These transcripts are from the Khaarij classes in theology delivered by Ustad Reza Brinjkar in 2022, focusing on the principle of af‘āl Allah kulluhā mu‘allalah bil-aghrāḍ (ACO – the conditioning of all divine acts to objectives). These lessons were later compiled and published in book form in 2023, though I do not currently have a copy of it. The discussions in these sessions explore foundational theological debates, tracing the evolution of the principle of ACO through classical and contemporary scholarship. Several topics are discussed within these lessons, drawing upon key arguments from the Mu‘tazilites, the Ash‘arites, and the Imāmiyyah. This post contains the notes from Lesson 1 and Lesson 2.

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The most important topic in theology, after proving the existence of God, is understanding the acts of God. One of the foundational principles in this discussion is al-ḥusn wa al-qubḥ (the inherent goodness or evil of actions). Another major principle is that all of God’s acts are conditioned to objectives (af‘āl Allah kulluhā mu‘allalah bil-aghrāḍ).

Other principles, such as Aṣlaḥ (the principle that God always does what is best) and Luṭf (divine grace that facilitates obedience), are also significant, but many theologians did not accept them. In fact, we ourselves did not accept these two and instead replaced them with a new principle called ‘adl wa faḍl (justice and grace), which we believe was accepted by theologians up until Shaykh Mufīd.

However, the principle that God’s acts are conditioned to objectives (ACO) is universally agreed upon by all Imami Shī‘a and the Mu‘tazilites. Shahīd Muṭahharī, in his book Divine Justice, considers this principle a fundamental pillar of later theological discussions, and it has also been explored in philosophy.

In theology, we assert that if someone does not accept al-ḥusn wa al-qubḥ (HWQ), they cannot accept ACO. However, one may accept HWQ without necessarily accepting ACO. ACO does not merely state that God’s acts have objectives; rather, it asserts that it is necessary for God’s acts to have objectives. Since necessity is a key element of this principle, HWQ must be assumed. Shahīd Ṣadr referred to this necessity as moral necessity, while other contemporary theologians describe it as wujūb ‘ala (necessity upon God), as opposed to wajaba ‘an (necessity arising from something external).

Some Ash‘arites today accept a version of ACO based on certain Quranic verses, but they do not believe in its necessity. Instead, they argue that since it is stated in the Quran, it has certainly occurred, but it was not necessary upon God.

ACO is directly linked to HWQ because if God’s acts have no objectives, they would be vain, and God does not engage in vain actions. This is an extension of HWQ, just as other related conclusions follow from it—such as the idea that God cannot impose obligations on someone beyond their capacity or that He must fulfill His promises.

In philosophy, since HWQ was not accepted, ACO was also rejected. Instead, it was regarded as a rational construct (i‘tibār). Shahīd Ṣadr explains that because philosophers accept ontological necessity and reject the concept of possibility in divine actions, they cannot accept HWQ or ACO. Philosophers argue that ACO implies deficiency in God—suggesting that He was incomplete and then moved toward perfection. In fact, one of the main arguments used by philosophers to refute divine will is that will is inherently tied to objectives.¹

Historical Context

The principles of Luṭf and Aṣlaḥ emerged around the late 2nd to early 3rd century Hijri. However, ACO can be traced back to the Quran itself, as it repeatedly affirms that God’s actions have objectives.

For instance, the Quran states:

وَمَا خَلَقْنَا ٱلسَّمَآءَ وَٱلْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا بَٰطِلًا ۚ ذَٰلِكَ ظَنُّ ٱلَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ ۚ فَوَيْلٌ لِّلَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ مِنَ ٱلنَّارِ

We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain. That is the thinking of those who disbelieve. So, woe to the disbelievers because of the Fire (they have to face). (38:27)

ٱلَّذِينَ يَذْكُرُونَ ٱللَّهَ قِيَـٰمًا وَقُعُودًا وَعَلَىٰ جُنُوبِهِمْ وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِى خَلْقِ ٱلسَّمَـٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَـٰذَا بَـٰطِلًا سُبْحَـٰنَكَ فَقِنَا عَذَابَ ٱلنَّارِ

They are those who remember Allah while standing, sitting, and lying on their sides, and reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth ˹and pray˺, “Our Lord! You have not created ˹all of˺ this without purpose. Glory be to You! Protect us from the torment of the Fire.” (3:191)

