There is a fascinating fiqhi treatise written by Wahid Behbahani (1706–1791) addressing a jurisprudential matter that had gained currency in the community during his time.1 The issue must have become sufficiently widespread among local communities that he felt compelled to compose a lengthy treatise in response – around 60 pages long. The opinion appears to have been propagated by certain Akhbari scholars and laymen who had encountered a tradition attributed to Imam Sadiq (a), which appears in our sources as follows:
لا يحلّ لأحد أن يجمع بين ثنتين من ولد فاطمة عليها السلام إنّ ذلك يبلغها فيشقّ عليها
“It is not permissible for anyone to marry two [women] from the progeny of Fatima, peace be upon her, for indeed that reaches her and grieves her.”
On the basis of this tradition, the view spread that it is either forbidden or strongly discouraged to enter into a polygamous marriage with two wives who are both descendants of Lady Fatima and Imam Ali [i.e. from the Sadaat]. Ayatullah Makarem Shirazi, in his Kitab al-Nikah2 discussion writes:
The ruling of prohibition arose among certain later Akhbari scholars; otherwise, neither the early nor the later scholars among our companions mentioned it among the prohibitions arising from affinity (muṣāharah). It suffices to cite the statement of the author of al-Ḥadā’iq — himself an Akhbari — who wrote: ‘This matter was not discussed except in these most recent times; the discourse of both our predecessors and later scholars is devoid of any mention or treatment of it… Opinion on it has since diverged, and there has been considerable dispute and contention among the scholars of our era and those shortly before them.’ He then relates the various positions taken — prohibition, permissibility, and suspension of judgment.
It likewise suffices to cite the statement of the author of al-Jawāhir: ‘I have not found anyone among the early or later scholars who mentioned this among the disliked acts, let alone the forbidden ones.’ He goes on to note that “the traditionist al-Baḥrānī asserted its prohibition categorically, composing a treatise on the matter laden with rhymed prose and polemic, in which he claims to have presented it to certain contemporaries who shared his flawed methodology and who concurred with him.” Al-Jawāhir’s author closes by observing that “some people classed it among reprehensible innovations (bidaʿ)” — a characterization he himself appears to endorse.
Behbahani’s treatise is of particular interest because, although his argument draws on jurisprudential principles to establish the permissibility of such marriages, much of it is also devoted to demonstrating the absurdity of a prohibition of this severity going unmentioned in the works of the jurists and unattested in any widespread or reliable transmission. He notes, moreover, that this view is absent even from the positions of the generation of Akhbaris preceding his own.
What makes this case particularly striking is the parallel it offers to a broader pattern: an isolated, weak tradition, unremarked upon for centuries, taken up by a handful of lenient Akhbari scholars and transformed into a new cultural taboo. This is, unfortunately, a dynamic that continues to recur in our communities today. Below, I have translated passages from Behbahani’s rebuttal of this position3.
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.
In Him is my trust.
Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, and God’s blessings upon Muhammad and his pure Household.
Lord, grant us success in what You love and are pleased with, and support and guide us through Muhammad and his Household.
Know, my brother, that combining two women who are both descendants of Fatimah [in marriage] is valid without any doubt — a matter of consensus (ijma’) among the Muslims, even according to al-Saduq and al-Shaykh [al-Tusi], as you shall come to know.
What proves its validity — indeed, its permissibility — is as follows:
The unanimous agreement of the jurists in their legal opinions, to the point that they did not even count it among the disliked acts, nor among what is contrary to proper etiquette, as their opinions declare; and the practice of all Muslims across every age and land, to the point that they did not avoid it even on the level of dislike, nor on the level of forgoing what is preferable.
Such a consensus is tantamount to something self-evidently established, because the status of this practice was, without any difference, like that of every other thing permitted as a matter of course among the jurists and the Muslims, as is plain to anyone who reflects on their statements and their conduct.
This continued until, in these later times, a doubt arose in the mind of a certain deluded person on the basis of his having come across a certain report — the true nature of which will become clear — while he remained heedless of the reality of the matter. Had this doubt not arisen, his position would undoubtedly have been the same as everyone else’s.
