This is the continuation of transcriptions of lessons given by Shaykh Muhammad Taqi Sobhani on the book Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, a seminal work by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. These lessons were delivered to students pursuing their Masters degree (or Sath Se) in the seminary and draw heavily on Kashf al-Murād by ‘Allāmah Ḥillī, a renowned commentary on Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, providing a structured and in-depth exploration of its theological discourse. This post includes transcriptions of Lesson 5 (October 5, 2019) and Lesson 6 (November 2, 2019).

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Section 2 – Regarding His Attributes

The discussion of God’s attributes involves a fundamental divergence between philosophers and theologians concerning the concept of ḥudūth (origination). Philosophers classify ḥudūth into dhātī (essential) and zamānī (temporal), whereas theologians define anything that comes after non-existence as ḥādith (originated).

Khwājā assumes that the entire ālam is ḥādith and uses this premise to establish God’s qudrah. The theological definition of qudrah is that when God did not want to create the ālam, He did not, and when He willed to create it, He did. This demonstrates His ability to act or not act.

Philosophers’ Perspective

Philosophers classify fā‘il (agent) into different categories:

• Fā‘il bil-tab‘ (agent by nature)
• Fā‘il bil-irādah (agent by will), further divided into:
  • Bil-qaṣd (intentional agent) – requires knowledge (‘ilm) and purpose (gharaḍ)
  • Bil-‘ilm (agent by knowledge) – acts merely by knowing

Philosophers argue that God cannot be fā‘il bil-qaṣd since this would imply change and contingency. Instead, they assert that God is fā‘il bil-ījāb (agent by necessity) or bil-iḍṭirār (compelled agent). However, they still attribute qudrah to God, albeit with a different definition: kawn al-shay bi-ḥaytho inshā’ fa’ala, wa in lam yasha, lam yaf’al (if He wills, He acts; if He does not will, He does not act). This definition allows an action to be necessarily occurring while still being classified as qudrah.

Theologians’ Perspective

Theologians define fā‘il into two categories:

1. Fā‘il mūjib – an agent whose action necessarily follows from its essence.
2. Fā‘il mukhtār – an agent whose will (irādah) is an extension of its essence, meaning the effect occurs only when the will is present.

For theologians, qudrah implies the ṣiḥḥat al-fi‘l wa al-tark (permissibility of doing or abstaining from an act). The philosophical view, which attributes qudrah to fā‘il bil-ījāb, would mean that every necessary agent (fā‘il bil-iḍṭirār) is qādir, which contradicts the theological definition.

Origins of the Dispute

The dispute arises from the principle of causality. Philosophers critique theologians by arguing that if God is mukhtar (volitional), then His action has an equal potential for existence and non-existence (istiwā al-nisba). When it comes into existence, it must have become necessary (ḍarūrī). The question then arises: what made the mumkin (possible) into ḍarūrī? If it was God’s essence, then His action is necessary, not volitional. If it was His will, then the will itself must have an external cause, which undermines divine independence (wājib bil-ghayr).

Building on the previous discussion, philosophers refine their categorization of fā‘il as follows:

1. Fā‘il bil-ṭab‘ (natural agent)
2. Fā‘il bil-‘ilm (agent by knowledge), further divided into:
   • Bil-‘ināyah (by providence)
   • Bil-riḍā (by satisfaction)
   • Bil-tajallī (by manifestation)
3. Fā‘il bil-qaṣd (intentional agent – requiring knowledge and inclination)

Later philosophers like Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra argue that even in fā‘il bil-‘ilm, there is a ghāya (purpose), as they uphold the principle of ‘illa ghāyī (final cause). However, unlike fā‘il bil-qaṣd, where the purpose is external to essence, in fā‘il bil-‘ilm, it is intrinsic.

Theologians’ Classification

Theologians simplify fā‘il into:

1. Fā‘il Mūjid – an agent whose effect necessarily follows its existence (e.g., fire causing heat).
2. Fā‘il Qādir wa Mukhtār – an agent that acts based on will (irādah), allowing for action or inaction.

This division is rooted in the theological definition of qudrah as ṣiḥḥat al-fi‘l wa al-tark (permissibility of action and inaction). Philosophers critique this definition with four objections:

1. Imkān al-fi‘l wa al-tark (possibility of action and inaction) implies imkān (contingency), which contradicts divine necessity. Since God is not mumkin, He cannot possess imkān.
2. If God could choose between action and inaction, it implies change in His essence.
3. If ṣiḥḥat al-fi‘l wa al-tark means jawāz ṣudūr al-fi‘l wa al-tark (the permissibility of acting or not acting), it implies God lacked gharaḍ (purpose) initially, which later emerged. If gharaḍ was always part of His ‘ilm (knowledge), then His action must have always been occurring.
4. Even for creation, defining qudrah as ṣiḥḥat al-fi‘l wa al-tark is flawed. If a person refrains from an action despite having the capacity, then some aspect of their essence prevents them. If they act, it is their essence acting, which negates external determination (tarjīḥ bilā murajjiḥ).

Thus, philosophers define qudrah as kawn al-shay bi-ḥaytho inshā’ fa’ala, wa in lam yasha, lam yaf’al (if He wills, He acts; if He does not will, He does not act). Since God’s will (shā’a bil-ḍarūrah) is necessary and unceasing, His action is continuous.

Additionally, philosophers distinguish between fā‘il bil-majāz (metaphorical agent) and fā‘il mūjid. Natural processes (e.g., tree movement, a key turning in a hand) are musakhkhar (compelled), whereas humans are fa‘il ghayr musakhkhar (independent agents). However, philosophers still classify both as fā‘il mūjid.

1. The ālam (universe) is ḥādith (originated).
2. God is qādir, meaning He can act against His previous actions. If this were not the case, either the ālam is not ḥādith, or God is fā‘il mūjid, meaning He and His creation are co-eternal.

In philosophy, qudrah is linked to ‘ilm, whereas in kalām, qudrah is independent of ‘ilm and linked to irādah. Before addressing critiques of the theological view of qudrah, Khwājā presents the first critique: What if the ālam is ḥādith, but its creator is not God, rather an intermediary (wāṣiṭah)? In response, theologians assert that ālam refers to mā siwa Allah (everything other than God), whereas the critique assumes mā siwa Allah  is of two kinds: qadīm (eternal) and ḥādith, which is not the case.

We will continue the discussion in the next lesson.0