By Shaykh Rasul Jafariyan

Introduction

When we browse the introductory sections of books on Milal wa Nihal (the study of religions and sects) and their tables of contents, we almost invariably find a similar categorization of the most important Islamic sects. In the past, in our review of the book Milal wa Nihal by Shahristani, al-Fasl by Ibn Hazm, and in the discussion of al-Farq bayn al-Firaq by Baghdadi, we have reviewed many of these classifications.

Shahristani, in order, mentions the Mu’tazilites, the Jabriyyah, the Sifatiyyah, the Kharijites, the Murji’ah, and the Shi’a. Under the titles of the Jabriyyah and Sifatiyyah, he discusses groups that fall under the name of Ahl al-Sunnah, such as the Ash’arites, the Mushabbihah, and others. Abu Al-Hasan al-Ash’ari refers to the Shi’a, Kharijites, Murji’ah, Mu’tazilites, Jahmiyyah, and finally “the general opinion of Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Sunnah.” Other sources also follow a similar pattern in their classifications.

Each of these classifications can be subjected to historical or theological criticism. For instance, the term Ahl al-Sunnah can encompass the Murji’ah, Ahl al-Hadith, the Uthmaniyyah, and the Marwaniyyah. In the later periods, the titles of the Ash’arites or Maturidites, which are often neglected in these works, represent two major Sunni groups. In these divisions, the meaning of Sunni is not homogenous. However, after the fifth century, with the exclusion of many groups, the title of Ahl al-Sunnah gained greater formal recognition.

Now, the question is, what is the purpose of this categorization from a theological perspective? What is the fundamental basis for these divisions? It seems that two main principles, along with dozens of other issues, serve as the foundation for this categorization. In these two principles, our discussion is not historical, in the sense of determining which came first or second, but rather to create a coherent and principled classification. The two overarching principles are the concepts of Imamate and Kufr and Iman. Additionally, one could also offer classifications based on other issues such as God’s attributes, which would allow one to categorize groups such as the Mushabbihah, Mu’tazilites, and Jahmiyyah. This is certainly possible.

When we look at the concept of Imamate, we observe that on one side stands the Shi’a with its various subgroups, and on the other side, virtually all other sects, including the Mu’tazilites, Murji’ah, Kharijites, and Ahl al-Sunnah with their specific subgroups such as the Murji’ah, Ahl al-Hadith, and the later Salafis. This classification, based on the concept of Imamate, has persisted even after many smaller sects in the Islamic world disappeared. Although the Kharijites, for particular reasons, have maintained their distance from Ahl al-Sunnah, in all of these sects, including the Mu’tazilites, there is no belief in the concept of nass (textual designation) regarding the Imamate. Furthermore, they consider the caliphates of the first two caliphs to be legitimate, whereas the Shi’a, while emphasizing the principle of nass, does not accept the caliphate of the first two caliphs, does not accept the overall conduct of the Sahaba, and holds a special reverence for Imam ‘Ali and his descendants under the title of Tawalli (affection) and expresses disavowal (Tabarri) towards his enemies.

In this area, while the evidences and arguments are theological in nature, there is a significant political disagreement at play, based on which the Shi’a do not recognize the legitimacy of any Sunni caliphates throughout history. They even consider the rule of many Shi’a rulers to be usurped and believe that only Imamate in its divine sense possesses legitimacy. Although, in some cases, they may indirectly endorse certain rulers.

As for the criterion of Kufr and Iman, and in other words, the disagreement over the concept of Kufr and Iman and determining their examples, this forms a very important basis for the sectarian divisions. This is an issue that we will address in this section. The origins of the matter trace back to the time of the Prophet (p) and the Qur’an itself, as there were frequent discussions on Kufr and Iman and their definitions, even with debates over identifying the examples. After the Prophet (p), during the Ridda wars and the killing of Uthman, the issue of Kufr and Iman became highly significant. However, it was during the battles of Jamal, Siffin, and Nahrawan that the issue gained the most prominence. The result of these events was the emergence of three sects: the Murji’ah, Kharijites, and Mu’tazilites. Even Ahl al-Hadith, for an extended period, made Iman one of their central concerns, writing hundreds of treatises and books on the matter. Here, the fundamental issue was the definition of Kufr and Iman and determining their examples, and as we see, many of the sectarian disagreements in the Islamic world are rooted in this fundamental issue and principle.

The Disagreement Regarding Kufr and Iman, the Qur’an, Hadith, and the History of the Companions

The discussions of Milal wa Nihal, including the subject of our study, in most books proceed based on the categorization of sects and their beliefs. A drawback of these discussions is that the historical context is often only considered minimally, just enough to review the sects. However, in recent years, a historical approach in analyzing beliefs, their gradual development, and transformations has gained significant importance. This is both valid for understanding how these beliefs evolved and for tracing their journey from one point to another.

Our question is: During the time of the Messenger of God (p), was the issue of Iman and Kufr debated among Muslims? And if so, did it reach the point where Muslims differed with one another, with one group accusing the other of disbelief or declaring them disbelievers, even though the accused party claimed to be believers?

This discussion, in the first stage, must be pursued with reference to the Qur’anic revelations of that period, examining the verses that address this issue. Secondly, it must be studied in the external and historical context, based on what happened among the people. Finally, the hadiths related to the matter, which are often aligned with the Qur’an or the historical conditions, should also be examined.

In this context, the nature of the discussion will be different. This means that the basic issue of declaring someone a believer or a disbeliever can be discussed at three levels: theological, ethical-religious, and jurisprudential. Starting with the latter, jurisprudential means that a group or individual is declared a non-believer to the extent that they are excluded from having civic rights and are not considered a Muslim. This involves declaring someone a disbeliever or an apostate, excluded from the religion. We know that in Islamic jurisprudence, certain rights are accorded to a Muslim, which are not accorded to a disbeliever. If someone is declared a disbeliever, they will be deprived of these rights.

However, from a theological perspective, the point is whether a Muslim, regardless of their beliefs about God, the Prophet, or the hereafter, is a believer or otherwise a disbeliever. Will someone be considered a disbeliever if they do not believe in physical resurrection? Will they be considered a disbeliever if they do not perceive the attributes of God as identical to His essence and consider them additional to the essence of unity? If someone has a specific belief about prophecy or even about practices like prayer and almsgiving, might they be considered “outside” the religion? Are there examples of this in the Qur’an or in the life of the Prophet Muhammad (p)? Perhaps a specific verse, although we do not know who historically are the subjects, speaks of Allah’s beautiful Names, advising against “deviation” in them: “And to Allah belong the best names, so invoke Him by them and leave those who deviate concerning His names. They will be recompensed for what they have been doing” (Al-A’raf: 180). According to Tafsir al-Tabari, this refers to idolaters who used divine names to name their idols. Therefore, it should not be related to later discussions among Muslims regarding the names and attributes of God.

Regarding the ethical or religious type, we will note that our intention includes cases where, in the Qur’an or history, groups have been recognized as hypocrites or weak in faith, and pushed to the brink of disbelief or even to disbelief itself.

Returning to the initial discussion. In the Qur’an, it is possible to define the context for real faith, true Muslim and believer, in contrast to someone whose faith is doubted. Here are several examples:

A: Verses from the Qur’an that define the boundaries between different religions and even focus on internal deviations of other religions, will testify that there are those who claim a religion but do not truly believe. For instance, pinpointing the doctrine of the Trinity, “They have certainly disbelieved who say, ‘Allah is the third of three’; and there is no god except one God. And if they do not desist from what they are saying, a painful punishment will surely afflict the disbelievers among them” (Al-Ma’idah: 73), or when God states that He did not tell Jesus to declare himself and his mother as two gods apart from Allah, “And [beware the Day] when Allah will say, ‘O Jesus, Son of Mary, did you say to the people, ‘Take me and my mother as two gods besides Allah?‘” (Al-Ma’idah: 116).

These and several other examples raise the issue of deviation within a religion that stems from conjecture and assumption (An-Nisa: 157). The discussion of “exaggeration” in religion, and the admonition, “O People of the Scripture, do not commit excess in your religion or say about Allah except the truth” (An-Nisa: 171), is a clear example of internal deviation within a religion. In any case, stating that real Christianity is one thing, and the Christianity practiced by some is another, serves to teach Muslims a lesson through incorrect interpretations of concepts within a religion. Regarding the Jews, similar issues have been raised about belief in Ezra as a son of God and even the discussion of the distortion of God’s book, whether it be spiritual or literal distortion: “Among those who are Jews, there are some who displace words from their (right) places” (An-Nisa: 46), clearly addressing internal religious disputes over the interpretation of key concepts. Surah Al-Ma’idah and An-Nisa reflect the internal deviations within Judaism and Christianity.

B: Another example of verses that establish a foundation for delineating the boundaries between true religion and deviation are those that discuss believing in some parts of the Qur’an while disbelieving in others. These can be seen as documentary evidence and interpretation that if someone accepts part of the religion but rejects another part, they will face problems: “Do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part? Then what is the reward of those among you who do so except disgrace in worldly life, and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment. And Allah is not unaware of what you do” (Al-Baqarah: 85).

C: Purity in Islamic faith is a point that is referenced in the Qur’an. Verses like the one where some are believers, yet “rush into disbelief,” present an integrated image of faith and submission: “O Messenger, do not be grieved by those who hasten into disbelief from among those who say, ‘We believe’ with their mouths, but their hearts do not believe” (Al-Ma’idah: 41). This is one of the last verses revealed. Regarding absolute submission to all beliefs, the verse that states no one is allowed to have a religion other than Islam might be a good example. Although this could be equivalent to other religions as well. In Surah Al-Imran (verse 85), it is stated: “And whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted of him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers,” implying that if one follows a path other than Islam, it will not be accepted, and they will be among the losers in the afterlife.

Of course, there is also debate about what “it will not be accepted from him” means. Does it mean he is a disbeliever and deprived of social rights, or does it carry an ethical meaning, suggesting that the person is bad and it would be better if they followed what we say, and if not, they will face problems in the hereafter? It seems that the general understanding among Muslims throughout history has been that only Islam is acceptable before God.

There is also a discussion about the concept of Islam in this verse, whether it refers to Islam as a religion, or to submission to God, which could potentially include true Christians or true Jews. This topic has been debated for a long time. Those who focus on a kind of “submission” often want to consider the spiritual essence of the religion, which provides a common identity to followers of several religions, sufficient and argue that the boundaries of disbelief and belief were not so strictly defined initially. Indeed, their claim is that later, when Muslims completely severed ties with adherents of other religions, especially in the external real world and turned to numerous wars against each other, they believed that only they would be saved, i.e., the concept of “salvation” as mentioned in the hadith about the seventy-three sects, where only one sect will be the “saved” one.

Another interpretation similar to the above discussion in the Qur’an is that one must fight until “all religion is for Allah”: “And fight them until there is no fitna, and the religion, all of it, is for Allah. And if they cease – then indeed, Allah is Seeing of what they do” (Al-Anfal: 39). This has been interpreted to mean that all religion must be for God, and naturally, a believer in the Qur’an and Islam would think that everyone should accept Islam. This certainly more defines the boundary with non-believers outside the Islamic circle, but it is also a serious interpretation of precise boundaries for separating individuals based on belief and disbelief. This expression is also found differently in the Qur’an: “And fight them until there is no fitna, and the religion is all for Allah. Then if they cease, there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors” (Al-Baqarah: 193). Once all religion is for God, if there is any “aggression” afterward, it will only be against the oppressors. What does it mean that all religion is for God? What does religion mean in this context? Anyway, such verses focus solely on Islam as a unified identity. It seems that these verses do not concern internal Muslim differences, but nonetheless, if someone doubts certain issues, even if they claim to be Muslim, others, based on these verses, will consider them outsiders, “apostates,” and will say that these individuals are pursuing something other than Islam.

D: However, there are other verses in the Qur’an that could have been seen as evidence by some. Perhaps the clearest example is the verse addressed to Muslims: “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers” (Al-Ma’idah: 44). Among you Muslims, if someone does not rule by God’s law, they will be considered disbelievers. We know that the Kharijites, based on this very verse, deemed someone like Imam Ali (a) a disbeliever because he had agreed to arbitration by men in matters of religion. It is not unlikely that their evidence against Uthman might have also been similar verses. Discussions about the concept of disbelief in this verse have taken place and even at that time, there were debates between the Kharijites and their opponents, with terms like “a word of truth by which falsehood is intended” attributed to Imam Ali (a).

Other examples include criticism of those who declare what Allah has made lawful as unlawful (Al-An’am: 150), although this seems to be about the claims of some polytheists and sometimes People of the Book, rather than such a disagreement arising within the Muslim community itself.

