Cultural and Social Changes Reflected in the Inquiries Posed to Shaykh Haeri Yazdi During the First Pahlavi Period

By Shaykh Rasul Jafariyan¹

Jurisprudential and legal texts have always been among the key sources for understanding the cultural and civilizational history of a society. Within the corpus of jurisprudential works, istiftāʾāt—that is, the legal questions posed by the public and the responses given by religious authorities—are particularly valuable because they refer to specific social situations and thus contain important information about the social and civilizational conditions of their time. For societies that lack abundant dedicated sources for studying their civilization, even such limited material is of great value.

The present article examines the intellectual and social conditions of the First Pahlavi period based on the istiftāʾāt of Ayatullah Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī (1859-1937), using them as a lens through which to explore the cultural and religious landscape of that era.

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Introduction

The range of historical sources—particularly those concerning social history—varies among different societies and peoples. For instance, a group like the Arabs, who place great value on genealogy and have written extensively on lineages, differs from other nations, especially from more “civilized” societies that generally do not attach much importance to ancestry and therefore produce no such writings. This distinction, from the perspective of sources, means that genealogical works serve as an important historical reference for some, whereas others lack them altogether.

Similarly, certain literary genres function as reflections of social realities. For example, the composition of poetry using chronograms creates a unique type of historical record, even though such a practice may not exist in the poetic traditions of other cultures. The same applies to tazkira-writing (biographical anthologies of poets), which in some cultures provides valuable historical material. This issue becomes even more significant within the field of social history, where each person often possesses distinct types of sources that can reveal much about their social life and culture.

In this context, we intend to examine the book Istiftāʾāt of Ayatullah Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī, using it as a source to better understand the cultural, religious, and social history of a particular historical period. Typically, religious authorities have a risālah ʿamaliyyah—a practical treatise—comprising standard jurisprudential rulings organized by topic. However, over the years, these same authorities have received numerous inquiries from their followers regarding new, unusual, or practical cases, to which they provide specific responses. These inquiries and responses are known as istiftāʾāt. Such works, because they include discussions of social and civilizational matters, hold great historical value. The questions often reflect the most interesting issues occurring within society at the time, offering scholars a valuable window into the lived realities of that period.

Here, we have before us one such example of these books, pertaining to the period of the marjaʿiyyah of the late Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī (1276–1355 AH / 1859–1937 CE), covering a span of fifteen years—from 1301 to 1315 in the solar Hijrī calendar (1922–1936 CE). This collection consists of 1,134 questions and answers, compiled and organized according to the standard chapters of jurisprudence (abwāb fiqhiyyah).

Our study of this work—and the selected examples we present below—focuses on the new and unusual issues faced by Iranian society during this period. Among these are questions concerning various technical innovations and their religious rulings, discussions about the performance of fabricated or false mourning sermons (rawzeh) from the pulpit and related objections, as well as religious and doctrinal doubts that had arisen in society. Other questions include issues such as wearing European-style clothing, using a fork and knife, and similar topics that had become contentious. These were posed to Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm, who provided answers to them.

It should be noted that the respondent here is a marjaʿ al-taqlīd—a source of emulation—who must simultaneously take into account at least three considerations. First, he must observe and uphold the divine rulings, as he has learned them through years of study, based on the Qur’an, Hadith, the jurisprudential works of the predecessors, and established methods of ijtihād. Second, he must consider the conditions of his own time—preserving people’s faith, showing forbearance toward them, and striving to maintain religiosity within the broader public. Third, in the case of Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm, there was a particular emphasis on maintaining a calm and reform-minded approach, coupled with a cautious awareness of the transformations of the modern world, which he had to take into account when addressing contemporary jurisprudential issues.

Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm is generally known as a composed and conciliatory marjaʿ, who lived through a sensitive period—on one side, the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution, which had largely marginalized religion; and on the other, the reign of Reza Shah, who was actively working to diminish religious customs and replace them with symbols of modernity. His experience as a marjaʿ was itself an important and instructive one, often recounted among scholars in later generations. Indeed, Haj Shaykh’s tenure occupies a special place in subsequent religious history and is often regarded as representing a distinct and unique path among the marājiʿ.

In some of these istiftāʾāt, Haj Shaykh expresses particular insights regarding his own method and reasoning, which are noteworthy. Consider the following example:

Question: “Is it permissible to perform theatrical reenactments (taʿziya) during mourning ceremonies, to beat drums and play trumpets?”
Answer: “These very practices used to be common in Qom; but since they often led to other problematic matters, I personally requested that they be abandoned, and they were replaced with recitations of rawzeh (narrative lamentations).” (Question 539)

Through these istiftāʾāt, we aim to gain insight into the intellectual concerns, religious anxieties, and thought patterns of the devout community of that time. Our overall emphasis is that such works—particularly this one—are of great importance for understanding the religious and social history of that era. As for the late Haj Shaykh Ḥāʾirī himself, I have written about him several times elsewhere, so I will not repeat that here.

The questions posed in this collection are, for the most part, jurisprudential in nature. However, there are also a significant number of theological questions, including a fascinating series of inquiries comparing Christianity and Islam, which appear to be especially valuable. These are lengthy questions with equally detailed answers. In this article, due to their length, they are only summarized; but in other cases, where the exchanges are brief, the texts are reproduced almost verbatim.

