Assessing the Possibility of Multiple Real Rulings: Theological, Hadith-Based, and Usuli Approaches – Views of Sayyid Mujtaba Khamenei
By Seyyed Mehdi Husseini, translated by Sayyid Ali Imran. Originally published in the Quarterly Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence and Principles (Fiqh and Usul)
Abstract
Based on the apparent meaning of certain narrations from the Infallible Imams (a), it appears that, through the Qur’anic verses, they can issue up to seven rulings for a single subject, rulings which are certainly all correct and correspond to reality. From observing these narrations, a question arises: Is this idea compatible with the theological and uṣūlī foundations found in the sources of Islamic sciences, and does the claim that real rulings (aḥkām wāqiʿiyyah) can be multiple avoid any fundamental problem? This article, drawn from the dars al-khārij lessons of Ustad Sayyid Mujtaba Hosseini Khamenei in uṣūl, seeks to examine this possibility and respond to the objections that may be raised regarding it. Ultimately, it demonstrates the plausibility of the claim and the absence of any preventing obstacle, thereby establishing the possibility of multiple real rulings.
Introduction
The ruling of the Lawgiver, considering what has been established in the Preserved Tablet for a given subject and the communication of that ruling to the addressees, involves two different stages in the process of legislation. The present study aims to examine the possibility of multiplicity at this level of the ruling. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the differences that may exist at the stage of expression and transmission of the ruling to the addressees, as well as the differences that may accompany them. It is also necessary to examine the possibility that different realities may be conceived for a single truth in the very essence of the matter.
When we observe that several rulings have been issued by the Lawgiver regarding a single subject, in order to reach the real ruling, we must turn to discussions such as reconciliation and preference between narrations, the issue of dissimulation by the Imam, and similar topics. Through these discussions, we attempt to determine which of the multiple rulings reported in the narrations represents the principal ruling that corresponds to the real ruling, according to the conjecture of the jurist. The question that arises, however, is whether the presentation of several different rulings as real rulings for a single subject is itself possible. How can it be possible that for a single subject we possess several different narrations, all of which we regard as valid, and based on them we infer the real ruling without accepting the notion of correctness for multiple positions? Is it possible that multiple realities exist with respect to a single truth?
Before answering these questions, we must note that sometimes the concept referred to as multiplicity of reality (taʿaddud al-wāqiʿ) is examined from the perspective of expanding the subject. In other words, just as we accept that the legal ruling for different individuals may change due to a change in circumstances or a difference in instances, for example, the ruling of prayer during travel or at home, or the specific covering required for women compared with men, and similar cases, different rulings may also be issued because of differences in the subject.
Now, if we are able to expand the subjects, such as by considering differences in people’s dispositions, and we also add the various states of the legally responsible person to the subject of the ruling, then different rulings may result. For example, the ruling of jihad may differ for courageous individuals compared with those who experience fear and hesitation. In such a case, different rulings will be issued. Since these differences in states and dispositions are not specified for the addressees and are not taken into account for them, this multiplicity in rulings may appear to indicate a kind of multiplicity in reality. However, the use of the term multiplicity of reality in this case would be figurative rather than real.
Sometimes, however, multiplicity in the real ruling is considered from the perspective of expansion within objective reality, which refers to the realities of the world and the very essence of the matter. In this case, the use of the concept of multiplicity of reality has a genuine meaning rather than a figurative one, because several realities may in fact exist. It is therefore natural that multiple real rulings may also be issued. Of course, having access to such a perspective would require that a person possess knowledge that goes beyond ordinary human knowledge and be aware of the essence of the matter and the rulings recorded in the Preserved Tablet. It appears that the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt possessed such knowledge.
Although understanding this perspective at the initial stage may appear difficult to some and may even seem far from the mind and not worthy of discussion, it remains a living possibility. As an illustration that brings the idea closer to mind, one may consider the difference between the rulings issued by Prophet David and Prophet Solomon, peace be upon them, regarding a single incident and subject. The case concerned a vineyard that had been destroyed by the sheep of a shepherd. In that incident, two different rulings were issued for one subject. At the same time, both rulings were real rulings, as related in the Qur’an (al-Anbiya 78–79).
