By Shaykh Rasul Jafariyan, Translated by Sayyid Ali Imran

Article Summary

We all know there is a significant difference between the science of astronomy and the pseudo-science of astrology, which at one time was considered a science, though not by everyone. The problem is that in certain periods, even contrary to the views of great scholars of the Islamic world, astrology held more credibility than astronomy. Our question is: what impact did this pseudo-knowledge, which many even then considered pseudo-knowledge, have on the state of science in Islamic civilization? The existence of such pseudo-sciences caused the course of true science to deviate. Instead of progress and development, the Islamic world remained bogged down in the mire of scientific stagnation. This article explores the extent of opposition to astrology, which was supported by kings and rulers, and pursued by some scholars for their livelihood, and examines the extent of its negative impact on the state of knowledge.¹

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A significant portion of volitional events in the human world have been, and continue to be, shaped by astrological outlooks. This issue has been prevalent, firstly, across the entire world, and secondly, in the Islamic world, both in the realm of political history, including wars, decisions, and actions of kings and rulers, and among the general populace.

Islamic-era historical records are filled with information on this topic, information that shows the extent to which people’s decisions were based on astrological knowledge conveyed to them by astrologers and soothsayers. Countless wars, battles, massacres, executions, and enmities have stemmed from astrological predictions. These issues are categorized under what is called “astral judgments” (aḥkām-e nujūmī) and are naturally distinct from the science of astronomy, which pertains to knowledge of planets, stars, their movements, eclipses, and similar phenomena. This distinction within astronomy has existed for a long ago, and even al-Fārābī made note of it.²

In the realm of astrological predictions, a common feature in public life was the presence of calendars that stated the auspicious and inauspicious days, and people arranged their daily affairs based on these. Sayyid al-Murtaḍā (d. 436 AH) mentioned the existence of such calendars among the populace.³ A description of these calendars and their influence and popularity among the people was provided by Sayyid Ibn Ṭāwūs (d. 664 AH) in his own time, which is quite fascinating.⁴ In his unique book, Ibn Ṭāwūs gives an account of the status of astrologers and their influence during the late Abbasid era and on the eve of its fall to the Mongols. At that time, there was an ongoing debate about the permissibility of astronomy, and Ibn Ṭāwūs titled his book accordingly: Faraj al-Mahmūm fī Maʿrifat Nahj al-Ḥalāl min ʿIlm al-Nujūm (“Relief for the Distressed in Knowing the Permissible Path in the Science of the Stars”). Without a doubt, this book can serve as a basis for a comprehensive examination of the ideas and opinions that existed in that period — and earlier — regarding the influence of the stars on human life.

This topic is discussed in various texts both in terms of refuting astral judgments and defending them. The truth is that most of the intellectual figures of the early Islamic centuries — especially the Peripatetic philosophers — were opposed to it. Therefore, we have more texts arguing against it than in favour. However, in social reality, astrologers wielded significant influence and were met with great approval by both politicians and the general public, who usually shared the same mindset.

What is of interest here is to familiarize the reader with the mode of argumentation on this topic — namely, how philosophical, theological, natural scientific, and religious methods become intertwined within a single discussion. The philosopher approaches the issue from one perspective, with a general metaphysical outlook; the theologian (mutakallim) engages with rational-religious arguments; the natural scientist proceeds based on empirical methods and the rational presuppositions that govern natural science; and the religious scholar and traditionist (muḥaddith) discusses it using reports and traditions. This kind of pluralistic approach reveals a disorder in epistemic discussions within Islamic civilization — a confusion that, in addition to the many other obstacles hindering the growth of science, prevented the correct path from being taken in evaluating scientific claims.

A subtle point here is that two groups of philosophers held differing views on the subject. The Peripatetic philosophers generally resisted astral judgments and considered them invalid, whereas mystical-leaning philosophers, Neoplatonists, and figures such as the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ — who held similar views — were proponents of astral judgments. Of course, their endorsement was of a different kind, but at the very least, they held that celestial movements could serve as signs (not causal agents) for the occurrence of certain terrestrial and human events.

The Beginning and Development of the Discussion

The topic of astrology was part of the Greek sciences that were translated into Arabic and made available to Muslims. They expanded and elaborated on it. Scattered information about this can be found in al-Nadīm’s Fihrist (pp. 327, 328, 333).

Before this period, in the 4th/10th century, various discussions were held on the topic among philosophers. One of the earliest treatises is by al-Fārābī (d. 339 AH) titled al-Nukat fī mā yaṣiḥḥ wa mā lā yaṣiḥḥ min ʿilm al-nujūm, which has been published.⁵ As a philosopher, Fārābī took a firm stance against astral judgments. His arguments are philosophical, and among them, he critiques the baseless presuppositions of astrological judgments. In one place he says:

“Now that the scholars and those knowledgeable of realities have agreed that celestial bodies in their essence are not capable of producing effects or generating formations, nor do their natures differ — then what prompted the proponents of astral judgments to declare some of them inauspicious and others auspicious?”⁶

In the second half of the 4th/10th century, astrology became a widely debated topic in Baghdad and many other scholarly circles. Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 400 AH) makes clear references to it.⁷ On later pages as well, opinions from various individuals on the matter are quoted.

Ibn Sīnā (d. 428 AH), in defining astronomy, considered it a kind of conjectural science and said:

“(Among them is) the science of astral judgments. It is a conjectural science whose aim is to reason from the configurations of the stars, by comparing them to one another, and to the degrees of the zodiac, and to the sum of these with respect to the Earth — concerning what occurs in the cycles of the world, kingdoms, countries, births, revolutions, transits, elections, and interrogations.”⁸

Ibn Sīnā’s arguments against astral judgments are also found concisely but forcefully in al-Shifāʾ, Theology section, p. 440.⁹

At the same time, a philosopher like Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī held a belief in the influence of the celestial spheres, and he wrote a text on the subject. ʿAlī ibn ʿĪsā also wrote a treatise titled Ibṭāl aḥkām al-nujūm (“Refutation of Astral Judgments”) in opposition to ʿĀmirī’s claims.¹⁰ The treatise by ʿAlī ibn ʿĪsā ibn al-Jarrāḥ, the vizier (d. 391 AH), titled Ibṭāl aḥkām al-nujūm, was published by Suḥbān Khalīfāt in the journal of the Jordanian Academy of Sciences (vol. 32, year 1987). Without a doubt, this work emerged in the context of debates that were taking place at the time between supporters and opponents of astrology in Baghdad.