A point to note about the Qur’an, which we have mentioned before, is that the discussion of disbelief is different from the discussion of takfir, but the two are related. For example, the Qur’an calling other religions “disbelievers” or idolatrous polytheists “disbelievers” is one thing, but the discussion of takfir specifically concerns someone being Muslim and then doing something that leads to their being declared a disbeliever. This is different even from formal or verbal apostasy. However, it is not unrelated, as we have seen instances where individuals have been considered apostates or heretics for denying a jurisprudential ruling in Islam or for interpreting a concept differently.

In the Qur’an, there are references to those who turned back from Islam and became disbelievers: “Indeed, those who disbelieved after their belief and then increased in disbelief – their repentance will not be accepted, and those are the ones astray” (Al-Imran: 90; also see Al-Tawbah: 12, which is said to refer to apostates). Also: “Indeed, those who believed and then disbelieved, then believed and then disbelieved, and then increased in disbelief – Allah will not forgive them nor guide them on a path” (An-Nisa: 137), and al-Tawbah: 22, which is reportedly about nine individuals who apostatized and went to Mecca, as mentioned in al-Kashshaf: 2/257. There’s also an-Nahl: 106 that addresses coercion in apostasy: “Whoever disbelieves in Allah after his belief, except for one who is forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in faith. But those who [willingly] open their breasts to disbelief, upon them is wrath from Allah, and for them is a great punishment“¹, and Muhammad: 25, “Indeed, those who have turned back on their heels after the guidance has become clear to them – Satan has enticed them and prolonged hope for them“².

Also, this verse: “And whoever denies faith – his work has become worthless, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers” (Al-Ma’idah: 5), and “And whoever among you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever – for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide therein” (Al-Baqarah: 217). It is evident that this was a significant issue.

It is worth noting that despite all these verses about apostasy, it has been claimed that during the Prophetic era of Islam, there is no recorded instance of someone being sentenced to death solely for apostasy. Rather, most cases were due to other reasons such as engaging in warfare and similar acts, as mentioned about those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger in “The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger…” (Al-Ma’idah: 33). The attribution here is to their actions, not merely to apostasy.³

These cases represent explicit apostasy and a formal return from Islam to disbelief, which, regardless of its ruling, differs from someone who interprets or denies parts of Islam while still accepting the Shahada. Essentially, we are discussing someone who professes the Shahada, but may be accused of disbelief at various levels, from committing major sins, interpreting the religion differently, to hypocrisy in showing a discrepancy between outward appearances and true beliefs. Some consider such individuals as apostates too, and they categorize them under the same or similar verses.

It is important to note that if in this discussion, we talk about the scope of the concept of disbelief in the Qur’an, it won’t directly settle our own debate but will certainly help enhance our overall understanding.

Shaykh Tusi offers an explanation that is relevant to this discussion. He says: Disbelief is of three kinds: one is original, where someone is fundamentally a disbeliever; second is apostasy, where someone formally renounces the religion and becomes an apostate; and third is zandaqa, unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this and only mentions whether their repentance is accepted or not⁴. Qutb al-Din Kaydari (d. 610) defines zandaqa as someone who is inwardly a disbeliever but outwardly professes Islam ⁵. It appears that the discussion on zandaqa is closely related to the discussions on takfir as intended in this debate.

Weakness of Faith or Hypocrisy and Its Place in Takfir

We can consider the issue of disbelief from a broader perspective, perhaps under ethical and faith-based viewpoints. It is often said that disbelief does not always carry its technical meaning and in language, means to conceal the truth, and in the Qur’an, at least in some instances, it is used in its linguistic sense. Particularly, we can talk about those who are “weak in faith.” Discussions on the levels of faith and its strength or weakness have occurred later in theological and narrative contexts. Some have considered a minimum level, suggesting that faith can strengthen. The Qur’an uses expressions like “when His verses are recited to them, it increases them in faith, and they trust in their Lord” (Anfal: 2) and “Indeed, they were youths who believed in their Lord, and We increased them in guidance” (Kahf: 13). These verses indicate a kind of gradation, at least in an increasing direction. Another aspect of this issue discusses those who are hypocrites to varying degrees. One point to consider is that different motivations for showing some form of hypocrisy should not make a difference in their manifestation externally from a jurisprudential and civil rights perspective. One might be motivated by worldly desires, another by religious doubts; they lack the necessary faith and indeed, it manifests in their behaviour. Qur’anic instances that discuss this, closer to our discussion of takfir—irrespective of the motivations—are about someone being accused of hypocrisy and alienation because of a belief, or distrust in the Prophet and the matter of being Muslim, or exhibiting devilish behavior. This could even be close to cases where someone, by interpreting a verse or hadith, damages an aspect of religion as perceived by religious leaders. Ultimately, a group with a particular interpretation or unique understanding of religion might accuse another group of “hypocrisy in religiosity,” deeming their beliefs about religion incorrect and declaring them apostates. Conversely, the same might happen where they are deemed outsiders to the faith by the other group.

However, the question is, what does hypocrite mean in the Qur’an? For instance, those who do not trust in God’s promises, are not committed to the religious laws, or prefer tribal or community interests over the interests of Islam, and overall, whose exterior and interior selves differ, are called hypocrites. In the Medinan period, the discussion of hypocrisy is extensive, and we even have a Surah called Al-Munafiqun. Many of these were individuals whom the Qur’an says harassed the Prophet and the believers. Those who verbally profess to be Muslim but do not believe in their hearts: “And of the people are some who say, ‘We believe in Allah and the Last Day,’ but they are not believers” (Baqarah: 8). Interestingly, it was believed by the Karamites in the early fourth century that the hypocrites of the Prophet’s time were “truly believers,” because they denied “disbelief in God” both formally and verbally⁶. It seems the Qur’an frames the discussion of hypocrisy as gradational, meaning it has different levels and stages, encompassing various actions that are criticized by God. A particularly malignant example is that of Abdullah ibn Ubayy ibn Salul. He outwardly accepted Islam but exhibited very poor behaviour, often antagonizing the Prophet and hindering the government. God commanded regarding him: “And do not pray [the funeral prayer, O Muhammad], over any of them who has died – ever – or stand at his grave. Indeed, they disbelieved in Allah and His Messenger and died while they were defiantly disobedient” (Tawbah: 84). This Surah contains much on this topic.

The Qur’an often speaks of what passes in some people’s hearts, i.e., they do not believe, and it is upon the Prophet to ignore them: “Those are the ones of whom Allah knows what is in their hearts, so turn away from them but admonish them” (Nisa: 63). Here, God advises the Prophet to admonish them, sometimes in harsh terms, sometimes gently. Suppose from a thousand Muslims who were supposed to be with the Prophet at Uhud, three hundred turned back midway, they are called hypocrites. What then will be our duty with respect to disbelief and faith? In Surah Ahzab, many weak in faith are mentioned who mocked God’s promises and spoke ill of the Prophet. In this case, a kind of societal division exists between those who are believers and those who are hypocrites.

Some of these hypocrites may be sinful, meaning their behaviours conflict with proper faith. However, as mentioned, whatever the motivation, its manifestation as a weakness in faith sets the stage for excluding them from the community of the saved and the faithful. This is the discussion we referred to, where our view of the concepts of disbelief and faith, and here, the concept of hypocrite has taken on an ethical and faith-based dimension. Many of the verses in the Medinan surahs pertain to this group. One of the first verses of Surah Baqarah states: “And of the people are some who say, ‘We believe in Allah and the Last Day,’ but they are not believers” (Baqarah: 8). However, from a jurisprudential perspective, as mentioned, the issue is whether someone accused of disbelief would still enjoy the rights and privileges that a Muslim citizen has, such as whether the verdict for them is death? Is there any indication in the Qur’an of this issue arising during the time of revelation? It seems one clear case is that of Hakam bin Abi al-As—the father of Marwan Hakam and the grandfather of the Marwanid dynasty of the Umayyad. He antagonized the Prophet along with figures like Abu Jahl and Uqba bin Abi Mu’ayt, even chaining his own nephew Uthman when he converted to Islam. He accepted Islam during the conquest of Mecca, but displayed harsh and mocking behaviour towards the Prophet, who then exiled him to Taif. He remained there until Uthman’s time, who then brought him back, and this became one of the factors for the objections against him⁷. To understand exactly what actions Hakam bin Abi al-As took besides mockery requires further exploration of sources, but his exile to Taif represents a type of deprivation imposed on him as a jurisprudential ruling due to his suspicious behaviour towards the Prophet. Later, during the objections against Uthman, it was claimed that because he had become a disbeliever, the Muslims of Medina, many of whom were companions of the Prophet (p), treated him accordingly. We will discuss this matter further. For now, let’s speak of the time of the Prophet (p).

One point here is that at the beginning of the conversion of non-believers to Islam, if someone said Salam, which is a sign of being Muslim, should they be considered a Muslim and naturally have the rights of a Muslim? This is one of the significant jurisprudential implications of the debate on takfir or deeming someone a disbeliever. We know that in the case of Khalid ibn Walid and Usama ibn Zaid, they encountered tribes who surrendered and greeted them with peace, yet they killed them. The Prophet compensated their families from the public treasury, implying that they were Muslims. Verse 94 of Surah An-Nisa states:

“O you who have believed, when you go forth [to fight] in the cause of Allah, investigate; and do not say to one who gives you [a greeting of] peace ‘You are not a believer,’ seeking the perishable goods of worldly life; there are much profits and spoils with Allah. You too were like that [before], then Allah conferred His Favors on you, therefore, be cautious in discrimination. Allah is ever, with what you do, Acquainted.”

The verse is about the mujahideen and says when you go in the way of God, clarify the situation and do not say to those who greet you with peace that they are not believers. And do not let your motive be worldly gain. Allah is the source of all spoils. You were like that before, but Allah bestowed His favor upon you; therefore, clarify the situation for Allah is aware of your actions. In Tafsir al-Tabari, a long narration from Abdullah ibn Umar regarding the context of this verse is mentioned, where the Prophet sent a person named Muhalim ibn Juthamah for jihad, and they encountered a man named Aamir ibn Adhbat al-Ashja’i in the area of Idham. He greeted them with peace. Muhalim attacked him because he had an old grievance from the days of ignorance. When they reported the matter to the Prophet, this verse was revealed⁸. Several other narrations are also cited there. The core narration states that when Usama killed people who had surrendered or greeted with peace, the Prophet asked him, “O Usama, did you kill him after he said ‘there is no god but Allah’?” Usama replied, “He said it out of fear of arms.” The Prophet then said, “Did you split open his heart?” ⁹, indicating to Usama that he should not have concerned himself with the motives in their hearts.

This verse could be related to a verse from Surah Al-Hujurat that distinguishes slightly between Islam and Iman. Verse 14 of this Surah states: “The bedouins say, ‘We have believed.’ Say, ‘You have not [yet] believed; but say [instead], “We have submitted,” for faith has not yet entered your hearts. And if you obey Allah and His Messenger, He will not deprive you of [the reward of] your deeds. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.'” Here, the Qur’an differentiates between Islam as submission and the entrance of faith into one’s heart. When the bedouins come and say they have become Muslims, tell them: You have not believed, but rather say we have submitted, as faith has not yet entered your hearts. This verse has been the source of extensive discussions in defining faith and Islam. The question is, if someone has converted to Islam and, according to this verse, faith has not yet entered their heart, should they be considered a Muslim and entitled to the rights of a Muslim, or should they be regarded as still disbelievers and thus outside the scope of the religion? It seems this verse was intended to facilitate the conversion of the bedouins so that they would not be harshly treated. Al-Tabari considers this the opinion of Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri and regards it as the most accurate interpretation of this verse:

“The most correct of statements in the interpretation of this is the one we mentioned from al-Zuhri, which is that Allah advanced to these bedouins who entered into the religion by their declaration, and they did not confirm their statement by their actions, to say unconditionally ‘we believe’ without restricting their statement by saying we believe in Allah and His Messenger, but He commanded them to say the statement that does not confuse its listeners and the one saying it is truthful, which is to say we have submitted, meaning: we have entered into the community and testified to the truth. The verse: ‘And yet faith has not entered your hearts,’ means the knowledge of the laws of faith and the realities of its meanings has not yet entered your hearts.” ¹⁰

There is also a discussion about Hijra (migration) and its importance in bestowing the title of believer on individuals. During the Medinan period, being a migrant was a significant advantage. It is evident in the Qur’an. Many desired to be considered a migrant Muslim, but after the conquest of Mecca, migration no longer held meaning. However, some still insisted and thought they had more privileges and were true believers. They saw that the Qur’an often mentions those who believed and migrated. Is it possible to think that the difference in Islam and Iman in this verse, considering it pertains to the bedouins, was due to the issue of migration, and that they sought migration for their faith to be formally recognized? Meaning that the Qur’an wanted to tell them that since you have not migrated, you are only Muslims? The verse, however, points to the lack of entry of faith into the heart.