أَفَحَسِبْتُمْ أَنَّمَا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ عَبَثًا وَأَنَّكُمْ إِلَيْنَا لَا تُرْجَعُونَ

Did you then think that We had created you without purpose, and that you would never be returned to Us? (23:115)

وَمَا خَلَقْنَا ٱلسَّمَآءَ وَٱلْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا لَٰعِبِينَ

We did not create the heavens and the earth and everything in between for sport. (21:16)

These verses indicate that ACO is understood through reason when reflecting on the consequences of God’s acts. There are nearly ten verses that describe God’s creation as bil-ḥaqq (with truth), in contrast to bil-bāṭil (in vain). Some other verses imply this principle more subtly:

وَهُوَ ٱلَّذِى خَلَقَ ٱلسَّمَٰوَٰتِ وَٱلْأَرْضَ فِى سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍۢ وَكَانَ عَرْشُهُۥ عَلَى ٱلْمَآءِ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ أَيُّكُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلًا

He is the One who created the heavens and the earth in six days, while His throne was on water, so that He might test you as to who among you is better in deed. (11:7)

Numerous other verses emphasize that neither we nor any part of creation was made in vain. God’s creation has wise and reasonable objectives.

Shahīd Muṭahharī argues that the entire discussion on the acts of God emerged from the debate on jabr wa ikhtiyār (predestination and free will), which subsequently led to discussions on ‘adl (divine justice) and ultimately to ACO. He writes:

The discussion on free will and predestination automatically led to deliberation on the idea of “justice”. This is because there is a direct connection between free will and justice on the one hand, and between predestination and injustice on the other. In other words, it is only when man is presumed to have free will that responsibility, due rewards, and just punishments take on any meaning whatsoever. If man did not have this freedom then his hands would be tied and he would be entirely at the mercy of the Divine Will and the contingencies of natural forces and laws. In such a case, he would no longer be held responsible and rewards and punishments would be meaningless.

From the outset the theologians were divided into two groups. The first, which favoured free will and justice, was called Mu‘tazilah. The second, which opted for predestination, was a group of Sunnis which later came to be known as the Ash‘arites. Needless to say that those who opposed justice, did not openly and directly say that they deny Divine justice. This is because both groups claimed adherence to the Quran, and the Quran strongly negates injustice with respect to God and affirms His justice. What the opponents of justice did do though, is to define justice in a special way. They said: Justice is not a reality in itself that we can describe “beforehand” and set as the standard by which to judge God’s acts. In fact, setting such a standard and point of reference for Divine acts is to in some way impose obligations on God and to constrain and limit His will. For can rules and laws be set for His acts which have authority over Him?! All laws are created by Him and fall under His jurisdiction, and He is the ultimate Authority. Any type of “superseding” authority which He must follow is against His absolute Immensity and Dominion. Divine justice does not mean that there are a set of previously defined “just” laws which He must abide by. Rather Divine justice means that He is the source of justice; whatever He does is just, not that He does what is just. Justice and injustice are consequences and derivatives of Divine acts. Justice is not the standard to judge Divine acts by, rather, Divine acts are the standard by which justice is defined.

Mu‘tazilites were known for their support of [Divine] justice. They argued that justice is a reality in itself and that God, because He is bound to be just and wise, carries out acts in accordance with this standard of justice. To explain, when we look at the very essence of acts, irregardless of whether or not the particular act is associated with God’s creative act or His commandments, we see that some of them are different from others. Some of these acts, in their essence, are just—such as rewarding the doers of good deeds; While other acts are in themselves oppression and unjust—such as punishing those who do good deeds. Now because these acts are different on the level of essence and because God is good and absolute in His perfection, wisdom and justice, He chooses acts that are in accordance with the standard of justice.

Essential Goodness and Essential Evil

The next topic that arose as a “development” and expansion of the subject of justice is that of good and evil actions. In general, is it the case that good and evil can be attributed to actions and deeds in their essence? For instance are deeds such as telling the truth, keeping trusts, generosity and the like, good in and of themselves? While telling lies, treachery, and usurpation and their like, are bad and reprehensible in themselves? Are qualities such as goodness and nobility of the order of the real and essential qualities of actions; implying that any action [having this quality]—regardless of its subject or any other external condition—assumes this quality in and of itself while negating the opposite of this quality?