And even granting that the matter were open to independent reasoning, there is no ambiguity regarding the authority [of consensus in such a case], as is agreed upon among the Shi’a and established in its proper place.
This is further evidenced by:
The principle of bara’ah and permissibility (ibahah). All that establishes these two principles — the transmitted consensuses, the Qur’anic verses, the mass-transmitted reports (akhbar mutawatirah), reason, and the presumption of continuity of a prior state — as we explained in our treatise on “The Principle of Bara’ah,” conclusively establishes both [validity and permissibility]. Indeed, we explained there, in the fullest possible manner, that the transmitted consensuses are, with certainty and conviction, genuine. So take note.
This is further evidenced by:
The principle of presumption of continuity (istishab), since at the very beginning of the Law this practice was self-evidently not forbidden, and so it remains thereafter, on account of what has been transmitted from them [the Imams]: “Do not annul certainty except with certainty,” and their saying: “Do not annul certainty except with a certainty like it,” and their saying: “Never annul certainty with doubt” — and other similar statements which we have written in the treatise [on this principle].
This is further evidenced by:
The verses [of the Qur’an], such as His saying, Exalted is He, (وَأُحِلَّ لَكُمْ مَا وَرَاءَ ذَلِكُمْ).
And His saying, Exalted is He, (فَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُونُوا دَخَلْتُمْ بِهِنَّ فَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْكُمْ).
And His saying, Exalted is He, (وَأَنْكِحُوا الْأَيَامَىٰ مِنْكُمْ).
And His saying, Exalted is He, (فَانكِحُوا مَا طَابَ لَكُم مِّنَ النِّسَاءِ مَثْنَىٰ وَثُلَاثَ وَرُبَاعَ) — for every single one of the ’Alawi women [descendants of ’Ali] is among those who are good [i.e., lawful to marry], so there is no obstacle to marrying two, three, or four of them.
And His saying, Exalted is He, (وَأَن تَجْمَعُوا بَيْنَ الْأُخْتَيْنِ) — for if combining two Fatimid women in marriage were likewise forbidden, that prohibition would not have been restricted to [combining] two sisters.
And other verses besides these.
This is further evidenced by:
The mass-transmitted reports — indeed, reports exceeding even the threshold of tawatur — from the Imams, peace be upon them. For in countless contexts they addressed what is forbidden in marriage, what is disliked, and what is unbecoming, yet they made no mention whatsoever of this matter. As for the anomalous (shadhdh) report that has been transmitted [on this issue], we have been instructed to set it aside from practice for many reasons, which you shall come to know.
Moreover, matters that are self-evident tenets of the religion, or matters agreed upon among the Muslims, or matters well known among them, were addressed by them [the Imams] in similar fashion — so how could they have failed to address a matter of the utmost obscurity, referring it instead to something we have been categorically commanded not to act upon?
Furthermore, the unrestricted statements concerning women that occur in the context of pregnancy and [marital] validity exceed the mass-transmitted reports beyond count, and an unrestricted statement is to be taken as general in scope, as is established and agreed upon by all, and this is the basis relied upon in jurisprudence.
The transmission of these reports is more than the registers could contain; among them is the Prophet’s statement, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household: “Our daughters are for our sons,” referring to the children of ’Ali and Ja’far, peace be upon them; and their saying: “The believers are, some of them, equals to others”; and their saying: “The Arabs marry among Quraysh, and Quraysh marry among Banu Hashim” — and other statements besides.