In any case, these are points that can be discussed in the debate on disbelief and faith.

Another broader point is how the Qur’an views the discussion of disbelief and faith. As mentioned in the discussion on religions and the non-acceptance of religions other than Islam, this issue also applies to Christians and Jews. Islamic jurisprudence later established that individuals are either Muslims, People of the Book, or idolaters and polytheists. There has also been discussion regarding groups like the Zoroastrians joining the People of the Book. The question is, was there a clear jurisprudential notion in the Qur’an about this? Did the Qur’an genuinely regard Christians and Jews as disbelievers? In the Prophet’s treaty with the Jews of Medina, the Prophet recognized them as part of the Islamic community, which has been a subject of much debate about how this is possible and reconcilable with the jurisprudence that developed later. There has generally been an agreement on the designation of the People of the Book, but perhaps there are broader views that should be examined by referring to the earliest sources. We know that strict interpretations like those of the Kharijites and lenient interpretations like those of the Murji’ah were present from the earliest generations.

This discussion can also be approached differently: How does the Qur’an’s conception of disbelief and faith impact the Islamic community? Is it meant to delineate a definitive boundary, or does it envision a brotherly community with those who do not possess this brotherliness being outside this circle? One point here is that due to the levels and applications of the term “disbelief” in the Qur’an, establishing a fixed red line requires further discussion. Such verses have led to various classifications of disbelief, for example, mentioning major (kabir) and minor (saghir) disbelief, with the understanding that minor disbelief does not warrant eternal damnation, but major disbelief does entail eternal damnation. In other words, major disbelief results in expulsion from the ummah, but minor disbelief does not¹¹. The same author discusses types of disbelief as: disbelief of denial, disbelief of refusal and arrogance, disbelief of turning away, disbelief of doubt, disbelief of hypocrisy, and cites relevant verses¹². These instances are sometimes supported by narrations, but fundamentally, the Qur’an itself does not always employ the term disbelief at one level.

Someone might argue that at the time the Qur’an was revealed, Islam did not place much emphasis on religious separations, let alone among Muslims themselves. Essentially, it was not aiming to establish an independent religion, but rather envisioned a community of believers. This view has been suggested by van Ess in some of his statements. Naturally, even if this phase was considered, it did not last long and quickly moved to serious religious and doctrinal delineations. We will see that in the course of the Ridda Wars, discussions of this nature quickly became the basis for governmental action, and the government’s interpretation of such verses, which could have been interpreted in various, sometimes milder ways in different interpretations, became harsher, more practical, and more formal.

Takfir in the Hadith Corpus

The discussion here is how, apart from the Qur’an and historical events to which hadiths also pertain, the issue of takfir can be traced within the hadiths themselves. It seems that there are numerous narrations that could be discussed, but remember that many of these hadiths either have doubts concerning their original issuance or have been influenced by the political and especially doctrinal and sectarian climates of later times and government demands. However, this discussion cannot be completely ignored and must be pursued in several areas.

The most relevant hadith in this regard is a famous narration mentioned in the sources, recognized as part of the Farewell Sermon¹³. It states that if someone recites the Shahada, their life and property are safe: “I have been commanded to fight people until they say there is no god but Allah, and if they say it, they protect from me their blood and their property except by the rights of Islam, and their account is with Allah”¹⁴. This narration is also mentioned in various other transmissions in Sunni hadith books. Ya’qubi also continues the narration where the Prophet said: “Do not return to disbelief after me by striking the necks of one another. I have left among you that which if you hold fast to, you shall not go astray: the Book of Allah and my family, the Ahl al-Bayt. Have I delivered [the message]? They said: Yes! He said: O Allah, be my witness. Then he said: You will be questioned about me, so let the present convey to the absent.”¹⁵

This hadith, “I am commanded to fight…” has been a point of debate since it was first proposed. When discussions on apostasy arose, particularly during the formative period of Islamic jurisprudence in the latter half of the second Hijri century, and in practice during the reigns of Mahdi and Harun, many heretics and Muslims accused of heresy were being killed, the question arose what to do with this hadith, because these individuals would pronounce the Shahada.

Another hadith that was used as a basis for executing such individuals was “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.” This positioned their actions as “changing religion,” and individuals with heterodox views were accused of apostasy and changing their religion. Historically, we may not be able to discern the true nature of these individuals’ thoughts, but this was the claim, and their execution was carried out for this reason. Even some extremist Shia groups were killed under these labels.

In any case, reconciling these narrations has always been a matter of debate, especially concerning whether someone who apostatizes and then returns to Islam should have their repentance accepted or not.¹⁶ It seems that this discussion should be historically placed in the context of the developments in the latter half of the second century, not as a narrative from the time of the Prophet (p). Essentially, the core of the discussion was shaped in that era. Since then, and to this day, the debates on takfir and apostasy have revolved around this hadith.

Another point is that the problem lies in the fact that this narration has been transmitted in several versions, which have become sources for various jurisprudential interpretations. Indeed, depending on the time or the needs that people had, additions have been made to it. In some transmissions, emphasis is placed on the Shahada alone, stating: “I have been commanded to fight the people until they say there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.” However, in other transmissions, it has been added: “until they perform the prayer and pay the zakat.”¹⁷ Meaning that they should both declare the testimony and also perform prayers and pay zakat.

The addition of prayer and zakat, and later other elements under the essential rules of Islam, has broadened the scope of this issue. Even if the original hadith is correct, it reflects a disagreement with Abu Bakr regarding fighting those who refused to pay zakat. When told that the Prophet had said to fight only until they say the Shahada, he responded that he made no distinction between prayer and zakat.¹⁸. Regardless, there is a range of opinions about the authenticity of this hadith, from outright denial to various interpretations it has received. Among these, there are also milder interpretations.

Another narration also speaks of takfir among Muslims after the death of the Prophet (p). This report, which we mentioned earlier, was brought up during the Farewell Pilgrimage, warning Muslims not to revert to disbelief and fight one another after his passing. This narration is found in many sources. It is also noted as part of the Farewell Pilgrimage sermon: “Beware, do not turn back to disbelief after me, striking each other’s necks with the sword over worldly matters, for if you do this, and you surely will, you will find me in a battalion between Gabriel and Michael, striking your faces with the sword.” In Tafsir Durr al-Manthur¹⁹, it is reported by Ibn Jarir and Ibn Abi Hatim from Zayd bin Aslam that when the verse, “Say, He is capable of sending punishment upon you…” was revealed, the Prophet (p) said, “Do not revert to disbelief after me, striking each other’s necks with swords.” They asked, “Even though we testify that there is no god but Allah and that you are His Messenger?” He replied, “Yes.” The latter part is interesting, suggesting that even while reciting the Shahada, they would still turn to disbelief and draw swords on each other.

Here, if there is no doubt about the authenticity of the narration, it is important to note that some Muslims, while maintaining their Islamic faith, may gravitate towards disbelief and turn their swords on other Muslims. This might have been envisioned for the Wars of Apostasy. Some also suggest that it could hint at the Sunni-Shia conflict, as some Shi’i considered Muslims who were hostile towards Imam Ali as inclining towards disbelief—at least in the literal sense.

If we are to proceed based on hadiths attributed to the Prophet (p), the scope becomes very broad. Nearly without exception, all major Islamic sects have hadiths attributed to the Prophet declaring other sects as disbelievers. Regarding the Rawafid, Kharijites, Jahmites, and Qadarites, a large number of hadiths are reported by scholars of hadith that these groups are, for example, disbelievers. Each sect has hadiths against the other. If these hadiths are correct, it means that discussions of takfir among Muslim sects were a common subject for the Prophet (p), although one should be skeptical of these hadiths and consider them as constructs of later hadith scholars. Of course, hadith scholars regard these as prophecies about the emergence of later sects, but common sense asks if the Prophet mentioned these sects so often, what was the perception of them among his followers? Did they not question them?

It’s always necessary to consider the social and political aspects of takfir. At that time, the conflict between the Muhajirun and the Ansar was significant. Moreover, the rivalry between the Aws and Khazraj within the Ansar was often exploited by the group the Qur’an calls the hypocrites of Medina, led by Abdullah ibn Ubayy. These differences manifested themselves in the Saqifah and naturally fueled subsequent conflicts. Among the Quraysh themselves, there were divisions between different factions: the Umayyad faction, the Hashimite faction, and a middle ground like the Banu Bakr and Banu Adi, which also showed themselves in the Saqifah. Narratives mention the angry faces of the Quraysh towards the Banu Hashim in the days before the Prophet’s death. The Qur’an also references “reconciling your hearts” to some of the pre-Islamic social and tribal divisions among Muslims that presumably persisted after Islam.

In such an environment, the Prophet’s passing occurred, and it might be pertinent to mention a significant event that happened during the days leading up to his demise, known as “the event of Thursday.” According to sources like Bukhari [in several instances in his book] and others, when the Prophet asked those around him to bring him a pen and paper to write something for them so they would not go astray after him, a person who later became the second Caliph of the Muslims said, “The Prophet is delirious.” This was the first time that such a statement was made regarding the “status of prophethood.” Ironically, the matter at hand was about “going astray” after the Prophet’s demise. Shahristani mentions this historical narration and considers it the first disagreement that arose among Muslims.²⁰

Can this be considered a disagreement over a religious concept of “prophethood”? It seems that even if this is not a widely recognized perspective, it forms the basis of a specific type of historical disagreement that can be traced. It’s also not irrelevant to mention that when the Prophet (p) passed away, Umar denied his death until he was convinced by Abu Bakr, according to his own statement. In fact, he attributed a sort of immortality to the Prophet (p) and stated that he would be the last person, after all his companions, to die.

Additionally, the emergence of false prophets in the final moments of the Prophet’s life could also be noted. The appearance of Musaylimah the Liar, considering his conversion to Islam and even his adherence to some Islamic rulings after claiming prophethood, is one of the intriguing issues of this period. In this context, he sent messengers to Prophet Muhammad (p), and the Prophet also sent two people to him, one of whom was killed by Musaylimah. This phenomenon of false prophets within the newly established Islamic community is a topic that can be historically pursued, and if the Prophet had views on this matter, they should be reviewed.

Faith and Disbelief After the Demise of the Prophet Muhammad (P)

The Apostasy Issue

In discussing faith and disbelief and its history after the Prophet’s demise, we must differentiate between two topics. First, the historical context of that time, such as the Apostasy Wars, where it is said many tribes apostatized after the Prophet’s death and Abu Bakr, commanding Khalid ibn Walid, fought against them. Many were killed, and many returned to Islam. Second, the later perception of the companions’ stances among different sects. For example, it is said that the Shi’a later criticized some companions and doubted their faith or did not. Apart from whether this issue is correct or not, these are discussions that arose later and are views formed during the development of systematic theological debates. However, our issue is regarding how the discussion of apostasy was brought up. Naturally, we follow it only in the context of views on faith and disbelief, not the events themselves.

It seems that the most important and initial issue that arose in connection with disbelief and faith was the discussion of al-Riddah or apostasy.

The assumption of official historians is that after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, some tribes reverted from Islam. By their actions, they wanted to express that they had been forcibly converted to Islam and now that this force was removed with the governance ending, they were leaving Islam.

However, historical sources are not unanimous on this matter. Some have provided a different interpretation of these events, suggesting that these people accepted the essence of Islam but denied zakat. They considered zakat as tribute that was due to the Prophet of this religion, and now that this Prophet was gone, why should they give their money to the Quraysh tribe and the rulers in Medina?

Another account concerns a different group from the first, stating that this group acknowledged zakat but refused to pay it to the central government. In essence, living within tribal structures, they did not recognize something called a central state. They stated they would distribute zakat among their own poor. This was while the central government needed this money to establish governance and continue conquests.

Abu Bakr’s reaction to these individuals was to label them as apostates. This term has appeared before in the Qur’an, which states: “O you who have believed, whoever of you should revert from his religion – Allah will bring forth [in place of them] a people He will love and who will love Him, [who are] humble toward the believers, mighty against the disbelievers” (Ma’idah 54). It has also been mentioned in Al-Imran 106 using the phrase “do you disbelieve after your belief?” This assumes that someone has reverted from their faith. Another verse states: “And whoever turns his back on his heels will never harm Allah at all” suggesting that someone reverting from their religion does not harm God. As previously mentioned, the Qur’an repeatedly discusses and condemns the act of reverting from Islam.

If by apostasy it is meant that someone formally and verbally abandons Islam and leaves it, our discussion will not encompass them. Apostasy in this sense has a specific context.

However, if the meaning is that someone, for example, denies zakat or denies paying zakat to the central government, i.e., accepts the testimony of faith and even performs prayers, does this also count as “apostasy”?

