue. I will begin with the position that supports the participation of, or the approval by, the Ahl al-Bayt regarding the conquests. After that [in the second part] I will move to the other position that rejects this. In the first, supportive position, I will mention their proofs and some of their arguments. In the rejection as well, I will mention the proof and some of their arguments and I will conclude with a brief final remark on the topic.

Evidence for the Second Group

Evidence 1 – Tacit approval

The first evidence presented is what I will call positive silence, or the tacit approval, of the Ahl al-Bayt toward the conquests.

The early caliphs carried out conquests outside the Arabian Peninsula and this is something nobody disputes. All of this happened openly right before the eyes of the Ahl al-Bayt, and yet despite this, we never hear a single criticism from them on this matter. We do not see Ali one day standing before the people telling them, “O people, these conquests in Rome or Persia are incorrect — do not participate.” Of course, the term “conquests” is a later expression, but the meaning is the same. Nor do we see him in private gatherings with his companions or his closest circle saying, “What these men are doing is wrong and I do not permit it.” Nothing of that sort reaches us.

We have no rejection from the Imams — especially the earliest of them — on this issue. And this is very clear evidence that they were in fact in agreement. If they had held a contrary view then it would have appeared somewhere. It would have been known and they would have explained it to their followers. If Ali himself did not disclose it, then surely the later Imams would have told their Shi‘a that Ali was not pleased with these campaigns or that he did not approve of them. Yet we have nothing of that kind. So this is a strong indication that they did not see the conquests as a problem.

For this reason I call this “the positive silence of the Ahl al-Bayt regarding the conquests,” especially the silence of the earliest Imams.

Critique of argument 1

Some might argue that the silence of Imams Ali, Hassan, and Husayn cannot be taken as proof of their approval. It is possible, they might argue, that they were in fact opposed but given that the conquests were already underway voicing opposition or criticism would have caused division within the Muslim community. The Muslims had just emerged from the conflicts of the apostasy wars and the community was fragile and a public stance from Ali against the conquests, according to this counter argument, could have heightened the divisions and weakened the Muslims.

Furthermore, even when Ali himself later assumed the caliphate, we see that he was unable to overturn certain deeply rooted customs and practices. So how could he then take a public stance against the conquests without facing severe backlash and without jeopardizing himself and his followers? Therefore, it can be argued that this silence is at most ambiguous and it could have been silent disapproval as much as tacit approval.

Response to this critique

The long silence of the later Imams — from Imam Baqir to Imam Askari — still has a weight of its own. Across that entire period, spanning generations, we do not find a single critical remark about the conquests or even a hint that these campaigns lacked legitimacy or divine approval. It is possible that the extended silence of the later Imams carries more historical significance than the silence of Imams Ali, Hassan, or Husayn, whose circumstances were much more constrained.

So this is the first argument for the view that the Ahl al-Bayt accepted the early Islamic conquests.

Evidence 2 – Consultation

The second evidence says that we have a group of historical examples that show the Ahl al-Bayt took part in the conquests through advice, military consultation, and strategic planning. I will mention the most important examples that are usually cited.

1. Ali’s Statement About Being Consulted by Umar

The first example is the well-known report where Ali speaks about his relationship with the second caliph Umar. Ali himself says that Umar used to consult him on major matters. This appears in the narration of Jabir al-Juʿfi as transmitted by al-Ṣadūq in al-Khiṣāl. The narration is from Imam Baqir who recounts a conversation between Ali and the chief rabbi of the Jews. Ali says to him:

“O brother of the Jews, the one who rose to authority after his companion [Umar after Abu Bakr] used to consult me in many matters and he would deal with them in line with my opinion. He would discuss with me challenging issues and he would act according to my opinion. I do not know of anyone — nor do my companions know of anyone — who debated these matters with him besides me….”³

This clearly points to a high level of consultation and coordination between Ali and Umar. Is it reasonable for Ali to say that Umar consulted him on the major matters, acted on his instruction, discussed challenging issues with him and proceeded according to his opinion — yet the issue of the conquests somehow fell outside this general framework Ali described?

Every minor and major matter, every important decision, every difficult point — Ali says Umar would ask him about it. So it is only natural to say that he must have asked him about the conquests as well. The conquests were not a simple decision. They were studied and debated before a final decision was made because they were extremely complex and there was even fear about whether the Muslims were capable of engaging in such large-scale wars.