The domain of modernity and its manifestations is one of the major themes addressed in these questions. For instance, one of the most frequently recurring issues concerns imitation of non-Muslims (tashabbuh bi’l-kuffār)—expressed through matters such as wearing European-style clothing, collars and neckties, using forks and knives, and other similar topics. These questions reflect the anxiety that even a reform-minded jurist such as Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī felt in confronting such cultural shifts.

When studying these istiftāʾāt, it should be kept in mind that some of the content may have been written by members of his legal inquiry committee (hayʾat al-istiftāʾ), and that certain longer responses may have been drafted by others. Nevertheless, all of the material was reviewed and approved by Haj Shaykh himself, which gives it authoritative weight.

These istiftāʾāt remained in manuscript form until they were edited by our friend, Ustadh Ahmad ʿĀbidī, and published in 2012 (1391 AH solar). Naturally, as it is an old and single-copy manuscript, there remain a number of difficult or uncertain readings. Hopefully, a more thoroughly revised edition will be produced and published in the future. It is worth adding that most of the questions are written without a direct address, sometimes beginning simply with “Bismillah”, but in certain cases, specific honorifics are used. These are of particular interest because they reveal the titles and epithets used at that time to address a marjaʿ al-taqlīd. Some examples include:

• Malādhānā (p. 70)

• Bāb al-Aḥkām (p. 119)

• Ḥujjat al-Islām (p. 148)

• Āyat Allāh fī al-ʿālamīn (p. 153)

• Nāʾib al-Imām (p. 156)

• Ḥaḍrat Āyat Allāh al-ʿUẓmā (p. 159)

• Āyat Allāh fī al-ʿālamīn (p. 206)

• Yā ḥāfiẓ al-muslimīn wa yā Āyat Allāh fī al-ʿālamīn (p. 321)

• Sharīʿatmadārā! Murawwij al-aḥkām! (p. 521)

The expression “bayyinū tuʾjarū” (“clarify and you shall be rewarded”), which was commonly used in older istiftāʾāt, appears only a few times here (p. 68). Typically, Haj Shaykh’s seal was placed beneath his answers. As noted, his seal bore the inscription: ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad Jaʿfar. In our own selection of materials, we have followed the order of the book’s pagination, although we have tried to group together questions that are thematically related.

Impurity and Purity of the Belongings of Non-Muslims and Related Matters

1. Medicines purchased from non-Muslims — whether from dhimmīs (protected non-Muslims) or non-dhimmīs, or from “non-Muslim doctors” (aṭibbāʾ al-kuffār) for medical treatment—be they solid or liquid—the ruling is that they are considered pure (ṭāhir) unless there is definite knowledge of impurity (najāsa). (p. 26)

2. Steam from impure water — regarding whether steam rising from impure water in a bathhouse, which then condenses on the ceiling and drips back down, is impure: if it is known that the droplet comes from the steam of impure water, the ruling is that it is impure (najis). (p. 27)

3. Association with a person suspected of disbelief — a person whose actions show opposition to the Jaʿfarī path and who associates and maintains ties with Bahāʾīs, but who “does not verbally profess such beliefs”: if one has certain knowledge of his disbelief (kufr), then one must not come into contact with him in a state of moisture. (p. 28)

4. Ruling on Bahāʾīs, Bābīs, Azalīs, and Shaykhīs — when asked whether the Bahāʾīs, Bābīs, and Azalīs are disbelievers, and whether the Shaykhīs are to be counted among the Bahāʾīs, the ruling states: “A disbeliever is one who denies God, or the Prophet, or one of the necessities of Islam, or believes that the Sharīʿah of the final Prophet has been abrogated.” (p. 43)

5. Oil imported from Europe or India — regarding mālt (likely malt oil) or other oils brought from foreign lands and obtained from non-Muslim hands: “If there is doubt regarding its impurity, there is no problem in using it.” (p. 45)

6. Shoes made with unknown tanning — regarding night shoes (shab-row): “For shoes made in Muslim lands and sewn by a Muslim’s hand, even if the buyer and seller have no certainty about whether the leather has been ritually purified (tadhkiya), it is permissible to use them, for the presumption of purity through Muslim ownership and market (yad wa sūq al-muslim) suffices.” (p. 290)

7. Transactions with Bahāʾīs — when asked about dealings with Bahāʾīs who were originally Zoroastrian or Jewish but left their faith and adopted another religion, and whether their property is to be respected, the reply was: “Their property is inviolable (muḥtaram) so long as they are not at war with Muslims (kāfir ḥarbī) or are living under the protection of Islam.” (p. 487)

8. Theft from People of the Book — when asked whether it is permissible to seize or steal the property of the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb)—those who do not abide by the terms of dhimmah and are thus treated as non-protected disbelievers—in such a way that no harm comes to Muslims, and whether this requires the permission of a jurist, the answer was: “It is not permissible to steal from the People of the Book or to harm them, provided that they uphold the terms of dhimmah or that they are under Muslim protection.” (p. 507)

Newly Converted Jews — But…

A question was asked: Some Jews claim to have converted to Islam, yet their conversion is doubtful because “they avoid eating meat slaughtered by Muslims, as well as lard, oil, and other such things.” What is their ruling?

The response: “If it is certain that the Jew remains upon his Judaism, then his mere declaration of being Muslim is of no consequence.” (p. 35)

[This issue particularly concerned the Jews of Mashhad, who maintained their Jewish identity and practices while outwardly professing Islam.]