The image that Sunni historical sources portray of the apostates is that they have abandoned Islam and left it. However, when we look closer at the reports, we see that this was not necessarily the case, and even initially, there was disagreement between Abu Bakr and Umar about whether to deal with them in a violent and combative manner or take them captive. According to Shi’i sources, as reported in theological books, Umar did not believe in Abu Bakr’s approach. Allama Hilli wrote: “Umar exercised ijtihad during his caliphate and returned the captives and their properties to them and released the prisoners”²¹. An important point noted by a book from the third century is that Abu Bakr never attributed his actions to the Prophet, nor did anyone ask him for evidence on this matter²². Most of these personal ijtihads later took the form of hadiths and impacted the Sunni legal-judicial system, sometimes being accepted or influential.

Historically, it is clear that some opponents of the Medina government, like Musaylimah the Liar, fundamentally reverted from Islam and even claimed prophethood. However, to paint all opponents with the same brush is historically doubtful.

One of the points of disagreement between Abu Bakr and Umar regarding this issue was that, during Abu Bakr’s time, when this group (the apostates) was defeated, they were taken as captives and made into slaves, and their women were also claimed as property. The term “Sabaya Ahl al-Ridda” (captives of the apostates) was used for these individuals. Umar had two concerns about this matter. First, he doubted whether they were truly apostates, and second, he did not like the idea of taking Arabs as captives. For this reason, he swiftly freed all the captives from among the apostates and apparently returned the women as well. This issue requires more in-depth research. Ya’qubi writes: “The first thing that Umar did upon becoming caliph was to return the captives from the apostasy wars to their tribes. He said: ‘I do not want the capturing of slaves to become a practice among the Arabs.’”²³ There is ambiguity about the reasoning behind this action. Was it because Umar did not accept Abu Bakr’s legal opinion of considering these individuals as apostates, or was it due to a racial view of the Arabs? With the presence of non-Arab captives—recently taken with the conquests in Syria—he may have wanted to avoid taking Arabs as captives.

In any case, it is clear that some of the companions disagreed with Abu Bakr on this matter. Wafayat al-A’yan²⁴ writes: “Most of the Sahaba supported him in this,” which may imply that not all of the Sahaba supported him in this action. It is also narrated from Anas ibn Malik: “The Sahaba disliked fighting against those who refused to pay zakat, but Abu Bakr drew his sword and fought them, which is a testament to his bravery.” ²⁵ Suyuti²⁶ also explicitly mentions Umar’s objection to Abu Bakr, stating: “Despite our master Umar’s attempt to prevent him from doing so.” In this context, tathbit means to stop or restrain.

Ibn Hazm, in al-Muhalla²⁷, writes that the apostates after the Prophet’s death were of two groups. The first group included the followers of Musaylima and Sajah. These were people who were at war with Islam and never became Muslims in the first place. There is no doubt that their repentance and acceptance of Islam would be accepted. The second group consisted of people who had become Muslim but never disbelieved after accepting Islam. However, they refused to pay Zakat to Abu Bakr, and that is why war was waged against them. Ibn Hazm adds that neither the Hanafis nor the Shafi’is dispute the fact that these people were not to be considered apostates. Both of these schools disagree with Abu Bakr’s actions against them and do not categorize them as belonging to the group of Ahl al-Ridda. He then cites a famous poem by the poet Hutay’ah about these people:

“We obeyed the Messenger of God when he was among us,
But alas! What has happened to the religion of Abu Bakr?
Does he inherit it for himself after the Prophet’s death?
By God, this is a crushing blow to us!
What you have demanded and denied us is sweeter to me than dates
Oh, what a pity for the people of Banu Bakr, who gave everything,
My camel and my goods as ransom the day spears were raised by Abu Bakr.”

Ibn Hazm adds that these people acknowledged the Prophet Muhammad (p). It is possible that there were individuals among them who did apostatize, such as those who believed in Tulayha and others like him, but this is not documented or supported by any evidence. Even if it were true, it would not serve as a reason, because there was disagreement among the Sahaba on this matter.²⁸

Apart from Khalid ibn al-Walid’s mistakes regarding Malik ibn Nuwayrah—which was an indefensible scandal—the government, in general, felt it had to turn a blind eye to the Malik ibn Nuwayrah incident in order for matters to proceed smoothly. Abu Bakr called him “the Sword of Allah” and said, “I will not sheathe a sword that God has unsheathed.” It is said that he remarked, “I will not stone him (Khalid) because he interpreted (the situation) and erred.”²⁹ I think this statement was likely fabricated later and attributed to Abu Bakr. Nevertheless, unlike him, Umar did not approve of Khalid’s behaviour and, upon assuming power, promptly dismissed Khalid ibn al-Walid from his command. It appears that this decision stemmed from the fact that Umar did not entirely accept Abu Bakr’s policies concerning the wars under the pretext of apostasy.

In any case, these people (those who refused to pay zakat) accepted Islam and prayer, and they were not referred to as “those who withhold Zakat”. In al-Amwal, Abu Ubaydah writes: “Abu Bakr, along with the Muhajirun and Ansar, fought against the apostates who refused to pay the Zakat on their sheep.”³⁰ This expression shows that the issue at hand was indeed the zakat on livestock. Their slogan was: “The prayer of someone who refuses to pay zakat is not accepted.”³¹

There is a verse in Surah Fussilat (41:7) that may be relevant to this discussion and is significant. The verse is:

“Say, ‘I am only a man like you, to whom it has been revealed that your God is one God. So take a straight path toward Him and seek His forgiveness.’ Woe to the polytheists—those who do not give Zakat, and they are disbelievers in the Hereafter.”

In this verse, the importance of not paying Zakat is mentioned, but it is initially described with the term “woe to the polytheists.” It is clear from the Qur’an’s usage of the term polytheists that it refers to idol worshipers. However, we cannot overlook the fact that the issue of withholding Zakat is considered so significant that it is mentioned between two crucial matters—Shirk and denial of the Resurrection.

Shahristani, in Milal wa Nihal, considers the disagreement over fighting against those who withhold Zakat to be one of the earliest disputes in the Islamic world. He refers to it as the seventh major difference among the earliest disagreements and notes that some people held the view that “We do not fight them as we fight the disbelievers.”³²

The story of apostasy quickly came to an end, and in reality, it was eradicated through severe suppression. The impact of these events not only remained in historical accounts but can also be traced in legal texts.

In any case, what was recorded in the historical texts is summarized in this narration that Ibn Kathir includes in al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya³³:

The group of scholars reported, except for Ibn Majah, from Abu Huraira that Umar ibn al-Khattab said to Abu Bakr: “Why are you fighting the people when the Messenger of Allah (p) said: ‘I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. If they do so, they protect their lives and their property from me except by right.’” Abu Bakr responded: “By Allah, if they withheld from me even a young female goat (in another narration: ‘a rope used to tie a camel’s leg’) which they used to give to the Messenger of Allah (p), I would fight them for withholding it. Zakat is a right on wealth. By Allah, I will fight anyone who separates prayer from Zakat.” Umar said: “Then I realized that Allah had opened Abu Bakr’s heart to fighting, and I recognized that it was the truth.” I said: Allah Almighty said in the Qur’an: ‘But if they repent, establish prayer, and give Zakat, then leave their way free.’ It is also established in the two authentic collections (Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim) that Islam is built upon five pillars: bearing witness that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, establishing prayer, giving Zakat, performing Hajj, and fasting during Ramadan.

Thus, it becomes clear that the famous hadith of the Prophet, where it is narrated that he said: “I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify…” must be interpreted in this way and not according to its apparent, literal meaning.

The Emergence of Divergent Religious and Jurisprudential Opinions (Foundations and Interpretations)

One important point that gradually becomes apparent is the disagreement over religious and jurisprudential issues. First, what was the Muslim understanding of these differences in opinion? Second, how did these disagreements fit into the context of Iman and Kufr? In any case, individuals had varying interpretations of the religion, including the verses of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s (p) life and practices. Interestingly, there was even disagreement over the status of the Sunnah and whether one must obey it. The second caliph, Umar, when he had his own view or reasoning, did not see a need to follow what the Prophet had said. He believed only in the Qur’an and, regarding other matters, if he had no specific opinion, he might inquire about how the Prophet acted in such cases.

All classical sources agree that Umar instructed his governors not to overwhelm the people with narrations of hadith and to narrate as little as possible. It is reported that he said: “Narrate less from the Messenger of Allah, and I will be with you in that.” ³⁴ The famous phrase “Sufficient for us is the Book of Allah” is also widely attributed to him³⁵.

Of course, because the Sunni school of thought was formed based on sunnah, meaning Hadith, very early on, Hadith gained credibility. Since this group had a strong belief in the second caliph, they overlooked this issue, and after that, no one remembered his stance on Hadith. In fact, it became as though he, too, believed in Hadith.

Now, we do not want to focus on these differences of opinion. The discussion is about how they addressed this issue: if a significant disagreement arose, and both sides insisted on their views, how would they resolve it? Was it possible that such disputes could lead to accusations of disbelief, where one group would accuse the other of deviation, heresy, hypocrisy, or corrupt beliefs?

Let me add a point: there is a narration from Umar that illustrates a distinction between financial and religious matters in terms of the questions people asked. He said, if someone has a question about inheritance, they should ask Zayd ibn Thabit; if they have a question about Fiqh, they should ask Mu’adh ibn Jabal; if they have a question about the Qur’an, they should ask Ubayy ibn Ka’b; and if they have any issue regarding wealth, they should come to me. This is something he stated in a sermon in Jabiyah: “Umar ibn al-Khattab delivered a sermon in Jabiyah, saying: Whoever wants to ask about the Qur’an, let him come to Ubayy ibn Ka’b; whoever wants to ask about inheritance laws, let him come to Zayd ibn Thabit; whoever wants to ask about Fiqh, let him come to Mu’adh ibn Jabal; and whoever has a question about wealth, let him come to me, for Allah has made me its treasurer and distributor.”³⁶ However, Umar did not always adhere strictly to this division, and he often gave his own opinions on religious matters, although sometimes he did not insist that his view be accepted.

During the years when the Sahaba were among the Muslims, they developed remarkable differences of opinion, some of which led to major conflicts, such as the Battles of Jamal and Siffin. The question now is: at that time (not later), what solution did they have for determining who was on the straight path? It is clear that later on, a justification was created to apply the concept of ijtihad to the actions of the Sahaba. They said that anyone who performs ijtihad and reaches the correct conclusion is rewarded with two rewards, and the one who errs but still engages in ijtihad receives one reward. This theory was developed later and applied even to the Battles of Jamal, Siffin, and other disputes among the Sahaba, solving many problems.

But now it is time for us to follow the experiences of the Sahaba in this regard. That is, to review what happened historically and examine the points of disagreement that arose among the Sahaba. We should look at how different opinions emerged, what arguments were used to defend their views, and how they perceived their opponents.

The way to identify these instances is to search through historical and hadith texts and compile a list of the disagreements and the reactions to them. It seems to me that these disagreements developed more slowly on theological issues.

We can highlight a few areas for this discussion. First, the differences of opinion between Shia and Sunni regarding Islamic matters led the Shia, later on, to explore the historical and hadith texts of the Sunni tradition and extract these instances. One of the books that has been specifically written on this topic is the work of Sayyid Sharaf al-Din al-Amili. He has compiled a long list of cases where the Prophet issued a clear nass (explicit instruction), but Abu Bakr, Umar, or Uthman acted with ijtihad in opposition to it. These include some political directives, such as the appointment of Usama ibn Zayd as the commander of the army and their refusal to obey him, as well as issues related to ablution, the call to prayer, and prayer practices. Sharaf al-Din has made every effort to substantiate his findings from Sunni sources. He alone has listed seventy cases where Umar’s actions contradicted narrations attributed to the Prophet.

Allama Amini also explored this topic in al-Ghadir, addressing the second caliph in the sixth volume and Uthman in the eighth volume. In particular, there are numerous examples concerning the second caliph, and this is largely because the second caliph fundamentally did not believe in the obligation to follow the Prophet’s instructions and, in many instances, acted based on his own reasoning and judgment.

Interestingly, some of the cases where Umar, the second caliph, expressed an opinion contrary to the Prophet’s view were later labelled in Sunni sources as Muwafaqat Umar (the agreements of Umar)—a term that seemingly emerged later, counting up to ten such cases. The term Muwafaqat implies that there were matters in which God agreed with Umar’s opinion, and even though the Prophet might have held a different view, he accepted Umar’s reasoning due to divine approval or Umar’s sound argument.³⁷ The core of this discussion pertains to instances where Umar’s personal judgments were later defended as ijtihad. Independent books on the Muwafaqat Umar have even been witten³⁸.

