The Intra-Imami Dispute Over Fadak: A Brief Overview of Shaykh Muntazari’s Political Interpretation and the Debates Surrounding It

By Shaykh Haider Hobbollah; translated & edited by: Sayyid Burair Abbas

Introduction

In modern times, at least, the study of historical issues has not been separated from the philosophical, religious, social, and political perspectives that a researcher brings to the field of historical analysis. The epistemological, intellectual, and political backgrounds of historians often influence how they interpret historical events. Sectarian topics are no exception to this rule; thus, when examining historical issues—especially those related to the Prophet and the figures of Ahlulbāyt—we can observe the researcher’s intellectual mindset and epistemological background.^[1]

A prime example of this phenomenon—one we have previously referred to—is the differing interpretations of Islamic political movements regarding the history of Ahlulbayt after the martyrdom of Imām Ḥusayn. While most Eastern and Western scholars agree that Ahlulbayt, in the Imāmi understanding of the term, withdrew from political and military engagement after Ḥusayn’s martyrdom, dedicating themselves to religious, scholarly, and educational pursuits, key figures of Islamic political movements have interpreted the Imāms’ actions after Ḥusayn as a continuation of his struggle. According to them, the Imāms remained actively engaged in the political sphere, striving to establish a legitimate and just Islamic state.

One of the historical issues that has remained significant in the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shi‘as over time is the case of Fadak—a land that the Prophet allegedly granted or bequeathed to his daughter, Faṭimah Al-Zahra. However, the focus here is not on the sectarian dispute or the historical debate surrounding this issue. Instead, this article aims to examine how modern Imāmi scholars have understood the matter of the Prophet’s granting of Fadak to Faṭimah. More broadly, how have they interpreted Faṭimah’s right to Fadak?

The discussion will be limited to the following points:

1. Non-Imāmi interpretations of the Fadak issue are not addressed. This includes the view that the dispute between Faṭimah Al-Zahra and Abu Bakr over Fadak was merely a personal legal disagreement that was later exaggerated by the Shi‘a for oppositional political purposes. According to this perspective, Abu Bakr did not confiscate other estates belonging to Faṭimah, which numbered seven.

2. The entitlement of Fadak to Sayyidah Faṭimah is not proved or disproved. This issue will be assumed to have settled, as the focus is on analyzing the modern Imāmi interpretation, which does not question Faṭimah’s prerogative to Fadak. Rather, the discussion centers around the relationship between Faṭimah and Fadak within the Imāmi context, presuming that it rightfully belonged to her.

3. This brief piece won’t analyze all the contemporary Imāmi interpretations of the Fadak event. Instead, the focus is only on a single interpretation that reflects a broader intellectual debate concerning the biography of Ahlulbāyt in general. As such, the views of figures like Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr or others are not examined. Rather, this article will entertain the interpretation of Shaykh Ḥusayn ‘Ali Muntaẓarī as a representative case, despite its similarities and differences with other viewpoints.

The study will be structured into the following sections:

First Section: An Overview of Shaykh Muntaẓarī’s Theory on Fadak.

This is further divided into:

A. Presenting and analyzing his ideas. 

B. Reviewing some of the key arguments supporting his theory.

Second Section: A Brief Overview of Reactions to Muntaẓarī’s Interpretation of Fadak.

Third Section: Analyzing the Reasons Behind the Dispute, Its Background, and Some Justifications for the Opponents’ Concerns.

