The following posts will be based on transcribed notes I was making several years ago while I was in Qom, based on the lessons given by Shaykh Muhammad Taqi Sobhani on the book Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, a seminal work by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. These lessons were delivered to students pursuing their Masters degree (or Sath Se) in the seminary and draw heavily on Kashf al-Murād by ‘Allāmah Ḥillī, a renowned commentary on Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, providing a structured and in-depth exploration of its theological discourse. This post includes transcriptions of Lesson 3 (September 21, 2019) and Lesson 4 (September 28, 2019).

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Section 1: Regarding His Existence

Allāmah Ḥillī states that the theologians have adhered to burhān ḥudūth, but he does not expand on it, likely because it relies on burhān imkān, and the latter is considered stronger. Philosophers, however, not only view burhān ḥudūth as weaker but also as incorrect. They only engage in discussions of ḥudūth and qidam when addressing theological views. For philosophers, ḥudūth dhātī is equivalent to imkān itself, while they argue that theologians, when speaking of ḥudūth, are actually referring to ḥudūth zamānī—the belief that there was a time when creation did not exist, followed by a time when it came into being.

Philosophers reject the concept of ḥudūth zamānī, considering it a flawed term. The theologians attempt to prove the existence of the Ṣāni‘ (Creator) through the following argument:

A: Al-‘ālam ḥādithun (The universe is ḥādith, i.e., originated)

B: Every ḥādith requires a muḥdith (which, according to theologians, is self-evident)

To support premise A, theologians provide various arguments (approximately 7-8). The most famous is:

Al-‘ālam mutaghayyirun (the universe is subject to change), and every mutaghayyir (changing entity) is ḥādith.

By ‘ālam, the theologians refer to more than just material existence, and by taghyīr, they mean more than mere ḥarakat (motion). As Mullā Ḥādī Sabzwārī outlines, there are three perspectives on proving ḥudūth and taghyīr:

1. Philosophers
2. Theologians—who do not equate taghyīr solely with ḥarakat
3. Ṭabī‘īyūn (naturalists)—a theological group believing only in two entities: God and the material world

Some theologians substituted taghyīr with maḥdūd (limited) or murakkab (composite) as the middle term in their arguments.

Allāmah Ḥillī asserts that qidam necessitates wujūb—a critical point that philosophers reject. There are three possible interpretations of Allāmah’s statement:

1. He is speaking philosophically—burhān for Ṣāni‘ is only proven through wujūb and imkān.
2. Burhān ḥudūth requires burhān wujūb and imkān—the former is not incorrect, but incomplete.
3. Burhān ḥudūth and qidam prove qidam, but further proof is needed to establish whether the qidam is wājib, thereby confirming the Ṣāni‘ in Islamic theology.

Philosophers challenge the theologians: how do they establish that the entire ‘ālam is ḥādith? A group of theologians (including some Mu‘tazilīs) argue that a ḥādith that is mumkin requires an ‘illah; however, neither imkān alone nor ḥudūth alone suffices. There were debates on whether ḥudūth and imkān share a necessary connection (mulāzamah), are conditional (sharṭ), or are two equal halves (shaṭr).

The major premise—”every ḥādith requires a muḥdith“—is also contested. Philosophers argue that a ḥādith qua ḥādith does not necessitate a cause; instead, the criterion for requiring a cause is imkān.

Section 1: Regarding His Existence

Philosophers maintain that all mujarrad (immaterial) contingent beings are qadīm, like Allah (swt), because imkān dhātī does not contradict being qadīm. According to philosophers, the need for an ‘illah arises from imkān, not ḥudūth. In contrast, theologians argue that it is impossible for something to be both mumkin and qadīm simultaneously, as qidam means that existence is inherent in its essence (wujūd).

Following Tajrīd, terms like wujūb and imkān became prevalent in Imāmī theology. These concepts were absent in earlier theological centers such as Baghdad and were only marginally used in Rey. However, they became central in burhānī (demonstrative) discussions.

In Tajrīd, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī asserts that imkān (istiwa al-nisba) is equivalent to ḥudūth, and that imkān and qidam are irreconcilable. He clarifies that although he adopts the terminology of imkān and wujūb from philosophers, he does not adhere to their interpretation.

For further study, refer to Al-Munqidh min al-Taqlīd by Sadīd al-Dīn al-Ḥimmaṣī.

Section 2 – Regarding His Attributes

Theologians define qudrah (power) as synonymous with ikhtiyār (will). Qudrah is the ability to act or refrain from acting. If an entity lacks will in any circumstance, it cannot be described as qādir (capable).

Philosophers, however, conceptualize qudrah differently. For them, qudrah signifies a fā‘il mūjib (necessitated agent), whereas theologians view it as fā‘il bil-qaṣd (intentional agent). An example of the former is fire, which necessarily dries or burns, and water, which necessarily wets. Similarly, philosophers argue that God’s essence necessitates creation.

The concept of fā‘il mūjib, or ‘illah tāmah (complete cause), implies that its effects must necessarily exist. If Allah’s essence necessitates creation, then it is impossible for His existence not to entail the existence of creation. This understanding underlies the philosophers’ belief in qidam.

Theologians, in contrast, believe that God is fā‘il mukhtār (a free agent) and that His actions have a purpose (gharaḍ). This distinction implies a difference in temporal relation between God and creation—it is not an automatic causation like the movement of a key when turned by a hand.

We will continue the discussion on His attributes in the subsequent lessons.