Al-Saduq said in his book al-Khisal: “The forbidden unions in the Book and the Sunnah number thirty-four kinds. Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn Hamzah related to us” — until he said — “he said: Musa ibn Ja’far related to me, from his father Ja’far ibn Muhammad, peace be upon them, that he said: ‘My father was asked about what God, Mighty and Majestic, forbade of marital unions in the Qur’an, and what the Messenger of God, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household, forbade in his Sunnah, and he said: What God forbade of that is thirty-four kinds — seventeen in the Qur’an and seventeen in the Sunnah. As for those in the Qur’an: fornication, for God the Exalted said, (وَلَا تَقْرَبُوا الزِّنَىٰ); and marrying one’s father’s wife, for God, Mighty and Majestic, said, (وَلَا تَنكِحُوا مَا نَكَحَ آبَاؤُكُم مِّنَ النِّسَاءِ), (أُمَّهَاتُكُمْ وَبَنَاتُكُمْ وَأَخَوَاتُكُمْ وَعَمَّاتُكُمْ وَخَالَاتُكُمْ وَبَنَاتُ الْأَخِ وَبَنَاتُ الْأُخْتِ وَأُمَّهَاتُكُمُ اللَّاتِي أَرْضَعْنَكُمْ وَأَخَوَاتُكُم مِّنَ الرَّضَاعَةِ) up to His saying, Exalted is He, (وَأَن تَجْمَعُوا بَيْنَ الْأُخْتَيْنِ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ سَلَفَ); and the menstruating woman, until she is purified, on account of His saying, Exalted is He, (وَلَا تَقْرَبُوهُنَّ) — the verse; and marital relations during i’tikaf, on account of His saying, Exalted is He, (وَلَا تُبَاشِرُوهُنَّ وَأَنتُمْ عَاكِفُونَ فِي الْمَسَاجِدِ). As for those in the Sunnah: sexual relations during the day in Ramadan, marrying a woman one has subjected to li’an after the li’an, marrying during the waiting period, sexual relations during ihram, a man in ihram marrying or arranging a marriage, and one who has pronounced zihar before making expiation.’” — to the end of the tradition.
He mentioned many things in it, but did not mention the combining of two Fatimid women at all.
Consider, O discerning reader, what this tradition indicates — a tradition that agrees with the many verses, the mass-transmitted reports, and the established principles drawn from reports, verses, and consensus, among other things.
Among these [proofs] is also this: the Messenger, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household, was commanded to warn the members of his own clan and kinsfolk in particular, as God the Exalted said, (وَأَنذِرْ عَشِيرَتَكَ الْأَقْرَبِينَ), and he undoubtedly did so.
Likewise, God, Mighty and Majestic, said, (قُوا أَنفُسَكُمْ وَأَهْلِيكُمْ نَارًا) — the verse.
And there has come in the reports something even stronger and more emphatic than this: that a man is held to account and punished for what issues from his household if he fails to convey [the truth to them] and fails to exert himself in doing so. So take note.
Given all of this, why did the Messenger, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household, not warn his clan and his children about this matter, nor warn his daughters against being joined together under a single marriage contract, under the authority of one husband? And likewise ’Ali, who — being the Messenger’s deputy and standing in his place — was obligated to convey whatever the Messenger was obligated to convey?
The same holds for each and every one of the Imams, peace be upon them, and indeed for Fatimah, peace be upon her, as well — given what you already know of the obligation to protect one’s household from the Fire, from unlawfulness, from fornication, and from any taint in [their] birth.
All this, in addition to what has been transmitted and established regarding the obligation upon them to convey the rulings of the Law to their own families. They were singled out and created specifically for this purpose, and sent for this task, whether by original obligation or by delegated authority, while it is certain that not one of them was ever remiss in the slightest.
Why, then, did neither the Messenger, nor ’Ali, nor Fatimah, nor al-Hasan, nor al-Husayn, nor any of the others, God’s blessings be upon them, convey this? Why did they not forbid their daughters from consenting to the contract in question? Why did none of them ever raise this matter with respect to their own children, and their children’s children, down to the Day of Resurrection — just as other rulings specific to one’s clan, children, and relatives did in fact issue from them?
And yet, no prohibition of what has been described, nor any bequest regarding it, was ever issued by the Messenger, nor by ’Ali, peace be upon them, nor by anyone else forbidding their daughters from this — even though the matter of the private parts is treated with the utmost severity, indeed as the gravest of matters, and the purity of one’s birth is among the most important and most deserving of concerns. How, then, could they all have agreed upon such an immense dereliction — failing to warn their clan, and failing to protect them from the Fire whose fuel is people and stones? — apart from what has been related, that al-Sadiq (a) said to a stranger, a man wholly unconnected to his clan and household: “Such-and-such is not permissible” — while this was never made apparent to the daughters of Fatimah (s), who are themselves his clan, his household, and his daughters — or the daughters of his clan, who are likewise his daughters and his household.