Although the person who has given attention to this issue is Ustad Sayyid Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, who raised this possibility in his advanced lessons and thereby sparked the initial idea for this research, traces of this discussion can also be found in other studies. For example, it appears in research concerning the role of expediency in jurisprudence, the question of whether rulings follow real benefits and harms or not, the effect of knowledge and ignorance on real and apparent rulings, and the theory of expediency-based conduct.
However, the examination of the real ruling at the stage of communication and the possibility that the Preserved Tablet itself may contain multiple rulings has received less attention among Imami scholars. Even the narration that suggests the issuance of at least seven real rulings for a single subject has not been given adequate consideration. Among Imami scholars, the prevailing view, based on the principle that rulings follow real benefits and harms, has been to regard the real ruling as confined to a single ruling.
On the other hand, among scholars who accept the theory of correctness for multiple positions, this idea has gained some prominence. This theory provides a basis for the possibility that rulings may be multiple in the very essence of the matter. Nevertheless, the present article will address the question of whether the possibility of multiplicity of reality is equivalent to the theory of correctness in all respects or only in some respects. The study proceeds through a library-based method and by employing the foundational principles proposed by Ustad Sayyid Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei. It turns to the evidence for this claim, which includes narrational, theological, and uṣūlī analyses. These will be examined in order of their importance, and the requirements and obstacles related to each of the three will be discussed in order to determine whether this issue is compatible with Imami legal-theoretical principles or not.
1. Hadith Evidence for the Multiplicity of Real Rulings
In this section, we examine a narration transmitted by Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, which serves as the principal textual basis for the discussion and which implies the possibility of multiplicity in the real ruling.
1.1 The Narration and Its Chain of Transmission
Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān reports that he said to Imam al-Ṣādiq (a): your traditions are transmitted in different forms. The Imam replied: “The Qur’an was revealed upon seven aspects, and the least share that the Imam has from it is that he may issue legal judgments according to seven aspects.” He then recited: “This is Our gift, so grant or withhold without reckoning.”1.
Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṣadūq transmits the narration through a chain in which Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣayrafī appears, from Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān, who narrates it from Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (a). Among the transmitters in this chain, only Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā has been disputed. The evaluation of this narrator will be discussed later in a full study of the chain. According to this narration, every verse may have different aspects that remain hidden from the general public but are clear to the Imam (a), who can derive different legal judgments from it.
There are also other narrations reported in the chapter concerning “the seven letters” (sabʿat aḥruf), for example, in Ibn Shahrāshūb and other sources. These narrations have been transmitted in four forms, and unfortunately, scholars have generally attempted to interpret all four forms in a single meaning, usually by identifying them with the various modes of Qur’anic recitation. However, the study of the “seven letters” in the heritage of Imami narrations shows that such an interpretation is not necessary and, in fact, deprives us of part of the teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt.
With regard to the meaning of the narration, one might say that because of the intellectual capacity and the divinely granted abilities possessed by the Imam, he can derive at least seven legal rulings from a single verse. In that case, the narration would have nothing to do with the present discussion, and the intent would merely be that different juristic conclusions can be drawn from one verse through various interpretive methods. This interpretation would imply that the differences in the narrations transmitted from the Ahl al-Bayt simply reflect the existence of different realities.
In response to this interpretation, it can be said, first, that deriving seven rulings from a single verse or narration is not something unique to the Imams. Even ordinary scholars who have acquired the ability of legal inference can do the same. For example, it has been reported that Shahid Thani used the concept contained in verse 29 of Surah al-Baqarah to derive a number of legal rulings in various fields concerning the details of law. It has also been reported that ‘Allamah Tabataba’i believed that this verse alone contains one million two hundred and sixty thousand meanings.
This interpretation, therefore, does not elevate the Imams beyond the level of scholarly ability. Rather, it reduces them to the level of an ordinary jurist. Secondly, the meaning of seven rulings must be understood in light of the narrations transmitted from Imam al-Ṣādiq (a), particularly those concerning the differences found in the narrations of the Infallible Imams regarding a single legal ruling. The Imam explained that such differences arise from the Imams’ connection to divine grace and their knowledge of what is recorded in the Preserved Tablet. This meaning becomes especially clear at the end of the narration when the Imam cites the verse: هَـٰذَا عَطَآؤُنَا فَٱمْنُنْ أَوْ أَمْسِكْ بِغَيْرِ حِسَابٍۢ – “This is Our gift, so grant or withhold without reckoning” (Qur’an 38:39). This indicates that God has granted the Imams a special divine favour.
