The following posts will be based on transcribed notes I was making several years ago while I was in Qom, based on the lessons given by Shaykh Muhammad Taqi Sobhani on the book Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, a seminal work by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. These lessons were delivered to students pursuing their Masters degree (or Sath Se) in the seminary and draw heavily on Kashf al-Murād by ‘Allāmah Ḥillī, a renowned commentary on Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, providing a structured and in-depth exploration of its theological discourse. This post includes transcriptions of lesson 1 (August 25th, 2019) and lesson 2 (September 14th, 2019).

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Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād stands as one of the most renowned Shī‘i theological works, having received extensive scholarly attention with approximately 231 commentaries and marginal notes composed over time. This series of lessons, based on Kashf al-Murād by ‘Allāmah Ḥillī, provides a structured analysis of this seminal work.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first two are primarily ontological, dealing with existence, non-existence, possibility, and necessity. The second part explores substance and accidental attributes, often referred to as ṭabi‘iyāt (natural attributes). The remaining four chapters address core theological tenets: Tawḥīd (Divine Unity), Nubuwwah (Prophethood), Imāmah (Leadership), and Ma‘ād (Eschatology). Notably, discussions on ‘Adl (Divine Justice) were historically incorporated under Tawḥīd al-Af‘ālī (Unity of Divine Acts). This study will focus on Tawḥīd, Nubuwwah, and Ma‘ād, omitting Imāmah due to its comprehensive coverage in Imamate-specific curricula.

Three primary commentaries are pivotal in understanding this work:

1. Kashf al-Murād by ‘Allāmah Ḥillī, also known as Sharḥ Qadīm (Old Commentary).
2. Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād by Mullā ‘Alī Qushchī, an Ash‘arī Sunnī, which is technically a marginal commentary (hāshiyah), also referred to as Sharḥ Jadīd (New Commentary).
3. A commentary by Muḥaqqiq Lāhijī (11th century Hijri), the son-in-law of Mullā Ṣadrā.

Evolution of Imāmī Theological Thought

The development of Imāmī kalām (theology) spans four significant phases over twelve centuries:

1. Early Kalām During the Time of the Imams
   • Two primary trends emerged:
     • Muḥaddithīn (Traditionists), such as Abān b. Taghlib, Muḥammad b. Muslim, and Jābir al-Ju‘fī, who engaged in theological discussions.
     • Mutakallim-muḥaddith (Theologian-Traditionists), including Hishām b. Ḥakam, Mu’min al-Ṭāq, and Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. These two groups had methodological differences and at times were in disagreement.
2. The Qom-Baghdad Divide
   • The muḥaddithīn gravitated towards Qom, represented by figures such as Shaykh Ṣadūq (305/917-8 – 381/991-2) and compilers of works like al-Maḥāsin and al-Baṣā‘ir.
   • The mutakallimūn flourished in Baghdad, with prominent scholars such as the Nawbakhtīs, Shaykh al-Mufīd, Sayyid al-Murtaṭā, and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.
   • A key distinction between these groups was their stance on rational argumentation. The mutakallimūn advocated for rearticulating theological arguments in the intellectual and linguistic framework of each era, whereas the muḥaddithīn held that the Imams had already presented the most optimal rational arguments, obviating the need for rewording or reformulation.
3. Philosophical Integration under Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī
   • Khwāja Naṣīr (597/1201 – 672/1274) introduced Peripatetic (mashshā’ī) philosophical discussions into kalām, a novel development in Shī‘i theology.
   • Prior Imāmī theologians relied on Mu‘tazilite principles, but Khwāja Naṣīr modified and updated these principles with contemporary philosophical insights.
   • This phase retained its kalām-based theological beliefs but incorporated philosophical methodologies.
4. Post-Mullā Ṣadrā: Integration of Sadrian Philosophy
   • After Mullā Ṣadrā (1572-1641), Peripatetic principles in theology were gradually replaced with Sadrian principles.
   • Scholars such as Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī exemplified this trend, blending Sadrian metaphysics with theological discourse.
   • In this phase, both theological principles and beliefs became deeply philosophical.