Moreover, if the obstacle to permissibility and the source of prohibition lies specifically on the side of the daughters — namely, that it grieves Fatimah (s) for her daughters to be brought together under one man — then why did none of her fathers, nor any of her infallible sons, ever forbid their own daughters from this?
Had any one of them forbidden their daughters from this, the daughters would certainly not have consented to it; and had any of them bequeathed such an instruction, the daughters would not have contravened it, and the matter would have become well known among the daughters of Fatimah and among them and the rest of the Household — and this indecency would have been eliminated from the pure progeny, becoming, like their other well-known noble distinguishing traits, a matter of common knowledge.
And how does this alleged indecency compare with their other distinguishing characteristics — for they said: “We have made the khums lawful for our Shi’a, for the purity of their birth”? How, then, could they have desired purity of birth for their Shi’a while not desiring it for their own pure progeny — given what you already know of the obligation to warn one’s nearest kin and the necessity of protecting them from the Fire, and other matters that need no further mention?
And how does the divine prohibition of unlawful unions compare to the mere withholding of the khums? And how does the effect of prohibition upon the purity of birth compare to the effect of withholding the khums?
It is self-evidently known that the daughters of Fatimah down to the time of al-Sadiq (a) were among the members of his household, let alone merely being related to his household — and yet they were in the utmost state of obedience to him, just as they were in the utmost state of obedience to their grandfather the Messenger (p), to their father ’Ali (a) and to their mother Fatimah (s) — and likewise to al-Hasan, al-Husayn, ’Ali ibn al-Husayn, and Muhammad ibn ’Ali, peace be upon them.
If, then, they had warned their clan and protected them from the Fire, and had conveyed to these women the ruling that God had decreed for them — namely, not to cause Fatimah distress, and not to bring unlawfulness, fornication, and indecency into her lineage and progeny, and to secure the purity of her birth — the women would certainly have obeyed them in the utmost degree, given how obedient they were to them.
Indeed, had this ruling been conveyed to them as being a ruling of God, they would certainly have obeyed it as such — even if the conveying had merely taken the form of a bequest addressed to them, let alone if it had taken the form of a direct command.
The same applies to the male descendants of Fatimah; had they been warned against marrying their daughters to a man who already had, as another wife, a daughter of Fatimah’s line, and against combining such marriages themselves, even if only in the form of a bequest to their descendants and progeny.
Had any such instruction issued from the Messenger (p), or from any of his successors, or from Fatimah, God’s blessings be upon them, it would certainly have become well known among the pure progeny, and then well known among the wider community — just as the distinguishing traits of the Family of the Messenger and the particulars of their lineage and circumstances became well known, recorded in the books devoted to their genealogies and their affairs — indeed, it would have become as well known as the sun itself.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the daughters of Fatimah (s) had no awareness of this matter down to the time of our teacher al-Hurr [al-’Amili] — indeed, even after him, down to the present — and that the standard practice across every age and land was that there was no difference between the pure progeny and others regarding the permissibility of such a union. Indeed, it is related in the books of genealogy that ’Ali ibn Ja’far al-Jalil, who was in the utmost state of obedience to al-Sadiq (a) and to the Imams after him, had two ’Alawi women as wives simultaneously, as has been related. So take note and investigate.
With all of this, the report in al-Khisal that we have mentioned, and other reports in agreement with it, together with the Qur’anic verses, conform to the consensus of the Muslims, let alone the jurists, even al-Saduq, whose own statements declare his agreement with the rest of the jurists and the Muslims.
Indeed, his statement in al-Faqih likewise declares this, where he said: “A chapter on what God, Mighty and Majestic, has made lawful [of marriage] and what He has forbidden of it,” after which he proceeded to relate the reports establishing this — reports of the utmost abundance — without any mention whatsoever of the prohibition of the combination in question, nor even of its being disliked, nor of its being contrary to the etiquette of marriage, even though he addressed everything else. This despite the fact that he, God have mercy on him, composed al-Faqih for the one who has no jurist [available] to consult, and yet, for all that, said what he said in its introduction — indeed, he made clear that his intent in it was not the intent of other compilers who simply record everything they have transmitted, whether or not they themselves acted upon it or issued legal opinions in accordance with it.