Rationally Derived Realities

As the previous section talked of essential qualities of actions, it perforce touched upon the intellect, or reason, and its independent role in the perception of these qualities. The argument at hand has been put forward in these terms: Is reason able to perceive the goodness or badness of things by itself—unaided and “independently”? Or does it have to take recourse in revelation and the Divine law? It is with this in mind that essential good and evil has been referred to also as rational good and evil. In this debate, the Mu‘tazilites affirmed the existence of the good—essentially, innately, and rationally—and put forward the argument of “rationally derived realities”. They said: We obviously perceive that acts are, in their essence, different from one another. We also obviously know that our intellects become aware of these realities without needing to be guided by revelation from the outside, so to speak.

The Ash‘arites, in the same way that they previously denied justice being an essential and a priori quality, also denied good and evil being essential, rational, and a priori qualities. They saw good and evil as relative realities that adapted themselves to the conditions of time and space and that were influenced by customs and indoctrinations. Moreover, for the perception of good and evil, they saw reason as being not only in need of revelation, but they even saw reason to be a consequence of revelation. Because the Ash‘arites denied intellectually derived realities, they countered the Mu‘tazilite belief in the selfsufficiency of human reason, saying: What’s justice? What’s injustice? What’s good? What’s evil? Revelation must speak to these questions; the Islamic tradition—and it only—must be followed in handling these issues. Hence, they referred to themselves as the “People of Tradition”. Moreover, the Ash‘arites used this name and label to make a social platform and movement for themselves amongst the masses. In other words, this dispute between them and the Mu‘tazilah—which was primarily based upon accepting or rejecting the idea of “rationally derived realities”—came to be cast into the acceptance or rejection of tradition in the popular eye. It was also portrayed as the conflict and opposition between reason and tradition, and for this reason the public platform and popular appeal of the Ash‘arites grew, while that of the Mu‘tazilah became weaker and weaker. It is not that the Mu‘tazilah disbelieved in tradition, it’s more that the Ash‘arites chose such a [noble sounding] name for themselves and by placing the Mu‘tazilah in the opposing camp, set them up for a fall. What is for certain is that this factor was very effectual in the popular defeat of the Mu‘tazilah during the first part of the third century [of the Islamic calendar]. This misunderstanding and error on the part of the masses was so widespread that even some orientalists—knowingly or unknowingly—labelled the Mu‘tazilah as “enlightened anti-traditionalists”. The truth, as is affirmed by those in the know, is that the difference of opinion between these two groups is totally unrelated to their adherence and loyalty to Islam, or lack thereof. In fact and in practical terms, the Mu‘tazilites sympathized and sacrificed more for the Islamic cause than their Ash‘arite counterparts.

It seems that usually when there is an intellectualist movement—no matter how sincere—that is opposed by exoteric pietists—no matter how insincere, it comes under these same old attacks and accusations in the public eye. Even though this dispute between the Mu‘tazilah and the Ash‘arites started from their disagreement on the rights and scope of human reason and its independence or lack thereof with respect to the issue of justice and essential goodness, it later spread to other topics, such as tawḥīd. In this latter subject as well, the Mu‘tazilah believed that reason had a say on the matter, while the Ash‘arites felt that an exoteric and literalist understanding of the traditions was what was necessary. We will expand on this at some later point.

The Motive and End of Divine Acts

Now we turn to the fourth problem, which is also one of the fundamental issues of theology and a consequence of its precursors—namely, are Divine acts the effects of motives and ends?

As we know, and is obvious, human beings have motives and ends for their works and actions. In every action, man has a “for” or “because”. Why does he study? “Because” he wants to be knowledgeable. Why does he work? “Because” he wants to make a living. For every “why”, there is a “because” or “for”. It is these very same “because’s” that give meaning to human deeds. Every act that has a rational end and purpose—that is, there is good in it—is counted as meaningful. An act or deed without purpose is like a word without meaning—an empty shell. Now of course every “because” and every “meaning”, in their own turn, might themselves have another “because” and “meaning”. But the fact is that this chain must end up in a reality which is in its essence an end and a meaning. This reality is what the philosophers call absolute goodness or the Good.

In any case, man has a motive and goal for every rational act of his and in response to every “why?” he posits a “because”. If he performs an action but refrains from giving a “because”, then that action is considered purposeless, meaningless and absurd. Philosophers have proven that a completely purposeless and absurd act can never be performed by man, as it is an impossibility. All such absurdities are relative. For instance, an act which issues from an imaginative temperament has a purpose and end that is appropriate to that temperament. Now because such an act lacks a rational end, we call it “absurd” and “vain”. In other words, with respect to the agent and subject which performed the act, it is not absurd and purposeless. But with respect to any other source that could have performed it but didn’t, it is considered absurd.

