What follows is a series of posts on a topic pertaining to language, speech, words and utterences, and their relation to blasphemy and disbelief. In particular, this series of posts will be looking at the issue of linguistic and uttered blasphemy in Hanafi law and the Farsi language. These translations are from the book Alfaz-e Kufr Farsi Dar Fiqh Hanafi written by Shaykh Rasul Jafariyan. This book is a compilation of several treatises as well as Shaykh Jafariyan’s own articles and analysis of this phenomenon. What follows in this first post is a brief overview of this discussion from between pages 18 to 28.

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The Historical Roots of Linguistic Kufriyat in the Hanafi School

As mentioned earlier, the concept of takfir—beyond the Qur’anic discussions and the events surrounding the so-called apostasy wars against the central government—was formally introduced during the uprising against ‘Uthman in 35 AH, followed by the Battles of Jamal and Siffin, and primarily by the Khawarij after the arbitration (tahkim) in 39 AH. In all these events, the central issue was the accusation of kufr against individuals who, despite professing Islam verbally and even performing Islamic rituals, were declared disbelievers for various reasons.

The Khawarij were the strictest in this regard, considering those who committed major sins to be disbelievers. As we know, the Mu‘tazilites, while not labelling those who committed major sins as disbelievers, did not regard them as Muslims either; instead, they considered them fasiq (deviants). The Murji’ites, who initially deferred judgment on the parties involved in the Battles of Jamal and Siffin to God, later, through theological debates, deemed the mere recitation of the shahadatayn sufficient for one to be considered a Muslim.

Other Muslims emphasized both inner faith (iman) and outward actions as prerequisites for recognizing someone as a Muslim. At this point, the role of language becomes prominent. Significant discussions emerged regarding the relationship between iman and language, will not be discussed in this book.

Before delving into the role of language in iman, it is important to note that the scope of apostasy and its contexts are far broader than what has been previously mentioned. One of the most significant aspects involves intellectual debates and the presentation of differing viewpoints, which arose as new ideas entered the evolving intellectual landscape of Islam. The emergence of new theology at the time brought with it the label of zandaqa for those who discussed differently or opposed the orthodox intellectual systems that were taking shape. Such individuals were often accused of apostasy.

The Shaykh al-Islam figures officially appointed under the Abbasid administration acted as jurists issuing rulings on the zindiq as apostates. For an example, one can refer to Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-‘Ulama by Al-Tahawi (d. 321 AH). In the section on al-Siyar in this book, rulings concerning apostates are included among the issues discussed. At that time, linguistic kufriyat was not yet a formal topic, but there are abundant examples of zandaqa and apostasy.

In issue 1651, regarding giving the opportunity for repentance to an apostate, a question is raised about a zindiq who “professes Islam” (yuzhir al-Islam). It is reported that Abu Hanifa said: “Treat him like an apostate. If he repents and becomes a Muslim, let him go; if not, execute him.” Abu Yusuf, the judge under Harun al-Rashid, added: “For a time, this was the ruling that was followed. However, when it was observed that the zindiqs would repent but then revert to their statements, my opinion changed. When a zindiq is brought, he should be executed without being given a chance to repent. If he repents before being executed, then he should not be killed and should be released.” (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-‘Ulama, p. 501)

Elsewhere, Al-Tahawi quotes Abu Hanifa as saying: “Execute the zindiq secretly because their repentance cannot be trusted (fa-inna tawbatahu la tu‘raf).” (Mukhtasar Ikhtilaf al-‘Ulama, p. 501) Here, the rulings on apostates and zindiq are entirely intertwined and are treated as one and the same. In Al-Tahawi’s book, written in the late 3rd century AH, there is still no mention of linguistic kufriyat.

Let us now continue the discussion on the foundations of linguistic kufriyat, based on the definition of iman and its reliance on the shahadatayn. It is worth noting the use of the term “utterance” (lafz). In old Persian texts like Tadhkirat al-Awliya and others, the term kufriyat often refers to statements attributed to zindiqs. In one section of this book, it is mentioned:

“Due to the enmity of this group [the Sufis], Ghulam Khalil rose against them and reported to the caliph: ‘A group has emerged that dances, recites songs, utters kufriyat, spends all day in entertainment, and secretly gathers in cellars to converse in hidden ways. These people are zindiqs. If Amir al-Mu’minin orders their execution, the sect of the zindiqs will be dismantled, as they are its leaders.’ …” (Tadhkirat al-Awliya, Zawar Edition, p. 406)

Of course, this event does not take place as Ghulam Khalil suggests. Here, the term kufriyat is applied to what Sufis like Junayd and others were saying. A similar usage is found in Khwaja’s Siyasatnama (Siyar al-Muluk, p. 88). This term also appears in Arabic texts, such as when used by Al-Dhahabi and others, for example: “Kufriyat of the Sufis and Philosophers” or “Kufriyat of Ibn Sina” (Tarikh al-Islam by Al-Dhahabi, 21/278; 42/23).