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Nor did he mention in his ’Ilal anything indicating his belief or ruling regarding the prohibition of the combination in question, nor its being disliked, nor its being contrary to etiquette, as is his practice in his other books; nor did he mention in the book of Marriage [therein] anything indicating any of this — nor even in the chapter on miscellaneous reasons pertaining to marriage at all.
Indeed, he did mention, at the end of the book, in the chapter on miscellaneous reasons (’ilal), an unsound report among the reports of that chapter — yet even this report is not clearly indicative of the prohibition of the combination in question, as you will come to see. Had he held the doctrine [the deluded person] understood from it, he would have devoted a separate chapter to it, saying: “A chapter on the reason for the prohibition of combining two ’Alawi women,” or “the reason for its being forbidden,” or “the reason for its being disliked,” and the like — and then mentioned the report in question as evidence for it, as is his practice in al-’Ilal and elsewhere in his books.
Moreover, he made no reference whatsoever to this report in his book of Marriage — neither when listing the forbidden unions in marriage, nor the disliked ones, nor any of its other rulings at all — nor did he refer to it even in the chapter on miscellaneous reasons pertaining to marriage.
This itself declares that, in his view, this report has no bearing whatsoever on the rulings and etiquette of marriage — as will also be related from my maternal uncle, al-’Allamah [al-Majlisi].
Indeed, al-Shaykh [al-Tusi] related this report in the chapter on supplementary matters of marriage through an even weaker chain, while stating elsewhere in clear terms the validity of this marriage, as you shall see — even though he explicitly states that in al-Tahdhib he records both accepted and rejected reports; and even though he states explicitly, in his book al-’Uddah, that a solitary report (khabar al-wahid) is not authoritative unless transmitted by trustworthy and upright narrators, and he recorded in the books on the science of narrators everyone he considered trustworthy.
This report is therefore, by his own standard, certainly transmitted by someone other than a trustworthy narrator.
Indeed, it appears from his ’Uddah and elsewhere that a report from an untrustworthy narrator, if corroborated by something that establishes its truthfulness, is also authoritative — such as being corroborated by the practice of the [early] companions [of the Imams].
In sum, it appears fully — indeed explicitly — from his statements in al-’Uddah and elsewhere that a report such as the one in question is categorically without authority, as is not hidden from the informed reader.
From this it likewise appears from his statement in al-Tahdhib that this combination is neither forbidden nor even disliked. Consider: in all his books of legal opinion he stated explicitly that the prohibitions of marriage are confined to the matters he enumerated, and he did not include this combination among them at all — nor did he mention it among the disliked matters, nor among matters of etiquette — in agreement with al-Saduq and the rest of the Shi’i jurists, both earlier and later, and indeed all Muslims. Moreover, his book al-Nihayah conforms to the traditions he cited in al-Tahdhib and acted upon, as is agreed upon among careful scholars — indeed, plainly evident and observable. So take note, investigate, and verify, until you attain certainty of this.
And with all this, the status of his Nihayah is like that of his other books of legal opinion, as we have described.
Moreover, it is the custom of our jurists to be lenient in matters of recommended and disliked acts, as is known to anyone with understanding and awareness — to the point that they frequently act, in such contexts, upon a weak report transmitted by the Sunnis in their own books, even one transmitted by some of them despite its extreme weakness, as is well known.
Indeed, they sometimes rely merely on the legal opinion of a single jurist without there being any report at all — as happened with their ruling that prayer facing an open door is disliked — and other similar cases too numerous to count, as is likewise well known to the informed.
Indeed, they sometimes rely, in such contexts, on something even weaker than a jurist’s legal opinion.
Given all of the above, it is evidently agreed upon among all of them that they did not regard the report in question as significant even in the context of the disliked matters of marriage, nor among matters contrary to what is recommended, nor contrary to etiquette — for they address everything in their books, and not one of them indicated that this combination is disliked, or contrary to what is recommended, or contrary to etiquette — despite the fact that, in matters of marriage and sexual relations, they exercise the utmost caution and rigor.