Al-Jarrāḥ, who had expertise in Qurʾanic and ḥadīth sciences, also studied Greek philosophy under Fārābī’s student Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, and he associated with the philosophers of Baghdad, becoming familiar with the works of al-Kindī and Abū Zayd al-Balkhī. He was also active in politics, having served three times as vizier under al-Muqtadir and once under al-Qāhir. He learned Persian and Syriac seriously, and among his written works is this very treatise refuting astrological judgments. If he followed Fārābī’s school in philosophy, then such a position is only natural.

The text of his treatise was also included by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah in his book Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿādah, though interspersed with words from others and annotations by Ibn Qayyim himself. The editor of the treatise explains that although the author emphasized the influence of celestial phenomena on the growth of plants and similar things, he denied their influence on human voluntary actions. In addition to rational arguments, he also used religious proofs, consistently emphasizing that there is no evidence for such claims in the Qurʾān or Prophetic Sunnah. He wrote this treatise in response to someone who had asked him to speak on the matter.

His opening phrase is quite interesting: “May God protect you from accepting impossibilities and from believing in what lacks any evidentiary proof.”¹¹

To show his fairness, he notes that he is not like those who deny all effects from the heavens upon the Earth. He follows this with many examples of changes on Earth and among humans — even things like skin color — being attributed to the heavens. But these are stated in order to refute the core claims of the proponents of astral judgments. For immediately afterward, he says:

“As for what they claim beyond this — that the stars determine that so-and-so will live such-and-such number of years and months, or that they pinpoint the moment down to the fraction of an hour, and that they indicate that a particular man will become king or another will become vizier, and that the duration of their rule will be such and such…”

With these words, he rejects the astrologers’ predictions that someone will live until a specific year or month, or that someone will be appointed to kingship or vizierate until a certain time.¹²

He also rejects the idea of planets being auspicious or inauspicious and addresses the disagreements among astrologers on these matters. He points out that the roots of these claims lie with Greek figures such as Ptolemy, Dorotheus, Antiochus, and Zosimus, as well as other Roman, Indian, and Babylonian scholars.¹³ In any case, this work is an extremely important and foundational treatise on the subject and one of the key landmarks in the debate.

The defenders of the theory of planetary influence, who were enthusiasts of Neoplatonic thought, continued along their own path. A chapter in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity is dedicated to discussing aḥkām al-nujūm, and right at the beginning, it notes the ongoing disagreements on this topic.¹⁴ The Neoplatonic disposition of this group in affirming the influence of celestial bodies on human affairs is evident. The authors of these epistles repeatedly discuss astrological rulings throughout various parts of the book.

In addition to philosophers, scholars and scientists of the natural sciences also opposed astrology, considering astrologers’ descriptions of the planets and stars to be mental illusions and far removed from reality. As a result, they deemed their interpretations and conclusions to be inaccurate.

Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī titled the fifth chapter of his book al-Tafhīm “On Astrological Judgments” and noted that the questioner for whom the book was written had requested this type of content: “The questioner intended this.” He then wrote: “Among most people, astrological judgments are considered the fruit of the mathematical sciences, although our belief about this product and this craft is similar to that of the most unlearned among people!”¹⁵

He then extensively describes the beliefs held among various nations on this matter, and at one point he writes: “The root of this discussion lies in the weakness of the premises of this craft and the disorder of its analogies. The practitioners of this field first agreed upon colours, scents, tastes, properties, actions, and temperaments, and then they assigned these to the stars according to their presumed natures, auspiciousness, and inauspiciousness…”¹⁶

Elsewhere, he also refers to the differing schools among astrologers on this issue and attributes the divergence in their conclusions to foundational differences in their underlying principles.¹⁷

For example, Shahrzūrī wrote in the 7th/13th century:

“As for the science of astrological judgments (ʿilm al-aḥkām al-nujūmiyya), it has no relation to the natural sciences. Most of what they mention contradicts the natural sciences, such as their description of the planets with the four elemental qualities. For instance, they say Saturn is cold and dry, Jupiter is temperate, Mars is hot and dry, and that temperance is good, and good is fortunate, and excess is evil, and evil is unlucky — therefore Mars is unlucky. These qualities are based on sensory perception, and there is no proof for describing the planets with such qualities. As for the Sun, although the senses indicate its heat, reason points to the contrary.”¹⁸

He states that he included a summary of the treatises of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī and Abū ʿAlī Sīnā that refute astrological judgments.

These discussions also took place among jurists and, with less intensity, among hadith transmitters and Qurʾanic exegetes. Among them, Sayyid al-Murtaḍā (d. 436 AH) wrote a treatise in response to a question on this matter titled Masʾalah fī al-radd ʿalā al-munajjimīn (“A Treatise in Refutation of the Astrologers”), which must be considered one of the best of its kind in that era. Sayyid al-Murtaḍā’s rational and intellectual approach can be seen throughout his writings.

He was asked about the astrologers’ belief in the “influences of the science of astrology,” and whether there was anything wrong with believing in the influence of the stars in the same way that we accept the influence of the Sun. Suppose the influence of the stars were impossible, what would be wrong in saying that God has habitually arranged things such that when a particular star rises, a particular event occurs on Earth?

Sayyid al-Murtaḍā discussed this in detail and emphasized that the notion of habit is not what astrologers propose; they explicitly posit influence. This is the position of early astrologers, and if the idea of habit is now being proposed, it is a new idea.

He states that the theologians rejected the idea that stars are agents (fāʿilah). Likewise, the concept of natures (ṭabāʾiʿ) was also rejected, and so was the idea that celestial bodies are living and capable. Life is incompatible with extreme heat — when the heat of the Sun reaches us from such a great distance with such intensity, how can it be possible for life to exist within it? Furthermore, the belief that stars are alive is unanimously considered incorrect and invalid among Muslims: “This is known necessarily from the religion of the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him and his family.”