Abu Hanifa (d. 150 AH), a key theorist of the Irja’ doctrine and the Murji’a school, was among those who considered the verbal utterance of the shahadatayn sufficient to call someone a Muslim. Apparently, he did not deem internal faith or action necessary conditions for applying the term “Muslim” to a person. This does not imply a disregard for these two elements but was based solely on the idea that the shahadatayn suffices for the term “Muslim.” Naturally, this could lead to extremes in belief or accusations of denigrating iman.

This contention led to a perpetual dispute between the Mu‘tazila and the Murji’a, placing them in opposition to each other. Shi‘i jurists also considered verbal iman sufficient but simultaneously emphasized internal faith and actions.

In reality, they considered it sufficient as a minimum requirement. Later, the Ash‘arites also adopted this belief. During the second to fourth centuries AH, prior to the rise and expansion of the Ash‘arite school, the ahl al-hadith had intense hostility toward the Murji’a. In their definition of iman, they insisted on the simultaneous presence of verbal, heartfelt, and actionable faith while emphasizing the variability of iman—its capacity to increase and decrease.

Over time, however, and after several centuries, this principle gradually gained acceptance among Muslims: the recitation of the shahadatayn was sufficient to call someone a Muslim, and sins—whether major or minor—did not, except under specific circumstances, remove a person from the fold of faith. This concept continued to evolve, leading to significant issues, books, and treatises addressing the theoretical explanation and definition of iman. A substantial portion of these discussions, with a historical and theological perspective, has been included in my article published in the tenth volume of Murji’a: History and Thought (Qom, Dalil-e Ma, 1380 SH).

In that article, I elaborated on the views of Abu Hanifa, who became the leading figure of the Hanafi school in the East and Transoxiana and later among the Turks and their dynasties, which then spread to other regions. It appears that the alliance between the Murji’a and the Hanafis, particularly in Khurasan, was the result of a political project aimed at opposing the Umayyads. On the other hand, this alliance appealed to the masses of Iranians who sought a simple and unembellished Islam, thereby spreading this school in Khurasan and almost extinguishing the Shafi‘i school in those areas.

It is precisely in this context, namely Transoxiana, that the issue of linguistic kufriyat arose. The Murji’a-Hanafi school, which had initially been lenient regarding the conversion of non-Arabs to Islam, eventually reached a point of extreme rigidity concerning “language” in matters of takfir. They began to take a strict stance against individuals who made blasphemous or mocking statements about religion, considering anyone who uttered even a slight insult toward the faith or its components to be a disbeliever.

The question of why the issue of blasphemous utterances emerged specifically in the Hanafi school, while it is absent in other schools, is not particularly difficult to answer. The Hanafi school arose from the doctrine of Irja’, which holds that faith is defined by the verbal expressions one utters, and that internal faith or physical acts, such as prayer and fasting, do not affect the concept of iman.

Accordingly, if someone utters blasphemous words, the foundation of their faith is undermined from that point onward. Essentially, a doctrine that had initially been formed to defend an easy and accessible iman, emphasizing lafz and language (lisan), now had to ensure that verbal expressions conformed to a sound state of faith. If someone used blasphemous expressions in their speech, it was natural for this school to insist on declaring them a disbeliever, as the foundation of iman was built on language.

Ibn Mazah (d. 616 AH) states in al-Muhit al-Burhani:

“If someone utters kufr willingly with their tongue, even if their heart is assured of faith, they are a disbeliever, and what is in their heart does not benefit them, because a disbeliever is distinguished from a believer by what they utter. If they utter kufr, they are considered a disbeliever by us and by Allah Almighty.” (al-Muhit al-Burhani, 7/379)

In this statement, it is explicitly declared that a person who freely utters blasphemy is deemed a disbeliever, even if their heart is assured of faith. Naturally, this ruling does not apply to cases where the utterance is made under coercion. It seems evident that the discussion on alfaz kufriyat is unique to the Hanafi school, and if the Shafi‘is have addressed it, it has been based on the Hanafi framework. Fazl ibn Rouzbihan Khunji Isfahani (d. 927 AH) notes:

“It should be known that there are many chapters in which the scholars of one madhhab refer to the books of scholars of another madhhab based on shared principles. For instance, the Shafi‘is, regarding the chapter on kufriyat alfaz, state that the Hanafi scholars paid meticulous attention to documenting these utterances, and in most cases, their principles align with ours. Therefore, we refer to their books and draw from them what is needed.” (Suluk al-Muluk, p. 189, ed. Muhammad Ali Muwahhid, Tehran, Khwarazmi, 1362 SH)

Here, it is explicitly stated that the discussion of alfaz kufriyat was specific to the Hanafis, and others relied on their works for this subject.