We see that these disagreements existed and that they later became relatively fixed within Sunni traditions, even though the first generation of companions disagreed with one another. We also know that there was disagreement over the compilation of the Qur’an, which reached its peak during Uthman’s caliphate. Abdullah ibn Mas’ud never supported Uthman’s decision to destroy other copies of the Qur’an in favour of one official compilation, and he remained opposed to it until the end. Certainly, one of the factors leading to the rebellion against Uthman was these very objections from the Sahaba, who considered his actions to be irreligious and deserving of opposition.

One important question is, if these disagreements existed, why did the companions not rebel against each other?

One important point is that when the government or ruler supports a particular stance, it is natural for others to follow. Most of these fatwas gained formal legal recognition within the framework of the power held by the early caliphs. Another point is that it seems the nature of disagreements during the time of Umar differed in some respects from those during the time of Uthman. Politically, Umar acted more strongly than Uthman and was more popular. Moreover, Umar did not make significant political mistakes, such as empowering his relatives over the people. He led an ascetic life, and all of this, combined with his authority and decisiveness, helped prevent others from having the courage to openly oppose him.

In contrast, during Uthman’s time, all of these factors—except for an unsupported power—were reversed. As a result, due to both religious and political opposition, the Sahaba rebelled against Uthman and ultimately killed him.

Citing a few examples that demonstrate the nature of the objections and responses can help clarify some points. I will mention two examples, one from the time of Umar and the other from the time of Uthman. 

Example A: In Sahih Muslim, it is narrated that a man came to Umar and said: “I am in a state of ritual impurity (junub), and I cannot find water to perform ghusl (ritual washing). What should I do for prayer?” Umar replied, “Do not pray.” Ammar then said, “O Commander of the Faithful! Do you not remember when you and I were on a military expedition, and we became junub? There was no water, and you did not pray, but I struck the ground (performed tayammum) and prayed. The Messenger of Allah (p) approved of my action and said that tayammum was sufficient.” Umar replied, “Fear Allah, O Ammar!” (warning him not to narrate the hadith). Ammar said, “If you wish, I will not narrate it again.”³⁹ This example illustrates both the difference of opinion and the nature of the response.

Example B: In another narration, when Uthman was the caliph, he set out for Hajj. Along the way, in the region of Qudayd, a game animal was brought to him to eat with his companions. He said, “We did not hunt it, nor did we order it to be hunted, so it is permissible for us.” His companions, however, exercised caution and refused to eat, awaiting the arrival of Ali ibn Abi Talib to ask his opinion. When Ali arrived, he cited an incident from the time of the Prophet, where a game animal was brought to the Prophet (p), but even though the Prophet had not hunted it, he refused to eat it. Uthman was displeased with Ali’s response and said, “You often oppose us.”⁴⁰ Another example is narrated by Malik in al-Muwatta. Miqdad told Ali ibn Abi Talib that Uthman had permitted combining Hajj and Umrah. Ali, visibly upset, said, “Did you say such a thing?” Uthman replied, “Yes, this is my opinion.” Ali, enraged, left and declared, “I am responding to the call of Allah for both Hajj and Umrah.”⁴¹

This is yet another example of disagreement over jurisprudential matters. It was possible, even when a ruler like Umar had an opinion, for that opinion not to be accepted. It is written that Umar said he heard a verse from the Prophet about stoning the elderly adulterer and wanted it included in the Qur’an, but the people did not agree, and he was not successful in having it included. It is said that he himself remarked, “Tomorrow, others will claim that Umar added a verse to the Qur’an, and I do not want that to be said.”⁴²

Certainly, navigating through this stage is not easy, as many of the events that occurred during this period are significant both because they shaped the foundation of the Sunni school of thought and because some of them remained as points of contention among the various Islamic sects. In fact, this period marks the development of Islamic thought within the framework of the companions’ disagreements, due to their differing interpretations of the Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunnah.

Religious Disputes and the Assassination of Uthman

Before discussing the assassination of Uthman and the role of religious and sectarian disputes among the Sahaba and the Tabi’un (the generation following the companions), it is necessary to point out an important issue. Historians have written that when Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf sought to cast his vote for the caliphate, either for Ali or Uthman, he began by speaking to Imam Ali. He said he would give him his vote on the condition that he would follow the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet, and the practices of the two preceding caliphs (Sirat al-Shaykhayn). Imam Ali refused the last condition, while Uthman accepted it and thus became the caliph. Ibn Khaldun explicitly states that Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf chose Uthman because he agreed to follow the two previous caliphs in all matters and not exercise ijtihad in opposition to them⁴³. However, it was an unrealistic expectation that Uthman would not use his own ijtihad. This was the same approach that Abu Bakr had used in the wars against the apostates, where hundreds, if not thousands, were killed due to his ijtihad regarding the apostates. Thousands more were taken captive, and many daughters and wives of these captives were given to the Sahaba. Umar also practiced ijtihad, and Uthman was aware of this. Therefore, it was baseless for Ibn Awf to expect Uthman to act solely based on the Qur’an, the Prophetic Sunnah, and the practices of the two caliphs.

Uthman himself was a practitioner of ijtihad, and one of the most interesting examples of this was his use of public treasury funds to benefit his relatives. Ibn Sa’d writes about the wealth that Uthman gave to Marwan ibn al-Hakam, his son-in-law, noting that Uthman justified this action under the pretext of maintaining familial ties (Sila al-Qurba).⁴⁴ In reality, Uthman used the verse about the rights of close relatives to justify his actions, as if the verse meant that every ruler could—and indeed was obligated to—provide for his relatives. In fact, Uthman’s handling of financial matters was, in his view, based on his own personal ijtihad. He distributed part of the government’s revenues among his relatives and also appointed them as governors over various Islamic regions. This led to objections against him, but Uthman argued that his interpretation of the Qur’an was that a ruler had the right to give part of the wealth to his close family members⁴⁵. He said, “Those who were before me did not give to their relatives as an act of piety, but the Messenger of Allah (p) gave to his relatives, and my relatives are in need and have little means, so I gave to them. If you see this as wrong, then return it.” Uthman argued that while Abu Bakr and Umar refrained from providing for their relatives, the Prophet had done so, and he was following the Prophet’s example.

This practice also had a broader principle according to Uthman’s reasoning: in his view, the wealth was at the disposal of the caliph, who could spend it as he saw fit. These differing interpretations may have had a familial motivation for Uthman, but outwardly, they appeared to have a religious and ijtihad-based justification. However, since these decisions were financial in nature and significant, his opponents rebelled against him because of them.

In any case, this issue—namely, the conduct of the caliphs—holds significance as a fundamental basis for later disagreements between the Shia and Sunni sects. What later became known as Sunnah and Hadith was not only the Hadith of the Prophet but also the Sīra of the first two caliphs, and even the conduct of the Sahaba. The sources generally agree that later, Ibn Awf accused Uthman, telling him, “You accepted the caliphate on the condition that you act in accordance with the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of the Prophet, and the conduct of the Shaykhayn, but you did not adhere to any of them.”⁴⁶ When Uthman was questioned about not following these conditions, he said, “I act according to my knowledge and capability.”⁴⁷ This reflects the same concept of ijtihad that he considered his right—just as the previous caliphs had also considered it their right, even in matters where the Prophet had given explicit instructions. So why shouldn’t Uthman also practice ijtihad? Uthman himself had said this many times. At times, he would also say, “I have not abandoned the Sunnah of Umar.”⁴⁸

Historical sources suggest that Uthman did not face significant issues with the people during the first six years of his caliphate. However, during the latter six years, the criticisms against him intensified. These sources provide numerous reports about the nature of these criticisms, which had both financial and political aspects.

There were also clear objections to Uthman’s views on jurisprudential matters. Among the many criticisms leveled against him was the objection to why, contrary to the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Shaykhayn, he performed the full prayer while in Mina, whereas they had shortened their prayers there (qasar).⁴⁹

The term used by opponents of Uthman, including individuals like Sa’d ibn Waqqas and Ammar ibn Yasir, was “ahdaath”—a term that in at least one sense could imply innovations or actions perceived as bid’ah (religious innovation). It is reported that during the protests, Abu Huraira remarked, “I heard from the Prophet (p) that after him, there will be fitan (tribulations) and ahdaath (innovations).”[note]Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1102; Kitab Nasab Quraysh, p. 103[/note]

One of the oldest works that documents the events surrounding the rebellion against Uthman is Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara by Ibn Shabba (d. 262 AH). He provides a detailed account of the early criticisms against Uthman up until his assassination.

One of the first objections came when a man stood up in the middle of Uthman’s Friday sermon and said, “I ask you about the Book of Allah.” This could have been a protest against Uthman’s actions regarding the destruction of various Qur’an copies and the unification of the text. Uthman responded, “Is there no one here who seeks the Book of Allah?”⁵⁰ On another occasion, those who criticized Uthman spoke about his “tearing up of the Qur’anic copies.”⁵¹ Later, Shia critics also denounced Uthman for tearing up and burning copies of the Qur’an and throwing them into pits⁵².

The critical point in these objections is understanding how the trajectory of criticism developed in such a way that it led to Uthman’s assassination by members of the Sahaba.

Later, a theory was put forward that people from outside of Medina came and killed Uthman. However, even if that were true, which it is not, the majority of the Muhajirun and Ansar were still in Medina. For our discussion, the important point is to understand the conditions that led to Uthman’s assassination being deemed permissible. Part of this was certainly political and tribal, with the Quraysh fully supporting Uthman, as he was their ally.⁵³ Even Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri pondered why Uthman was killed. He asked Sa’id ibn al-Musayyib: “Do you know why Uthman was killed and what happened between him and the people? Why did the companions of the Prophet not support him?”⁵⁴ Al-Musayyib responded by saying, “Uthman was wronged and killed unjustly, and his killer is a tyrant, but those who did not support him are excused.”⁵⁵

As previously discussed, the religious aspect of this conflict is critical. Another theory held that the entire episode was a fitna foretold by the Prophet, making the situation seem inevitable and without justification. We referred earlier to Abu Huraira’s narration on this subject. Ibn Shabba includes numerous accounts about the fitna and the destined assassination of Uthman, which later became the primary justification used by the Sunni tradition to avoid dealing with the criticism. It is interesting to note that even fabricated stories emerged, with Ka’b al-Ahbar claiming that the story of Uthman was mentioned in the Torah as a tribulation that would occur.⁵⁶ These accounts belong to eschatological issues and are not historical. What truly happened and led to Uthman’s assassination were the religious and political justifications in the minds of the Sahaba.

The significance of the rebellion against Uthman lies in the fact that it was the first major event of its kind, showing religious division among Muslims. We have referred to other disagreements, but none with the scale and impact of this one. This event is significant in both its consequences and influence.

In this regard, the letter written by the people of Egypt to Uthman, expressing their criticisms, is a crucial document. It begins:

“From the Muslim assembly to the afflicted caliph. Praise be to Allah, who has bestowed His grace upon us and upon you, and granted us the ability to reason. We remind you of Allah in regard to the guidance He has given through the clouds; for Allah said in His Book: ‘Do you consider the provisions that Allah has sent down to you to be something that you can make lawful and unlawful at will?’ (Yunus: 59). We remind you of Allah in regard to the limits He has set, that you abandon them for those nearby and enforce them on those far away; for the law of Allah is one. We remind you of Allah concerning those whom Allah took a covenant from for obedience, to be witnesses over His creation. They advised you sincerely, but you rejected their advice and expelled them from their homes and wealth, while Allah says in His Book: ‘We took your covenant that you will not shed your own blood or expel yourselves from your homes. Then you admitted to this while bearing witness’ (Al-Baqarah: 84). We remind you of Allah and urge you to avoid sin, for you claim that we owe you obedience, but the Book of Allah declares: There is no obedience to one who disobeys Allah. If you obey Allah, we will support and honour you, but if you refuse, we know that you seek our destruction and yours. Who can save us from Allah if we obey you and disobey Him, while you are a mortal servant accountable for your actions, and Allah is the Creator, the Originator, the Shaper, who does not die.”⁵⁷

In this letter, the objections revolve around three main issues: altering the lawful and unlawful, abandoning the enforcement of divine limits, and disobeying Allah, which, based on the principle of “la taa’a lil-man ‘asa Allah” (no obedience to one who disobeys Allah), justifies their disobedience to Uthman. In his response, Uthman warned them against division and disobedience and cited verses on this matter.

In another report, a young man accused Uthman by quoting a verse referring to those who lie about Allah: “You have made things lawful and unlawful. Say, did Allah give you permission, or do you fabricate lies against Allah?” ⁵⁸ Uthman tried to defend his actions by referring to Umar, claiming that Umar had done similar things.⁵⁹

Our discussion is not about the correctness of these criticisms, but rather to highlight that a group from the first generation of Muslims objected to matters of lawful and unlawful and considered these criticisms as justifications for killing Uthman.