Another related question states:

“The Jewish community in these regions claims to have become Muslim, saying, ‘We are newly converted Muslims,’ yet they abstain from Muslim-slaughtered meat, lard, oil, etc. They neither give their daughters in marriage to Muslims nor take Muslim daughters as wives. Are they to be considered Muslims or not? And is it permissible for Muslims to use the same public bathhouses as them—that is, to come into contact with them while wet? If we are certain they are lying and remain Jews, what is the ruling?”

The reply:

“Indeed, if it is certain that the Jew remains upon his Judaism, then his claim of having become Muslim carries no weight.” (pp. 504, Q. 1042)

In another question:

“What is the ruling if a group of Jews formally converted to Islam, and for a time observed Islamic duties—attending mosques, participating in congregational prayers, and maintaining contact with religious scholars—but then one of them later converted to the Bahāʾī faith and now serves as a missionary for them? Is such a person an apostate by birth (murtadd fiṭrī) or apostate by national affiliation (murtadd millī)?”

The answer:

“In the given case, such a person is a murtadd millī. Therefore, his previous transactions remain valid, and it is permissible, in accordance with Islamic law, for Muslims to rent his bathhouse or other properties without issue.” (p. 503)

The phenomenon of Jews converting to the Bahāʾī faith in Iran was both curious and widespread.

Government Property — Lawful or Unlawful?

The concept of a usurping government (ḥukūmat ghāṣib) has always created financial and ethical dilemmas for devout believers. Employment with the state or use of government property often raised religious concerns.

Several related questions were asked:

1. Government funds used in holy shrines — If the water used in sacred sites and shrines (amākin mutabarraka) was funded by state money—possibly derived from taxes—what is the ruling on performing ablution (wuḍūʾ) with it?

“The ruling is that the ablution is valid.” (p. 38)

This refers to the belief that taxation was unlawful, so expenditures from it created doubts about the permissibility of using such facilities.

2. Bread made from government-supplied wheat — A more detailed question from Tehran reads:

“All bakeries in Tehran receive wheat from the government’s supply office (Edāreh Arzāq Dawlati). Naturally, all this wheat comes from one of three sources: taxes, state-owned lands (amlāk khāliṣah), or government purchases made with state funds. Apparently, this makes it either illicit (ḥarām muḥaqqaq) or of unknown ownership (majhūl al-mālik). What should the people do regarding such bread?”

A related question adds:

“Most people in government departments earn their living from state salaries; their homes, furnishings, and goods are all purchased with this money. Tradesmen, in turn, do business with these employees, so all financial dealings are mixed with such doubtful income. Government offices and ministries are frequented daily by the public. Truly, living in Tehran with complete caution is exceedingly difficult. I request permission to use property of unknown ownership and to perform prayer in such homes or trade in such goods.”

The reply:

“When property is of unknown ownership (majhūl al-mālik) and its true owner is completely unknown, and you have no alternative but to use it, I grant you permission to use it—on the condition that, to the best of your ability, you give some portion in charity to poor and modest Muslims whom you personally know.” (pp. 535–536)

3. State employee seeking lawful income — Another question reads:

“A man employed in road and street maintenance, constantly moving from one place to another, is poor. He requests permission that the salary he receives be considered charity on behalf of its rightful owner, or that you prescribe another way to make his income lawful.” (p. 61)

This refers to the practice whereby government salaries—deemed illicit—could be made lawful through symbolic transfer or authorization by a qualified jurist.

Recitation of Mourning Narratives (Rawzeh-khwānī) and Its Related Issues

Numerous questions in these istiftāʾāt concern rawzeh reciters and the practice of narrating the events of Karbala. A portion of these questions deals with recounting stories from unreliable or fabricated sources.

One preacher asked: “If during the day, while fasting, I narrate such stories and ascribe a doubtful statement to an Infallible, does this invalidate the fast?”

He then gave examples:

• In one narration, it is said that Imam Ḥusayn (a) told Ḥabīb b. Muẓāhir at the time of farewell, ‘You are a reciter of the Qur’an.’ But the book actually places this statement not at the farewell but when the Imam came to his bedside.

• In another, it is said that when Imam Ḥusayn (a) bid farewell to Sukayna, who was weeping, he wiped her tears—but the preacher later doubted whether this actually occurred.

• In a third, while recounting the Imam’s conversation with the enemy, upon hearing the wailing of the women, the preacher said the Imam told ʿAbbās and ʿAlī Akbar, ‘Go and silence them, for the enemy mocks us.’ Yet, in the source, the word “go” does not appear; only ‘silence them’ is mentioned.

He then asked: Are these fabrications? And if I said them unintentionally or mistakenly while fasting, but later suspected I might have said them deliberately, what is the ruling?

Answer:

If one has read the material in a book, he should narrate it explicitly as a report from that book—that is, say, “It is written in such-and-such book.” Doing so does not harm the fast, because in that case the falsehood is attributed to the author of the book, not to the Imam. However, if it is certain that the Imam never said it, and one asserts it as fact, then with certainty of false attribution, it falls under the category of lying upon an Infallible, which invalidates the fast. (pp. 90–91)

Income from Rawḍah Recitation

A question was asked about how to calculate the khums for income from rawzeh recitation. The ruling:

If one knows the start date of their annual cycle, they should use that as their fiscal year; whatever they have earned so far, they must now pay its khums, and thereafter fix a specific day each year for that purpose.