It should be noted, although I have not seen it explicitly stated, that there must be a distinction between this type of takfir and formal apostasy, even though this matter has not been fully discussed. In most cases where a person is declared a disbeliever for uttering something about God or similar topics, the issue of executing them is not raised, although there are rare instances. It does not even necessarily need to go to court for such a judgment. However, the individual is separated from their spouse and must remarry. Perhaps because such cases are so frequent, they have not been categorized under apostasy. Moreover, it is thought that this individual remains a Muslim since they profess the shahadatayn.

Nonetheless, the depth of this distinction from apostasy has not been clearly articulated. One instance where the death penalty is mentioned pertains to insulting ‘A’isha, the wife of the Prophet (p). It is known that sometimes, during discussions on apostasy, it has been stated that those who insult the two Shaykhs (Abu Bakr and ‘Umar) are to be judged as apostates. Some Hanafi scholars believed, for instance, that:

“One who curses the two Shaykhs is a disbeliever and an innovator if they elevate ‘Ali above them.” (Majma‘ al-Anhur fi Sharh Multaqa al-Abhur, p. 321)

In Hanafi legal texts, discussions under Kitab al-Murtaddin (the Book of Apostates) often lack detailed treatment of alfaz kufriyat, as seen, for example, in Bada’i‘ al-Sana’i by al-Kasani (Volume 6, Suleymaniye Library, No. 398, Folios 92–96). However, some books from Transoxiana, especially collections of fatawa, include these discussions. Additionally, treatises on the subject were still being written in the Ottoman Empire during the 11th and 12th centuries AH.

Could this type of takfir be comparable to the Zaydi concept of kufr ni‘ma (ingratitude for God’s blessings)? This does not seem likely, as in many cases, the ruling explicitly includes separation from one’s spouse as one of its definitive consequences.

Fundamentally, many instances of kufriyat have historically stemmed from individuals with sharp tongues, often coupled with a sense of estrangement from religion or its teachings. For example, there are those who struggle to reconcile divine justice with the Ash‘arite perspective or the nizam al-ahsan (the best possible system) of the Mu‘tazila. Frequently, encountering what they perceive as irregularities leads them to utter blasphemous statements.

This tendency fosters a rebellious spirit within them, prompting them to articulate sentiments in prose or verse that challenge God. The notion of “complaints against God” remains evident in the poetry of many poets. Some of these complaints resemble the lamentations of Job, who suffered greatly, as depicted in the Book of Job in the Torah:

“Cursed be the day I was born, and the night I was conceived in my mother’s womb. Let that day be forgotten forever, and let God never remember it…”

In any case, a distinction must be made between this type of kufr and apostasy. The linguistic kufr under discussion is not merely a moral issue but is primarily addressed within the context of remaining within the fold of Islam and reforming one’s speech to avoid uttering blasphemies, rather than categorizing it as apostasy.

The first chapter of the book Tabyin al-Maharim (Suleymaniye manuscript no. 400), which is largely an ethical work, is titled Bab al-Kufr (Chapter on Disbelief). In this section, an explanation is provided in Arabic (without the use of Persian terminology) about this topic, stating that kufr pertains to four areas: first, God; second, the Qur’an; third, our Prophet and other prophets; and fourth, Islamic rulings.

Examples are then provided for each of these categories, using Hanafi legal texts such as al-Muhit and others. The chapter also translates several Persian expressions from treatises on alfaz kufriyat into Arabic. However, at the end of the discussion, there is no mention of apostasy. Below is a page from that section for your reference:

Criteria for Takfir in Linguistic Kufriyat

The criteria or standards for deeming certain expressions as blasphemous according to the Hanafis—whether expressed in Persian or Arabic—require careful consideration and analysis. It is evident that statements made can be interpreted or explained in various ways, often carrying both literal and contextual meanings. A person may utter something but claim that their intended meaning was different.

There is also debate regarding words spoken in jest, depending on the individual’s intent and the differing rulings for such expressions based on intent. A significant aspect of this discussion revolves around the individual’s inner intention or purpose behind using particular phrases in everyday conversations. Do words spoken intentionally versus unintentionally differ in their classification as blasphemous? The question of what is in a person’s heart and whether these statements are open to interpretation is central to these legal discussions.

In such cases, the jurists often examine whether the words or phrases clearly indicate kufr. Most jurists begin this discussion by citing Abu Hanifa’s statement:

“Kufr will not be considered kufr unless the heart is firmly committed to it.”

This means that while Islam is affirmed by the tongue, kufr is only established when there is a firm conviction of it in the heart. If this standard is upheld, many blasphemous words spoken without intent or conviction should not be regarded as kufr. However, in the fatwas issued, this criterion is rarely emphasized, and judgments of kufr are often made based solely on the apparent meaning of the statement.