As further supporting evidence, one may refer to the authentic narration of ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān reported in al-Kāfī. He says: I asked Imam al-Ṣādiq (a) whether the Imam has been granted the same authority that was given to Prophet Solomon (a), son of David (a). The Imam replied: yes. For example, if someone asks the Imam a question, he may answer him in one way; another person may ask the same question and receive a different answer; and a third person may ask the same question and the Imam will give him yet another answer, different from the two previous ones.
Then the Imam cited verse 39 of Sūrat Ṣād as evidence: “This is Our gift, so grant or withhold without reckoning.” The Imam added that this verse is recited in the reading of Imam ʿAlī (a) in this form, although the well-known recitation reads “give or withhold.”
The narrator says: I asked, “May I be your ransom, when the Imam gives these different answers, does he recognize the people to whom he gives them?” The Imam replied: “Glory be to God! Do you not hear what God says: ‘Indeed in this are signs for those who perceive’ (15:75).” These signs are for those who are attentive and constantly firm upon the truth. They are the Imams, who never depart from it.
Then the Imam said to me: yes, the Imam certainly recognizes a person when he sees him, even if he hears his speech from behind a wall. He recognizes him and understands what kind of person he is. God says: “And among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your languages and colors. Indeed in that are signs for those who know” (30:22). Those who possess knowledge are the scholars, and the true scholars are the Imams.
Thus, no one speaks to them except that they recognize whether he is among the people of salvation or the people of destruction. For this reason they answer each person in accordance with his condition2.
As is clear, this narration, like the previous narration, fully supports the claim that multiple legal rulings may be issued for a single case.
1.2 Examination of the Narrators of the Hadith
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq transmits this narration through five intermediaries from Imam al-Ṣādiq, peace be upon him. Examination of the chain in the books of rijāl shows that:
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Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. al-Walīd is a reliable jurist and a prominent scholar.
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Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār is also a trustworthy and eminent figure.
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ʿAbbās b. Maʿrūf is regarded as reliable.
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Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān is likewise authenticated and is even counted among those upon whom consensus exists.
Although the name Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān is shared by both Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān al-Nāb and Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān b. ʿAmr b. Khālid al-Fazārī, both of them have been declared reliable in the rijāl works, and some scholars even consider them to be the same individual. The only narrator about whom some discussion arises is Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣayrafī. As for Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī introduces him in his works and transmits narrations through him. However, he does not explicitly provide an independent authentication for him. If we accept that Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā possesses the two epithets “al-Ṣayrafī” and “al-Khazzāz,” then an explicit authentication exists for him. Al-Najāshī records that Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz is trustworthy and reliable.
Several indicators support identifying the narrator in this chain with Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz. For example:
A. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī in Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām transmits two narrations concerning the obligations of ḥajj which share the same wording but have slightly different chains of transmission. In both chains Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā narrates from Ḥammād b. ʿUthmān and the narration ultimately reaches Imam al-Ṣādiq (a). In one of the chains the narrator appears with the epithet “al-Ṣayrafī,” while in the other the epithet is omitted.
From this it can be concluded that whenever the name Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā appears without an epithet, it most likely refers to Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣayrafī, especially in light of the view of al-Khūʾī that when Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā appears without qualification in this group of narrations it refers to Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz.
On this basis, Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣayrafī and Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz appear to be the same individual. If this identification is accepted, then the authentications recorded for al-Khazzāz in the rijāl sources apply to him as well. Al-Najāshī describes him as trustworthy and eminent in the field of hadith.
B. Since the purpose of the authors of the rijāl works is to mention all transmitters and the different layers of narrators, we observe that the name Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣayrafī appears only in the Fihrist of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, and no one named al-Khazzāz is mentioned there. On the other hand, the reverse situation appears in the work of al-Najāshī, where only the name Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz is mentioned. From this we may conclude that the two titles refer to the same person.
Furthermore, the fact that the epithets al-Khazzāz and al-Ṣayrafī were used in the same historical period supports the view that both may have been applied to a single individual. As some scholars have noted, there is no difficulty in accepting the union of these two titles. A single person may possess two epithets, one derived from the occupation of his father (Khazzāz) and another from his own occupation (Ṣayrafī).
In what follows we briefly cite the statements of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Najāshī, Ibn Dāwūd, and ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī regarding him.