Moreover, all of them were aware of this report — al-Shaykh and al-Saduq included — to the point that one of them stated explicitly, in some of his certifications (ijazat), that he had taught al-Tahdhib from beginning to end more than fifty or forty times over. If his teaching of it reached such a degree, what then of his awareness, reading, and consideration of it in the context of the many other works, legal opinions, and so forth that issued from them?
And yet, with all this, they all remained in agreement on what we have described, down to the time of the deluded one, and even after him, up to the writing of this treatise.
For this reason my maternal uncle, al-’Allamah al-Majlisi, said, when mentioning the report in al-Tahdhib: “I have not found anyone who holds this doctrine at all” — even though he was the unique scholar of his age in his knowledge of the positions of the jurists, indeed unmatched across the ages, as is not hidden from the informed.
Indeed, Isfahan was filled with scholars and jurists, most of them — indeed all of them — exercising the utmost caution in matters of sexual relations, to the point that they would repeat the marriage formula many times over, and beyond that they exercised caution in this and other, weaker matters as well — and yet not one of them was observed to exercise caution regarding the combination in question, nor even to regard it as disliked, nor as contrary to what is recommended or to etiquette.
In sum, not a trace nor a sign of any of this was observed from any one of them, nor any presumption of it, nor any supposition, nor any conception of it whatsoever — and such was likewise the state of every other city that was a gathering place of scholars and jurists, even the sacred shrine city of Mashhad, down to the time of our deluded teacher, may God have mercy on him, and even afterward.
In sum, the true, saved sect [of Islam] was not united in error down to the time of the deluded one, nor afterward either — for the falsity of such a notion is evident from the mass-transmitted reports, in addition to the other proofs of consensus, in addition to its widespread nature, and the established fact of the intermingling of lineages among the children of the Imams, peace be upon them, and the pure progeny, as has already been mentioned and will be further indicated — since the standard practice across every age and land was based on their [the jurists’] legal opinions. And this would be the most severe of all things against the Messenger, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household, the Imams, peace be upon them, and Fatimah, peace be upon her — that they should be remiss in propagating the ordinances of the Law!
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This is so, even though God, His Messenger, and the Imams, peace be upon them, went to the utmost lengths in declaring the prohibition of fornication, even with a woman among the disbelievers, and the obligation to protect lineages, even the lineage of a disbeliever. To the point that they instituted worldly punishments for it too, such as flogging and stoning, as is well known. Indeed, they went to the utmost lengths of caution regarding sexual matters, saying: “Indeed, the matter of the private parts is a grave one, for from it comes the child, and we are cautious regarding it” — and other statements besides.
How, then, could nothing whatsoever have issued from him regarding the preservation of the lineage of the House of Fatimah, from confusion and intermixture — indeed, the very opposite has repeatedly issued from him, and likewise from the Messenger and the Imams, peace be upon them — apart from what an unknown man related from al-Sadiq (a) that he said: “It is not permissible to combine two [wives] from the progeny of Fatimah, for that reaches her and grieves her”? And how does grieving Fatimah (s), in particular, compare to the severe threats and grave punishments in the Hereafter — in addition to this world — issued by God, His Messenger, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household, and the Imams, peace be upon them, with utter certainty and conviction?
Moreover, even if the combination in question were forbidden, what sense would there be in justifying it by its being grievous specifically to Fatimah (s), while it would not be grievous to God, nor to His Messenger, nor to any of the Imams, peace be upon them — given that Fatimah, together with God, His Messenger, and the Imams share a single word, a single approval, and, self-evidently, a single disapproval?
And if the combination were not grievous to God, nor to His Messenger, nor to any of the Imams, then self-evidently it would not be grievous to Fatimah (s) either.
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Indeed, there is no doubt that it would grieve her — most certainly — were a debauched, abusive man, one who mistreats and strikes women and fails to fulfil their due rights, to take one of her own daughters in marriage, just as it would grieve her were such a man to take one of the daughters of the community — especially a chaste, noble, virtuous, righteous woman — especially were he to take her merely to serve as a rival wife alongside some base, indecent, immodest, unrighteous, unchaste woman. And yet this contract [of marriage] is, according to the deluded one, undoubtedly valid, and its dissolution contingent solely on divorce, without any question.