Even if it were assumed that the stars are living beings, their influence on Earth would have to occur through generation and reproduction, which would require an intermediary medium — but there is no such medium between the stars and Earth. If it is claimed that air fulfills this function, then it too lacks the capacity and strength to carry heavy objects or endure intense motion.

Moreover, some actions are not material; they are matters of will and belief. How then can celestial bodies influence such affairs on Earth and in human beings?

Additionally, accepting the influence of stars would render divine command and prohibition, praise and blame meaningless, and human affairs would be governed by compulsion, for in that case, there would be no free will for humans. In truth, all the objections raised by the Muʿtazilah against the Mujabbirah (determinists) would apply here as well.

As for the theory of habit, that God may have ordinarily designed things such that when a certain planet rises, a certain event happens on Earth, the response is that, first of all, this is not the astrologers’ theory; and although such a thing is possible in principle, there is no scientific way to establish it: “There is no path to knowledge that such a thing has occurred and been verified.” How do we know that if Saturn or Mars is at a particular degree of ascension, it will result in misfortune, or that if Jupiter is at a certain position, it will bring fortune? What report [or narration] do we have to prove this claim?

If it is claimed that this knowledge is based on experience, then the response is that the cases in which astrologers’ predictions are proven wrong far exceed those in which they are proven correct. Justifying this by saying that the error lies in the astrologer’s calculation is not valid, because the foundation of astrological judgments must first be proven independently: “You would only have the right to this justification if there were a decisive proof of the validity of astrological judgments — proof other than the astrologer’s occasional accuracy.”

Sayyid al-Murtaḍā here recounts an encounter with a certain nobleman — perhaps even a vizier — who was a learned man, a writer, and an astrologer. One day, this man spoke with him about astrological judgments, and, seeing that Sayyid paid no attention to the subject and considered those engaged in it to be wasting their lives, asked him:

“Have you come across any specific text that refutes astrological judgments? Why is it that, for travel, clothing, or other needs, you do not choose particular days based on astrological timing?”

Sayyid al-Murtaḍā responds: I have reached the point where I neither keep a calendar at home nor look at one, and I have seen nothing but good come from this practice. Then he narrates a parable for the vizier, saying: if there is a path with dangerous wells along the way, and the traveler must be cautious not to fall into them, would there be a difference between a blind person and one who sees when traversing that path? The vizier replies, “Yes,” and it is evident that those who can see will pass more safely than the blind. Sayyid continues: the work of astrologers is similar. They portray a dangerous path, and since they are familiar with astrological judgments, they are like those who can see, and others are like the blind. But in practice, can it truly be said that these ‘sighted ones’ — the astrologers — have fared better across time and history than others? It is clear that this is not the case. Therefore, their knowledge and information have not added to their vision; rather, they are equal in this regard: “We have certainly known the contrary, and that safety or trials are similar and not disparate among all.”

Sayyid al-Murtaḍā continues: among the things that show that the work of astrologers lacks foundation is the fact that some of the zarrāqīn — street astrologers and market charlatans — who know nothing of the science of astronomy, sometimes have their words come true. He then mentions a man named Shaʿrānī, who did not know how to use an astrolabe, had never seen a zīj (astronomical table), but was clever, and many times his words turned out to be correct. Once, he came to a gathering where Sayyid was present and said something about each person there, many of which turned out to be true. Among them, he said to one man, “In your pocket, there is something in which promises have been made to you.” The man denied it, and everyone helped search until eventually papers were found in his pocket promising a gift from the khalīfat al-wuzarāʾ (chief of ministers). We were all astonished that, despite this man’s lack of knowledge of astronomy, his words had come true. A friend of ours used to say: The best proof of the falsity of astrological judgments is the accurate predictions of Shaʿrānī.

One of the defenders of astrological judgments responded by saying, perhaps the fate of Shaʿrānī is such that whatever he says comes true. But I replied: perhaps Ptolemy and every other scholar among the astrologers whose predictions are accurate — the reason for their accurate statements lies in their fate, and not in their knowledge and understanding. Therefore, the occurrence of truth in their words should not be taken as a sign of the validity of this science. If the truth of their statements stems from fate and birth timing, then the correspondence of their words to reality cannot be considered proof of the correctness of this science, since it was their fate — not the science itself — that caused the prediction to be accurate.

Sayyid al-Murtaḍā continues: one of the best proofs of the invalidity of astrological judgments is this — we know that one of the miracles of the Prophets is the ability to foretell the unseen, something that is considered outside the natural order, just like reviving the dead or curing the blind and leprous. If knowledge of future events were possible through astrology, then foretelling the unseen would not be considered a miracle or something outside the norm. Furthermore, both in ancient and recent times, all Muslims have agreed on denying astrologers and testifying to the corruption of their beliefs and the falsity of their judgments. From the religion of the Messenger (p), it is clear that the claims of astrologers must be denied. Numerous narrations also exist on this topic. Likewise, the Ahl al-Bayt and the best of the companions of the Prophet (p) disassociated themselves from astrologers and considered them to be in error and misguidance.

Sayyid further states that one must not conflate the prediction of eclipses with what is said regarding the influence of stars upon the Earth. Eclipses, planetary conjunctions, and their distances are determined through calculations and the movements of celestial bodies and are based on sound principles and firm rules. However, what is said about the influence of celestial bodies in terms of good and evil, benefit and harm, is baseless.¹⁹

Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s Report on Theories Concerning Astrological Judgments

Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, in his commentary on a statement made by Imam ʿAlī (a) in response to an astrologer, explains astrological rulings. In his Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah,²⁰ he reports that Imam ʿAlī (a), when confronted by an astrologer who advised him not to go to battle at that “time,” saying, “I fear that if you go now, you will not be victorious,” responded as follows:

“Do you claim that you guide us to an hour in which whoever travels will be safe from harm, and you warn against an hour in which whoever travels will be struck by harm? Then whoever believes you in this has surely denied the Qur’an, and sees no need for seeking help from God in attaining what is beloved and repelling what is disliked. And you seek by your words that those who act upon your counsel should praise you instead of their Lord — for, according to your claim, you are the one who guided him to the hour in which he obtained benefit and was safe from harm.

