By Muhammad Taqi Sobhani (corresponding author)1 and Sayyid Ali Ahmadi Foroushani2

Research article. Imamat dar Partow-e Qurʾan va sunnaht (Imamate in the Light of the Qurʾan and sunnah), biannual journal, Year 2, Issue 3, 1404 SH. Publisher: International Imamate Foundation (ipj.emamat.org). Received: 18/03/1404; revised: 15/05/1404; accepted: 17/07/1404; published online: 07/04/1405. Licence: CC BY-NC. © The authors.

Cite this article: Sobhani, Muhammad Taqi; Ahmadi Foroushani, Sayyid Ali (1404 SH). “Religious Authority: A New Discourse on Imamate.” Imamate in the Light of the Qurʾan and sunnah, 2(3), pp. 205–231. https://doi.org/10.22034/emamah.2025.529226.1070

Abstract

Imamate is counted among the most fundamental doctrinal principles of the Shi’a and has long been a subject of debate and discussion among scholars of both schools. Researchers and writers have approached the topic from a variety of angles. The traditionists (muḥaddithūn) addressed it through the narrations, under headings such as Ḥujjat Allah (the Proof of God), Khalīfat Allah (the Vicegerent of God) and ʿĀlim Rabbānī (the divinely guided scholar), while the theologians (mutakallimūn) explained Imamate on the basis of the idea of riʼāsa ʿāmma (general leadership). It would seem that Imamate can also be discussed through other windows. This article seeks to explain Imamate as marjaʿiyyat-e dīnī (religious authority).

These views and discourses have several distinguishing features, and the importance of this approach can be demonstrated from several angles: the raison d’être (reason for being) of the Imam; the audience and its cultural and social contexts; the audience’s level of knowledge and belief and its needs; and, finally, the fact that the approach is open to rational argument. Religious authority, it seems, can initiate a new discourse on Imamate and develop a fresh literature for explaining the knowledge of the Imams. It is therefore necessary to introduce this approach carefully, set out its necessity and evidence, and finally explain its benefits and functions.

Although the roots of the discussion of the Imams’ religious authority are present in the literature of the traditionists and theologians, the topic under this description and title has no notable precedent in the history of Shi’i thought, and few researchers have explained and examined Imamate through this approach. It may therefore be regarded as one of the new approaches in the thought of Imamate.

1. Introduction

In Imami thought, Imamate is presented as a vital pillar of Islam without which Islam would not stand firm. Scholars, theologians and traditionists alike have stated explicitly that Imamate is one of the most important principles of religion (Mufīd, 1413: 28; Ḥillī, 1379: 27). In their view, it is enough to recognize the place of this principle that attention to it is a condition for realizing the other pillars and principles of religion. Tawhīd, prophethood, maʿād, the sacred law and its rulings all depend on Imamate, and without it a correct understanding of religion cannot be obtained (Kulaynī, 1407: 2/16; Majlisī, 1403: 37/247).

The Imamate in which the Shi’a believe, following their divine teachings, is connected with many realities of the world and is not limited to humanity’s worldly political and social affairs. Human spiritual and material life, felicity and ultimate destiny depend on following the true Imams and the guides of light. On the one hand, the foundation of Imamate was laid before the creation of humankind; on the other, this momentous matter was discussed and covenanted in the prior worlds (Qummī, 1404: 1/247; Ṣaffār, 1404: 70). Imamate is also influential in the worlds to come (Ṣaffār, 1404: 497; ʿAyyāshī, 1380: 2/19; Kulaynī, 1407: 1/184), and our relationship with Imamate in this world can shape our future in various ways. A correct understanding of this important subject therefore plays a decisive role in human life, both in this world and the next.

If Imamate is presented merely as a political office in charge of administering religious and worldly affairs, its spiritual and true dimension will be neglected. If, on the other hand, it is presented as a divine station with no political standing whatsoever, the conditions for religious commitment will not be established in society, and a serious problem — namely, distance from the religion of divine guidance — will arise. Imamate concerns a complete and comprehensive system of religion and encompasses diverse and varied functions. All dimensions of Imamate must therefore be examined, all definitions and ideas concerning it must be considered, and a correct and complete conception of it must be offered.

In this regard, it seems that a comprehensive definition able to encompass all these dimensions and present Imamate as it truly is, is religious authority (marjaʿiyyat-e dīnī). Few have focused on the title “religious authority”, and no discussion of it has taken place to date; hence no precise meaning of it has been offered. A search found no works other than a handful written specifically on religious authority,3 and even their definitions of religious authority leave room for reflection. This paper seeks to clarify the concept of religious authority in order to unveil a new framework for presenting Imamate and, within its scope, to define the limits and aspects of this topic.

2. Different Dimensions of Imamate in the Views of Scholars

Ever since Imamate came to be written about, traditionists and theologians have explained it in various ways. Attending to these various dimensions can open a new window of understanding of Imamate. In the first Islamic decades, presenting the theory of divine Imamate was limited to transmitting narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt (a), critiquing the opposing theory, and debating the principle of Imamate. After a century had passed, however, the companions of the Imams began writing works on Imamate, and these works became a prelude to the compilation of hadith collections and kalām sources.