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī says: “Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣayrafī. He has a book.”3
Al-Najāshī lists several narrators who transmitted from him or from whom he transmitted, including: “Abū ʿAlī al-Khazzāz al-Kūfī, who narrated from the companions of Abū ʿAbd Allāh, peace be upon him. He is trustworthy. Abū al-ʿAbbās mentioned that he had a book which was transmitted by a number of our companions. Among those who narrated from him was Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-ʿAṭṭār narrated from him.”4
He also writes: “Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz al-Kūfī narrated from the companions of Abū ʿAbd Allāh. He is trustworthy and reliable. He has a book of rare narrations. Among those who transmitted from him was Muḥammad b. Muḥammad.”5
Both Ibn Dāwūd and ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī also explicitly authenticate him and write: “Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Khazzāz: trustworthy, reliable, who narrated from the companions of Abū ʿAbd Allāh.”6
Taken together, the discussions of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Najāshī, Ibn Dāwūd, and ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī show that this narrator possessed two epithets, al-Khazzāz and al-Kūfī, while Shaykh al-Ṭūsī refers to him as al-Ṣayrafī. From the evidence presented, we may conclude that he was a trustworthy and reliable transmitter. Therefore, the narration under discussion is sound and capable of serving as evidence.
2. The Possibility of Multiplicity of Reality from the Perspective of Theology (ʿIlm al-Kalām)
Since the proof of this discussion ultimately returns to theological and doctrinal foundations, it is necessary to examine its preliminary assumptions within the framework of theological discourse. The existence of multiple realities that correspond directly to external realities is not something self-evident or impossible from the standpoint of existence and non-existence. Rather, it must be studied from the perspective of possibility.
This requires a philosophical and theological analysis that examines whether God could have willed such a reality. Is it possible that such multiplicity exists within the created world? This inquiry naturally leads to broader theological topics such as the knowledge and power of God, the divine will, the limitless majesty of the Divine, and the limitations of human understanding.
2–1. God’s Absolute and All-Encompassing Knowledge
God is the Absolute Knower and has complete awareness and comprehensive knowledge of all dimensions of existence. The Qur’an states: “Does He who created not know? And He is the Subtle, the Aware.” (Qur’an 67:14). It also says: “There is nothing whose treasuries are not with Us, and We do not send it down except in a determined measure.” (Qur’an 15:21). These and many other verses in the Qur’an testify to God’s knowledge and awareness of everything that exists, has existed, and will exist. All beings receive their measure from the source of divine grace and the fountain of divine bounty.
A report related to this topic appears in a letter written by Ayyub b. Nūḥ to Imam al-Hādī (a) in which he asks: Did God know things before He created them, or did He first create them and then come to know them? The Imam replied: “God, the Exalted, was knowing of things before creating them, just as He knows them after creating them.”7.
This narration clearly indicates that God’s knowledge encompasses all beings equally, before their creation and after their creation. The Imam’s answer demonstrates the absoluteness of the divine attribute of knowledge. Numerous verses in the Qur’an refer to this divine attribute. Among them is the frequently repeated phrase in Sūrat al-Nisāʾ: “Indeed God is All-Knowing and Wise.”8.
2–2. God’s Lordship and Guidance
God is the Lord of the worlds. He guides all beings toward perfection and leads human beings along the path of nurture and development. Every particle of existence moves toward its perfection and follows the path of the divine command. God says to the heavens and the earth: “Come willingly or unwillingly.” They replied: “We come willingly.” (Qur’an 41:11). Human beings are also not separated from this order of creation. They likewise strive to attain their intended perfection and to harmonize themselves with other creatures. The Qur’an states: “He is the Living; there is no god except Him. So call upon Him, devoting the religion sincerely to Him. Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds.” (Qur’an 40:65).
Regarding the teaching of human beings, the Qur’an says: “He taught the human being what he did not know.” (Qur’an 96:5). It also states: “And God has taught you what you did not know.” (Qur’an 4:113). Similarly, it is stated: “The Most Merciful taught the Qur’an. He created the human being and taught him expression.” (Qur’an 55:1–4). Thus, the knowledge of human beings ultimately comes from God. Just as material provisions come from Him, intellectual and spiritual provisions also originate from Him. Therefore, God is the educator and nurturer of human beings in all dimensions of existence.