So is it reasonable that Ali describes the scene — the relationship between him and Umar — as one of complete consultation and coordination, and that we have an Imami Shia narration transmitted by Shaykh Saduq himself, and yet Umar would not have consulted him on the matter of the conquests? He most certainly must have asked him. And since Ali says that Umar would proceed according to his instruction and act upon his opinion, this would mean that Ali agreed to the conquests. This is therefore a strong piece of evidence cited in this discussion.

2. Ali’s Advice to Umar Regarding the Roman Campaign

A second example is the set of reports about Ali advising Umar when Umar was preparing to march against the Romans. This appears in Nahj al-Balaghah, and a similar narration can be found in Yaʿqūbī’s Tārīkh and in Ibn ʿAsākir’s Tārīkh Dimashq. Imam Ali tells him:

“Allah has taken upon Himself for the followers of this religion the strengthening of boundaries and hiding of the secret places. Allah helped them when they were few and could not protect themselves. He is Living and will not die. If you will yourself proceed towards the enemy and clash with them and fall into some trouble, there will be no place of refuge for the Muslims other than their remote cities, nor any place they would return to. Therefore, you should send there an experienced man and send with him people of good performance who are well-intentioned. If Allah grants you victory, then this is what you want. If it is otherwise, you would serve as a support for the people and a returning place for the Muslims.”⁴

So here is another example. What does this text indicate? It shows that the Imam was consulted, that he gave his opinion, that he approved of the expedition and that he in fact wanted the campaign to succeed.

As a disclaimer note that we are only discussing Imam Ali’s view on the conquest and we are not by anyway making an argument that Imam Ali acknowledged Umar’s caliphate – that is an entirely separate matter [and can no way be inferred from this].

3. Ali’s Consultation on the Persian Campaign

A third example is another consultation recorded in Nahj al-Balaghah where Umar again seeks Ali’s advice this time about the Persians:

The position of the head of government is that of the thread for beads, as it connects them and keeps them together. If the thread is broken, they will disperse and be lost, and will never come together again. The Arabs today, even though small in number are big because of Islam and strong because of unity. You should remain like the axis for them, and rotate the mill (of government) with (the help of) the Arabs, and be their root. Avoid battle, because if you leave this place the Arabs will attack you from all sides and directions till the unguarded places left behind by you will become more important than those before you.

If the Persians see you tomorrow they will say, “He is the root (chief) of Arabia. If we do away with him we will be in peace.” In this way this will heighten their eagerness against you and their keenness to aim at you. You say that they have set out to fight against the Muslims. Well, Allah detests their setting out more than you do, and He is more capable of preventing what He detests. As regards your idea about their (large) number, in the past we did not fight on the strength of large numbers but we fought on the basis of Allah’s support and assistance.⁵

This again shows active consultation and shows Imam Ali offering guidance that supports the war effort.

4. The Consultation of Abu Bakr With Ali

A fourth example appears in the accounts of Ibn ʿAsākir, Ibn al-Atham al-Kūfī, the Indian compiler al-Muttaqī in Kanz al-ʿUmmāl, and Yaʿqūbī.

Abu Bakr said to them, “What do you think?” Uthman ibn Affan replied, “I believe that you are sincere toward the people of this religion and concerned for their well-being. So if you hold a view that you consider beneficial for the community at large, then proceed with it, for you are not someone to be suspected.” Talha, al-Zubayr, Sad, Abu Ubayda, Said ibn Zayd, and those present in that gathering from the Muhajirun and the Ansar all said, “Uthman has spoken the truth. Whatever you see to be the right course, then carry it out. We will neither oppose you nor accuse you.” They mentioned this and similar statements, while Ali was sitting among them and had not spoken.

Abu Bakr then turned to him and said, “What is your view, Aba al-Hasan?” Ali said, “I see that whether you go out to them yourself or you send someone to them, you will be granted victory over them, God willing.” Abu Bakr said, “May God give you good news. From where did you know this?” Ali replied, “I heard the Messenger of God say: ‘This religion will continue to prevail over everyone who opposes it until the religion stands firm and its people are dominant.’”⁶

This narration is cited by multiple historians with variations in wording.

According to those who present these historical examples, this is strong evidence that Ali was not only consulted but supported the initiative and believed in its success.

Critique of argument 2

It’s possible to raise a few criticisms of the evidence presented here.

Firstly, these traditions that speak of the Imam consulting and giving advice are few in number, and secondly, most of them have no chain of narration. Even if they happen to appear in books like Nahj al-Balagha this does not mean that they are automatically authentic. Thirdly, none of them have anything to say about the principle of conquests themselves, rather, they touch on the details or particulars of the war. The Imam isn’t going to refrain from giving advice on how to conduct the campaigns now that the conquests are already underway.  The Imam will obviously try to help the Muslim army in it’s current predicament.