All four aforementioned trends persist today, albeit with varying degrees of prevalence. The first two phases, those of the muḥaddithīn and early mutakallimūn, have a diminished following compared to the latter two phases, where philosophical theology predominates.

Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād was authored during the third phase, when philosophical principles were adopted for structuring kalām, yet without full acceptance of all philosophical conclusions. Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s approach exemplifies this balance—utilizing philosophical frameworks while maintaining the core theological tenets of Imāmī thought.

Proving the Ṣāni‘ and His Attributes and Effects | Section 1: Regarding His Existence

The concept of ithbāt—whether God’s existence requires proof—has been a subject of debate within Islamic thought. There are four major trends in this discourse:

• Muḥaddithīn and Ahl al-Ḥadīth (Shia and Sunni traditionists)
• Mutakallimīn (Shia, Ash‘ari, Mu‘tazili, Maturidi theologians)
• Philosophers
• Gnostics (‘Urafā’)

Groups two and three argue that proving God’s existence is necessary through rational reflection. Groups one and four, however, maintain that proof is either unnecessary or impossible—muḥaddithīn consider belief in God fiṭrī (innate) but acknowledge the possibility of rational argumentation, while ‘Urafā’ assert that God’s existence is self-evident and can only be realized through direct spiritual experience.

1. Since Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī belongs to the second group, he seeks to establish the existence of a ṣāni‘ (Creator). Philosophers use the term wājib al-wujūd (Necessary Existence), while theologians prefer ṣāni‘. Some, like Shaykh al-Ishrāq, employ nūr al-anwār (Light of Lights). Despite adopting philosophical principles, Khwāja retains the theological term ṣāni‘ to emphasize his distinctive approach—one that aligns with kalām rather than philosophy.
2. Theologians seek to prove the existence of an essence possessing attributes such as irāda (will) and qudrah (power), whereas philosophers focus on identifying the ultimate origin of creation. Terms like khāliq (Creator) and ṣāni‘ (Maker) are secondary for philosophers, who believe that once wājib al-wujūd is established, other divine attributes follow. However, proving wājib al-wujūd does not necessarily demonstrate that this entity possesses knowledge, power, and creative agency (khalq).
3. Traditional theological works introduced discussions with wujūb al-naẓar (obligation of rational inquiry), but Khwāja does not include this section in Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād.

The Argument of Imkān and Wujūb

Before Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, theological works typically proved the existence of a ṣāni‘ using arguments based on ḥudūth (origination) and qidam (eternity). Khwāja, however, was the first to employ imkān (contingency) and wujūb (necessity) in a kalāmī work, an approach traditionally reserved for philosophers.

Among theologians, the most popular arguments for God’s existence included burhān ḥudūth (proof from origination), burhān ḥarakat (proof from motion), and burhān al-naẓm (proof from order). The latter two were influenced by Greek philosophy but were less widely accepted than ḥudūth.

Why did Khwāja avoid ḥudūth and qidam? ‘Allāmah Ḥillī explains that these arguments ultimately depend on imkān and wujūb. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), the pioneer of this argument in Islamic thought, referred to it as burhān al-ṣiddīqīn (proof of the veracious) rather than burhān al-imkān wa al-wujūb. Philosophers before him relied on burhān innī (inferential proof) by reasoning from creation to the Creator, whereas Ibn Sīnā’s proof does not require the existence of creation—it is a burhān limmī (demonstrative proof) that derives God’s necessity from the concept of existence itself.

The syllogism follows:

1. There is existence, irrespective of whether it is ma‘lūl (effect) or ‘illah (cause).
2. Existence is either contingent or necessary.
3. If necessary, then God’s existence is established; if contingent, then it requires a cause, lest it result in an infinite regress or circular reasoning.

Ibn Sīnā cites the following verse as conveying the essence of his argument:

“Is it not sufficient for your Lord that He is a Witness over all things?” (Qur’an 41:53)

This implies that God is self-evident, not needing external validation. Ibn Sīnā classifies his argument as burhān limmī, but later commentators, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, disagree. Mullā Ṣadrā argues that Ibn Sīnā’s proof still relies on the existence of mumkin beings, making it burhān innī. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, true burhān limmī can only be used to prove wājib al-wujūd after accepting the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), in which case imkān need not be invoked at all.