The Qur’an also refers to the stages of human creation and divine guidance: “He is the One who created you from dust, then from a drop of fluid, then from a clot. Then He brings you forth as a child so that you may reach your maturity and become old. Some of you die earlier, and some reach a specified term so that you may understand.” (Qur’an 40:67).
These verses and many others express the manifestations of divine lordship. This is summarized comprehensively in Sūrat al-Ḥamd: “Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds.” (Qur’an 1:2).
2–3. Differences Among Creatures and Human Beings
God created individuals differently and assigned particular needs and limitations to each person. The ranks and levels of individuals, therefore, differ from one another. The fundamental human disposition toward seeking God and worshipping Him exists in all human beings, but this does not mean that people’s inclinations and capacities for growth and perfection are identical. Each of these capacities depends on numerous factors, and when those factors change, their results also change.
For example, God has granted some individuals superiority over others and has assigned distinct capacities and limitations to each person. The Qur’an clearly points to these differences: “Look how We have favored some of them over others; yet the degrees of the Hereafter are greater and more superior.” (Qur’an 17:21). Elsewhere it states: “He is the One who made you successors upon the earth and raised some of you above others in rank so that He may test you in what He has given you.” (Qur’an 6:165). A similar understanding appears in the interpretation of this verse in Majmaʿ al-Bayān. Likewise, in Tafsīr Nūr al-Thaqalayn, a narration from Imam ʿAlī (a) indicates the same meaning. The Qur’an also points to differences in personal dispositions: “Say: each person acts according to his own disposition.” (Qur’an 17:84).
In his commentary on this verse, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i notes that people differ in their dispositions and tendencies. For example, the behaviour of a courageous person differs from that of a fearful person, and the behaviour of a generous person differs from that of a miserly person.
3–2. The Importance of a Hierarchy of Interests in the Discussion of the Multiplicity of Reality
Among the issues discussed in the science of legal theory is the question of the authority of legal indicators (ḥujjiyyat al-amārāt): are such indicators authoritative because they reveal reality, or because they function as a cause? In other words, does a legal indicator produce a real ruling, or does it merely provide a path toward reaching reality, which may or may not ultimately succeed? In this regard, Shaykh al-Anṣārī in Farāʾid al-Uṣūl rejects the causal interpretation. Accepting it would imply the doctrine of taṣwīb, meaning that the jurist’s ruling always coincides with the real ruling. This view is considered invalid because there remains a distinction between the apparent ruling and the real ruling.
Therefore, the multiplicity of real rulings does not necessarily imply that the jurist reaches all of them. Rather, it indicates that the Imams may have expressed different rulings originating from different real considerations. Consequently, the jurist is not required to claim that each juristic opinion is correct. Instead, the focus lies on recognizing that the divine ruling itself may have multiple aspects.
Shaykh al-Anṣārī also maintains that acting upon legal indicators may involve a particular type of benefit. Acting upon an indicator does not necessarily guarantee that one has reached the real ruling; rather, it produces a form of benefit referred to as practical or behavioural benefit (maṣlaḥat sulūkīyah). When a person acts according to a valid legal indicator, the act may either correspond to the real ruling or not correspond to it. If it corresponds to reality, the real ruling has been fulfilled; if it does not correspond to reality, the benefit of obedience and compliance compensates for the missed real benefit.
One might also describe this type of benefit as “composite benefit” (maṣlaḥat-e rukniyya), which appears in the course of the discussions of this article. From this perspective, the command that reaches us is considered primarily as a means of cultivating submission and obedience toward the Master, rather than merely producing a particular external effect. Thus, the focus lies on the spirit of obedience on the part of the morally responsible individual. In this sense, the discussion becomes closely connected with the notion of taʿabbud (devotional submission) and faith. The question of the multiplicity of real rulings can therefore be examined in light of such a composite benefit.
Indeed, Shaykh al-Anṣārī himself appears to have paid attention to this dimension within his discussions in legal theory. Although we refer to it as behavioral benefit or facilitating benefit, the subject under discussion possesses its own nuances. For instance, in the case of facilitating benefit there is no multiplicity in reality, whereas in the case of composite benefit it is conceivable that multiple real rulings might exist—depending on the circumstances and conditions of the responsible individual—because the interest involved concerns the individual’s degree of submission and obedience. Thus, at the very least, it can be said that the idea of composite benefit can be discerned within Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s notion of behavioral benefit.