Even though grave discord and countless corruptions may follow from such a marriage contract — enmity and estrangement among relatives by marriage, indeed strife and tribulation among kinsfolk, even spreading to strangers and outsiders.
The same holds for other contracts, and indeed other legal acts too, such as divorce, which may likewise sometimes give rise to a child’s disobedience toward parents, and other forbidden things besides.
Furthermore, it is well known that it would grieve the Messenger and the Imams for us to waste our lives on matters unrelated to attaining the Hereafter, in worldly affairs that avail nothing — even where such matters are not, in themselves, forbidden.
In sum, from what we have mentioned, and from other matters you shall come to know, no jurist paid any attention to this report in the context of recommendation, dislike, or etiquette — even though it is their custom to be utterly lenient regarding evidence for recommended and disliked acts, just as it is their custom to be utterly cautious in matters of sexual relations.
How, then, could they all have agreed on there being no dislike attached to it, let alone prohibition or caution regarding sexual relations — as is not hidden from anyone with the slightest awareness, and as we have indicated in brief?
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Now, in these later times, there has arisen an opinion holding this combination forbidden — despite the enormous distance in time from the era of the sacred Law, a span of well over a thousand years — without this opinion having been the statement of any jurist, nor the practice of any Muslim, during that entire period; rather, the matter was the very opposite, with not even an opinion of dislike, let alone prohibition, having been expressed, as you already know.
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All this, in addition to what you already know — that he did not mention the report in question in the book of Marriage, nor in the chapter on miscellaneous matters of marriage, nor did he devote a chapter heading to it, nor did he issue a legal opinion of its being disliked, let alone forbidden, in his books of legal opinion — and what has already passed regarding al-Khisal has already passed — and other points besides, given that it is the custom of compilers sometimes to take note [of such matters when they hold them].
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In sum, all our jurists, earlier and later, have issued legal opinions of permissibility and non-prohibition — indeed, of non-dislike as well — and their statements declare this. So the arguer’s claim that “the legal opinion of the companions is not known to contradict it” is itself problematic — indeed, al-Shaykh himself issued a legal opinion contrary to it, so what do you suppose of others?
Moreover, al-Shaykh composed his book al-Khilaf specifically to relate points of disagreement, opinions, and views — to the point that he relates the views of the Sunnis and other dissenting groups, let alone those of our own school — and the entire purpose and composition of the book was devoted to nothing else, with all his effort expended toward that end. Given, then, his extreme proximity in time to the earlier scholars — indeed, being himself one of them, having met their greatest figures, and having become acquainted, through his consummate skill, with the statements of those he did not personally meet — he nevertheless related from no one any statement holding the combination in question forbidden, nor even any difficulty or doubt regarding its permissibility, nor even regarding the absence of its being disliked.
Indeed, his words declare its permissibility, just as the permissibility of combining any women in marriage other than two sisters is declared — even though he himself is the narrator of the report in question, and his composition of al-Khilaf certainly came after al-Tahdhib. Indeed, al-Tahdhib was the first of his works in jurisprudence; he then composed al-Nihayah afterward, in accordance with what he chose and stated in al-Tahdhib; then after that al-Istibsar and his other compositions — all of them certainly coming after al-Tahdhib.
If, then, he held the combination in question to be forbidden, how could he have expressed the opposite view in al-Khilaf — indeed, avoided mentioning it altogether, even in the context of dislike or of forgoing what is preferable — despite having related what he related, his own view of leniency in both respects being unconcealed, and his agreement, in everything he stated, with the rest of the jurists — given that he himself made clear the position of the jurists as a whole on this matter?
Moreover, he frequently relates highly anomalous opinions entirely devoid of any supporting evidence — by his own admission — even in contexts of far less importance than that of sexual relations. How, then, could he have failed to relate any opinion holding the prohibition in question, indeed failed even to raise any difficulty at all, given that he himself is the narrator of the report in question?
Indeed, he followed the same approach in al-Mabsut and al-Jumal and other works as in al-Khilaf, even though he mentions in them opinions that are subject to objection without any doubt.