When we study texts such as Tarikh al-Madina, we understand that the root of discord in the Muslim community can be traced back not just to the Battle of Jamal but to the rebellion against Uthman, which can be seen as a form of revolution. This was clearly a comprehensive revolution, encompassing financial, economic, sectarian, and religious issues, along with internal disputes within the Quraysh, and on a larger scale, conflicts between the Quraysh, the Muhajirun, the Ansar, and other Arab tribes.

At this point, we do not intend to delve further into the rebellion against Uthman. However, by examining the reports related to Uthman’s fatwas and the disagreements that arose concerning them, we can gauge the extent of religious differences during this period. Uthman himself believed that Umar had followed similar practices, but even if that were true, Uthman, due to his weaker position and his tribal favoritism that antagonized other Arab tribes and branches of the Quraysh, found himself in an intolerable situation and faced significant criticism. When Uthman brought back al-Hakam ibn Abi al-As, who had been exiled by the Prophet, from Ta’if to Medina, and was criticized for it—especially when he placed a canopy over Al-Hakam’s grave at the time of his death, which drew further criticism—he responded by saying, “In Umar’s time, a canopy was placed over the grave of Zaynab bint Jahsh, the wife of the Prophet, but no one criticized that.” ⁶⁰

In a letter written by some of the companions to the various cities in an effort to incite people against Uthman, it was stated that the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet had been altered, just as the practices of the first two caliphs had been changed.

One of the clearest examples of this was Uthman’s decision to perform the full prayer in Mina, contrary to the practice of the Prophet (p), which caused a group to rise up against him. When he was criticized for this, Uthman responded, “This is my opinion.” ⁶¹. He explained, “I am now settled in Mecca, and that is why I perform the full prayer here.”

According to some Shia and Mu’tazili Shia sources, Ammar, one of Uthman’s prominent opponents, said, “We killed him as a disbeliever.”⁶² Ammar reportedly stood before the rebels at the Battle of Jamal and asked them, “Why are you fighting against us?” They replied, “Because Uthman was killed while he was a believer.” Ammar responded, “We are fighting you because he was killed as a disbeliever.”⁶³ Zayd ibn Arqam was asked why they declared Uthman a disbeliever, to which he replied, “For three reasons, one of which was ruling contrary to the Book of Allah.”⁶⁴ Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr also opposed Uthman, stating that Uthman had altered the Book of Allah (Al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya, 7/175). It was also reported that Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr said, “Uthman ruled unjustly and changed the rulings of the Qur’an.” ⁶⁵ The verse he referred to was, “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, they are the disbelievers.” After facing public criticism, Uthman repented and promised the people that he would thereafter follow the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet.

Aisha is also reported to have referred to Uthman as “Na’thal” and said, “Kill the Na’thal, for he has become a disbeliever.” ⁶⁶ These references highlight the accusations of takfir that were directed at Uthman leading up to his assassination.

The specific disagreements between Abu Dharr and Uthman are among the most prominent examples that shed light on the religious disputes among Muslims at the scholarly level. One such example is the question of whether the public treasury belongs to the caliph personally or if it is merely under his management. The story of Uthman’s disagreement with Abu Dharr, and Ka’b al-Ahbar’s involvement in the debate—where he opined that it was permissible for the caliph to use the public treasury for his own affairs and for whomever he wished—and Abu Dharr’s objection to Ka’b’s fatwa are recorded in Muruj al-Dhahab by al-Mas’udi⁶⁷. Another significant account of Uthman’s legal differences with others can be found in volume 8 of al-Ghadir. The 30th issue relates to the caliph’s perspective on the caliph’s control over charity funds and public assets. This stance, in complete contrast to the practices of the Prophet and later Imam Ali, led to many problems for Uthman⁶⁸. Based on this ruling, Uthman distributed wealth and land to his relatives, which became the cause of political opposition to him and ultimately led to his assassination.

With Uthman’s assassination in the final days of 35 AH, the situation became more complicated, and the rift between the factions supporting Uthman (Shi’a Uthman) and those supporting Ali (Shi’a Ali) became much more serious. The general populace, separate from these two factions, was left confused. They remained with Ali for a few years, although many of them had sympathies with the Umayyads. It could be said that the bulk of society sided with Imam Ali, although with each of the three wars—all of which were fought between Muslims—the division deepened. A large part of this religious divide centered on Uthman and whether he should be held accountable. The Sunnis, whose ideology was later solidified by the Umayyads, soon included Uthman alongside the first two caliphs in their recognition. In contrast, both the Shia and the Kharijites were unanimous in their rejection of Uthman, although the Shia, unlike the Kharijites, did not hold a favourable view of the first two caliphs either. This issue later influenced their views on kufr and iman.

The Issue of Takfir and Conflicting Ijtihads During Imam Ali’s Caliphate

The rebellion against Uthman firmly established the internal divisions among Muslims. This event was not just a rebellion but even a revolution, encompassing financial, political, cultural, and religious dimensions all at once. The legacy of this upheaval fell to Imam Ali’s government and manifested itself in the three wars that followed. All three wars had their roots in the rebellion against Uthman, the reevaluation of the principles behind it, and the religious differences that emerged from it.

The Battle of Jamal was the first significant legacy of the revolt against Uthman, with companions of the Prophet on both sides, leading to numerous deaths. On one side were Aisha, Talha, and Zubayr, and on the other were Ali, Ammar, and many of the Ansar who had also refrained from supporting Uthman during his time. Imam Ali’s supporters were of two groups: the Shia in a broad sense and the general public, who supported him due to the allegiance of the Muhajirun and Ansar. Opposing them were the rebels who had incited the people against Uthman, but now, for other reasons, they were not inclined to support Imam Ali’s government. In reality, they had not expected Imam Ali to come to power.

Religious and doctrinal disagreements in the Battle of Jamal, particularly concerning issues of deviation and disbelief, are important to our discussion. Perhaps one of the key statements is when Imam Ali said, “By Allah, I found myself either fighting these people or rejecting what Muhammad (p) had brought.” ⁶⁹ This does not imply that Imam Ali considered his opponents to be disbelievers, but rather that he saw the battle as necessary, as failing to fight would equate to disbelief in the prophethood. Imam Ali frequently remarked that while he had previously fought with these people over the tanzil (revelation) of the Qur’an, now he was fighting over its ta’wil (interpretation). Ammar Yasir expressed this in poetry:

“We fought you over its revelation,
And today we fight you over its interpretation.”

What was thought in that moment differed from what various sects later said about the participants in the Battle of Jamal, including the Ahl al-Hadith, the Shia, the Murji’ah, the Mu’tazilites, and the Kharijites. Their discussions on whether the participants were believers, disbelievers, or sinners, and the theological debates that followed, were different from the immediate thinking at the time. It seems that, in that moment, the notion of baghi (rebellion) against the central government came to mind. The essence of the matter was that this rebellion was against a legitimate government that had been established according to accepted standards—namely, the allegiance (bay’ah) of the Muhajirun and Ansar. This situation aligned with the verse from Surat al-Hujurat, which permitted fighting against rebels (baghi):

“And if two parties among the believers fight, then make peace between them. But if one of them rebels against the other, then fight against the one that rebels until it returns to the command of Allah. And if it returns, then make peace between them with justice and be equitable, for Allah loves those who act justly.” (Qur’an 49:9)

Almost without much debate, as Imam al-Shafi’i stated, this verse applied to the battles against rebels, and Imam Ali’s actions clarified the specifics of the rulings regarding them. Al-Shafi’i said: “The Muslims took the guidance for fighting polytheists from the Messenger of Allah (p), and they took the guidance for fighting rebels from Ali (a).”⁷⁰ He further stated: “We did not know the rulings on fighting rebels except from the actions of Ali.”⁷¹

A narration from the Battle of Siffin states that when Imam Ali was asked by Mughira ibn Shu’ba and Abdullah ibn Umar about the legitimacy of his battles, he referred to this verse from Surat al-Hujurat⁷². This agreement between Shia and Sunni sources shows that these battles were considered to be against rebels, thus leaving no room for legal rulings of disbelief.⁷³ A baghi is a rebellious Muslim who rises up against the central government.

Both sides in the Battle of Jamal claimed faith in God, and this was the core issue of the conflict. At the beginning of the battle, there was a suggestion to settle the matter by referring to the Qur’an, but the supporters of Jamal refused. After several of Imam Ali’s soldiers were killed and the forces of Jamal initiated the battle, the fighting began, leading to the defeat of the Basra army. When the battle was over, the issue of spoils of war was raised. In previous battles, which were classified as conquests, the war was against disbelievers, and the spoils were divided among the fighters. But this time, what should be done?

Imam Ali’s conduct during the battle against the rebels became well known: captives were to be freed, the property of the defeated returned, the pursuit of fleeing soldiers was forbidden, and no attacks were to be made on the wounded (Waq’at Siffin, p. 204). The goal was to extinguish the flames of rebellion, which had come to an end.

Abu Mikhnaf narrates from Imam Ali, saying: 

“On the day of Jamal, Ali said: Do not pursue those who flee, do not attack the wounded, do not kill the captives, and beware of harming the women, even if they insult your honor or curse your leaders.”⁷⁴ In other words, do not chase down those who run away, do not kill the wounded or the captives, and leave the women alone.

Some of Imam Ali’s more zealous companions, who later became part of the Kharijites, believed that the spoils should be divided. Imam Ali opposed this view. Their confusion lay in the question: How is it permissible to kill someone but not to take their belongings? (Al-Jamal, p. 40).

For the Shia, especially the close followers of Imam Ali (AS), the faith of the opponents, particularly those in Siffin and their leaders, was not certain. During the Battle of Siffin, someone asked Ammar about the hadith of the Prophet that states, “Fight the people until they submit (embrace Islam), and once they do, their lives and property will be protected from me.” Ammar replied, “Yes, by Allah, they submitted outwardly, but they concealed disbelief in their hearts until they found supporters for it.”⁷⁵ He implied that they were inwardly disbelievers and remained so until they gained allies. Similarly, Qays ibn Sa’d wrote to Muawiyah, saying, “You were forced into Islam, but you are an idol, son of an idol. You entered Islam unwillingly and left it willingly… and we are the supporters of the religion from which you have left, and the enemies of the religion to which you have entered.”⁷⁶ In this letter, Qays referred to Muawiyah as an “idol, son of an idol.”

It seems that the story of the Battle of Jamal was not simple, just as the rebellion against Uthman wasn’t. These events, followed by the Battle of Siffin and more importantly, the Battle of Nahrawan, deeply intertwined the discussion of kufr and iman into the discourse of Muslims. The question arose of how it was possible that the companions of the Prophet could have gone astray, and whether this error would lead to severe punishment in the afterlife. We know that some Muslims quickly rose to defend the companions, and more notably, the supporters of the Uthmaniyya sect essentially blamed Imam Ali (a) for the conflict. On the other side, the Shi’a and many moderate Sunnis directed their criticisms towards Uthman and the Umayyads, grouping together the participants of the Battles of Jamal and Siffin.

The overarching question was: With all the war, killing, and bloodshed, who was responsible? At the very least, this was a major sin. What was the fate of a sin that led to the deaths of thousands? In terms of religious judgment, how should this sin be classified—under concepts such as fisq, kufr, or some other term? Did these actions take the perpetrators out of the fold of faith or not?

In any case, a significant historical event had occurred, and now, based on Qur’anic principles and the established Muslim tradition up to that time, the theoretical aspects needed to be clarified. This debate continued for centuries and gave rise to new interpretations, with fresh opinions emerging over time.

Sheikh Mufid, in his introduction to al-Jamal, provides a report on the various views that arose regarding these events. These categorizations are so detailed, and each is based on independent theological and historical analyses, that one is left astonished. Some strove to affirm the faith of both groups, others argued for the disbelief of one side and the faith of the other, some attributed worldly motives to one party, while others differentiated between the common people and their leaders. Each group chose different paths to justify their perspectives.

The group of Qa’idin—those who stayed out of the conflict—such as Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas, Abdullah ibn Umar, Muhammad ibn Maslamah, and Usama ibn Zayd, did not participate in the Battle of Jamal from the beginning. They believed both sides were in error, saying, “Give us a sword that can only harm a disbeliever but not kill a Muslim.” However, they did not accuse either side of fisq or corruption⁷⁷ According to Sheikh Mufid, this stance was later adopted by some Sunni scholars who believed that both sides were wrong and that the bloodshed was a mistake. Nevertheless, they considered the companions of the Prophet on both sides to be forgiven because of their companionship with the Prophet (p), while the common people who followed them were considered destined for Hellfire. In this view, the leaders on both sides of the Battle of Jamal were seen as blessed and victorious, while the rest of the people were deemed unfortunate and ruined.