The opposite of absurdity is wisdom. The wise act is one which is never—even relatively—without a motive and purpose. In other words, it is an act that must have a rational motive which must in all conditions be considered the better option. Hence, the fact that any action is wise depends upon it having a purpose and end—one that is rationally acceptable and always the better and precedent choice. The wise man is he who firstly, has a purpose and end for his works; secondly, chooses from amongst the many purposes and ends, the best of them; thirdly, chooses the nearest and best and most expedient means to achieve his end. In other words, wisdom or man being wise entails that he, with perfect knowledge, chooses the best possible conditions for the best ends. Once again, wisdom or being wise necessitates that man have a “because” for every “why”—regardless of whether this “why” pertains to his choice of “ends” or his choice of “means.”

Why did you do so-and-so?

Because of this-and-that purpose.

Why did you give preference to that purpose and end?

For the reason of this-or-that particularity.

Why did you use such-and-such means?

Because of this-or-that distinction and priority.

Any human act that can not give a rational answer to “why”—to the degree that it is imperfect in this respect— gives lie to the defective wisdom of the man who carried out the act. What about God? Are Divine acts, like their human counterparts, the result of motives? Do God’s acts also have a “why” and a “because” and involve preponderance and expediency? Or are all these things particular to man—making their generalisation to God a type of anthropomorphism and comparison of the Creator to the created? The Mu‘tazilah naturally became the proponents of God’s creation having an end and a motive. They saw God’s wisdom—something that the Quran clearly emphasizes over and over again—to lie in that fact that He has specific motives and purposes for His acts and that He—with perfect knowledge—carries out these acts by choosing the best and most expedient means.

The Ash‘arites on the other hand, denied motives and ends for God’s acts. They explained away the concept of wisdom—which appears repeatedly in the Quran—in the same way that they had dealt with justice. That is to say, it was their belief that whatever God does is wise, not that He does what is wise. According to the Mu‘tazilah, Divine acts are the result of a series of expedients. According to the Ash‘arites, it is wrong to say that Divine acts are due to certain expediencies. For, just as God is the creator of creation, He is also the creator of any such things that are named “expediencies”—albeit, without having created anything because of some expediency and without that thing having an ontological, essential, or causal connection with any expediency.

We generally agree with the historical outline presented by Shahīd Muṭahharī, as the discussion of jabr wa ikhtiyār (predestination and free will) is closely related to ‘adl (divine justice). This, in turn, led to the discussion of al-ḥusn wa al-qubḥ (HWQ), which eventually culminated in the principle of af‘āl Allah kulluhā mu‘allalah bil-aghrāḍ (ACO – the conditioning of all divine acts to objectives). However, we believe that, logically, jabr wa ikhtiyār follows from HWQ, even if, historically, it may have been discussed first.

From the second century Hijri onwards, the Ahl al-Ḥadīth, Mu‘tazilites, and Imāmiyyah were deeply engaged in discussions surrounding ACO. One of the primary points of debate was the precise definition of an objective (gharaḍ). Among the Imāmiyyah, there was a consensus that the objective of human creation was to grant us benefit (ṣalāḥ). Later, theologians debated whether mere ṣalāḥ was sufficient or whether God’s actions must always aim for aṣlaḥ (the absolute best), leading to the emergence of the principle of Aṣlaḥ.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, in al-Maqālāt, writes:

و اجمعت المعتزلة على ان اللّه سبحانه خلق عباده لينفعهم لا ليضرّهم و ان ما كان من الخلق غير مكلّف فانما خلقه لينتفع‌ به المكلّف ممن خلق و ليكون عبرة لمن يخلقه‌ و دليلا، و اختلفوا فى خلق الشي‌ء لا ليعتبر به على مقالتين:
فقال اكثرهم: لن يجوز ان يخلق اللّه سبحانه الاشياء الا ليعتبر بها العباد و ينتفعوا بها و لا يجوز ان يخلق شيئا لا يراه احد و لا يحسّ به احد من المكلّفين و قال بعضهم ممن ذهب الى ان اللّه عز و جل لم يأمر بالمعرفة ان جميع ما خلقه اللّه فلم يخلقه ليعتبر به احد و يستدلّ به احد، و هذا قول «ثمامة بن اشرس» فيما اظنّ‌.