Then he (a) turned to the people and said:

‘O people, beware of learning astrology, except that by which one seeks guidance on land or sea — for it leads to soothsaying. The astrologer is like a soothsayer, and the soothsayer is like a sorcerer, and the sorcerer is like a disbeliever, and the disbeliever is in the Fire. Travel in the name of God.’”

In this statement, the Imam refuted the astrologer’s claim and equated his action with that of soothsayers and sorcerers, ultimately equating it with disbelief.

Here, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd takes the opportunity to present an independent discussion on astrological judgments and their validity or falsity. At the beginning of this discussion, he presents his own position (which is in fact a summary of what Sayyid al-Murtaḍā wrote in his aforementioned treatise), and then cites two excerpts from two books or treatises that he considers beneficial in this context. The first is from the book al-Muʿtabar fī al-Ḥikmah by Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 547 AH), which, fortunately, was published in recent years by the University of Isfahan (1373 Sh/1994 CE). The second is a treatise by Abū Jaʿfar al-Khāzin [alive in 342 AH], whom Ibn Miskawayh²¹ mentions as an envoy in that year and identifies as the author of Zīj al-Ṣafāʾiḥ and one of the scholarly viziers of the Seljuq era. Ibn al-Nadīm also mentions him and attributes to him the books Zīj al-Ṣafāʾiḥ and al-Masāʾil al-ʿAdadiyya.²² Elsewhere, references to his book al-Samāʾ wa al-ʿĀlam are found²³. He, too, was among the scholars of the 4th/10th century who became engaged in the discussion of astrological judgments and spoke with caution on the matter.

Theological Discussion on the Influence of Astrology on Human Life

People differ in opinion regarding astrological rulings, but all Muslims and verifying philosophers reject it. Here, we will discuss the matter from two standpoints: theological (kalāmī) and philosophical (ḥikmī). From the theological standpoint, the first issue is to ask: those who believe in the validity of astrological judgments may hold one of two beliefs about the relationship between astrology and human life:

First: that celestial phenomena are effective causes in human life.

Second: that celestial events are not effective causes but rather signs that indicate the occurrence of certain events in human life. Regarding the claim that celestial phenomena have an effect on human life, two possibilities arise:

First: that this influence is voluntary.

Second: that it is necessary and coercive.

As for the idea that the influence of the stars is voluntary, the answer is: any voluntary agent must necessarily be alive, and there is consensus among Muslims that stars are not alive, and therefore, they are not capable agents. And consensus (ijmāʿ) is a valid proof. Theologians have clarified that life requires two conditions: one is moisture, and the other is heat to an appropriate degree. If heat is excessive, the possibility of life in a body is negated. Therefore, the nature of fire cannot support life because it lacks moisture and has excessive heat. The sun, being itself a source of heat and many times hotter than fire, how can it possibly be alive?

Furthermore, theologians have clarified that if the celestial spheres were alive, they would also have to be capable agents — but not in the sense of crafting or contriving — rather, through productive power. There must be a real connection between agent and act, but the stars have no contact with us and no link or relationship to us whatsoever. Thus, they can’t have any effect on us.

If someone claims that “air” is the medium of connection between us and the stars, the response is as follows:

First: air cannot serve as a “connector” or “instrument” for intense motion or the carrying of heavy objects, especially if it is not accompanied by waves or currents.

Second: we must be able to feel and know and understand that air is moving or relocating us, just as we sense when a body moves us through contact or stimulus.

Third: some actions and events that occur within us, such as our intentions, beliefs, and the like, do not arise through instruments or external causes. [What then of these?]

Our companions [i.e., the Muʿtazilī theologians] have argued against the claim that the stars are the creators [and effective causes] of our actions by stating that if this were the case, it would eliminate the possibility of command and prohibition, praise and blame, and all the consequences that follow for the determinist (mujabbirah) would apply here as well. This argument applies equally to those who consider the influence of the stars to be voluntary and those who consider it deterministic.

But if it is said that the stars are merely signs (amārāt) for the occurrence of our actions, this might be supported by suggesting: why would it be impermissible for God, the Exalted, to have placed a custom and habitual order such that, at the rising of a particular star, or its setting, or its conjunction with another, specific actions or events are brought about? In other words, it is possible — if there is definitive transmitted evidence [from religion] that indicates this — that the intellect would have no opposition to it.

Discussion on the Possibility of Empirical Proof for Astrological Influence

If it is claimed: we discover this influence through experience (tajriba),

The answer is: experience is only a valid proof when it is consistent and widespread. Yet the number of errors you commit in the rulings you derive from astrology exceeds the number of correct and accurate cases. So why should we not consider the correct cases to be mere coincidences or estimations? We witness that street astrologers and guessers — whose work has no valid foundation or structure — often have more correct predictions than you do.

If you say: the astrologer erred due to a miscalculation in the movement of the planets, the reply will be: why should we not regard the correct predictions as coincidental? That justification — that the astrologer merely miscalculated — is only valid if we already have decisive proof that the rulings of astrology are sound, independent of the methods used by the astrologer to derive them.

If accurate predictions are taken as evidence of the truth of astrological judgments, then why should inaccurate predictions not be taken as proof of their falsity? They are equal in weight [and neither establishes certainty].

One of the theologians²⁴ said to an astrologer: let us suppose that we are on a road that people travel both night and day, and along this road are wells situated close to one another, so the traveler must proceed with caution and pause in order to avoid falling in. In such a situation, does having sight or not make any difference for those travelling this path? We suppose that on this path — which is never empty of travellers — there are both sighted and blind people. Are the sighted and the blind equal on this path?

The astrologer said: Absolutely not. It is clear that the sighted are more likely to remain safe than the blind.