Attending Gatherings with Questionable Content

Another inquiry concerned attending mourning gatherings where the preachers recite false or unreliable reports and sometimes mix them with other discussions: “For us, the listeners, is attending such gatherings permissible or not?”

Answer:

“InshāʾAllāh, your attendance is not problematic, since their falsehood is not certain.” (p. 492)

On Statements about the Imams’ Status

A preacher had made some statements about the spiritual rank of an Imam, which the questioner thought excessive. Haj Shaykh responded:

“If those statements are consistent with what is found in Ziyārat al-Jāmiʿah, then there is no objection.” (p. 471)

Regarding Rewards Mentioned in Supplications

Someone asked about narrations promising immense forgiveness for reciting certain supplications—for example, “So many sins will be forgiven”—and whether it is believable that one can sin freely and then have all forgiven simply by reciting a duʿāʾ.

Answer:

“It is not far-fetched (istibʿād nadārad) that such statements refer to repentance or something akin to it.” (p. 475)

Endowed Properties for Rawḍah and Shrines

A question asked: “Some endowed properties for rawḍah recitation or for lighting holy shrines were seized—by the state or by others—and are now lost. Is it permissible to transfer ownership of such property to someone who can restore it to its endowment (waqf) status?”

Answer:

“No, it is not permissible to claim ownership. However, if money is given as a reward (juʿālah) to someone to recover the property from wrongful possession, there is no problem.” (p. 155)

This reflects the concern over state appropriation of endowed (waqf) properties during that period.

On Vows and Offerings

Another question: “In the villages, it is customary that some people make vows (nadhir) by donating cloths to be tied to the standards (ʿalam). Is it permissible to sell those cloths and use the proceeds for mourning ceremonies or for maintaining the mourning hall?”

Answer:

“There is no objection.” (p. 242)

A considerable number of questions address property endowed for mourning ceremonies and rawḍah recitation, covering various legal and practical circumstances. (pp. 166–168, 173–174, 180–181, 186, 195, 219, 239, 328, 345–346, 440)

New Civilizational Changes and Their Jurisprudential Rulings

A question was asked: “Is the statement of a ship’s captain regarding the direction of the qiblah—when he is knowledgeable about the directions of various lands—considered valid?”

Ruling: “In such circumstances, the captain’s statement is indeed valid.” (p. 62)

Another question stated: “Our master, the British government brings fish eggs from other regions and releases them into springs or rivers. By the perfect power of the Almighty Creator, fish are born and grow there. Often these fish are placed in enclosed waterways or mesh-covered rivers so that they cannot escape. Please clarify whether catching such fish without the owner’s permission is permissible, and what if some fish happen to escape the enclosure and enter other waters?”

Answer: “They must not be caught without the owner’s permission.” (p. 414)

(This question refers to the British authorities introducing fish eggs into Iranian waters.)

Another inquiry asked: “While in a state of iḥrām (during pilgrimage), if one sits inside a covered automobile or airplane, does each instance require a separate expiation (kaffārah), or is one expiation sufficient for multiple occasions?”

Answer: “Apparently, a single expiation suffices for all instances.” (p. 146)

It is noteworthy that this question was posed before the death of Haj Shaykh in 1936 (1315 SH), indicating that issues relating to automobiles and airplanes were already reaching juristic attention in his time.

A question was also asked about lottery-style sales: “Some people sell goods as a form of gambling—for example, in every hundred boxes of sweets or cigarettes, they place one one-toman bill. Because of this, buyers pay one toman for a box of cigarettes worth only ten shāhīs, hoping to win the inserted money and ‘test their luck.’ Is such a transaction valid?”

Answer: “The validity of such a transaction is doubtful.” (p. 282)

Regarding artificial teeth during prayer, the question was: “What is the ruling on wearing false teeth while praying?”

Ruling: “There is no problem.” (p. 84)

Transferring Corpses to the Holy Shrines (ʿAtabāt)

One detailed question discussed various methods of preserving bodies that were to be transported to the sacred shrines in Iraq, according to the deceased’s will: “Some place the body inside a coffin within a trench in the ground… some lay it as though in the position of prayer… some do this without a coffin… others place it in a trench similar to a legal burial, and some, out of caution, bury it fully in a proper grave (laḥd) temporarily.”

Answer:

“It is better to bury the body in a proper Islamic burial, and when the time of transport arrives, the grave may be exhumed.” (p. 203)

Several other questions were also posed on the transportation of bodies to the holy shrines, with corresponding rulings provided (for example, pp. 209, 210, 212).

Drawing and Its Ruling

A question was asked regarding painting:

“Ḥujjat al-Islām! Āyat Allāh! What is your opinion on the issue of painting? Is all painting in every form forbidden? Or is it only the depiction of beings possessing souls (dhawī al-arwāḥ) that is prohibited, while other forms—such as landscapes, flowers, and fruits—are permissible? If depicting living beings is problematic, does a partial image—such as half a human body—also fall under prohibition? And what about a profile showing only one eye, one eyebrow, and one side of the nose and mouth—is that considered a complete or incomplete image? Are depictions of dead humans or animals treated like depictions of the living, or are they considered non-living forms? Finally, if someone has no means of livelihood other than painting, and is compelled to paint for a living, is it still forbidden for such a person, or is it permissible?”