The First Section: Al-Shaykh Al-Muntazari’s view on the issue of Fadak

Several contemporary researchers believe that Shaykh Ḥusayn ‘Ali Al-Muntaẓarī (d. 2009) is the true expositor of the idea of the guardianship of the jurist and its ramifications in modern history and that Sayyid Rūḥullah Khomeini (d. 1989) himself was influenced by Al-Muntaẓarī and Mutahhari on this subject. Regardless of the accuracy of this claim, it is undoubtedly true that Al-Muntaẓarī was a prominent figure in theorizing the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih in the era of occultation, according to the Imāmite classification of history. His book Dirasāt fi Wilayah al-Faqih Wa Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah (Studies in the Guardianship of the Jurist and Islamic State Jurisprudence) in its four volumes was a significant project in its time to theorize a comprehensive political jurisprudence. In it, Al-Muntaẓarī studied many jurisprudential and historical issues related to the Islamic state and gathered them from various Shi’a and Sunni jurisprudential research, including books on Sultanate laws, to form a jurisprudential and ijtihad-based vision for the Islamic state project and Islamic governance.

In the third volume of this book, Al-Muntaẓarī addressed research related to financial matters, studying zakat, khums, spoils of war (ghanimah), and fa’i. On this occasion—specifically the discussion about fa’i, which refers to lands acquired by Muslims without war and is mentioned in the Qur’ān (Al-Hashr: 6) as lands that were not captured by cavalry or riders—he discussed that Shari’ah considers fa’i to be property of the state. In this context, he digressed into a discussion about Fadak, since Fadak land was considered part of the fa’i properties.^[2] Al-Muntaẓarī also dedicated a book, which was a series of lectures, titled “The Sermon of Sayyidah Faṭimah Al-Zahra and the Incident of Fadak,” in which he explained the famous sermon of Sayyidah Al-Zahra. The book concluded with a short third section consisting of two lessons discussing the story of Fadak based on Imām Ṣādiq’s narration of the incident.^[3]

Al-Muntaẓarī does not dispute that Fadak was for Zahra; for him, this is a settled issue. However, the question he raises is: Why did the Prophet give Fadak to Zahra? He cites some historical and narrational evidence confirming that Fadak was part of the fa’i which belonged to Rasūlullah (s), meaning that the fighters had no right to these lands and properties, unlike the spoils of war, in which they had a right after paying its due share (khums).

In his book about the sermon of Lady Faṭimah and the incident of Fadak, Al-Muntaẓarī sheds light on a problem that had been raised by the communists—or others, as he put it—regarding Islam during that period. The issue was that the Prophet was a symbol of humility and asceticism, and his family lived in humility and asceticism, to the point of being an example for the Muslims. The Prophet had called on Muslims to live a modest life, so how could it be rational that he gave his daughter Fadak, a village that represented a massive financial source, at a time when many of the emigrants (muhājirūn) and helpers (anṣār) were suffering from poverty and difficult economic conditions?

This issue might have prompted Al-Muntaẓarī to reconsider the Fadak case from a different angle, one that aligns the results of his thinking with his political background. The central point in Al-Muntaẓarī’s analysis is that the Prophet did not give Fadak to Zahra “just because she was his daughter, but because her house was the dwelling of angels, the center for preserving the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and guaranteeing the future of the Ummah, which were among the most important public interests.” He (s) wanted to support the financial power of the House of Imāmah, and with this purpose, he gave Fadak to Faṭimah. This same purpose was also the reason why the usurpers took it from her. The demand for inheritance was secondary and merely an attempt to align with the situation, as can be seen by those who trace the details.^[4]

Therefore, in Al-Muntaẓarī’s analysis, giving Fadak to Faṭimah was not merely a gift from a father to his daughter, or as Al-Muntaẓarī puts it, “not in terms of personal emotions.” Nor was the taking of Fadak by the authorities after the Prophet’s death simply because they wanted to seize a piece of land from the daughter of the Prophet’s daughter. Rather, the matter was deeper than that. The Prophet gave her Fadak because he intended to strengthen the financial authority of the Ahlulbayt and the Imāmah after his passing. Thus, giving Fadak was a way of financing the Imāmah’s authority after the Prophet’s death, and Faṭimah was the means to achieve this goal, based on the idea that giving it to Ali might complicate matters, whereas giving it to Faṭimah would remove suspicions and achieve the purpose. As Al-Muntaẓarī explains: “He gave it to Faṭimah because she was the mother of the pure Imāms and the companion of the first of the executors. Perhaps her closeness to the Prophet would make it shameful to violate her honor. Emotions would prevent the theft of her right, but the hand of politics destroyed what the Prophet had established, and who knows what politics is?”^[5]