“The Mu‘tazilites unanimously agreed that God, the Exalted, created His servants to benefit them, not to harm them. As for creation that is not subject to religious obligations (taklīf), it was created so that those who are obligated could benefit from it and so that it may serve as a lesson and a sign for those He creates. They then disagreed on whether God may create something without it serving as a lesson or sign, leading to two positions:

• The majority held that it is impermissible for God, the Exalted, to create things except that they serve as lessons for His servants and provide them with benefit. He does not create anything that is not seen or perceived by those subject to religious obligations.²
• However, some, including those who believed that God did not command ma‘rifah (cognitive knowledge of Him), argued that everything God created was not necessarily meant to serve as a lesson or a sign. This view is attributed to Thumāma b. Ashras, as far as I recall.”³

We can mention seven key theological stages as pwe this passage above:

1. Actions possess inherent ḥusn wa qubḥ (goodness and evil), and the intellect (‘aql) can perceive them.
2. God is just (‘ādil).
3. If an act lacks a rational objective (gharaḍ ‘aqlī), it is qabīḥ (evil) because it is purposeless.
4. The objective (gharaḍ) of God’s actions cannot be directed toward Himself, as that would imply He is in need of completion.
5. Gharaḍ must be directed toward human beings or other creation.
6. This gharaḍ cannot involve harm (iḍrār), as harm is ẓulm (oppression) and inherently qabīḥ.
7. The gharaḍ must provide benefit (ṣalāḥ), which leads to the discussion of the principle of Aṣlaḥ.

Following this, Ash‘arī further elaborates:

واختلفت المعتزلة: هل خلق الله- سبحانه!- الخلق لعلة أم لا؟ على أربعة أقاويل:
1- فقال أبو الهذيل: خلق الله-عز وجل- خلقه لعلة والعلة هي الخلق والخلق هو الإرادة والقول وأنه إنما خلق الخلق لمنفعتهم ولولا ذلك كان لا وجه لخلقهم لأن من خلق ما لا ينتفع به ولا يزيل بخلقه عنه ضررًا ولا ينتفع به غيره ولا يضر به غيره فهو عابث.
2- وقال النظام: خلق الله الخلق لعلة تكون وهي المنفعة والعلة هي الغرض في خلقه لهم وما أراد من منفعتهم ولم يثبت علة معه لها كان مخلوقًا كما قال أبو الهذيل بل قال: هي علة تكون وهي الغرض.
3- وقال معمر: خلق الله الخلق لعلة والعلة لعلة وليس للعلل غاية ولا كل.
4- وقال عباد خلق الله- سبحانه- الخلق لا لعلة.

“The Mu‘tazilites disagreed on whether God, the Exalted, created creation for a cause (‘illa) or not. They held four positions:

1. Abū al-Hudhayl stated that God created creation for a cause, and that cause is khalaq (the act of creating) itself, which is synonymous with divine will and decree. He asserted that God created creation for their benefit, and without this purpose, there would be no justification for their creation. Creating something that neither benefits the creator nor removes harm, nor benefits or harms anyone else, would be ‘abath (absurd).
2. Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām maintained that God created creation for a cause (‘illa), which is benefit (manfa‘a). The ‘illa is the objective (gharaḍ) behind His creation of them, and what He intended from their benefit. However, unlike Abū al-Hudhayl, he did not consider this cause as something external to God’s will, but rather as the purpose itself.
3. Mu‘ammar argued that God created creation for a cause, and that cause itself has another cause, leading to an infinite regress of causes.
4. ‘Abbād took the opposite stance, asserting that God, the Exalted, created creation without any cause (la li-‘illa).”

In this passage, Ash‘arī appears to conflate ‘illat fā‘ilī (efficient cause) and ‘illat ghā’ī (final cause). The first passage suggests that there was a consensus among the Mu‘tazilites, while the latter passage highlights their internal differences on the nature of divine causality. It seems that in this section, Ash‘arī is specifically referring to ‘illat fā‘ilī—though there is some ambiguity in his wording.

1. Ibn Sīnā in Namṭ 6 uses this argument.
2. For example, is it possible for God to create something that has no benefit for us; like some star in some other galaxy. There was a difference of opinion.
3. Source