The theologian said: Then your argument [regarding the influence of stars] is invalid — because our analogy is like your situation. On this path, the sighted are like you, who know astrological judgments, distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious times, are aware of the harms and movements of time, and understand its benefits. In contrast, the blind are those who are ignorant of astrology or scholars who do not believe in it, and likewise the general public, who far outnumber astrologers. The example of the road with wells is like time, which has passed, and through which all creatures have journeyed. The wells are like the misfortunes and tribulations that have befallen people. In such a case, if astrology were true, then the safety of astrologers should be greater than others, and their suffering much less than that of other people, since they know when misfortunes will occur and are aware beforehand. Meanwhile, the ignorant — being far more numerous — should experience greater suffering. Yet this has not happened, and safety and misfortune have affected both groups equally and without distinction.

Philosophical Discussion on Astrology

The philosophical discussion on this matter [i.e., criticism of astrological rulings] is as follows: An event that takes place in the elemental world either occurs:

1. 1. At the time when a specific star arrives at a specific zodiac sign;

   2. Or simply because of that star, regardless of which sign it’s in;

   3. Or because of the arrival of that star into that particular sign, such that this arrival causes the event in the elemental world to occur.

The first and second possibilities are invalid because they necessitate that the act exists before it actually occurs. The third is also invalid because either this zodiac sign — into which the star arrives — is, in its essence, the same as other zodiac signs, or it is different from them. If it is the same, then this act must also occur when the star enters other signs, because the rule for one thing applies equally to its like. But if it is different, this implies that the collection of signs are internally different in their parts — and in that case, their essence would have to be composite. Yet, evidence has been established that none of the celestial spheres (aflāk) are composite in nature.

Two responses have been given to the above argument:

First: Why is it not permissible that the effects of the wandering stars (kawākib mutaḥayyirah) vary depending on the zodiac signs they enter, not due to differences within the signs themselves, but because the fixed stars (kawākib thābitah) within these signs have different natures?

Second: How could it be impossible that the ninth sphere (falak al-tāsiʿ) contains small stars that we cannot see due to their great distance from us? When these move in their spherical paths, they at times coincide with certain fixed star paths, which constitute the celestial zodiac (falak al-burūj), and thus the effects of the wandering stars, when entering a given sign, differ due to the differing influence of these small [invisible] stars. Why should there not exist a sphere between the eighth sphere and the outermost celestial sphere (falak al-aṭlas), which governs all other spheres from east to west, and which moves very slowly such that the span of our lives is too short to perceive its motion, and which includes a host of small stars with differing natures?

In reply to the first objection, it has been said: if this were so, then the positions of the stars, their aspects, and their limits, during the movement of the fixed stars, should differ with the movement of their respective spheres. Thus, at the beginning of every hundred years — according to ancient scholars — or every sixty-six years — according to more recent scholars — their position would be one degree ahead of previous positions. Yet this is not the case. For example, the position of the Moon in our time is in the third degree of Taurus, and it has remained in this position for the past one thousand or even two thousand years.

The second justification has no reply [because it is merely a supposition, and what reply could one offer to a mere hypothesis?].

Know that philosophers have taken a unified route in refuting astrological rulings, namely: the foundation of this science is experience, and such experience — which astrologers claim to possess — does not actually exist. Many of the occurrences claimed by astrologers only repeat themselves over extremely long durations — such as cycles and millennia — as Abū Maʿshar claims are the foundation of this science. Events like Saturn’s body touching the sphere to which the fixed stars are attached, or the alignment of the equator (iʿtidāl al-nahār) with the ecliptic (dāʾirat falak al-burūj), are said by astrologers to cause great floods across the entire earth. Yet such events occur only over tens or hundreds of thousands of years. So how can empirical experience be applied in such cases?

Moreover, when we witness an event that coincides with a specific star entering a specific sign, how can we be certain that this event is caused by the star’s entry into that sign? The heavens are filled with countless stars — so why should this event be attributed to this star in this sign and not to something else? Suppose we concede that the entry of this star into that sign does have an effect — clearly, before it enters that sign, we cannot be certain that the event will definitely occur once it does. It’s possible that another occurrence cancels out that effect — for example, another star entering another sign may negate the first’s influence, or a terrestrial substance might lack the capacity to receive that form or event, for just as an active cause is necessary, so is a receptive capacity (qābiliyyah). When doubt arises in this manner, the certainty of astrological judgments collapses. This is a strong argument if astrologers are seeking certainty in their judgments. But if they only seek probability or likelihood (ẓann) — i.e., they admit their rulings are only conjectural — then this argument does not entirely refute their position.

A Statement from Ibn Malka al-Baghdādī

Abū al-Barakāt Ibn Malka al-Baghdādī, author of al-Muʿtabar, regarded astrological rulings as false from one perspective and valid from another.²⁵

Whoever attempts to conform the science of astrological judgments to a natural principle will get nowhere. From their rulings, all we see is that they issue arbitrary judgments — such as assigning heat or cold, moisture or dryness, or balance to stars. They say: Saturn is cold and dry, Jupiter is balanced, balance is good, extremity is evil — and from this they conclude that goodness leads to fortune and evil to misfortune. These are claims that natural philosophers do not accept, and such conclusions cannot be drawn from their premises. What is evident from natural science is that celestial bodies, in themselves and without qualification, have influence along with whatever is within or attached to them and whatever orbits them, and that this influence has no specific time limit and is not bound by any precise estimation.

Meanwhile, astrologers who claim they possess this knowledge through tradition or experience are not aligned with the principles of natural science.

If, for example, one claims from a natural science standpoint that Jupiter is fortunate (saʿd), Mars is unfortunate (naḥs), Saturn is cold and dry, and Mars is hot and dry, it should be noted that heat and cold are sensory phenomena. The only body whose influence is directly perceived through sensation — like its heat warming the earth via its rays — is the sun. At most, one might say that celestial bodies have differing natures, and it is more likely they are all warm, since they are all luminous.

When the natural philosopher speaks of dividing the sphere into parts — just as astrologers divide it into imaginary segments such as signs (burūj), degrees (daraj), and minutes — this is acceptable for someone who is imagining such things, but that does not mean they have an actual reality in existence. Yet these astrologers go on to treat these permissible imaginative divisions as necessary existents in their rulings. “They transferred that which is imaginatively permitted to that which is necessarily existent in their rulings”.