At first, the companions’ books merely gathered narrations without classification or arrangement. Later, with greater care, classified and arranged narrations found their way into the books of other traditionists and companions. The earliest surviving hadith book with such classification is Baṣāʼir al-Darajāt by Ṣaffār. It is possible that earlier books also classified the narrations on Imamate; but since they are not available to us, no judgement can be based on them, nor can their centrality be shown. Al-Maḥāsin of Barqī is one example: it comprised some eighty-odd books, of which fewer than twenty have reached us. None of the surviving books seems to carry a title related to Imamate; interestingly, however, chapters fully related to Imamate have been placed in books whose titles are outwardly unrelated to it, such as Thawāb al-Aʿmāl and ʿIqāb al-Aʿmāl. Al-Maḥāsin therefore cannot be regarded as the first compendium on the topic of Imamate.

2.1. The Divinely Guided Scholar (ʿĀlim Rabbānī): The Axis of Explaining Imamate in Ṣaffār’s Book

In this book, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār explains Imamate from the dimension of divine knowledge and the divinely guided scholar. The first chapter he establishes concerns the obligation of seeking knowledge for all people (Ṣaffār, 1371: 2). He then turns to the reward of the scholar and the learner (ibid.: 3), and in the third chapter to knowledge of the scholar whom whoever knows has known God, and whoever denies has denied God (ibid.: 6). The fourth chapter addresses the superiority of the scholar over the worshipper (ibid.), and the fifth the division of people into scholar, learner and ghuthāʾ4, presenting the Imams as the scholars of the community (ibid.: 8).

From the sequence of these opening chapters, it can be understood that Ṣaffār presents the Imam as a divine scholar whom everyone must know. Moreover, the knowledge whose acquisition is obligatory upon all is the knowledge taken from the Imams. One can therefore say that the Imam’s role in society and the station of his Imamate derive from his divine knowledge. Accordingly, in the sixth chapter he addresses the necessity of taking knowledge from its mine, namely the Ahl al-Bayt (Ṣaffār, 1371: 9); and from the fifth and sixth chapters he draws attention to the point that the Imams are scholars to whom people must refer (ibid.: 9 and 11).

2.2. Al-Kāfī and the Centrality of Ḥujjiyya in Explaining Imamate

After Ṣaffār, Kulaynī compiled al-Kāfī, the first comprehensive Shi’i hadith collection. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī begins this book with the Book of Intellect and Ignorance, opening his discourse by drawing attention to the intellect (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/10). This arrangement shows that, although Kulaynī is an accomplished traditionist, he approaches the divine teachings with an intellect-centred approach, looking at faith, disbelief and knowledge of the Proof (ḥujja) through the gateway of intellect and tawhīd. For this reason, al-Kāfī has received more attention among theologians than other books of the traditionists (Najāshī, 1365: 377).

After the Book of Intellect and Ignorance and the two books of Knowledge and Tawhīd, he turns to the Book of the Proof (Kitāb al-Ḥujja). The difference between Kulaynī’s expression and Ṣaffār’s shows that he examines Imamate through the window of people’s need for an intermediary between themselves and the Creator, and as the path to God’s pleasure and nearness to Him, presenting the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt within this frame (Ahmadi Foroushani, 1398: 1/10).

An important point in Kitāb al-Ḥujja of al-Kāfī is the chapters Kulaynī has classified and arranged. In Kitāb al-Ḥujja, known as the book presenting prophethood and Imamate in al-Kāfī, he begins with the aspects of need and compulsion (iḍṭirār) for the Proof, presenting the subject on the basis of narrations but with a rational approach (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/168–174). He then turns to the ranks of the divine Proofs and the differences between them, and next to the completion of the proof against creation through the Imam. He also devotes chapters to the earth never being devoid of a Proof, and to the point that if only two people remained on earth, one of them would be the Imam (ibid.: 174–180). Only after these chapters does Kulaynī enter the chapters specific to knowledge of the Imam.

2.3. Divine Vicegerency (Khilāfa): The Window for Explaining Imamate in Kamāl al-Dīn

Alongside these two, a third window on Imamate emerged: divine vicegerency. In Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-Niʿma, one of the books on Imamate, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Bābawayh begins by presenting divine vicegerency and the point that God’s vicegerent must come into being before created beings (Ṣadūq, 1395: 1/4). He then shows that obedience to the vicegerents is obligatory upon all, and that their appointment rests with God alone (ibid.: 5). The oneness of the vicegerent in every age and the necessity of a vicegerent in every era are also among Shaykh Ṣadūq’s preliminary discussions on Imamate (ibid.: 9).

He goes on to explain why God commanded the angels to prostrate before Adam (a), who was Khalīfat Allāh, and after these discussions turns to the attributes of the Imam (ibid.: 13). Shaykh Ṣadūq regards Imamate as divine vicegerency and the Imam as Khalīfat Allāh, opening the discussion of Imamate by explaining the verses and narrations on the rank and station of divine vicegerency. The important point is that he regards the Imam as one instance of vicegerency, applies the attributes and characteristics of divine vicegerency to the Imam, and explains Imamate through the window of vicegerency.