Composite benefit is essentially the criterion for measuring the degree of submission and obedience of the responsible individual before the divine command. When different rulings are expressed concerning a single subject, the presence of such multiplicity reveals itself more clearly. The stronger a person’s servitude becomes, the more fully the ranks and stages of servanthood manifest themselves. It becomes evident that when a person observes that the Master has issued two or more rulings regarding a single matter, this situation places the attribute of servitude under a greater test. When the individual accepts these rulings with a spirit of submission, his devotion to the Master becomes more apparent.
In this way, the promulgation of legal rulings serves not only the purpose of guiding actions but also the purpose of revealing the degree of human servitude and cultivating other related spiritual benefits. This point is explicitly emphasized in various narrations and discussions in the science of legal theory, particularly in discussions concerning the ranks of legal rulings, where the subject of rulings is examined from the perspective of benefit and harm. However, such cases are limited. In many instances, rulings appear without explicitly mentioning the particular benefit or harm behind them; in such cases, the wisdom behind the ruling itself functions as the underlying reason.
Narrations often emphasize that, in general, benefit lies in obedience to commands and harm lies in disobedience. When this point is combined with the principle that every effect ultimately proceeds from God—who is both Creator and Lawgiver, and who therefore places the appropriate benefits within actions—it becomes clear that all benefits ultimately fall under the umbrella of obedience and submission before the Master. This is precisely what we have described as composite benefit. The Qur’an explicitly refers to this wisdom in the context of servitude: “And I did not create jinn and mankind except that they may worship Me.” (Qur’an 51:56)
The well-known narration of ʿAbdullāh b. Abī Yaʿfūr further illustrates this meaning. He narrates: One day I came before Imam al-Ṣādiq (a) and presented a matter to him. The Imam said: “This is lawful.” Then he later said: “This is forbidden.” I said: “By God, if you were to divide this pomegranate into two halves and say that one half is lawful and the other half forbidden, I would accept it wholeheartedly.” The Imam replied: “May God have mercy upon you.” ʿAbdullāh b. Abī Yaʿfūr was among the distinguished companions of Imam al-Ṣādiq and Imam al-Kāẓim (a), and he holds a high rank among the transmitters of hadith. Imam al-Ṣādiq is also reported to have said: “We have not found anyone more obedient to us than ʿAbdullāh b. Abī Yaʿfūr. No one has accepted my instruction and obeyed my commands the way Ibn Abī Yaʿfūr did.”
From this, we observe that in the teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt, the true measure of human dignity and perfection lies in submission and obedience to divine authority. The ultimate objective of the obligations placed upon the morally responsible individual in sacred law is precisely the cultivation of this quality. This is the same principle that Shaykh al-Anṣārī referred to in his discussion of behavioral benefit: namely, that when a person encounters multiple rulings concerning a single subject, the individual is placed under a greater spiritual test, and the depth of his submission becomes more clearly revealed.
3–3. The Possibility of the Multiplicity of Reality from the Perspective of the Issue of Tajarrī (Audacious Disobedience)
Another issue that can help clarify the importance of the hierarchical structure of interests is the discussion of tajarrī. In linguistic usage, tajarrī means daring or audacity toward the master, that is, committing an act of opposition to the master. In technical terminology, however, tajarrī refers to a situation in which a person believes he is disobeying the command of the master, even though no real disobedience has actually occurred. For example, someone may drink a liquid thinking that it is wine, but afterward it becomes clear that the liquid was actually water and not wine. In reality, tajarrī refers to opposition to the master in intention, not necessarily opposition in the actual external act.
Another example: a person may be certain that a particular act is obligatory or that another act is forbidden, yet he abandons the supposed obligation or commits what he thinks is a forbidden act. Later, it becomes clear that his certainty was mistaken and that no real violation occurred. Such a person is called a mutajarrī, and his action is referred to as tajarrī. The question then arises: Is tajarrī itself forbidden, and does it deserve punishment, or not? There is disagreement among scholars on this matter. For example, Ākhund Khurāsānī holds that tajarrī is indeed forbidden and deserving of punishment. In other words, tajarrī possesses both an active ugliness (qubḥ fiʿlī) and an agent-based ugliness (qubḥ fāʿilī).