Answer:

“Depicting non-living forms (ghayr dhawī al-arwāḥ) is not forbidden, nor is drawing incomplete images of living beings. The criterion for what is considered complete or incomplete depends on customary perception (ʿurf). There is no difference between depicting the dead or the living. However, lacking a lawful profession does not justify engaging in an unlawful one.” (p. 437)

Theatrical Reenactments (Taʿziyah) and Mourning Plays for Imam Ḥusayn (a)

A question was posed: “What is the ruling on taʿziyah performances for Sayyid al-Shuhadāʾ (a), in which men wear women’s clothing, recite fabricated verses, and commit certain forbidden acts?”

Answer: “Given these conditions, the impropriety of such practices is evident.” (p. 439)

Another question asked: “In the taʿziyah of Sayyid al-Shuhadāʾ (a), is it permissible to bring actors representing the martyrs of Karbala and the captives, including men acting as the women of the Imam’s family, and to use drums and cymbals?”

Answer: “Performing taʿziyah for Sayyid al-Shuhadāʾ (may our souls be his ransom) is among the highly recommended acts, provided that it does not involve drums and cymbals. As a precaution, it should also avoid the common practice of cross-gender impersonation.” (p. 508)

Another inquiry stated: “Is it permissible to use theatrical imitation (shabīh āvardan), drum-beating, and trumpet-blowing during mourning ceremonies?”

Answer: “These very practices were once common in Qom. However, since they often led to other problematic matters, I personally requested that they be discontinued, and they were replaced with rawḍah recitation.” (p. 539)

Yet, another question received a different answer: “It is customary in these regions that during ʿĀshūrāʾ and similar occasions, people create a representation of Dhū al-Janāḥ (the horse of Imam Ḥusayn) and perform chest-beating (sīneh-zanī) around it. Since such a representation stirs sorrow and brings tears to the eyes of the faithful, is it permissible and commendable to do so?”

Answer: “There is no prohibition in doing so; in fact, it is not devoid of merit.” (p. 541)

Belief in Rajʿah (Return of the Imams) — Not a Necessity of the Faith or Sect

A question was asked regarding rajʿah (the return of certain believers and disbelievers before the Day of Judgment)—an issue that, during Ayatullah Ḥāʾirī’s period of leadership, had become a matter of public debate, with some expressing doubt.

“It has been reported that His Eminence, Āyatullāh, has said: ‘Belief in rajʿah is neither a necessity of religion nor of the madhhab (sect).’ Yet, many distinguished scholars have argued for it using over a dozen Qur’anic verses and numerous mutawātir (mass-transmitted) reports, as well as explicit references in authentic ziyārah texts such as Ziyārat al-Wārith, Ziyārat al-Arbaʿīn, Ziyārat al-Sardāb al-Muṭahhar, Ziyārat of the Prophet and the Imams, Ziyārat of the Third of Shaʿbān and Rajabiyyah, Ziyārat al-Jāmiʿah, Duʿāʾ al-ʿAhd, and others. We request a brief clarification—how is this not a necessary doctrine of the faith?”

Answer: “I have written an explanation on this matter, which has been printed and published—please refer to it. In short: I personally believe in rajʿah, and there is sufficient evidence for its truth. However, it is not among those beliefs whose denial, out of mere doubt, would take a person out of Islam or the Shīʿī madhhab.” (pp. 440–441)

This refers to the same istiftāʾ that was published during his lifetime in the Humāyūn journal of Qom.

The Beard as a Legal Issue

The question of beard shaving has been a recurrent topic of inquiry among jurists over the past century. Both Shia and Sunni scholars have authored numerous treatises on it.

One question asked: “Can the prohibition of shaving the beard be established through the Qur’an, or is it derived from Hadith?”

Answer: “It is not necessary that everything be derived from the Qur’an—just as the number of rakʿāt in the daily prayers cannot be learned from the Qur’an alone. The prohibition of shaving the beard is known from Hadith. May God protect us from corrupt thoughts and the evil of devils.” (p. 446)

The closing remark reflects the modern ideological debates of the time surrounding personal appearance and Western influence.

Another question asked: “What is the permissible limit for trimming the beard?”

Answer: “The purpose of trimming (iṣlāḥ) is recommended. Its limit is to round out the beard by cutting hairs that are excessively longer than the rest.” (p. 516)

A similar question followed: “Please explain the Qur’anic verses or Hadiths that prohibit shaving the face, and clarify the minimum required length of the beard according to Islamic law.”

Answer: “This is not the place to cite verses and Hadiths in detail. In summary, shaving or anything equivalent to shaving is forbidden. The beard must be of such length that it is customarily recognized as a beard (yaṣduq ʿalayh al-liḥyah ʿurfan), and as a precaution (aḥwaṭ), it should be at least a handful in length.” (p. 539)

Another question raised the issue of Western imitation (farangī-maʾābī): “What is the ruling on cutting some parts of the hair and leaving others long in a style resembling Westerners? Likewise, what is the ruling on wearing Western-style clothes? And if one wears such clothes under other garments so that they are not visible, what then?”

 Answer: “He should avoid imitating them in these matters.” (p. 427)

The Ruling on the Radio

A lengthy question was posed regarding the radio, though Haj Shaykh’s answer was brief. The detailed wording of the question, however, reveals fascinating insights into how people at that time perceived the new technology—especially since radio had not yet been officially introduced in Iran (discussions began around 1934, and it was launched in 1940—four years after Ḥāʾirī’s death).