2.4. The Theologians and the Centrality of Riʼāsa ʿĀmma

Alongside the view of the traditionists, the title riʼāsa ʿāmma (general leadership) was chosen by the Imami theologians to present the Imam (Sayyid Murtaḍā, 1407: 1/5; Ṭūsī, 1414: 103). General leadership is a view that the Imami theologians of Baghdad adopted as a minimal presentation of the Imam, so that in disputation and debate with the Muʿtazila they could broaden the logic of dialogue and the sphere of mutual understanding with their interlocutors (Chegini, 1395: 46/101). In this definition of Imamate, which originated with Sunni theologians (ibid.: 102), Imamate is defined on the basis of Shi’i beliefs, and the attributes and conditions of the Shi’i Imamate are explained and defended. The theologian therefore chose this view for dialogue and for writing his works on Imamate, though behind the veil of defence he may have tied his heartfelt belief to the axes of the traditionists’ discussions, such as ḥujjiyya and divine vicegerency.

The theologians present the Imam as the head of society in religious and worldly affairs, and on this basis explain Imamate and the attributes and characteristics of the Imam. They go on to state explicitly that the head of society holds deputyship from the Messenger of God (p) in administering religious and worldly affairs, and that this office is exclusive to a single person.

From these explanations it can be discovered that the great Imami scholars, over past centuries, in entering the field of Imamate and discussing its stations and characteristics, each chose a horizon from which to approach it; naturally, each opened a window and spoke of Imamate according to the conditions and circumstances before him. It therefore seems mistaken to confine the discussions of Imamate to a single angle. Just as Imami scholars opened different windows over the centuries and viewed Imamate from various perspectives, all approaches should remain open to researchers in the field, each of whom may reread the topics and issues ofImamate in their light. Clearly, attending to Imamate from different angles will not alter the substance of its discussions; rather, new points can be derived from its various perspectives, and the topics and issues of Imamate can be supported and argued in different ways. Research on Imamate with new and effective approaches for the present age should therefore be encouraged.

The question remains: what characteristics and factors led Shaykh Ṣadūq to view Imamate from the perspective of divine vicegerency, and Kulaynī from that of the divine Proof? And shortly after Ṣadūq’s era, the theologians of Baghdad made general leadership the axis of Imamate.

2. Factors and Indicators Influencing the Different Views

It seems that certain factors and indicators brought about this divergence:

2.1. The Raison d’Être of the Imam

For the scholars of kalām, the existence of the Imam has a particular rationale. They attended only to certain dimensions of the effects and raison d’être of the Imam, which led them to view the station of Imamate differently from other scholars. For example, if the rationale for the Imam’s existence is reread solely on the axis of rational understanding and rational needs, it will differ from a rationale for the Imam’s existence grounded in revelatory propositions. The Muʿtazili theologians set out a rational rationale for the existence of the Imam (Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, n.d.: 20/17). They presented the Imam’s existence as the cause of the community’s security and tranquillity and the agent for implementing the commands of religion, including the ḥudūd and diyāt. The Imam’s existence also restrains rebels and tyrants from plundering people’s property, leaving them powerless to destroy people’s rights (Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, 1422: 509).

The Imami theologians of Baghdad, contemporaries of the Muʿtazila of Baghdad and Basra, were compelled to take the definition of Imamate from them and to depict the aims and raison d’être of the Imam as they did, in order to be able to enter into debate and dialogue with them. Hence, for some Imami theologians, the explanation of the Imam’s raison d’être came to resemble the one set out by the Sunni Muʿtazila (Ṭūsī, 1382: 1/70).

In contrast to the theologians of Baghdad, the traditionists explained the Imam’s raison d’être on the basis of the narrations. In al-Kāfī, in the chapter “al-Iḍṭirār ilā al-Ḥujja”, Kulaynī cites narrations pointing to the aspects of the community’s need for the divine Proofs. In another chapter, titled “The Earth Is Never Devoid of a Proof”, he points to other aspects of the need for the divine Proof. The difference between the two is that the first chapter contains narrations on the legislative and volitional aspects of the Imam’s existence, which rational people also accept, such as resolving disputes within the community (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/170) and explaining what God has made lawful and unlawful (ibid.: 169); while the second contains narrations on the cosmological (takwīnī) aspects of the Imam’s existence, such as the preservation of the earth and the heavens, the descent of rain, and the security of the earth’s inhabitants (ibid.: 178).

In Biḥār al-Anwār, Majlisī gathers all these narrations in a collection titled “Bāb al-Iḍṭirār ilā al-Ḥujja” in the Kitāb al-Imāma, addressing both the legislative and the cosmological aspects of the Imam’s existence. It follows that, for some scholars, Imamate has a raison d’être and notable effects that the intellect can grasp, and of which non-Shi’i scholars too can become aware insofar as the intellect understands them; whereas, on the other view, the Imam’s raison d’être is not confined to what the intellect perceives, and on the basis of narrated propositions one can discover that the Imam’s existence has higher and more exalted benefits and effects.

2.2. The Audience and Its Cultural and Social Contexts

Among the features that influence the endurance of an idea are knowing one’s audience and awareness of the cultural and social contexts of those who encounter it. Every researcher of an idea examines different levels of it according to their audience and sets aside its other aspects. The idea of Imamate is no exception. Researchers of the topic of Imamate have long reread the idea of Imamate according to their particular audiences and, in the same vein, revisited its dimensions. The neglect of some aspects of Imamate is therefore due to the researcher’s attention to the cultural and social contexts of their audience.