It seems that Al-Muntaẓarī is trying to say that the Prophet aimed to prevent those who would take power after him from unlawfully confiscating the assets of the Imāmah. If he gave Fadak to ‘Ali, it would be easier for them to seize it from him since they saw him as the leader of the opposing faction. However, giving it to Zahra—who was his daughter and the best of women in the world—carried an emotional weight that could create a psychological barrier for Muslims, preventing the authorities from taking this land.

For this reason, Al-Muntaẓarī believes that the Prophet did not give Faṭimah only from the wealth of the fa’i. History shows that he gave similar land to many other Muslims, including Abu Bakr, Abdul Rahman bin Awf, and others from the land of Banu al-Naḍīr. In fact, even Abu Bakr himself gave some lands from the fa’i to Muslims such as Al-Zubayr and ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb. This led Al-Muntaẓarī to conclude that the dispute between the authorities and Faṭimah was not about the land of Fadak as a prophetic gift from the fa’i, but rather because Abu Bakr saw this land as a financial resource for ‘Ali’s faction, and thus it was necessary to dry up the financial resources of the opposition.

In this way, Al-Muntaẓarī understands the connection between the Fadak story and the story of the Imāmah, rather than a story about the Prophet and Faṭimah. Giving Fadak to Faṭimah, according to Al-Muntaẓarī, was “to support the House of Imāmah,” as if the Prophet was anticipating problems after his death and worked on securing the financial resource for the Imāmah through Faṭimah.

But what are the main proofs that Al-Muntaẓarī presented to confirm this idea?

Al-Muntazari attempted to provide some evidence to support this concept, including:

The first proof: Al-Muntaẓarī offered a dual-element approach. In the Fadak issue, there are two main elements presented by hadith and history books and the reasons for revelation:

The first element: The Prophet’s giving of Fadak to Faṭimah occurred after the revelation of the verse: “And give to the near kin his due” (Al-Isra: 26).

The second element: The majority of Shi’a scholars—except for a few—agree that “the near kin” mentioned in this verse refers to the Imām. Some narrations also support this interpretation.

By combining these two elements, Al-Muntaẓarī concluded that the giving of Fadak was in response to the command of this Qur’anic verse, and that the one who was truly given Fadak was the Imām. This cannot be understood except by saying that the giving of Fadak to Faṭimah was, in essence, a gift to the Imām through her, not to Faṭimah in her personal capacity.

Al-Muntazari states: “What supports what we have mentioned regarding the connection of the Fadak issue with the topic of caliphate and Imāmah, and that giving it to Faṭimah was for supporting the Imāmah and not due to personal emotions, is what is mentioned about the giving of Fadak occurring after the revelation of the verse: ‘And give to the near kin his due.’ Our Shi’a scholars, except for a few, have agreed that the ‘near kin’ refers to the Imām, as also explained in some narrations.”^[6]

It is clear that Al-Muntaẓarī does not possess a direct historical or ḥadīth text that explicitly reveals the Prophet’s intention behind giving Fadak to Faṭimah. However, through his interpretation of hadith and historical texts, he seeks to arrive at a different conclusion from the mainstream view.

The second proof: Some narrations from later Imāms indicate that Fadak was not just a piece of land but rather a symbol of what belongs to the Imām and his authority over the lands. These narrations suggest that all Muslim lands are considered Fadak, and this has no meaning if we understand Fadak as merely a personal gift to Lady Faṭimah. Rather, these narrations bridge Fadak to the Imām’s authority over the lands, emphasizing that it was much larger than simply a gift from the Prophet to his daughter.