The idea here is that no one has the right to pass judgment on the companions and their disagreements. It is even forbidden to think about it, as such thoughts are considered an innovation in the religion⁷⁸ This perspective, which emerged later as Sunni beliefs developed, became widely accepted. Sheikh Mufid refers to those who hold these views as part of the Hashwiyya, a group whose beliefs he describes as simplistic and ignorant.

Another group, also part of the Hashwiyya, though considering themselves as thinkers and debaters, held that both sides were correct because both were acting based on their ijtihad. They believed that if any error occurred, it was due to a lack of complete knowledge rather than deliberate wrongdoing, and thus, both parties were forgiven by God⁷⁹. Naturally, they sought to find ways to justify the actions of both sides from a legal perspective, presenting arguments to support the positions of both parties. Sheikh Mufid notes that many people in his time held this opinion.

The two leaders of the Mu’tazilite school, Amr ibn Ubayd and Wasil ibn Ata, believed that one of the two groups involved in the Battle of Jamal must have been misguided and wrong, but determining which group that was is difficult, if not impossible. They argued that it is not possible to label Ali and his companions as misguided, nor could Aisha, Talha, and Zubayr be labeled as such. Only God can determine who was right and who was wrong⁸⁰.

Abu Bakr al-Asamm, another leader of the Mu’tazilites, stated that he would remain silent regarding both sides, neither judging them as rightly guided nor as misguided. He argued that the true intentions of these individuals were not clear to him. If Imam Ali’s intentions were truly righteous, then he was on the right path; otherwise, he was not. But since the intentions of both Imam Ali and the other group were unclear to him, he would not make a judgment⁸¹.

Hisham Fuwati and Abu Sahl ‘Abbad ibn Sulayman Saymari, leaders of the Mu’tazilites, believed that Ali and his close companions, as well as Aisha and her close companions, were on the right path, but the rest of the followers of both sides were misguided and doomed. The reason, they argued, was that the leaders’ intention was to command what is right and forbid what is wrong (amr bil ma’ruf wa nahi anil munkar), but the common people should not have intervened in such matters⁸².

A large number of Mu’tazilite leaders, including Bishr ibn al-Mu’tamir, al-Iskafi, and al-Jubba’i, along with the Shia, believed that Imam Ali (a) was right in all his battles and that he fulfilled the obligations God had placed on him. They also believed that all those who rebelled against him and fought him were misguided and, due to their opposition and warfare against him, deserved Hellfire.⁸³ Sheikh Mufid states that most of the Mu’tazilites supported Ali’s position and did not agree with al-Asamm’s view. In particular, they considered Muawiyah and Amr ibn al-As as corrupt and sinful individuals who were destined for Hell. They also viewed anyone who believed in Muawiyah’s legitimacy as deviant and outside of Islam. Among the Murji’ah and Ahl al-Hadith, there were some who considered Muawiyah and Amr ibn al-As misguided but did not go so far as to assert that they were destined for Hell, instead hoping for God’s forgiveness for them.

The Kharijites, however, drew a distinction between the period before and after the arbitration. They believed that Imam Ali and his followers were correct up until the Battle of Jamal, and that the opponents were disbelievers, misguided, and destined for Hellfire. Regarding Siffin, they maintained that Ali was in the right until the Qur’ans were raised on the spears. After that, they considered him to have made a mistake, and even acknowledged their own error, with the difference being that they repented, while Imam Ali did not. Naturally, they considered the forces of Muawiyah to be entirely culpable and sinful⁸⁴.

As for the Shia, according to Sheikh Mufid, they believed that anyone who fought Imam Ali was a disbeliever (kafir), though they did not regard such individuals as being outside of the Muslim community (ummah). These opponents, after all, bore witness to the oneness of God and the prophethood of Muhammad (p), and they practiced some of the Islamic obligations. Nonetheless, they would still be condemned to eternal Hellfire[/note]Al-Jamal, p. 35[/note]

The difference in the concept of kufr between what the Shia put forward and what the Kharijites proposed lay in the fact that while the Shia considered those who fought Imam Ali to be disbelievers, they did not view them as being outside the Muslim community. In contrast, the Kharijites’ conception of kufr was akin to shirk, and they regarded the people of Basra and Syria as disbelievers, considering them outside the fold of Islam⁸⁵.

This summary highlights the various views regarding the errors, sins, accusations of takfir, immorality, condemnation to eternal Hellfire, legitimacy of ijtihad, and whether or not one side was right in the context of the Battles of Jamal and Siffin.

What remains significant from this period is the issue of the Kharijites, arbitration, and the theory of takfir that the Kharijites introduced. The rebellion against Uthman, coupled with the events of Jamal and Siffin, formed a triangle that gave rise to concepts like takfir. However, it was the Kharijites, with their interpretation of kufr and the factors that lead to it, who turned the issue of iman and kufr into one of the most important theological debates of the first two to three centuries of Islam.

The issue of the Kharijites concerning major sins (kaba’ir) eventually became the central point in the debate on kufr and iman, forcing opponents to clarify their positions on the definition of faith and disbelief and the role of major sins in it. As a result, the main structure of Islamic sects at this time took shape based on their stance on this issue.

The Kharijites, who initially considered Uthman a disbeliever and viewed him as being outside the Muslim community, later declared the people of Jamal and the inhabitants of Syria, including those in the Battle of Siffin, as disbelievers. However, they went further into extremism by declaring Imam Ali a disbeliever for accepting the arbitration and for not repenting from it. They deemed him worthy of being killed and waged war against him. When the year-long peace agreement between Imam Ali’s forces and Muawiyah’s forces was signed, the Kharijites declared Imam Ali a disbeliever and stated, “They declared anyone who accepted the arbitration of the Qur’an and did not repent from it to be a disbeliever.” ⁸⁶ They continued to regard the people of Syria and the Umayyads as disbelievers but accepted the first and second caliphs.

In justifying this view, the Kharijites referred to a verse from the Qur’an, “The decision is only for Allah” (Qur’an 6:57), asserting that judgment belongs solely to God. They did not accept the sunnah of the Prophet as authoritative and, in this regard, followed the approach of Umar. When Imam Ali sent Ibn Abbas to debate with them, he instructed Ibn Abbas to avoid referencing the Qur’an, saying instead to rely on the Prophet’s sunnah. Ibn Abbas said, “O Commander of the Faithful, I know the Qur’an better than them; it was revealed in our homes.” Ali replied, “You are correct, but the Qur’an can be interpreted in different ways. You will say something, and they will say something else, but argue with them using the sunnah, for they will not find an escape from it.” Ibn Abbas argued using the sunnah, and they were left with no response⁸⁷. Imam Ali’s reasoning was that while the Qur’an can be interpreted in multiple ways, the practical examples from the Prophet’s life, such as accepting Sa’d ibn Mu’adh’s arbitration in the Battle of Banu Qurayza, cannot be reinterpreted. This shows that the Kharijites did not consider the sunnah as binding, and this was why they were not convinced to change their stance, except for other possible motivations driving them forward.

One of their critiques was that Imam Ali accepted human arbitration in religious matters. Their other criticism was related to the Battle of Jamal and the way Imam Ali dealt with the defeated opponents. They said that Ali fought them but did not take captives or collect spoils of war, saying, “He fought but did not take any spoils or captives.”⁸⁸ They argued that if these people were believers, it was not lawful to fight them and take captives. If they were not believers, then fighting them and taking captives should have been done. This reflected their extreme position on the concept of kufr—they believed it was impossible for someone to be declared a disbeliever while still benefiting from the rights of being a Muslim. In this view, the person was a disbeliever but not outside the Muslim community. While some suggest that the Kharijites were driven by a desire for spoils of war, the underlying theological problem for them was how it could be permissible to shed someone’s blood without confiscating their property. This was a dilemma that the Kharijite mindset could not reconcile.

An important historical event, known as the arbitration, which followed the assassination of Uthman and the Battle of Siffin, required theological justification for the extremist Kharijites. Their legal basis became the principle that accepting human arbitration in religion, according to the verse “The decision is only for Allah,” was a major sin, and anyone who commits a major sin is a disbeliever. From then on, the rule became that takfir would apply to anyone who commits a major sin. This reasoning was linked to the Qur’anic verse, “They are the disbelievers” (Qur’an 5:44), which the Kharijites interpreted to mean that those who accept human judgment instead of divine judgment were disbelievers.

The Kharijites, aside from the previously mentioned issues, were the pioneers in establishing a major division based on the definition of iman and kufr. The two main groups that would emerge after this—the Mu’tazilites and the Murji’ah—were formed precisely in response to this issue raised by the Kharijites. As we have stated many times, the beginning of this discussion revolved around the rebellion against Uthman, the question of whether he had left the faith, and whether he should be declared a disbeliever or merely a sinner. However, it was the Kharijites who played a major role in theorizing and centralizing this debate. They later even cited hadiths from the Prophet declaring that adulterers and thieves were disbelievers, in order to broaden the scope of labelling those who committed major sins as disbelievers⁸⁹

In general, the Mu’tazilites’ stance on those who commit major sins was that such individuals occupied a middle position, “Manzilah bayna al-Manzilatayn”, between faith and disbelief, where the person was regarded as fasiq, neither a Muslim nor a disbeliever. They believed they held a moderate view between the Kharijites and the Murji’ah. Some, like the Zaydis, considered the disbelief of someone who committed a major sin as kufr al-ni’ma (denial of God’s blessings), not kufr al-shirk (polytheism). This demonstrated that these terms did not yet have precise definitions among Muslims.

The Murji’ah, as a very large sect, considered the one who committed a major sin to still be a Muslim. For this reason, they were compelled to provide a simpler definition of faith. In doing so, they encountered significant challenges and developed numerous theories, because, on the one hand, they had to establish a minimal criterion for faith that would qualify anyone who recited the shahada as a believer. On the other hand, they were confronted with a multitude of Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions that portrayed faith as something that could increase and decrease, while also describing the Islamic community as being divided into several ranks, some of which were accused of disbelief.⁹⁰

In contrast, the Kharijites continued to assert the disbelief of those who committed major sins. For the Shia, the issue was not primarily about the definition of faith and disbelief; rather, their issue was defending Imam Ali and opposing those who fought him. When they discussed disbelief, it was in the context of whether someone stood with Imam Ali or fought against him. Of course, this was not kufr in the sense of being outside the Muslim community, even though such people were considered deserving of eternal punishment in Hell. Naturally, more detailed discussions about the beliefs of each group and the changes in the definitions of faith and disbelief over time would occur in later periods. As far as the Kharijites were concerned, they continually emphasized takfir, and they were considered the root of this discord in the Islamic world. Abu Mikhnaf recounts that when the Kharijites withdrew, a group of Ali’s Shia came to him and said: “Our allegiance is with you; we are friends of whoever you befriend and enemies of whoever you oppose.” When the Kharijites heard this statement, they said: “These people and the people of Syria are like two racing horses competing in disbelief.” ⁹¹

The most significant in this context were the Murji’ah, who officially accepted the minimum threshold of faith and did not believe that it could rise and fall in terms of calling someone a believer, as long as they possessed this minimum level of faith.

In contrast to the Murji’ah, the Ahl al-Hadith, whose first generation were the Uthmaniyya, shaped their beliefs within the framework of Umayyad political power. They advocated for a type of faith that, while acknowledging it could increase or decrease, labelled supporters of the government as Muslims and adherents to the Ahl al-Hadith, while others were branded as people of innovation (ahl al-bid’ah). The term “innovation” (bid’ah) emerged later to indicate a kind of deviation that constituted a departure from the faith, which would be discussed further in later historical periods.

 Two Specific Cases of Apostasy and Takfir from the Time of Imam Ali (a)

In historical sources, there are two specific cases, one about clear apostasy and the other about a form of takfir, that require clarification.

The first case concerns a man named Mustawrad al-‘Ajli, who was originally a Christian, converted to Islam, and then reverted to Christianity, thus being identified as an apostate. Since he did not repent, he was sentenced to death. This case of overt apostasy is not directly related to our discussion of takfir in the context of accusations of disbelief, but it sheds light on certain aspects of the issue. The story of Mustawrad is mentioned under the section titled Bab Mass al-Salib (“The Chapter on Touching the Cross”) in the works of ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-San’ani, and is also discussed in two other instances in his book. ‘Utbah ibn Farqad reported this incident to Imam Ali (a)⁹². It is written that the Imam met him while going to pray, and he was bound in chains of iron⁹³ In another narration it says that Mustawrad came to Imam Ali (a) with a cloak made of goat’s hair and was riding a donkey⁹⁴. The Imam invited him to repent, but Mustawrad began to deny and blaspheme. The Imam responded, “I seek God’s help against you.” Mustawrad replied, “I seek the help of Christ against you!” ⁹⁵ In another narration, when the Imam said “Allahu Akbar,” Mustawrad responded with “al-Masih Akbar” (Christ is greater)⁹⁶.