A further issue is to do with the Shi’i narration of Jabir al-Ju’fi. This tradition has a weak chain and has been graded weak by several scholars too (albeit Shaykh Ansari in his Makasib has accepted this tradition according to his own framework).

Response to this critique

But in any case, even though these examples are weak, they still give us something. They cannot be completely dismissed. When we look at them together in terms of their number, their content, and their chains, they offer a certain degree of strength [even if small].

Interestingly Syed Khoie has a comment on some of these narrations. He says that these reports apply to the lands that were conquered during the time of Umar only and that this does not necessarily apply to other periods. This brings us back to the point I mentioned earlier. I said a little while ago that it is possible the Imams may have given approval in one period and withheld approval in another. Their policy on this issue may have followed their policy in dealing with the ruling authorities. And because their relationship with the governing powers changed from one era to another, their stance on matters like the conquests may also have changed. So we may see one type of attitude in the Umayyad period and a different one in the period before them. If we keep this possibility in mind it will help us better understand Syed Khoie’s opinion [when we get to it].

Evidence 3 – Participation of close companions

The third evidence presented begins by asking: why should we restrict ourselves to textual reports when we have clear and undeniable historical accounts that dozens of the closest students of Imam Ali, his most loyal companions and those most attached to him, also took part in the conquests. Is it reasonable to assume that all these figures participated without knowing whether Imam Ali approved of it or not? When I [as a close companion of the Imam] participate, it means I consider that the Imam approves it.

And there is a long name of companions who participated, to name some: Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān, Salman al-Fārsī, ʿAmmār ibn Yāsir, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, al-Miqdād ibn ʿAmr, Khālid ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ and his brother ʿAmr, Hāshim ibn ʿUtbah al-Mirqāl, ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib al-Hāshimī along with his two sons, ʿAbd Allāh and ʿUtbah, Burayd al-Aslamī, ʿUbādah ibn al-Ṣāmit, Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī, ʿUthmān ibn Ḥunaf and his brother ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sahl al-Anṣārī, Mālik ibn al-Ḥārith al-Ashtar together with his brothers, Saʿsaʿah ibn Ṣūḥān al-ʿAbdī and his brothers, al-Aḥnaf ibn Qays, Ḥujr ibn ʿAdī al-Kindī, ʿAmr ibn al-Ḥamq al-Khuzāʿī, Abū al-Haytham ibn al-Tayyahān, Jaʿd ibn Hubayrah, al-Nuʿmān ibn Muqarrin, Muḥammad ibn Abī Ḥudhayfah al-Anṣārī, Abū Umāmah al-Bāhilī, Abū Rāfiʿ, the freedman of the Messenger of Allah, al-Barāʾ ibn ʿĀzib, Khuzaimah ibn Thābit al-Anṣārī, ʿAdī ibn Ḥātim al-Ṭāʾī, Jārī ibn Qudāmah al-Saʿdī, and Abū al-Aswad al-DuʾAli.

And the list goes on. History is full of dozens of companions who participated. It would be absurd to assume that all of these people, who we could classify as being from Imam Ali’s group (hizb), entered dangerous military campaigns risking their lives in the process, exposing themselves to death and destruction, without having a green light to do so from Imam Ali, or having some level of reassurance that the Imam was ok with it.

In my opinion they must have had permission. They must have known of his satisfaction, and this becomes a conclusive piece of evidence. When we combine this evidence with the previous two evidences the overall argument becomes even stronger.

Critique of Argument 3

Now of course the group who argue that the Imam did not approve of these conquests cannot deny this historical fact given the overwhelming documentation for it, so instead they critique this evidence by making the following claim: They argue that what we today call the “Islamic conquests” can be divided into two categories: defensive wars and non-defensive wars. They say that those companions who were close to Imam Ali only participated in the defensive wars — such as the battles of Nahāwand and al-Qādisiyyah. Some of them went even further and said that the conquests of Iraq and Egypt themselves were defensive. What do they mean by “defensive”? They say that in Iraq there were people who had embraced Islam and were persecuted, and in Egypt there were people who had embraced Islam and were persecuted. These new Muslims then asked the Muslim community to save them from being oppressed so the Muslims intervened to defend them.