Some other blasphemous phrases arise from theological beliefs. For instance, any statement that hints at Qadariyyah is, according to Hanafi theologians, considered apostasy, kufr, or a grave error. For example, if someone says, “So-and-so was struck by bad fate,” and another responds, “The decree of God is not bad,” the second statement is not kufr but is considered incorrect. This is because it aligns with the beliefs of the Qadariyyah, who claim that good comes from God while evil comes from others.¹

Disrespect toward God, the Prophet, religion, religious scholars, and religious beliefs is one of the criteria frequently emphasized in these texts. The term humor (tanz) in this context refers to mocking or ridiculing religion and its symbols.

Another issue is the acknowledgment of disbelief. If someone, either out of seriousness or even anger, declares themselves to be a disbeliever, it often results in the ruling that they have become a disbeliever, are separated from their spouse, and must renew their marriage contract.

Most of these statements concern issues that people, especially the less-educated masses, encounter in their daily lives. Popular literature contains many expressions uttered in anger during times of hardship. For example, the saying attributed to the Prophet (p): “Do not curse time” (la tasubbu al-dahr) is an example of typical human behavior when facing difficulties in life. Al-Jahiz interprets this statement to mean that “time” (dahr) is synonymous with God, and cursing time is effectively cursing God (al-Hayawan, 1/226).

In particular circumstances, non-religious individuals often utter phrases that indicate a lack of belief in religion, especially when advised to perform good deeds or forbidden from committing sins. These expressions are commonly directed at participating in congregational prayers at the mosque, fasting during Ramadan, or similar obligations, especially during times of great personal hardship.

Some instances involve jokes about Quranic verses or even specific surahs. We will see how these phrases reveal fascinating insights into people’s reactions to such matters. For example, when someone says: “Being a disbeliever is better than being a traitor.” What does this mean in terms of disbelief? This is a type of interpretation held by some individuals but is not religiously acceptable within the Hanafi tradition.

We mentioned that the emergence of the Murji’ah-Hanafi school took place in Khorasan. Naturally, in addition to Arabic, the language of the Muslim and Arab migrants, it had to adapt to the local Persian Dari language in this environment, fostering stronger ties with the local populace. When the issue of kufriyat arose regarding language and utterences, it primarily pertained to the Persian language spoken by the masses, who needed to be cautious about their speech and expressions. Hanafi jurisprudence, which developed among the Persian-speaking common people, approached this issue precisely with this perspective, using the phrases and expressions common among everyday people.

Even in Arabic, many of the phrases in these texts are translations of Persian terms spoken by ordinary people. The connotations of words and phrases in every language follow unique patterns, and it was necessary to analyze whether a particular Persian phrase implied a meaning that could lead to declaring someone a disbeliever. These discussions appear in Hanafi legal texts under the topic of apostasy.

A comparable issue arises in discussions on divorce. For instance, if a man said, “I have placed you in a thousand divorces,” would this count as a divorce? Or if he said, “I have taken your veil off,” or, “I have tied your scarf,” would this constitute a divorce? (al-Muhit al-Burhani, 4/398). Similar issues also arose under oaths and vows, examples of which we have included in the appendix.

One of the oldest Hanafi works from Khorasan is Fatawa al-Nawazil by Abu al-Layth al-Samarqandi (d. 303 AH). This book contains a chapter titled “What Necessitates Disbelief” (Fi ma Yujib al-Kufr), which begins with the issue of being pleased with disbelief, specifically in cases where one praises it. Such a person is deemed a disbeliever. This section contains few Persian expressions, although one example states:

“The actions of the scholars are the same as those of the disbelievers.” (Fatawa al-Nawazil, p. 195; this phrase appears with errors in the original text).

The scope of this discussion gradually expanded, occupying a significant section of Hanafi legal texts, as we will detail. This cultural framework spread with the Turks to Asia Minor and, during the Ottoman period, independent treatises on the topic were composed under titles that included terms like lafz al-kufr.

Over time, Persian phrases related to lafz in topics like kufriyat, divorce, and oaths became more prominent in Hanafi jurisprudence. Coexistence between Muslims, Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians led to new legal questions, some of which touched on the issue of takfir. For example, a Muslim participating in Zoroastrian Nowruz celebrations or attending Christian gatherings of amusement raised questions that required answers from jurists and muftis.

In later texts, numerous examples of these cases can be observed. These discussions among the Hanafis of the East continued until the Hanafi school was spread by the Turks to the western Islamic world, from Asia Minor to Egypt. Over time, the works written by Hanafis in the Ottoman Empire on lafz al-kufr gradually became devoid of these Persian phrases, although a few isolated examples persisted.

1. Al-Fatawa al-Tatar Khaniyya, Vol. 15, p. 322