Because the theologians of Baghdad accompanied their dialogues with the Muʿtazili Sunnis with rational proofs, they were compelled to base their approach to Imamate on reason, refraining from transmitted ideas, especially narrations exclusive to the Shi’a, and contenting themselves with material that both schools accept as authoritative. As a result, the theologians’ conception of Imamate was different from, and narrower than, that of the traditionists. In the thought of the traditionists of Kufa and Qom — since they were not confronting the Sunnis and were not engaged in exchange and dialogue with them — Imamate has a broader definition. The cause of this difference is attention to different sources. In the thought of the traditionists of Kufa and Qom, every reliable report from the infallible Imams concerning the definition and explanation of Imamate and its characteristics can be employed in understanding the concept of Imamate and used in presenting a theory of it. Along the same lines, various social contexts can be named that caused changes in the thought of researchers of Imamate, some examples of which follow.

Owing to political and governmental readings of the concept of Imamate, some Shi’a regarded it solely as a political position: the office of leadership after the Prophet (p). They therefore conceived of Imamate only in its political dimensions. As a result, Imamate was presented solely as a worldly and social position devoid of any divine characteristic — what is called “political Imamate”. In the view of these people, such an idea is rooted in the social contexts of the era of succession to the Prophet, since the followers of Imamate sought uprising and the formation of government in the periods after the Prophet, and were heedless of, or denied, the divine dimensions and exclusive characteristics of the Imams. This thinking can be found among those who paved the way for the Zaydī sect (Āqānūrī and Bayāt Aṣgharī, 1393: 12).

Another example of belief in a political Imamate in the contemporary period is the idea of the ʿulamāʾ abrār (the “pious scholars” thesis). Although their conception of Imamate is somewhat new, this reading has emerged on the strength of works transmitted from the age of the Imams’ presence and their attribution to certain Imami companions. This idea presents the Imam merely as a pious scholar who can let others benefit from his knowledge. In this thinking, the Imam is devoid of divine stations and political offices and is influential only as a scholar effective in the moral formation of society. Those who deny the divine Imamate of the Ahl al-Bayt and are in some way deficient in understanding and interpreting religious texts have presented Imamate in this mould (Qurbānī Mubīn and Khusrowpanāh, 1392: 25).

2.3. The Audience’s Level of Knowledge and Belief

One of the factors influencing the explanation of the idea of Imamate is the audience’s different levels of awareness and belief. This claim has historical and narrative support. From the beginning of the formation of the Shi’i community, the companions of the Imams did not share a uniform understanding of the Imams; each had a conception of their Imamate commensurate with his own understanding of religious teachings and of the station of Imamate, although they shared some beliefs. Hence, among the matters the Imams forbade their companions from spreading was the explanation of the Imam’s special stations to people with a low level of awareness and belief (Majlisī, 1402: 2/212–214). In such a situation, the explanation of Imamate for people with little awareness will differ from that for people with high awareness. The difference between the various explanations of Imamate thus sometimes goes back to differences in the audience’s level of knowledge and belief. The hadith of “the striking of the slave-girl” (ḍarb al-jāriya) is one of the reports that confirms this (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/257; Majlisī, 1404: 3/114).

2.4. The Audience’s Needs

Another cause of different ideas on Imamate is the needs of the audience. Owing to the needs and demands present in society, the followers of Imamate depicted in their thought a form of belief in Imamate that answered their own needs and responded to society’s demands. Hence, the idea of Imamate for one group could be broader or narrower than for another. A clear example is the idea of Imamate among theologians who were constantly engaged in confronting their opponents and seeking answers to their attacks. Though they were extremely firm and impenetrable against the opponents’ onslaught, they held a narrower and different belief compared with the traditionists’ idea of Imamate. The cause of this difference is the needs of society and the demands of the audience. In their belief about Imamate, the traditionists raised topics the theologians did not need and could in no way address. Since the traditionists did not take a serious stance against opponents, they could engage with and adhere to the text of the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt in the exclusive Imami sources; whereas the theologian, owing to confrontation, debate and disputation with opponents, needs beliefs grounded in rational proofs or in narrations agreed upon by Shi’a and Sunnis (Tārīvardī, 1398: 26/37).

2.5. The Dimension Amenable to Argument and Proof

Another feature taken into account in the idea of Imamate is which issues and topics can be argued for and presented. There are titles in the discussions of Imamate that cannot be argued for, or supported with rational evidence, before an opponent, and for which one can rely only on transmitted evidence exclusive to the Shi’a, such as the luminous creation of the Imams. Among the topics of Imamate, there are titles for which, in addition to transmitted evidence, a rational proof could also be established, such as the appointment of the Imam and the community’s need for him. Scholars who focused on beliefs grounded in rational and transmitted proofs and presentable to all audiences refrained from presenting those aspects of Imamate that can be spoken of only to the elect.

3. Religious Authority: A New and Effective Approach to Presenting Imamate

The question now arises: in the present era, and given its diverse audiences, with what language should Imamate be presented? Some of that audience support Imamate, and some stand opposed to it; all are committed to Islamic and Qurʾanic foundations, yet they have doubts about explaining the issues of Imamate. If, in the present age, discourse on Imamate can be presented in a way that has a universal expression and, beyond a language suited to the Islamic community, is presentable even to the international community, with rational argument and revelatory evidence, then the literature of Imamate can be explained to general audiences while retaining its authentic Shi’i conception.