So this group does not deny the historical participation itself, instead they try to reinterpret the nature of the wars. They say that the participation of imam Ali’s companions was limited to defensive battles or what we might be called “humanitarian intervention,” meaning they intervened to rescue persecuted believers in Iraq or Egypt, or they fought pre-emptively because the Persians were preparing to attack, as in the cases of Qādisiyyah and Nahāwand. According to this reading, defensive wars are not the issue [and the participation of all of these companions in them proves nothing]. Call them “conquests” if you want, use whatever terminology you prefer. The argument is that we are discussing the conquests that fall outside the category of defensive warfare so all this evidence must be re-examined through that lens.

Of course this requires a serious investigation. We would have to gather every narration about the participation of these companions and then determine exactly which battles they joined and then on top of that determine the nature of each battle and whether it was truly defensive. It suffices to say that this is not easy to establish.

Second critique on evidence 3

Another argument raised on this evidence is the argument of Syed Ja’far Murtadha al-Amili. He says in his book al-Hayāt al-Siyāsiyyah lil-Imām al-Ḥasan that the companions of the Prophet and Imam Ali participated in the conquests did so while being unaware of the truth of the matter. These were sincere individuals who wanted to serve Islam and Muslims but they did not know the opinion of the Imams on these conquests. The Imams, according to Syed Murtadha, rejected the conquests and these companions did not know that and they participated in the conquests albeit without awareness of the Imams real position or without receiving explicit permission.

Syed Murtadha takes this argument even further. He also says that perhaps the ruling authority forced these companions to join the conquests, that maybe pressure was put on them, that the state exercised coercion which compelled them to take part in these campaigns. So to summarise, Syed Murtadha presents two issues – the first is that the companions did not know that the Imam disapproved of the conquests, and the second is that they might have known (or they might not have) but regardless they were pressured by the authorities to take part.⁷

A critique on this critique

In my view this argument is not convincing at all — at least when it comes to the close companions of Imam Ali, as it makes no sense that they would have no knowledge of the Imam’s view. What kind of secrecy is this supposed to be? These were people who lived with the Imam, who were with him in Madina, they were in constant contact and communication with him. What does it mean that they “didn’t know”, or that the Imam hid his views from them? If they didn’t know, then who knew? It seems like a hypothesis put forward only to create far-fetched alternatives (just to push away the obvious explanation). That is how it appears to me.

Shaykh Kūrānī comments on this saying: “The claim that the companions of Imam Ali were unaware of his position and still participated [in the conquests] is a weak claim. How can we imagine that such great figures engaged in wars, bore the heavy responsibilities of blood, honor, wealth, and the reputation of Islam, all the while believing that Ali, the successor of their Prophet and their divinely appointed Imam yet they never asked him about the ruling of their actions?⁸

It seems then that Sayyid Jaʿfar Murtadā is clutching at straws here. He assumes that the companions had absolutely no knowledge of Imam Ali’s position on the conquests and that they went on to participate in something so serious and so critical in the life of Muslims without even one of them seeking out information. Naturally if the Imam had a negative opinion then word of it would have spread among them.

Even the assumption that pressure was placed upon them — that they were forced — has no evidence whatsoever. We have no information supporting anything like that. This idea of pressure and taqiyyah often appears whenever researchers encounter a historical difficulty — a problem in a narration, a particular issue or a contradiction [between theology and history]. The first way they react is to say, “This was out of taqiyyah,” or, “This was under pressure,” or, “They couldn’t act otherwise”, but in all honesty that is just an assumption — empty hypothetical scenarios void of any evidence. I could come up with ten such hypotheses right now if I wanted to but unless there’s even a faint scent of evidence for one of them, they hold no value.

In fiqh, creating hypotheses might be useful as it can sharpen your reasoning. But we’re not doing fiqh here — we’re studying history. And in history this method doesn’t work. You can produce many hypotheses, yes, but when it comes to historical proof, it’s difficult to find anything of that sort.

Some contemporary scholars have even tried to say that during his own caliphate, Imam Ali also led conquests in regions such as Khurasan and Africa however this needs further investigation.

Others have focused on the Ahl al-Bayt’s concern for those stationed on the borders — the people of the frontiers (ahl al-thughūr). For example, Imam Sajjad’s supplication for the people of the frontiers in al-Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādiyyah has been cited as evidence of the Ahl al-Bayt’s approval of those engaged in the conquests however this also requires clarification. Were the ahl al-thughūr engaged purely in defensive roles? If so, that’s not evidence for approval of offensive conquests. Or was their duty both defensive and offensive — not limited to protection? That, too, needs further study. Indeed, some of the phrases in Imam Sajjad’s supplication for the frontier guards in al-Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādiyyah suggest that part of the operations they undertook were offensive in nature, however this subject requires further discussion which we won’t do here.