The question read: “Nayib al-Imām! Please state your esteemed ruling concerning the use of a device called the radio, which has recently become widespread throughout the world.

For further clarification, its features are described as follows: The radio is a box which, when connected to an electric wire, transmits speech from the speaker to the listener, similar to the telephone and telegraph. The difference from the telegraph is that the voice of the speaker, along with its tone and accent, can be heard and recognized. The radio is a sound-transmitting device capable of conveying good or bad speech, Qur’an recitation, commentary, sermons, admonitions, musical instruments, gunfire, the roar of lions, the song of nightingales, and more—from the broadcasting center to the ears of listeners.

It operates through special transmission centers, which contain machines that send sound. The reciter, preacher, or musician must go to such a center and speak before a small device called a microphone, connected to electric wires. Whatever is said—whether in Arabic or another language, news reports, commercial prices, or other sounds—reaches the listeners’ ears.

The radio also has a special switch, allowing the listener to block any undesirable sound. For example, if a broadcasting station were established in Najaf al-Ashraf or Qom, the religious scholars could directly convey their ideas and rulings to the entire world—to anyone who owns a radio box. They could address all the Shīʿah of the world and enlighten them.

Especially in these times, when the Japanese people are inclined to abandon idolatry and adopt one of the three Abrahamic religions—Islam, Judaism, or Christianity—how wonderful it would be if sixty or seventy million souls were to embrace Islam!

In any case, please issue your ruling regarding whether the use of the radio is permitted or prohibited, so that your opinion may serve as a guide when needed.”

Ḥāʾirī’s reply: “In the situation described, listening to permissible sounds (aswāt muḥallalah) through the radio appears to have no objection.* (pp. 446–447)

Thus, Haj Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī—while cautious in many matters—acknowledged the potential of modern technologies such as radio and viewed their use, when restricted to lawful content, as permissible and beneficial.

Question on the Causes of Muslim Backwardness

A question was raised regarding the reasons for the decline and backwardness of Muslims, despite possessing a divine book like the Qur’an: “The Qur’an, which encompasses all previous scriptures, is said to be the source from which Europe and other nations learned science and industry, leading to their advancement. Why then have our scholars not explained the sciences and industries for us? We Iranians are poor and distressed—is there truth to their claim? Or did our scholars explain these matters, but people failed to act upon them?”

Ayatullah Ḥāʾirī replied:

“The Qur’an and Hadith have both strongly encouraged social organization, earning a livelihood, and managing worldly affairs. But the specifics of the sciences and industries belong to those with high aspirations (himam ʿāliya). Foreigners pursued these aims with intellectual effort, developed their mental capacities, and thereby discovered the sciences and industries. We, however, through laziness and lack of zeal, have neglected our intellectual powers and fallen behind. This failure is not the responsibility of the scholars.” (p. 448)

Two key points emerge from this exchange:

1. The questioner’s assumption reflects a popular notion at the time—that Islam inherently contains all knowledge, that the West advanced by following the Qur’an, while Muslims did not act upon it and therefore declined. Ḥāʾirī’s response directly refutes this idea, asserting that the Qur’an is not a book of industry or technical sciences, nor are such fields derived from revelation. They belong to the realm of human initiative and aspiration. Progress requires personal effort and industriousness, not simply religious knowledge.

2. He also absolves the scholars of responsibility, since the question implicitly blamed them for not teaching worldly sciences. Ḥāʾirī clarifies that the issue lies in the lack of ambition and diligence among the people, not the neglect of the ʿulamāʾ.

He thus presents a distinctly rational and sociological view of Muslim decline, emphasizing individual and collective agency rather than religious determinism.

Interest in Christianity — Correspondence with Ayatullah Ḥāʾirī

Another extended section of the istiftāʾāt—spanning pages 448 to 471—deals with an exchange on Christianity.

The story begins with a letter from the son of a scholar, who writes that he has developed doubts and misgivings about Islam, arising from “certain external causes.” He explains that he was a descendant of scholars, studied seminary texts up to Rasāʾil and Makāsib, but later left the seminary, attended modern schools, adopted modernist ideas, began debating on Christianity—and eventually converted to Christianity: “I have come to believe in the Christian faith and have been following it for some time.”

In this letter, he seeks to explain the reasons for his conversion to Ayatullah Ḥāʾirī, whom he respectfully addresses as Ḥaḍrat Malādh al-Anām (the refuge of mankind):

“Perhaps if my state of misguidance is made clear to me, I may renew my Islam and expose the superstitions of Christianity; otherwise, I will remain as I am.” (p. 449)

He then proceeds to present detailed arguments and citations from the Qur’an in support of Christian doctrines, demonstrating a significant level of familiarity with theological debate (pp. 450–453). His expectation was that the marjaʿ (Ḥāʾirī) would respond directly to these questions and doubts.

Ḥāʾirī replied:

“Your letter has reached me, and it has caused me great sorrow—on two counts. First, that a fellow believer should abandon Islam for another religion without any rational or reasonable cause; and second, that in the lands of Islam, despite the presence of scholars of the Jaʿfarī school, not one person could gently guide a confused soul back from error to the path of truth. This is one of the misfortunes of our Muslim community.” (p. 453)

He then proceeds with a series of explanations and arguments, though too lengthy to reproduce fully here. His reply continues up to page 457, after which the original questioner writes another letter in response:

“I had little hope that you would reply so promptly to my questions.”