Certainly, attending to the scholarly dimensions and facets of Imamate is of great importance for explaining and presenting it. Over past centuries, various dimensions of Imamate have been the ground of dialogue between sects and schools, and argument and dispute have taken place around them. Yet each of these dimensions has features and characteristics such that, if the topics of Imamate are raised on its axis, a problem is encountered. For example, articulating Imamate and the Imam on the axis of ḥujjiyya, though it has benefits, is difficult for non-Shi’a to understand. A non-Shi’i person, and even someone outside the faith, does not have a correct understanding of ḥujjiyya in coming to know Imamate and cannot apply it to anyone. Moreover, ḥujjiyya is not a common or current topic; it has not been discussed in non-Shi’i society and has no shared vocabulary there.

Another axis raised in knowing Imamate is the expression ʿālim rabbānī. Although this expression was entirely clear to the traditionists — meaning a divine scholar who has received his knowledge from the Lord — in today’s parlance ʿālim (scholar) has a broad and vague meaning, and ʿālim rabbānī cannot be mapped onto Imamate for an audience outside the faith.

Another title that has for centuries been the axis for explaining Imamate is riʼāsa ʿāmma. Although this title is prevalent in the literature of the theologians, it is problematic for explaining Imamate in today’s society. First, general leadership conveys only the governance dimension among Imamate’s various dimensions, whereas today the other dimensions of Imamate are more needed. Besides, Imamate is not limited and confined to certain schools of thought. It is therefore necessary to seek a title that, in addition to manifesting all dimensions of Imamate, can be understood and explained within all schools of thought and all foundations. It seems that one of the axes and titles able to explain Imamate in all its aspects and dimensions, and for all schools of thought, is religious authority.

3.1. The Difference Between Religious Authority and Scholarly Authority

One of the titles that has for some time served as a framework for presenting the Ahl al-Bayt is the scholarly authority (marjaʿiyyat-e ʿilmī) of the Ahl al-Bayt. What is meant by scholarly authority is entirely different from the religious authority intended in this study. Scholarly authority concerns the role of receiving the religious sciences from the Imams. According to the hadith al-Thaqalayn and the like, the Ahl al-Bayt have, from the Prophet, probative authority in their word, deed and tacit approval (taqrīr); they are a source for receiving knowledge, and their word is authoritative in arriving at rulings and laws. Because its supporting evidence is shared between Shi’a and Sunnis, this title has created one of the avenues of rapprochement between the schools, since, on the basis of these narrations, Shi’a and others alike must regard the sunnah of the Ahl al-Bayt as authoritative and issue opinions and fatwas accordingly (Manāfī and Riḍānizhād, 1396: 127).

The consequence of this theory is that the Ahl al-Bayt can be a source from which religious sciences are taken, but not the origin (maṣdar) of religion. In other words, according to this theory, the authority of the sunnah of the Ahl al-Bayt derives from the sunnah of the Prophet; and since they are a reliable channel for transmitting the sunnah of the Messenger of God, they can be authoritative for all Muslims, Shi’a and others. This subject can therefore be presented as common ground between Shi’a and Sunnis, even though, alongside the Ahl al-Bayt, Sunnis also believe in the authority of the word of others, such as the Companions and the Successors, and even the four Imams of the Sunni schools.

Religious authority, by contrast, means religious discretion and stewardship (ṣāḥib-ikhtiyār va zimāmdārī-ye dīnī). If a person becomes the authority of religion, his word is authoritative independently, not by virtue of transmitting the sunnah of the Messenger of God. One who has become the authority of religion need not attribute his words to the Qurʾan or the sunnah of the Prophet, even though we believe that his words are not without grounding in the Qurʾan and the sunnah of the Prophet. Hence every word and deed that issues from him becomes the text of religion.

Another point in distinguishing religious authority from scholarly authority is that scholarly authority is merely a reporter who informs of the sciences, not one who holds Wilāyah and religious sovereignty over the people. In contrast, the religious authority, by virtue of the Wilāyah that God has instituted for him and the dominion God has given him over religion and the sacred law, must be followed. Everyone must obey him, and he can exercise Wilāyah where necessary. In this respect, scholarly authority does not reveal the Wilāyah of the authority; it is religious authority that reveals the authority’s Wilāyah over the whole range of religious and human affairs.

With this explanation, scholarly authority cannot at all be a window for presenting and knowing Imamate. For although this title — scholarly authority — is exclusive to the Ahl al-Bayt among the Shi’a, among the Sunnis it is applied to others such as the Companions and the Successors, who are considered origins of the religious sciences, something the Shi’a do not accept. Hence the scholarly authority of the Ahl al-Bayt may become a path towards rapprochement between the schools (Taskhīrī, 1381: 9–67), but it cannot be a means for presenting Imamate, in its own authentic sense, to non-Shi’i society.

3.2. Dimensions of Religious Authority

Although religious authority is rooted in the verses and in the narrations of the Prophet of God, since it is a newly coined title it needs to be introduced and explained through a brief account of its definition, evidence, necessity, supporting indications and benefits.

3.2.1. Definition

Religious authority is a new term in the field of Imamate studies and has not been fully defined in the words of eminent scholars and thinkers. It is therefore presented here as it can be inferred from the Qurʾanic and narrative evidence and from kalām thought. Religious authority is counted as one of the roles of the prophets and messengers, by virtue of which, owing to their relationship with the Exalted God and God’s religion, they hold discretion over religion and religious affairs and determine the divine commands. Because of this station, they are the point of reference to which people turn to receive the divine religion (al-Shūrā: 13). Since the Imam is the vicegerent of the Noble Prophet, and the vicegerent shares all roles with the one he succeeds except for those excepted, he too holds this role (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/200).