Moreover, even granting — on the assumption of an obvious error, evident from many innumerable angles — that he did hold the view of prohibition specifically in al-Tahdhib, there is no doubt that he retracted this position in all his [subsequent] books, to the point of paying it no attention whatsoever, indeed abandoning any mention of it altogether, even in the context of the recommended and disliked matters, indeed even in the context of the mere possibility of recommendation or dislike. This can only be because the error had become so thoroughly evident to him that it no longer merited mention in any context whatsoever — especially given that his custom was the utmost caution in matters of sexual relations, the utmost leniency in matters of the recommended and the disliked, and the utmost attentiveness to solitary reports, and other such matters — and yet, despite all this, what issued from him in all his books is what issued. Reflect on this!
Then, one may compare to al-Shaykh’s book the books al-Mukhtalaf and al-Muntaha and similar works among the books of the jurists which record opinions even where anomalous, indeed even entirely devoid of any supporting evidence at all, let alone one based on a mere report.
Thus, considering the totality of the books mentioned, one attains certainty that there is no opinion of prohibition whatsoever, root and branch. Had the report in question been an authoritative report of certain transmission — as the arguer claims — how could its status have turned out this way? For most weak reports, undermined by evident weaknesses, do not end up in such a state.
My brother, do you not fear becoming one of those who, by his own judgment, forbids what is lawfully permitted in matters of the private parts? Do you not exercise caution against this, and against disobeying God, His Messenger and the Imams, peace be upon them — making their prohibitions into a legal ruling that you incorporate into the religion of the Messenger, God’s blessings be upon him and his Household — despite the countless warnings, rebukes, cautions, and threats [against such a thing]?
Would you commit all of this on the mere pretext that the basis [of your position] is the authority of something that contradicts the Qur’an?
Would you not ask: whose basis, and in what context? For in matters of consensus, they [the Imams] have commanded and permitted us, saying: “Take what is agreed upon, for what is agreed upon admits no doubt” — and other certain proofs of the authority of their consensus, which the verifying scholars have established in their proper places, and which we ourselves have established in our treatise on the subject, and in Sharh al-Mafatih, and elsewhere, such that no doubt, concealment, or uncertainty remains!
From this, the permissibility of combining two Fatimid women in marriage becomes clear beyond doubt. For just as consensus serves as a legitimate basis even where it opposes the word of God and the word of His Messenger, and the Imams, peace be upon them, as found in the mass-transmitted reports, so too does it serve as a legitimate basis with respect to the single, weak, anomalous report that contradicts consensus, the verses, the mass-transmitted reports, and what has come in al-Khisal and elsewhere — and other matters already mentioned and yet to come.
Moreover, the basis also rests on rejecting anomalous reports, and reports that contradict the mass-transmitted reports, the Qur’an, and the agreement of the jurists, and other such self-evident matters.
More astonishing still than this is that one should attribute to God, Exalted is He, and ascribe to Him, the position of someone who thereby disobeys God, His Messenger and the Imams, peace be upon them, with such a grave, severe, and prolonged disobedience — and then say: “God has forbidden the combining of two Fatimid women,” thereby rendering the lineages of the pure progeny, down to the Day of Resurrection, tainted with fornication and unlawfulness, as you have already learned — thereby becoming one who spreads indecency about them and impugns their lineages.
And you already know that those who do not judge by what God has revealed are the disbelievers, the wrongdoers, and the transgressors — and other things regarding them that have come in the verses and the mass-transmitted reports, not hidden from you.
What, then, do you suppose of your own position, if you have made the one who disobeys God, His Messenger, and the Imams, peace be upon them, with countless acts of disobedience and the commission of the most hideous offences in this matter — as you have already learned — to be, in himself, identical with the very ruling of God? Or do you not fear becoming one of those who forbid what God has made lawful of the private parts — given what has come regarding this from the Commander of the Faithful (a), and God’s saying to His Messenger, (لِمَ تُحَرِّمُ مَا أَحَلَّ اللَّهُ لَكَ) — and other similar cases?
Footnotes
- Shaykh Wahid Behbahani is among the great scholars of the Khuzestan region, who, for many years in Behbahan, conducted debates and discussions with Akhbari scholars, wrote books, brought them to recognize their errors, and averted the danger their presence posed to the Shi’a school of thought.
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