He continues, saying that he still seeks truth, wanting to “find stability in one of the two firm foundations—Christianity or Islam.” He notes that he has written articles on “reform and irreligion” in Ancient Iran Magazine (issues 35 and 36), and insists that he remains a believer to the end of his life, unlike those who say:

“In the twentieth century, what need is there for religion or faith?” (p. 459)

He then elaborates on the superiority of Christ over other prophets, adding that:

“What I wrote was the truth of my belief, not mere sentimental attachment.” (p. 463)

At this point, Ayatullah Ḥāʾirī responds again with a second letter, continuing his refutation and counsel (pp. 463–471).

Another related question—no. 950 on page 472—appears to continue this discussion (though separated by an unrelated inquiry). It concerns the non-distortion of the Gospel, a topic Muslims have historically emphasized. Ḥāʾirī’s reply once again addresses this same theme. (p. 473)

Religious Doubts and the Spread of Skepticism among the Devout

The intellectual spread of irreligion during the Reza Shah era led to certain questions being raised—though some of these skeptical inquiries are not unique to that period. One question vividly illustrates the climate of doubt experienced by some believers:

A person does not deny any of the true doctrines of religion and acts upon all the practices of the saved sect. Yet doubts keep occurring to him: whenever he presents arguments to himself or hears proofs, another doubt appears, or the same doubt is not entirely dispelled. On the one hand he greatly fears his condition; on the other, he is bewildered. Reflecting on the world, he observes that all things arise from one another and everything occurs through causes. Now, when told that there is a Creator of nature and a Causer of causes, he finds no rational proof for it, because such a Being is not perceptible to the five senses; nor is there a universal consensus among humanity such that its opposite could not even be imagined. Nor are we in the age of the Prophet and Imams (peace be upon them) so that certainty could be attained through their miracles. Moreover, there are myriad disagreements, with each group following a different path, each claiming to be right and proving its own beliefs.

In short, if such a person resolves to perform all obligations, avoid all prohibitions, adopt the conduct of this madhhab as his way, maintain fear of God and hope in Him, seek recourse to the Imams—especially the Master of Martyrs (a)—and pray for his own guidance—what is the state of this person before God? What will become of him after death?

Answer:

The Islam and faith of such a person are valid. The appearance of doubts in his mind and his inability to dispel them do not harm his faith. However, it is obligatory for him to present himself to a fully learned and insightful scholar and complete his foundational beliefs (uṣūl al-ʿaqāʾid) under his guidance, giving this precedence over other necessary matters. For the evidences of the fundamentals of belief are so clear and free of difficulty that, with a little attention to those manifest proofs, one attains full certainty. (p. 488)

Another question asked: A person finds blasphemous notions passing through his heart—such as insulting the Almighty God or the Imams (peace be upon them)—while he himself is not pleased with such thoughts, becomes distressed by them, and is unable to repel them. What is the ruling for such a person? Is he a believer or a disbeliever?

Answer:

Such states are from Satan, and this person is certainly a believer. (p. 458)

(The lenient, pastoral approach of Āyatullāh Ḥāʾirī appears clearly in other places as well.)

Another inquiry: If someone says that khums and zakāt were invented by the mullās to seize people’s wealth—either to consume it themselves or give it to others—does this statement constitute apostasy?

Answer:

This statement entails two elements: (1) insult and disparagement of the scholars of Islam, and (2) denial of something necessarily known of Islam—since the obligation of zakāt is like the obligation of prayer. As for khums, its being “necessary (self-evident) knowledge” is not like zakāt, though it too is obligatory. As for the reports of remission (akhbār al-taḥlīl regarding khums), upon careful consideration it becomes clear that they pertain to specific cases. (p. 128)

A seven-page query (pp. 418–424) was also submitted in which the questioner sets out his notions and objections in seeking the true nature of legal rulings during the occultation. He asks the Āyatullāh for a prompt and clear answer. The questioner’s mind is preoccupied with whether, in the age of occultation, fatwas are based on conjecture and ijtihād, or are identical to the very ḥadīths of the Infallibles. If they are not identical, what guarantee is there of their correctness, and why would God leave people in such a state?

Āyatullāh Ḥāʾirī’s reply spans three pages (pp. 424–427):

“Although there is no space for a detailed treatment, I hope this brief response removes your doubt; and if any difficulty remains, inform me again.”

He then endeavors to explain that the jurist’s opinion, even when termed ẓannī (probabilistic), is in essence founded upon deep study and reflection on the ḥadīths, not—as some imagine—merely the scholar’s personal inclination (“if a scholar says ‘my opinion is this,’ it does not mean ‘this is my personal desire’…”). He proceeds to outline the differences between Akhbārīs and Uṣūlīs, concluding that the path the mujtahid follows yields, in the end, the ruling of the Sharīʿah with firm commitment, even if it is not absolutely certain. (p. 426)

Imitating Non-Muslims and Europeanized Practices

A question was asked: “Is it forbidden to eat using a knife and fork, as is customary among Europeans?”