This role shows that the Prophet, and after him the Imam, are the expounder and legislator of religion, and that the reality of religion is explained and presented through their speech and conduct — not that God sent down a book to present religion so that people, by learning it, would have no need of anyone else. From the verses and narrations it is clearly understood that religion needs explanation, clarification and guardianship (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/178). Religion depends on one to whom God has entrusted it, whom He has made a holder of Wilāyah, and whose word and deed He has presented as the origin of religion and the source of rulings (Ṣaffār, 1404: 61, 332 and 529). Hence, everyone, in order to understand and know religion, refers only to him or to someone he designates. It seems religious authority can be presented through four characteristics:

  1. Authority entails the necessity of taking and adopting from it. Religious authority entails the necessity of referring to, and following, the authority of religion. Wilāyah is one of the roles of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt, and religious authority revolves around the axis of Wilāyah. Religious authority defines the relationship between follower (maʼmūm) and Imam. The religious authority of the Ahl al-Bayt entails the necessity of referring to their words and conduct.
  2. Religious authority is an exclusive attribute that distinguishes its holder from other people. Since the characteristics of the Ahl al-Bayt are exclusive to them and others do not share in those attributes, religious authority, being a role consequent upon those attributes, will also be exclusive.
  3. Religious authority is independent. The authority of religion holds an office independent of any other person and is not dependent on the permission and will of another. This is unlike the governors and rulers appointed by the Imams over a region, whose word and deed became authoritative through the Imam’s permission and will. Those appointed by the Imams must therefore be followed by virtue of the Imams’ specific permission, but they do not possess iftirāḍ al-ṭāʿa (divinely mandated obedience) in its special sense. The difference between the authority of Mālik al-Ashtar and ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās and that of the Commander of the Faithful (a) is that his authority is independent, whereas theirs derives from his. Likewise, the religious authority of the Commander of the Faithful was independent during his own Imamate, but during the lifetime of the Noble Prophet it derived from the Messenger of God, and his word and deed were by the Prophet’s permission and will.
  4. Religious authority fills a fundamental void and need in the sphere of religion. Religious authority is a fundamental need of humanity, and the necessity of appointing a Prophet and an Imam stems from that void. Through the divine appointment of the Imam and his presence, this void is filled. The dispute after the Noble Prophet was over who would occupy the station of his religious authority after him. Thus, the existence of society’s fundamental need for one who explains religion and holds discretion over it proves the necessity of a religious authority, that is, an Imam.

3.2.2. Necessity

Religion is the set of teachings that paves the path of nearness to God and guarantees human perfection, and the purpose of human creation is to attain this perfection, felicity and divine nearness (al-Dhāriyāt: 56). Not sending religion from the Exalted God to human beings would therefore defeat the purpose of human creation and be incompatible with divine wisdom.

Sending religion from the Exalted God to humanity is possible in two ways. In the first, God sends a written text to the people, by reading and acting upon which they become adherents of the divine religion. This method has drawbacks and defects: the possibility of distortion, of deletions or additions; ambiguity and generality in the text and its intended meaning; the absence of rulings for new matters; unsuitability for resolving conflict and disagreement; and the lack of a decisive arbiter (faṣl al-khiṭāb) for religious disputes and for implementing rulings in society. A written text cannot take charge of implementing religion in society; at most it can state rulings in some cases. The text therefore also needs a knowledgeable and capable person to implement its rulings.

In the second way, a person is charged by the Exalted God with explaining and conveying religion and implementing its rulings. This person can be one whose speech is God’s speech and whose word and deed are the source of God’s religion. Besides being free of the defects of the first way, this has merits, such as the fact that he himself implements religion and needs no one else. Given these two scenarios, the first is ineffective and cannot transmit religion correctly and completely to others in all circumstances. Divine wisdom requires that the second be realized in society.

3.2.3. Evidence

From the Qurʾan one can derive indications of the existence of a religious authority for the realization of religion, and that religion from God is not merely a written text. The verses on absolute obedience to the Prophet of God (al-Nisāʾ: 59; al-Māʼida: 92; al-Nūr: 54 and 56; Muḥammad: 33; al-Taghābun: 12), the verses on referring to the Prophet for judgement and the resolution of conflict and disagreement (al-Nisāʾ: 59 and 65), the verse on taking commands and prohibitions from him (al-Ḥashr: 7), the verse describing the Prophet as one who calls to God and as a light-giving lamp (al-Aḥzāb: 46), and the verses on religion originating from the prophets (al-Shūrā: 13) are all indications of religion’s dependence on an authority. According to these verses, the authority of religion for the people is the person of the Prophet — not his written text, nor a sunnah left behind after him. These verses show that the one who determines, and has the final word (faṣl al-khiṭāb) on, religious matters is the person of the Noble Prophet.

If this is established for the Prophet, establishing it for the Imams and the Ahl al-Bayt is also possible by rational and transmitted judgment. The intellect perceives that the need for religious authority continues after the Prophet and that this need must be met by God. Likewise, by the verses and narrations that present the roles of the Ahl al-Bayt as identical to those of the Prophet, this role is established for the Imams after him.