Evidence 4 – Jurisprudential approval

The fourth evidence has to do with what I would call the Ahl al-Bayt’s approach to the legal consequences of the conquests, and this is the point at which the jurists enter the discussion. When we turn to the jurisprudence of the Ahl al-Bayt — to their narrations, teachings, and legal practice — we find that they dealt with the lands opened by force (al-arāḍī al-maftūḥah ʿanwatan), that is, those territories seized through warfare, as lands governed by the rulings of conquest.

As is well known, land in Islam carries different legal classifications — among them, lands of ṣulḥ (opened through treaty), lands opened by force and lands whose people embraced Islam willingly. When we examine the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt and the practice of their companions, we find that they consistently recognized and applied the legal results of the conquests as something legitimate within the Shariah.

In matters related to captives, spoils, lands, and wealth, we do not see from them any negative or oppositional stance — no statement such as, “These lands of Iraq were not legitimately conquered by force; we reject their being classified as maftūḥah ʿanwatan, since Imam Ali did not grant a religious authorization, and therefore their rulings do not apply.”

On the contrary, they treated these lands according to the legal framework that applies to arāḍī maftūḥah ʿanwatan — meaning lands taken in battle. If such rulings did not apply, then logically those territories would have fallen under other categories, such as anfāl (property belonging to the Imam), or fay’, or something else altogether.

On this basis the jurists have said: the conduct of the Imams, their narrations, and the practice of their followers demonstrate a consistent legal treatment of the conquests in full accordance with Islamic law. This continuity in legal recognition, without any attempt to alter or negate it, stands as evidence that the Ahl al-Bayt approved of these conquests — for how could the Imams establish legal rulings and consequences upon an act that they deemed illegitimate?

We are referring to an entire corpus of intricate legal rulings in Islamic jurisprudence built upon these conquests. Imam Sadiq, Imam Baqir, and the Imams who followed — all addressed these lands, spoils, and rulings as legally valid outcomes of legitimate wars. That in itself is a strong indication that the conquests held religious legitimacy in their view.

Critique of Argument 4

This is a detailed juristic discussion and I do not wish to delve too deeply into it here. Some might argue that the Imams, as the rightful custodians (awliyā’) of these lands, later granted legal sanction to them to ease the practical burdens the Muslims and the Shia. That is another possible line of analysis but we shall not enter it here

Evidence 5 – The spread of Islam

The fifth argument is brought by Muḥaddith al-Bahrani who despite being a traditionalist (akhbari), is among those who defended the idea that the Ahl al-Bayt gave their approval for the conquests.

Bahrani’s approach, as we might describe it today, is a maqāṣid-based or end’s driven argument. That is, his reasoning carries a theological and goal-directed tone. He begins by asking: Who is the true authority after the Prophet? The true authority after the Prophet is Imam Ali. Then he asks: Would the one who holds true authority after the Prophet not love to see Islam strengthened, its name exalted, and its dominion extended? If Islam should prevail — even if its victory comes through the hands of others — would he reject it? If he rejected it, would that make him, God forbid, envious or resentful, as though he could only rejoice in triumphs that came through himself? Of course not.

What is the ultimate purpose of the Prophet’s and Imams mission if not to extinguish the fire of disbelief and to establish Islam? Whether Imam Ali had direct control over the command of the state or the authority to dispatch armies is beside the point. As Bahrani explains, the fundamental purpose — the triumph of Islam — was achieved regardless. People entered the religion in vast numbers; Islam spread to the East and West of the world. Would Imam Ali then be displeased at that? How could he, when such an outcome represents the very goal of the prophetic mission — a goal that he himself deeply loved and lived for? How could he reject or disapprove of something that fulfills the divine purpose of Islam? That would be inconceivable.

Muhaddith Bahrani concludes his argument in al-Ḥadāʾiq al-Nāḍirah saying: “And this, by the praise of Allah, is a sound and reasonable view for whoever judges with fairness and accepts the truth; and what we have presented stands as testimony for anyone who recognizes the truth and upholds it.”⁹

Here we see that Bahranis reasoning stems from a theological vision of the Imamate — an end’s driven or maqāṣidī approach. He asks: What is the aim of the conquests? What is the purpose of the Imamate itself? Surely, it is to fortify the religion and establish its strength. If that goal was fulfilled — even if not through the Imam’s own direct hand — could he possibly resent it? Could he be displeased with an outcome that brings power to Islam, merely because it did not occur through him personally? Perhaps he might disapprove of the person who carried it out, if that person was unworthy — but not of the act itself, which advanced Islam’s cause.