Their assumptions are based on the movement of the sun, days, and months. From these, they construct imaginary divisions and treat them like real, effective entities with actual limits and lines. Just as the sun, in its celestial movement from one point to another, seems to trace imaginary lines across the sky…

[Here, one page is dedicated to describing the illusions astrologers create based on these imagined diagrams of solar movement, then it continues:]

At this point, they begin to present their astrological judgments in terms of good and bad, affirmative and negative, necessary and possible. Some of these predictions do indeed come true — and this causes people to trust them and disregard their falsehoods. And when one of their predictions proves incorrect, people make excuses for them, saying, “He is an astrologer, not a prophet. He can’t be right in everything.” They claim, “This is a grand science — no one can master it. If anyone did, they would never make a mistake.” By God! If someone had complete, truthful knowledge and mastery over all the conditions involved, they would speak correctly. But the key is to have actual mastery — not to propose hypotheses based on fantasy and then treat them as necessary existents, using them as the basis of their judgment.

What is valid from this science — and what intelligent people may give some consideration to — is nothing more than what is derived through real experience or verified observation, such as eclipses, planetary conjunctions, and the observable motions of the wandering stars: retrogradation, direct motion, altitude in the north, descent in the south, and so on.

Up to this point, this is the view of Ibn Malka, who dismissed this science from one perspective and acknowledged its validity from another.

A Statement by Muḥammad Ṣan‘ānī Khāzin

I found a statement on this topic from Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn Ṣan‘ānī, known as Khāzin, the author of the Zīj al-Ṣafā’iḥ, in a writing attributed to him called Kitāb al-‘Ālamayn. I will quote it in full here, for it is a statement lā ba’sa bihi [i.e., there is no harm in quoting it, or: it is worthy of attention]. He says:

“Some of those who affirm astrological rulings, as well as all of those who deny them, have deviated from the path of truth in this matter. Many of the affirmers have included elements in it which are not from it [i.e., from astrology itself], and have claimed things that cannot be perceived, such that their errors have multiplied, their lies have become exposed, and this has led the majority of people to reject it.

As for the deniers, they have exaggerated in their denial to the extent that they claim none of it is valid and accuse its practitioners of deceit and trickery. Therefore, we will begin by demonstrating the validity of this craft so that the falsity of those who entirely reject it is made clear. Thereafter, we will endeavor to outline what parts of it can be comprehended, in order to show the falsehood of the claims of those who affirm astrological rulings in things that are inherently impossible to realize.

As for the indicators that show the validity of the astrological craft, they are numerous. Among them is the universal human observation of the sun’s influence: summer and winter, heat and cold, rain and wind, the growth of plants from the earth, the rise of trees and their fruiting, the movement of animals in reproduction and procreation—all of these are, for the most part, due to the sun’s proximity from the northern hemisphere or its distancing from the southern. Due to the sun’s superiority in force over that of the moon and other celestial bodies [i.e., planets], these effects become evident to all people. What results daily from the sun’s movement—its rising, culmination, and setting—are observable and undeniable phenomena.

These are matters that become apparent to farmers and sailors with minimal investigation into the events occurring before them—events caused by the moon and the fixed stars—like the tides, wind patterns, rainfall, and their timings, as well as what coincides or conflicts with optimal planting times, and the timing of pollination and birth. Likewise, the effects of the moon on aquatic animal reproduction and the arising of moisture are undeniable. There are other such effects known only to astrologers [not the general populace], dependent on their virtue, knowledge, and precision.

Based on what we have briefly stated concerning the correctness of this science, we may now distinguish what can and cannot be comprehended through it. When weather changes occur, they do so according to the conditions and movements of the sun, moon, and the wandering and fixed stars. Understanding these changes sometimes derives from astronomy and other times from associated phenomena like wind, cloud, rain, snow, thunder, and lightning. For things that appear on the earth and are affected by its surrounding air, general states emerge which influence these phenomena—like abundance or scarcity of water, fruit, and livestock; or droughts, famines, plagues, and diseases that impact certain species or groups.

Just as human disposition is dependent on the temperament of the body—and the events we mentioned alter bodily temperament—they naturally also alter human character. The primary original temperament is that which most often dominates a person and their experiences: the same temperament established while in the womb, during birth, and at the moment of delivery. This influences the body’s makeup, the soul’s constitution, health and sickness, and other related matters which do not stem from voluntary actions. All of this can be understood through astrology. When an event is beyond human will, it proceeds according to what nature necessitates.

To this we must add that errors made by practitioners of this craft arise from various causes, some internal to the discipline and some from external disciplines. Among the latter is humanity’s general incapacity to grasp the complete scope of any science to the point of leaving no aspect unexplored. Hence, the frequency or rarity of errors is proportional to individual shortcomings.

However, the errors intrinsic to the discipline are numerous. Among them is the astrologer’s need to grasp matters that are, for the most part, only accessible through conjecture and estimation—let alone inference and analogy. These include knowledge of celestial conditions and the events arising from each. Each of these phenomena has a distinct operation, and what results from their sum total—amidst the diversity and divergence of the disciplines—generates a single force and action which causes events in the world. This is a difficult task, and any neglect of a factor will result in an error proportionate to the oversight and its exclusion.

Now, after all that has been said, it is necessary to recognize the condition under which this “single force of things,” where events arise, becomes active. For instance, if something in the heavens indicates heat, and the objects exposed to it have previously undergone heat and become warm, then it will exert a strong effect on them. But if they were exposed to cold beforehand, the effect will be weak. This is something that applies to all events that affect something other than themselves, and this suits the nature of this knowledge.

As for events specific to a region, people, race, or individual birth, understanding them requires knowledge of the conditions of lands, customs, foods, and similar contributing factors—just as a doctor considers them in treatment. First comes understanding, and once all of this is acquired, it is proper to examine whether an event’s occurrence can be inferred. One must then assess whether it is the sort of thing that can be counteracted or nullified by something else—like heat being negated by cold—or by something else such as medicine or clever methods. Or perhaps it is not subject to such negation—for example, if it is inferred that a certain person will experience heat that warms them, and it is judged that they will develop a fever, unless this is counteracted by cold. If it is, then the outcome will change accordingly.