The narrations also point to the religious authority of the Ahl al-Bayt. The hadith al-Thaqalayn (Ṣaffār, 1404: 49; Kulaynī, 1407: 1/287, 294 and 322), the hadith al-Safīna (Ṣaffār, 1404: 297; Ṭabarī, 1415: 260; Ṭūsī, 1376: 269), the hadith al-Amān (Khazzāz Rāzī, 1401: 29; Ṣadūq, 1395: 1/205), and other hadiths on the necessity of taking and acquiring religion from the Imams indicate this. Taken together, the verses and narrations mentioned show that the Prophet, and after him the Ahl al-Bayt, are in charge of the affairs of religion, the origin of rulings and laws, and the point of reference for the people in coming to know religion.

3.2.4. Rational and Transmitted Indications

In addition to rational indications, religious authority has supporting indications in the Noble Qurʾan and the narrative sources. One important indication of religion’s dependence on an authority is that on earth the vicegerent and Proof of God was created first (Ṣadūq, 1395: 1/4), and the divine religion then took shape from his words, commands and conduct. In the age of each of the prophets, too, the prophet himself was the axis of the people’s religion; the heavenly book was not the axis of religiosity but rather a charter so that people would not lose their way in receiving religion and could find a path to religious truths. In the age of the Messenger of God, too, the axis of religion was his person, not the heavenly book.

It is essential to note that the truth of the heavenly book itself rests on the truth of the Messenger of God. Since the divine origin of the Qurʾan and its being God’s speech depend on the Prophet’s mission and his declaration, had the Prophet not said “this speech of mine is God’s speech”, there would have been no way to recognize divine speech. Thus, although by the hadith al-Thaqalayn God’s speech also offers a way to discover the truth of religion, that too depends on the truth of the Messenger of God.

On the other hand, the Qurʾan itself depends on understanding and explanation, and its expounder is the Noble Prophet; the Prophet’s exposition in clarifying and elaborating the verses forms part of religion (al-Nisāʾ: 65 and 105; al-Naḥl: 44 and 64). The Qurʾan by itself therefore cannot be the axis of religion. Hence the axis of religiosity is the person of the Messenger of God, and after him the axis is not the book. The book exists only so that the path to the divine religion becomes clear and the path of servitude to God is not lost; therefore the Qurʾan guides to the person of the Imam (Ṣaffār, 1404: 477; Kulaynī, 1407: 1/216; Ṣadūq, 1403: 132). Otherwise, a book open to erroneous interpretations and esoteric readings (taʼwīl), whose meanings and referents can be tampered with, cannot be the way to discover the truths of religion (Kulaynī, 1407: 1/169).

Moreover, if the Qurʾan could have been the axis of religion and the reality of servitude, this would have happened in the time of the Messenger of God himself. Just as the Qurʾan needed explanation and interpretation in his time and was open to erroneous interpretations of its meanings and referents, so it is after him, and it cannot by itself take charge of explaining religion. In addition, religious authority, beyond answering people’s needs in religious matters, is the implementer of religion in society, and a book cannot by itself implement religion.

This claim can be established from the verses of the Qurʾan even before the narrations. In verse 101 of Āl ʿImrān,5 God, with the word “how” (kayfa), expresses astonishment at Muslims disbelieving despite the Qurʾan, the recitation of the divine verses and the presence of the Messenger of God. This astonishment arises because, with the verses recited by the Messenger of God and with an expounder and interpreter like him present, no excuse remains for disbelief. Hence the axis of faith in God and of following the divine religion is the person of the Messenger of God, who is himself counted as the reciter of God’s verses. Consequently, just as in the Prophet’s time the mere verses of God did not suffice for guidance and the realization of servitude to God, but depended on the presence of an infallible person, after the Prophet too God’s verses need one who recites them. Otherwise, disbelievers would have an excuse for their disbelief, and the verse’s astonishment at the disbelief of Muslims would no longer hold.

This point is stated even more explicitly at the end of the verse. The phrase “whoever holds fast to God”, coming after mention of “the verses of God and His Messenger”, makes clear that “holding fast to God” means the verses and the Messenger of God. Now if, after the Prophet, the verses of God remained but neither the Prophet nor anyone able to assume his role were present, disbelievers would be excused for their disbelief and irreligion. Therefore, so that there is never an excuse for disbelief, the role of the Messenger of God must continue after him, and there must be someone who is the axis of faith and divine religion and who recites the Book of God. The same is derived from the hadith al-Thaqalayn. In this hadith, transmitted from the Messenger of God, guidance and servitude to God do not depend on the Book of God alone; rather, alongside the Qurʾan, referring to the Prophet’s ʿItra is a condition for realizing guidance. This condition shows that the axis is not the divine Book alone; rather, alongside the Qurʾan, the presence of the ʿItra is the condition for being delivered from misguidance.