Later scholars engaged with this reasoning. Syed Khoei, for example, remarked that while there is no problem in principle with Bahranis argument — and indeed it may well be valid — it does not necessarily follow that every conquest met with the approval of the Ahl al-Bayt. Some conquests, he suggested, may have weakened Islam rather than strengthened it. Syed Khoie seems to have accepted the logic of Muhaddith Bahrani’s framework in general, but questioned its application: How can we be certain that every single conquest served the cause of Islam? Perhaps some didn’t.

Concluding Remarks

And so to summarize these are the 5 principal approaches adopted by the scholars who supported the view that the Ahl al-Bayt approved of the early Islamic conquests. Among the most prominent figures who endorsed this position was the great jurist Muhaqqiq Sabzawari, who in his Kifāyat al-Aḥkām references the consultations between Imam Ali and Umar, and to Umar’s decisions being made with Ali’s approval, as evidence that the Imam approved of them. He also mentions the participation of certain Shia figures in positions of command and governance, as well as in military leadership.¹⁰

Among those who shared this position, as we have mentioned, was al-Muḥaddith al-Bahrani with his theological argument, and likewise Shaykh al-Anṣārī, who in al-Makāsib, when discussing the lands of Iraq, stated that they were conquered with the permission of Imam Ali — and he then extends the discussion to other territories beyond Iraq.¹¹

In our next session, I will turn to the position of Syed Khoie, for it seems that he held two different opinions on this matter — at times he appears to agree and at other times to disagree. However, before concluding today, let me briefly point to two important issues that are particularly relevant to our discussion.

The first concerns whether Imam Ali actually participated himself as a soldier under the command of Abū Bakr in the wars of apostasy. This claim was mentioned by Syed Mohammad Sadr in one of his public speeches — a statement he directed to the Iraqi people in 1979 — which subsequently caused some controversy.¹² We will stop to look at this issue carefully: what might have been Sayyid Sadr’s reasoning for such a statement and what sources, if any, support it?

The second point has to do with the reported participation of Imam Hassan and Imam Hussayn in some of the later Islamic conquests in regions such as Africa, Ṭabaristān, and elsewhere. We have to consider: are these reports authentic? Is there any reliable evidence for them? And if so, can they offer us insights into our broader question about the stance of the Ahl al-Bayt toward the conquests?

1. Shaykh Kurani, Qirāʾah Jadīdah lil-Futūḥāt al-Islāmiyyah, v.1 p.46
2. Syed Qazwini – Legitimacy of Islamic Conquests
3. Shaykh Saduq, al-Khisal, v2. p. 374
4. Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 134
5. Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 146
6. Ibn Asakir, Tarikh al-Dimashq, v.2, p.64
7. Syed Ja’far Murtadha, al-Hayāt al-Siyāsiyyah lil-Imām al-Ḥasan, p.126
8. Qirāʾah Jadīdah lil-Futūḥāt al-Islāmiyyah , v1, p. 40
9. al-Ḥadāʾiq al-Nāḍirah, v.18, p.309
10. Kifāyat al-Aḥkām, p.391
11. al-Makāsib, v.5, p.351

12. واُريد أن أقولها لكم يا أبناء علىّ والحسين، وأبناء أبي بكر وعمر: إنّ المعركة ليست بين الشيعة والحكم السنّيّ.

    إنّ الحكم السنّيّ الذي مثّله الخلفاء الراشدون، والذي كان يقوم على أساس الإسلام والعدل، حمل علي السيف للدفاع عنه؛ إذ حارب جنديّاً في حروب الردّة تحت لواء الخليفة الأوّل (أبي بكر)، وكلّنا نحارب عن راية الإسلام، وتحت راية الإسلام مهما كان لونها المذهبىّ.

    And I want to say this to you, O sons of Ali and al-Husayn, and sons of Abu Bakr and Umar: the struggle is not between the Shia and Sunni governments.

    The Sunni government represented by the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, which was founded upon Islam and justice — Ali carried the sword in its defense. He fought as a soldier in the Ridda wars under the banner of the first caliph, Abu Bakr. And all of us fight for the banner of Islam and under the banner of Islam irrespective of the sect.  Syed Kadhim Ha’iri, Mabahith al-Usul, p. 138