Some other scholars, such as Shaykh al-Anṣārī, do not consider tajarrī itself to be forbidden and do not regard it as deserving punishment. According to their view, tajarrī possesses only agent-based ugliness, not intrinsic wrongdoing. According to this view, no external corruption actually occurs in tajarrī. Nevertheless, a form of moral deficiency appears in the person committing the act. This deficiency reveals a weakness in the person’s moral disposition, because justice is defined as a spiritual quality that restrains a person from committing sins. The presence of tajrī indicates the absence of such a moral quality. Thus, even if we do not definitively say that tajarrī is forbidden or punishable, we can still conclude that it reveals a flaw in the character of the one who commits it.
Implication for the Discussion: The fact that the Lawgiver does not always intend to prevent a specific corruption in the world, but rather intends to prevent attitudes of rebellion and lack of submission toward the divine authority, becomes evident through this discussion. With this clarification, it becomes apparent that one of the topics that can be examined within the science of legal theory regarding the possibility of multiple real rulings is precisely this issue. When the discussion of benefits and harms in legal rulings shifts from a focus on specific external outcomes to broader considerations such as obedience and submission, it becomes natural that multiple rulings may exist concerning a single subject. Such multiplicity may, in fact, better achieve the intended higher objective.
3–4. The Possibility of the Multiplicity of Reality from the Perspective of the Theory of the Right to Obedience (Ḥaqq al-Ṭāʿa)
The theory of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa (the right to obedience) is a foundational principle in legal theory associated with Shahid Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr. He presents this theory in his work Durūs fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl (al-Ḥalaqāt). According to this theory, in cases of uncertain obligations, the intellect judges that one must exercise caution. In other words, when there is a possibility that something may be obligatory or forbidden, the intellect requires precaution rather than freedom from obligation. This raises the question: If no definitive proof has been established regarding an obligation or prohibition, is a person free to act as he wishes? Or does he remain responsible because of the possibility that a divine command may exist?
Shahid al-Ṣadr argues that the foundation of this discussion lies in the concept of the right of the master to obedience. Does the right of obedience apply only to commands that are known with certainty? Or does it also include commands that are merely probable? According to Shahid al-Ṣadr, the scope of this right is very broad, because the foundation of divine authority lies in God’s absolute sovereignty, ownership, and lordship over creation. Therefore, the right of obedience extends even to probable obligations, meaning that a person must take such possibilities seriously. The proof for this claim, according to him, lies in the testimony of conscience.
Relation to the Discussion of Hierarchical Interests: In examining this discussion more closely, we find that the underlying principle behind the legislation of rulings is precisely the composite interest mentioned earlier. Divine commands were not issued solely because of specific benefits or harms within actions themselves, but also because of the broader objective of establishing obedience to the divine authority. Although Shahid al-Ṣadr regarded legal rulings as primarily dependent on benefits and harms within the actions themselves, the theory of composite interests clarifies the broader structure within which these rulings operate.
Therefore, the theory of ḥaqq al-ṭāʿa becomes an important conceptual foundation for understanding the possibility of multiple real rulings. When the right to obedience is taken seriously, the domain of obligations expands to include even probable commands.
Conclusion
From the explanations and analysis presented above, it becomes clear that the multiplicity of real rulings is not only possible but also fully compatible with both theological principles and the foundational concepts of legal theory. Human nature itself tends toward this understanding. The spirit governing divine law demonstrates that obedience to the true Master is the ultimate objective of legislation. The purpose of creation is the attainment of closeness to God through servitude.
For this reason, many divine commands appear in the form of tests, through which the sincerity and submission of human beings are examined. When the concept of composite interest is taken into account, there is no contradiction in the existence of multiple real rulings concerning a single subject. Rather, this multiplicity may even be preferable, since it better fulfills the higher objective of obedience and submission to God.
And the final word of their supplication is: “All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds.” (Qur’an 10:10)
Sayyid Ali studied in the seminary of Qom from 2012 to 2021, while also concurrently obtaining a M.A in Islamic Studies from the Islamic College of London in 2018. In the seminary he engaged in the study of legal theory, jurisprudence and philosophy, eventually attending the advanced kharij of Usul and Fiqh in 2018. He completed his Masters of Education at the University of Toronto in 2025 and is the head of a private faith-based school in Toronto, as well as an instructor at the Mufid Seminary.