Al-Muntaẓarī refers to the following two narrations to support his argument:^[7]

The first narration: Ibn Shahr Ashūb mentions in his Manāqib Aale Abū Ṭālib that Harun al-Rashid said to Musa ibn Ja’far (Imām al-Kadhim), “Take Fadak, and I will return it to you.” Imām Musa ibn Ja’far refused, and when Harun insisted, the Imām responded, “I will only take it with its boundaries.” Harun asked, “What are its boundaries?” The Imām replied, “The first boundary is Aden,” which caused Harun’s face to change color. “The second boundary is Samarkand,” and Harun’s face darkened further. “The third is Africa,” causing his face to turn black. “The fourth is the sea sword near the islands and Armenia.” At this point, Harun exclaimed, “There is nothing left for us.” Imām Musa then said, “I told you, if I defined it, you would not return it.” Harun then resolved to kill him.^[8]

The second narration: ‘Ali ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullah relates that when Imām Musa al-Kadhim visited al-Mahdi, he saw him returning the wrongs of the people. Imām Musa asked, “O Commander of the Faithful, why is our wrong not returned?” Al-Mahdi asked, “What do you mean?” Imām Musa responded, “When Allah opened Fadak for His Prophet and it was not taken by cavalry or camels, He revealed to the Prophet the verse: ‘And give to the near kin his due.’ The Prophet did not know whom it referred to, so he consulted Jibraīl, who then consulted his Lord, and Allah revealed that Fadak should be given to Faṭimah. The Prophet called her and said: ‘O Faṭimah, Allah has commanded me to give you Fadak.’ She said: ‘I accept, O Messenger of Allah, from Allah and from you.’ Her agents managed Fadak during the lifetime of the Prophet, but when Abu Bakr became the leader, he removed her agents.’” Imām Musa continued, “The boundaries of Fadak are: one boundary is Mount Uhud, another is the edge of Egypt, another is the sea sword (the coastline), and another is Dumat al-Jandal.” Al-Mahdi responded, “That’s a lot. I will consider it.”^[9]

These narrations, as cited by Al-Muntaẓarī, help support his argument that Fadak represents the Imām’s authority over all lands, not just a personal inheritance for Lady Faṭimah.

The third proof: This refers to the letter of Imām ‘Ali to ‘Uthmān ibn Ḥunayf Al-Anṣarī, who was his governor in Basra, when he learned that ‘Uthmān had been invited to a feast by some of the people there. The letter states: “Yes, Fadak was in our possession, from everything under the sky. But the souls of some people were greedy for it, while others were indifferent to it. And how excellent a judge is Allah. What use do I have for Fadak or anything else, when tomorrow my body will be in the grave?”^[10]

In this statement by Imām ‘Ali, “It was in our hands” implies his control over Fadak, rather than its ownership. One would not typically say “this farm was in my hands” to mean it was owned by them; rather, one would say, “this farm was mine.” Therefore, the phrase suggests Imām ‘Ali’s authority over Fadak, which aligns with the understanding that Fadak belonged to the Imāmah, not to personal property.

In conclusion, Al-Muntaẓarī reinterprets the Fadak issue in the context of the financial assets of the Imāmah position rather than as personal property. He also removes the notion of ownership of Fadak from Lady Faṭimah, presenting her merely as a conduit through which the Prophet ensured the financial resources for the Imāmah after his passing.

The Second Section: A glance at some reactions to Muntaẓarī’s analysis

The ideas presented by Muntaẓarī regarding Fadak and other matters caused confusion within religious and political circles in Iran during the 1970s and 1980s. However, Muntaẓarī’s scientific, religious, and political influence at the time, as well as his position as the anticipated successor to Imām Khomeini, prevented these criticisms from turning into a massive wave that could overthrow him, so they remained somewhat suppressed.