But if the event is strong enough that it cannot be countered by any of the aforementioned methods, then such measures are unnecessary—the event will no doubt occur. What is strong and widespread among the people cannot be countered or annulled. And even if it could be, this would only be possible in some cases—not all.

Most events occur universally, like summer for everyone, though some people may be able to alter its effect using cooling devices or other means to negate the heat.

Conclusion

These were some of the things that are worthy of being known, and the function of this craft is based upon them. I, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, say: This is an admission that most events related to the domain of human will, and that of animals other than humans, have no connection to astrological rulings. Therefore, the words of someone who says, for example, to Zayd: “You will get married,” or “You will buy a horse,” or “You will kill an enemy,” or “You will travel to a city,” and similar things—these statements are not valid. And yet, these are the majority of things that [astrologers] say and judge upon.

However, in general matters that occur and are not related to the will and choice of animals, perhaps there is a basis for their words according to the explanation that has been given. These are generally related to the movement of the sun and the moon. But what is evident from the religion of the Messenger of Allah (p) is the invalidation of astrological rulings, the prohibition of belief in them, and the strong discouragement and reprimand regarding trusting astrologers. This is the meaning of the words of the Commander of the Faithful (a) in this section when he said: “So whoever believes you in this has indeed denied the Qur’an and sees no need for seeking help from God”.²⁶

Up to this point, we have presented material that Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd transmitted from earlier sources, along with his own commentary on them.

In this article, our attention has been focused primarily on two angles. First, how Muslim scholars regarded these kinds of fraudulent and superstitious sciences. From what has been presented, it is clear that Islamic philosophy, despite being indebted to Greek thought, nonetheless resisted these kinds of superstitious Greek ideas. The usage of the word “superstition” (khurāfāt) for them by some of these thinkers, and their strong insistence on rejecting them, indicates the strength of rationality in Islamic civilization.

The second point is the type of arguments used in refuting astrological rulings, arguments that circle between kalām, philosophy, the natural and empirical sciences, and even religious debates and scriptural and narrational evidence. This intermingling demonstrates both the effort and struggle of the critics on the one hand, and the confusion of methodologies in dealing with a subject whose exact nature is not entirely clear. In this context, the assumptions used in these discussions concerning the natural sciences also reveal this intellectual confusion. Nevertheless, a kind of distinction exists between what is serious and scientific and what is merely superstition—something that can still be sensed.

It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned statement of Imām ‘Alī (a) in Nahj al-Balāghah led later commentators—such as Ibn Maytham Baḥrānī and Kaydarī—to also deny the validity of astrological rulings.

Astrological Judgments in Later Periods

The discussion surrounding astrological rulings continued throughout these centuries, and as mentioned in the introduction, despite opposition from first-rate scholars, it persisted among the public, courtiers, astrologers, and a group of scholars of less-than-average rank. Among top-tier scholars or those close to that level, some who were known for mystical or Sufi tendencies were more receptive to accepting astrological rulings. The reason for this was the significance this science held for the royal court, especially for making critical decisions, as well as for the general public in their daily choices, such as deciding on the time for marriage, travel, and even when to visit the bathhouse.

The author has previously published a report on the treatise Anwār-i Mushriqa, a valuable work from the Safavid period that reflects the views prevalent at the time on this subject.²⁷ Within that discussion, opinions of the contemporaries of the treatise’s author were cited, and reviewing them is beneficial, since the majority denied astrological rulings. It is mentioned there that Mīr Dāmād believed in astronomy and observed astrological hours.²⁸ The example given relates to astronomy and the prediction of solar and lunar eclipses, which – since they are based on geometric rules – should be accepted by astronomers. However, what appears in one of Mīr Dāmād’s legal works shows his opposition to astrological rulings.

He writes in ʿUyūn al-Masāʾil:

“If a person with expertise in observational astronomy (rasadī [munajjim]) comes and says that an eclipse has occurred, or an upright observer gives news of a solar or lunar eclipse, and the time has come, but it is not apparent to us due to an obstruction (like clouds), our shaykh has said in al-Bayān that the view closer to reality is that the word of such an astrologer is like that of a scholar [and should be accepted]. However, if the time of the eclipse arrives and there is no obstruction and nothing is seen in the sky, then there is no obligation on us.

[Mīr Dāmād continues:] As for matters other than eclipses, such as earthquakes or other heavenly calamities, no judgment can be made in a state of ignorance: ‘Such a ruling with ignorance is absolutely void’, and the astrologer’s word is not to be accepted. The difference between these two is that knowledge of eclipses is derived from astronomy and observation, which is a true science from the core mathematical disciplines, established through certain geometric demonstrations whose origin reaches the innate sciences. But rulings such as predicting earthquakes and similar matters are based on astrology, which is a speculative practice and a sub-branch of natural science, and there is no path to certain knowledge in this domain. For this reason, ‘The foremost sages have invalidated astrological rulings, and have demonstrated in their books and commentaries – especially in divine metaphysics, which is the philosophy above nature – that we have no reason to affirm even a single judgment from an astrologer’s rulings, even if it coincidentally matches reality.’”²⁹

It is worth noting that ʿAllāmah Majlisī extensively discussed astrological rulings and the views of Shīʿī scholars on the matter.³⁰ He presents a large number of narrations, analyzes them, and then, starting from vol. 55, p. 278, under the title “A Noble Appendix and a Beautiful Elaboration” – elaborates on the opinions and statements of scholars in this regard, offering his own commentary on most of them. Reviewing this part of Biḥār can be of interest for continuing this discussion.