In a further interaction, the Imam spoke to him, walking around him, while Mustawrad said he did not understand what the Imam was saying and testified that Jesus was the son of God⁹⁷. The Imam suspected that Mustawrad may have wanted to marry a Christian woman, and he offered to arrange the marriage for him, but Mustawrad replied with “Quddus, Quddus” (Holy, Holy), stating that he wanted to meet Christ⁹⁸. The Imam then asked if he had truly become a Christian, to which Mustawrad said yes. The Imam then said “Allahu Akbar”, to which Mustawrad again responded with “al-Masih Akbar.” The Imam grabbed his garment, threw him to the ground, and ordered the people to kill him. They trampled him to death⁹⁹.

This account is also mentioned in al-Kafi without naming Mustawrad: “A man from among the Muslims became a Christian… The Imam called him to repent, but he refused. So he grabbed his hair and said to the people, ‘Trample him,’ and he was trampled until he died.” ¹⁰⁰. The report also appears briefly in Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq regarding issues of inheritance and marriage. In this version, Mustawrad simply says: “Not until I meet Christ.” Imam Ali then ordered his execution, and his inheritance was distributed among his Muslim heirs¹⁰¹. In one narration, the Imam gave Mustawrad three days to repent. He was imprisoned in the mosque, given food and water, but after three days, when he still refused to repent, he was brought out to the courtyard of the mosque and executed¹⁰².

Mustawrad was also wearing a cross around his neck when he met with Imam Ali. The Imam removed it during their conversation. The Imam, who had come to pray, left someone in his place and stated that he preferred to perform ablution again after touching the cross, which he considered impure (najis)¹⁰³. The three-day grace period later became a source for the ruling that an apostate should be given three days to repent¹⁰⁴. In the end, Mustawrad’s refusal to repent and his return to Christianity led Imam Ali to issue the death sentence for apostasy. His inheritance was then divided among his Muslim heirs¹⁰⁵. In some sources, it is even mentioned that Mustawrad’s body was burned¹⁰⁶. ‘Abd al-Razzaq narrates that after his execution, the Christians offered 30,000 dirhams in exchange for his body, but this offer was rejected¹⁰⁷.

In another report, it is mentioned that Imam Ali struck Mustawrad with his foot and killed him, and the Christians considered Mustawrad a martyr due to his resistance¹⁰⁸. In yet another narration, the Christians asked for the body or the ashes of Mustawrad in exchange for money, but Imam Ali refused and said, “I do not want to help Satan against them.”¹⁰⁹ There is a possibility that Mustawrad’s body was burned to prevent further issues regarding the request for his remains¹¹⁰. In the same Musannaf, there is another letter in which Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, Imam Ali’s governor in Egypt, asks about two Muslims who became heretics. Imam Ali replied: “If they repent, let them be, but if not, execute them.” ¹¹¹. There is also a case regarding two men in Kufa who became idol worshippers and were said to have been burned¹¹². A similar letter was sent by Umar.¹¹³

An interesting and related scholarly question and answer concerns a query directed to Sayyid Murtada: Which caliph fought but neither took captives nor seized spoils? He responded, During Abu Bakr’s time, a young slave apostatized, and they killed him, but Abu Bakr did not touch his property. Similarly, during Umar’s time, they killed an apostate, but Umar did not seize his property. Imam Ali also killed Mustawrad al-‘Ajli but did not touch his property. Killing does not give one the right to take property.¹¹⁴ This contrasts with previous reports which state that Mustawrad’s property was given to his Muslim heirs.

The second case of takfir, or perhaps “blasphemy,” concerns some extremists (ghulat) who claimed divinity for Imam Ali (a), and the Imam punished them. I have written a study on these historical reports under the title “The Extremists of Imam Ali’s Era: A Review of Several Historical Narrations” (published in Maqalat wa Rasa’il Tarikhi, Dafter Awwal, Tehran, Nashr-e Ilm), where I examined these reports in terms of their sources and content. There are two key narrations on this matter.

The first is that a group of extremists in the city of Mada’in, upon hearing the news of Imam Ali’s martyrdom, refused to believe it, attributing divinity and immortality to him. In a narration recorded by Ibn Abi al-Dunya through a person named Mujalid, who reports from al-Sha’bi via Zahr ibn Qays al-Ju’fi, Zahr says: “I was with 400 men sent by Imam Ali (a) to Mada’in, and it was there that I received the news of the killing of Ali ibn Abi Talib (a). At that time, Abdullah ibn Wahb al-Saba’i raised his hands to the sky, saying ‘Allahu Akbar’ and proclaimed, ‘He (Ali) will not die until he drives the Arabs with his staff.’”¹¹⁵ In the aforementioned study, I found this narration to be questionable in terms of both its chain of transmission and content.

The second narration, reported by both al-Kulayni and al-Kashshi concerning apostasy and the apostates, states that after Imam Ali (a) finished the Battle of Jamal, a group of 70 people from the Zutt (Indian gypsies) came to him in Basra, greeted him in their language, and spoke with him. The Imam returned their greeting and then said, “I am not what you claim; I am a servant created by God.” They refused to accept this and insisted, “You are indeed He (God).” The Imam warned them, “If you do not desist from this statement, repent, and abandon your beliefs, I will kill you.” They refused to repent. The Imam then ordered that pits be dug, which were interconnected at the bottom. He threw them into these pits, covered them, and lit a fire in one of the empty pits, allowing the smoke to enter the other pits, causing them all to die. In al-Kashshi’s version, the sequence of events differs slightly, but burning as a form of punishment is also mentioned.¹¹⁶ The use of fire in punishment has long been a matter of contention, and the story of the pits gives the account a legendary aspect.¹¹⁷

There is no clear evidence in these sources indicating that this group was Muslim and made such claims about Imam Ali. It is likely that a group of nomadic gypsies, upon seeing the Islamic ruler, made exaggerated statements, and the Imam rejected their claims. If this incident had truly been as violent as described, it would have been reported far more frequently than it was.¹¹⁸

1. See al-Kashshaf: 2/636
2. See al-Kashshaf: 4/326)
3. See: Review and Critique of the Punishment for Apostasy in Islam and Other Religions, Journal of New Religious Thought, Spring 2014, Issue 36, Pages 23-48, p. 37.
4. Al-Mabsut: 7/282
5. Isbah al-Shi’a: 191
6. Maqalat al-Islamiyyin, p. 141
7. Al-Isabah: 2/91)
8. Tafsir al-Tabari, narration number 10212
9. Mawsu’ah al-Kharaj, part 1, p. 179
10. Tafsir al-Tabari: 26/90
11. See PhD thesis: Dhawabit al-Takfir fi al-Alfaz al-Dhamm fi al-Qur’an, pp. 22-23)
12. Ibid., pp. 29-39
13. According to Ya’qubi: 2/111
14. Tafsir al-Qummi: 171
15. Al-Ya’qubi: 2/111
16. Mawsu’ah al-Kharaj, Part One, p. 179
17. Tafsir al-Tabari: 2/113
18. Tafsir al-Tabari: 15/589
19. Vol. 3, pg. 20
20. Al-Milal wa al-Nihal: 1/30
21. Minhaj al-Karamah, p. 110
22. Al-Mi’yar wa al-Muwazanah, p. 35
23. Al-Ya’qubi, 2/139
24. Vol. 4, pg. 170
25. Tarikh al-Khamis, 2/201
26. Tarikh al-Khulafa, p. 93
27. Pg. 2103
28. Al-Muhalla, Book of Apostasy, p. 2103
29. Tabari, 3/242
30. Kitab al-Amwal, p. 685
31. Fadha’il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 1/78)
32. Milal wa Nihal by Shahristani, 1/33
33. Vol. 6, pg. 311
34. Al-Tabari, 4/87; Al-Kubra, 6/204
35. See Shahrastani’s Milal wa Nihal, 1/188; Al-Tabari, 1/30
36. Al-Ma’rifah wa al-Tarikh, 1/463
37. See: Subul al-Huda wa al-Rishad, 9/143, which states: “This is considered among the agreements of Umar.”
38. See: Miftah al-Saada wa Misbah al-Siyada, 2/351
39. Sahih Muslim, 1/355
40. Al-Musannaf by Abdul-Razzaq, 4/434; Musnad Ahmad, 1/100, and many other sources
41. Muwatta by Malik ibn Anas, vol. 1, p. 336
42. Tabaqat al-Kubra, 3/160; Tarikh Yaqubi, 255
43. Ibn Khaldun, Tarikh, 1/262
44. Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqat, 5/27
45. Tarikh Ibn Khaldun, 2/549, 581
46. Rawdat al-Safa, 2/1820
47. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/930
48. Tarikh Madinat Dimashq, 39/257
49. Tarikh Madinat Dimashq, 39/256
50. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1108
51. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1136
52. Taqrib al-Ma’arif, p. 230
53. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1114
54. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 4/1157
55. Al-Iqd al-Farid, 5/39
56. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1118
57. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1120-1121
58. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1129
59. Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwara, 3/1133
60. Al-Isabah, 2/92
61. Ansab al-Ashraf, 5/39
62. Al-Mi’yar wa al-Muwazana, p. 171; Taqrib al-Ma’arif, p. 274
63. Jamal by Shaykh Mufid, p. 336
64. Sharh Nahj al-Balagha by Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 3/51
65. Al-Gharat, 1/284
66. Al-Futuh, 2/216, 4/459; Ansab al-Ashraf, 4/437, 569; Tabari, 4/1
67. 2/357
68. Al-Ghadir, 8/336-340
69. Ansab al-Ashraf, 3/33; Tathbit Dala’il al-Nubuwwa, 1/219
70. Kashf al-Ghummah, 1/138
71. Al-Muhadhdhab al-Bar’i, 2/301
72. Waq’at Siffin, p. 551
73. Sharh al-Akhbar by Qadhi Nu’man, vol. 1, pg. 413-414.
74. Tarikh Wasit by Aslam ibn Sahl al-Razzaz Bahshal (d. 292 AH / 905 AD), p. 165; Al-Jamal, p. 405
75. Waq’at Siffin, pp. 215-216
76. Uyoon al-Akhbar by Ibn Qutaybah, Al-Kamil by al-Mubarrad, 1/232, 2/419-420
77. Al-Jamal, p. 26
78. Al-Jamal, p. 27
79. Al-Jamal, p. 28
80. Al-Jamal, p. 30)
81. Al-Jamal, p. 31
82. Al-Jamal, p. 32
83. Al-Jamal, p. 33
84. Al-Jamal, p. 34
85. Al-Jamal, p. 35
86. Maqtal al-Imam Amir al-Mu’minin Ibn Abi al-Dunya, p. 21
87. Tabaqat al-Kubra, 10/181
88. Ma’rifa wa al-Tarikh, 1/523; Sharh al-Akhbar by Qadi Nu’man, 2/48, Jami’ Bayan al-‘Ilm, pg. 377.
89. Al-Aghani, 23/172, the sermon of Abu Hamza, the Kharijite, to the people
90. For the detailed and later theorized views of the Murji’ah, see: Maqalat al-Islamiyyin, pp. 132-152.
91. Ansab al-Ashraf, 3/122
92. Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq, 10/170; Tahdhib al-Athar, 4/125, 83/4-84
93. Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq, 1/262; Ibn Hazm in al-Muhalla, vol. 1, pg. 83-84
94. Tahdhib al-Athar Tabari, 3/78-79
95. Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq, 10/170
96. Da’a’im al-Islam, 2/480
97. Tahdhib al-Athar, 4/83-84
98. Da’a’im, 2/280; Mabsut fi Fiqh al-Imamiyya, 281-282
99. Da’a’im al-Islam, 2/480
100. al-Kafi, 7/256, Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih, 3/152
101. Vol. 6, pg. 104-105
102. al-Ja’fariyat, p. 127; Ahkam al-Sultaniyya by al-Mawardi, p. 56
103. Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq, 1/125
104. al-Nahj al-Masluk fi Siyasat al-Muluk, p. 290; al-Tamhid by Ibn Abdul Barr, 9/166
105. Kitab al-Kharaj, p. 181
106. Ahl al-Milal wa al-Ridda wa al-Zanadiqa from al-Jami by Imam Ahmad
107. Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq, 10/170
108. Ibid.
109. al-Ja’fariyat, p. 127
110. Asma al-Matalib, p. 403
111. Musannaf, 10/171
112. Tahdhib, 10/105-140
113. Tahdhib, 6/105
114. Bihar al-Anwar, 29/448; Manaqib, 1/276
115. Ibn Abi al-Dunya, 1990, pp. 208-281
116. al-Kashshi, p. 308
117. al-Kashshi, p. 1348
118. The sources used in this article are all from books available in the Noor library collections.