Answer: “Because it involves imitation (tashabbuh) of non-believers, it is objectionable; if one can avoid it, that is certainly better.” (p. 489)

Another question, this time concerning clothing: “Are the ordinary clothes of modern people—such as collars and neckties—forbidden for everyone, or only for certain individuals whose social appearance (zīyy) does not suit such dress?”

Answer: “Without necessity or real need, one should not adopt the distinctive style of non-believers or immoral people.” (p. 489)

Another inquiry: “Men and women of today imitate Europeans in their style of dress and in the way they arrange their hair. Is this by itself permissible or not? And if forbidden, under what category does the prohibition fall?”

Answer: “Imitating non-believers in matters that are distinctive to them is not permissible.” (p. 496)

A question was also posed: “Is it permissible to send one’s children to modern schools to study new sciences and English books?”

Answer: “If there is a likelihood of corruption of their faith, it is not permissible.” (p. 506)

Regarding women’s use of belts and coats (palto):

Ruling: “If these garments are not exclusively men’s clothing, there is no problem; though it is not far-fetched that belts are among items specific to men.” (p. 56)

(This reflects the period when women’s clothing styles were gradually changing.)

On praying while wearing European-style clothing, the question was: “Is prayer valid in such garments, and what about adopting European dress in general?”

Answer: “Apparently, performing prayer in these clothes does not invalidate it—even if wearing them is itself sinful.” (p. 85)

Consulting an Unqualified Doctor

A rather striking question asked about consulting a local physician, whether non-Muslim or a convert to Islam, when opinions about his competence differ—some praising him, others denying his medical knowledge: “Is it permissible to consult him for treatment?”

Answer: “If one doubts his competence, he should not consult him, unless it is known that his treatment will not cause harm. When there is no alternative, and until confidence is gained, the safer course (aḥwaṭ) is to refrain from consulting him.” (p. 495)

The Ruling on Stealing a Neighbor’s Cat

Another curious question: “May one steal a clever, mouse-catching cat belonging to a neighbor?”

Answer: “If the owner of the house in which the cat lives takes care of it, it is not far-fetched that he acquires a special right of possession (ḥaqq al-ikhtiṣāṣ) over it.” (pp. 496–497)

(The question here concerned the status of ownership in relation to domestic animals such as cats.)

Prohibition of Opium Smoking

A question was asked regarding smoking opium: “Assuming it is forbidden, is there any difference between a beginner and an addict?”

Answer: “There is no difference between them.” (p. 538)

Ruling on Prayer for the Shahsavan Nomads

A question concerned the Shahsavan tribes and whether they should perform the shortened (qaṣr) or complete (tamām) prayer during their seasonal migrations (summer and winter pastures). Since each tribe owns an area roughly one farsakh by one farsakh, the ruling was:

“In their summer and winter encampments, the prayer is complete (tamām); while on the road between them, it is shortened (qaṣr).” (p. 81)

Submerging the Head Underwater While Fasting

In a detailed question about bathhouse operators, the structure of traditional bathhouses (khazīnahs) is explained—how beneath the pool there is a furnace (tūn) that heats the water. Sometimes cracks appear, allowing water to seep through, extinguishing the fire and wasting water worth at least twenty tomans, which would close the bathhouse and cause loss. The question concerned the bathhouse owner’s fast if he submerged his head under water to inspect or repair the crack. (p. 89)

Prostration on the Thresholds of Shrines

A question was raised: “Some common people, upon entering mosques, shrines, or takiyas, kiss the doors and curtains; some even place their foreheads upon them—sometimes even on the threshold or pulpit. Is this permissible?”

Answer: “Kissing the door or threshold of a shrine, mosque, or other sacred place for the purpose of seeking blessing (tabarruk) is permissible, God willing. However, doing so as an act of humility or prostration is not permissible, since that resembles sujūd, which is an act of worship exclusive to God.” (pp. 483–484)

Forced Labor of Women and Children by Men

A question was asked: “Some men force their wives and children to work; if they refuse, they are insulted, cursed, or even beaten. The women and children, to avoid harm, end up working. Are such men obligated to pay them wages?”

Answer: “If they are compelled and do not intend to volunteer (tabarruʿ), then yes, the men are liable to pay their wages.” (p. 249)

Father’s Permission for a Virgin’s Marriage

A question was asked: “If a virgin girl has found a suitable match (kufʾ), and she is willing to marry him, but her father refuses—does his permission remain a condition?”

Answer: “If the man is a proper match and the girl desires him, the father or paternal grandfather has no right to prevent the marriage.” (p. 397)

Excavating Another’s Land to Find Antiquities

Two questions were submitted regarding digging on others’ property to search for antiquities or buried treasures (p. 417), reflecting how antiquities-hunting had become a growing practice in that historical period.

Giving Money to Buy Books for Children

A question asked whether zakāt funds, which the jurist had said may be spent on general charitable works such as schools, mosques, and bridges, could also be used for other projects from non-zakāt funds, and specifically: “Is it permissible to use zakāt to buy books for schoolchildren or to give them a monthly stipend?”

Answer: “If there are poor people in the town, it is better to give the zakāt directly to them.” (p. 102)

Hearing the Voice of a Non-Mahram Woman

A question was asked: “Is it permissible to listen to the voice of a non-mahram woman (ṣawt al-ajnabiyyah)?”

Answer: “If there is no intention of lust or temptation (riybah), then there is no problem.” (p. 387)

1. Source