It is also worth mentioning that the usual trend in jurisprudence was for jurists to warn against the activities of astrologers and their predictions, treating them similarly, though perhaps slightly less severely, than sorcerers and soothsayers. For example, al-Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī wrote the following about them:

“What is meant by astrology is giving information about the rulings of the stars based on celestial movements and planetary conjunctions, which are rooted in analogy and conjecture. That a particular movement or conjunction is the cause of a particular occurrence, astrologers base this on observing its previous occurrence alongside similar celestial events. But this does not prove causality, for there may be other factors involved in causing the outcome that have not been comprehensively understood. The human intellect has no path to comprehensively grasping them, and for this reason, astrologers are mostly wrong and lie frequently. The Lawgiver has strictly prohibited the learning of astrology, to the extent that the Commander of the Faithful (a) said: ‘Beware of learning the stars, except as a guide at sea or on land, for it leads to soothsaying, and the astrologer is like a soothsayer, and the soothsayer is like a sorcerer, and the sorcerer is like a disbeliever, and the disbeliever is in Hell.’

Once this is established, know that astrology, with the belief that the stars have an effect on lower-world existents, even in a contributory way, is prohibited. Likewise, learning astrology with this belief is also prohibited. In fact, this belief in and of itself is disbelief, and we seek refuge in God from it.

However, astrology not understood in this way, and practiced while avoiding falsehood, is permissible. For example, it is established that marriage and ḥajj travel are disliked when the moon is in Scorpio, and this is of this kind. Yes, it is still discouraged because it leads to corrupt beliefs, and it has been prohibited absolutely in order to cut off its root cause. The ruling on whether its earnings are prohibited depends on the act itself.

Al-Shahīd has related in al-Durūs that some of the companions considered it prohibited, due to the risk of falling into prohibited matters and because its rulings are speculative and prone to falsehood. But the science of astronomy (ʿilm al-hayʾah) is not disliked; in fact, it is perhaps recommended due to the insights it provides into the grandeur of God’s power. As for rummal (geomancy), there is no prohibition if one does not claim it aligns with reality, for such alignment is not definite.”³¹

As noted earlier, all of this discussion aims to clarify how the concept of “knowledge” and “cognition” functioned in Islamic civilization and how pseudo-sciences like astrology were evaluated.

Throughout Iranian history, including the Safavid period, the best astrologers were employed by the court to extract astrological rulings and calendars. The works of these astrologers have survived and bear witness to the amount of effort they invested, even though it was ultimately like pounding water in a mortar.

A work titled Ṭāliʿ-i Mawlūd by Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Mīrzā Jān, written for Shāh ʿAbbās II in 1057 AH, is a beautiful, content-rich work that includes many marvels in the field of astrological rulings. This manuscript, catalogued as no. 6491 in the Majlis Library, is a royal copy—colored, highly luxurious—containing 171 frames. In its introduction, the author objects: “Astrologers claim to foretell the unseen, yet no one but God knows the unseen—so whatever they say must be false.” He then offers two responses: First, he says that the special properties of certain things are known through experience. Thus, if someone says that the special property of a magnet is that it attracts iron, he is not informing of the unseen, nor claiming knowledge of the unseen, and thus is not considered a disbeliever. Similarly, if he says that the nature of fire is to be hot.

Second, he states that the science of astrology was revealed to the prophet Idrīs (a), and it may be that the states of the cosmos and the properties of things were made known to him through revelation. Therefore, what is transmitted from him is not knowledge of the unseen and contains no sin. (Ṭāliʿ-i Mawʿūd, frame 9). In this way, he attempts to solve the issue of astrological rulings through two principles: experience and revelation.

1. Printed in The Concept of Knowledge in Islamic Civilization, Qom, Nāshir-i Muwarrikh, 1402 SH, pp. 159–178
2. Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, Cairo, 1968, p. 102
3. Rasāʾil al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Qom, 1405 AH, vol. 2, p. 306
4. Faraj al-Mahmūm, Qom, 1398 AH, p. 5
5. Al-Aʿmāl al-Falsafiyyah (Philosophical Works), Beirut, Dār al-Manāhil, 1413 AH, pp. 281–302
6. Al-Aʿmāl al-Falsafiyyah, p. 297
7. Al-Muqābasāt, Egypt, 1929 CE, pp. 127–128
8. Tisʿ Rasāʾil fī al-Ḥikmah wa al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt, Cairo, 1326 AH, p. 110
9. A similar phrase appears in Kitāb al-Najāt, p. 770
10. See: Rasāʾil Abū al-Ḥasan ʿĀmirī, Tehran, 1375 SH, introduction, pp. 78, 124
11. Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-Urdunī, Issue 32, p. 133
12. Ibid., p. 134
13. Ibid., p. 136
14. Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, vol. 1, p. 144
15. Al-Tafhīm, ed. Humāyī, p. 316
16. Ibid., p. 360
17. Ibid., pp. 400–401
18. Rasāʾil al-Shajarah al-Ilāhiyyah fī ʿUlūm al-Ḥaqāʾiq al-Rabbāniyyah, Tehran, 1383 SH, p. 321
19. Rasāʾil al-Murtaḍā, vol. 2, pp. 301–310
20. Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah, vol. 6, p. 200
21. Tajārib (Experiments/Trials), vol. 6, p. 191
22. Al-Fihrist, Beirut, Dār al-Maʿrifah, p. 393
23. Ibid., p. 199, and in Āthār al-Bāqiyah, p. 83, his book al-Madkhal al-Kabīr ilā al-Nujūm is also cited, along with mentions in Taḥdīd Nihāyāt al-Amākin, pp. 30, 70, and others, as well as in al-Qānūn al-Masʿūdī, vol. 1, p. 107, and other places
24. This story is attributed to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, who recounts it in greater detail in Rasāʾil 2/304
25. This text appears in Al-Muʿtabar fī al-Ḥikmah, vol. 2, pp. 233–236
26. Volume 6, pg. 212.
27. Maqālāt wa Rasāʾil Tārīkhī (Essays and Historical Treatises), Tehran, ʿIlm Publications, 1391 SH, pp. 31–49
28. Ibid., p. 46
29. ʿUyūn al-Masāʾil, printed in Ithnā ʿAshar Masāʾil, Tehran, 1397 AH, p. 214
30. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 55, from p. 217 onward: “Chapter on the Science of the Stars and Acting upon it, and the Condition of Astrologers.
31. Jāmiʿ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 32