3.2.5. Benefits and Functions of Religious Authority

In the verses and narrations, religious authority has benefits and functions, some of which are noted here:

  1. Explaining and interpreting the rulings of religion. The sacred law revealed to a prophet or messenger needs an expounder and interpreter: sometimes the prophet or messenger himself, and sometimes the legatee (waṣī) and Imam after him. Explaining and interpreting the rulings of religion is sometimes achieved by explaining the verses of the Qurʾan and sometimes by explaining the Prophet’s sunnah. Removing ambiguity and generality from rulings is another role of religious authority. When people come to the authority of religion, he removes the ambiguity and generality; all the more so because, with the passage of time, ambiguities arise, and for people who did not live in the age of revelation, the explanation and clarification of religion becomes indispensable.
  2. Stating the rulings for new matters. Divine rulings and their subjects are not confined to the age of the Messenger of God; new matters have arisen and continue to arise after the revelation of the Qurʾan that need a divine ruling. With the Messenger of God gone, and given the cessation of revelation, who can state the true divine ruling for new matters, other than an infallible person connected to the Unseen? Hence, a person who is himself the steward of religion, whose word in religious matters is God’s word, is needed in every age. In Shi’i belief, the Ahl al-Bayt after the Messenger of God hold the role of stating the rulings of new matters.
  3. Protecting religion against deletions and additions. The reality of religion is what is revealed to the heart of the Prophet and Messenger of God, issues from his tongue, and is placed at the disposal of the public. The most significant cause of deletions from and additions to religion is its being placed in others’ hands and spread. Once religious teachings reach others and are transmitted onwards, deletions from or additions to religion occur, even where there is no deliberate intent. An indication that such deletion and addition is not deliberate is that the narrations attribute it to believers, meaning it may occur at the hands of believers (Kulaynī, 1404: 1/178). In addition, some deliberately seek deviation, deletion and addition in religion. Given this, only one who has complete awareness of religion and can detect any deletion or addition can prevent such deviation. He must also be infallible against all error, so that his words and conduct are authoritative for religion and the religious. Furthermore, if there is no divine authority alongside religion, acting on religion will not be authoritative for the general public. Religious teachings are authoritative, and people have the right to act on them, only when there is a divine Proof alongside them guaranteeing their soundness and reality. Hence, if there is no guardian and protector alongside religion, the teachings presented as religion cannot be given official standing or counted as part of religion.
  4. Implementing religion in political and social affairs. Beyond individual matters, religion includes political and social affairs such as government and adjudication, and a heavenly book cannot by itself be the agent of implementing religion. Implementing religion requires a person aware of all dimensions of religion, infallible against all error and mistake, possessing divine Wilāyah, and having the requisite power and capability to implement it, so that his word becomes the final word and decisive arbiter in all social affairs. Implementing religion is part of religion itself; one cannot state its rulings and commands and then leave their implementation to the people to carry out themselves — this very point would be one of the causes of religion’s deviation. The Qurʾan has placed the responsibility of implementing religion upon the prophets and, after them, upon the infallible Imams. The Qurʾan explicitly presents government as one of the roles of God’s vicegerent (Ṣād: 26) and regards the Prophet of God as in charge of resolving disputes and disagreements and judging between people (al-Nisāʾ: 59, 65 and 105). Likewise, one of the purposes of the prophets’ mission is to lead people towards equity and justice (al-Ḥadīd: 25). Naturally, to attain these purposes, knowledge and infallibility, Wilāyah and iftirāḍ al-ṭāʿa are principal and essential conditions.

4. Conclusion

Religious authority can be a new discourse on Imamate, through which the attributes, roles and offices of Imamate can be presented. This subject is rooted in the Qurʾan and the sunnah of the Prophet, and rational indications also point to the concept. Compared with existing discourses such as ḥujjiyya, divine vicegerency, ʿālim rabbānī and riʼāsa ʿāmma, this discourse can explain Imamate in the greatest number of its dimensions. In today’s various communities — Shi’i, Sunni, intellectual and Orientalist — it can serve as an axis for presenting the foundational idea of the Imami Imamate and convey authentic Shi’i thought to its audiences.

Owing to its broad conceptual scope, religious authority on the one hand fully reveals the relationship with God and the divine characteristics, and on the other shows the relationship with the people and the political and social standing of the Imam, while also explaining governance within religion. It is therefore fitting that it become the subject of research and study, and that, with it as the axis, the definition, necessity, conditions and attributes, roles and powers, and offices and duties of the Imam be reread.

References

  • The Noble Qurʾan.
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Footnotes

  1. Assistant Professor, Research Institute of Philosophy and Kalām, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran. sobhani.mt@gmail.com
  2. Assistant Professor, Research Institute of Imamate, International Imamate Foundation, Jaʿfari Culture Foundation, Qom, Iran. saahmadi110@yahoo.com
  3. Marjaʿiyyat-e Dīnī-ye Ahl al-Bayt by ʿAlī-Aṣghar Riḍwānī; the article “The Foundations of Religious Authority in the Verses and Narrations” by Majīd Maʿārif in Muṭālaʿāt-e Qurʾan va hadith; the doctoral dissertation “The Scholarly Authority of the Ahl al-Bayt among Non-Shi’a” by Muḥsin Rafīʿī, Faculty of Uṣūl al-Dīn; and the master’s thesis “An Examination of the Religious Authority of the Infallible Imam” by ʿAlī-Aṣghar Sulṭānī Harawī, Al-Mustafa International University, Mashhad branch.
  4. Foam and debris on the surface of water.
  5. “And how can you disbelieve while the verses of God are recited to you and His Messenger is among you? And whoever holds fast to God has been guided to a straight path” (Āl ʿImrān: 101).