The events surrounding the trial of Dr. Ahmad Mahdavi Damghani (2022), according to his account, reveal that the judiciary was used to exert further pressure on Damghani due to his criticism of Muntaẓarī’s position on Fadak. Damghani attempted to critique Muntaẓarī in the class he was teaching at the Faculty of Arts at Tehran University in 1980. Damghani relied on teaching the text of “Al-Shāfi’ fi al-Imāmah” by Sayyid Al-Murtaḍā (436 AH) in his discussion about Fadak, implicitly presenting a critical reading of Muntaẓarī’s views at the university. This was considered an insult to Shaykh Muntaẓarī by the other side, and one of the students recorded Damghani’s comments and submitted the recorded tape to security authorities, which, according to him, led to pressure being applied on him even during the trial.

This story helps us understand why the campaign against Muntaẓarī was not widespread and public among the religious groups. It reveals that his influence and position within the seminary and the political establishment were so significant that pressure was applied on those attempting to confront him.

Sayyid Aḥmad Khomeini mentions in his book “Ranjnameh”, which discusses the events that occurred with Muntaẓarī, that some of Imām Khomeini’s followers were hostile toward him, stemming from the “eternal martyr” story, the “Fadak” issue, and the ‘Mahdi Hashemi’ story. He tells Muntaẓarī: “For this reason, we asked you not to allow Na’matullah Salehi Najafabadi to give lessons in your Ḥusayniyyah, but you refused to cooperate on this matter.”^[11]

This text shows that there was discontent against Muntaẓarī within religious and political circles during that period, based on some of his intellectual stances, not just his political positions. Even within the faction loyal to Imām Khomeini, there was division over Muntaẓarī due to his intellectual positions, including his stance on Fadak.

The issue did not stop being discussed in some circles here and there, and even in a fatwa response about the matter dated 2006, Muntaẓarī denied saying that Fadak was not for Faṭimah, asserting that this was a lie and slander against him. He confirmed that Fadak belonged to Faṭimah, but the reason it was given to her was because she was the wife of the Imām and the mother of the Imāms, reiterating his view in other instances.

Some of Muntaẓarī’s opponents believe that what happened to him in his later life was due to his opposition to Faṭimah and was a form of vengeance on her behalf.

Many have said that Muntaẓarī’s idea came within the context of his projects for Islamic unity. However, this claim is inaccurate. Muntaẓarī, in presenting this topic, did not have the idea of Islamic unity in mind. Yes, he may have said not to stir up controversial issues, but this analysis of the Fadak issue is not related to Islamic unity.

The Third Section: Analysis of the causes of the dispute

Away from the exchanged statements between the parties to the discussion here, we can analyze the causes of the tension that arose as a result of Muntaẓarī’s position on the issue of Fadak by saying that Muntaẓarī does not deny the rightful claim of the Ahlulbayt to Fadak, nor does he deny that others usurped Fadak from its rightful owners. So, where does the problem lie with him and his way of analyzing the situation?

The core problem lies in the following:

A – Muntaẓarī is known for attempting to reframe many issues related to the Ahlulbayt within a political context. He was one of those who worked in the modern era to make many of the Imāms’ powers or prerogatives linked to the position of the Imāmah rather than the person of the Imām. This dispute is not simple. For Muntaẓarī, it paves the way for the theory of Islamic authority during the occultation and strengthens the position of the Wilayat al-Faqih. However, from the perspective of his opponents, it raises concerns due to the marginalization of the Imāms’ personalities. What does that mean?

It means that when you say, for example, that the administration of the Islamic society was granted to the Imām not because he is divinely appointed and infallible, but because he is the most suitable person in his time, this implies that someone other than the Imām during the occultation, according to the Imāmi classification of history, will be granted the position of Imāmah. When you say that Friday prayers are obligatory during the occultation because the condition is not the presence of a divinely appointed and infallible Imām, but the presence of a just authority, this means detaching Friday prayers from the divinely appointed Imām and reconnecting it to the just authority, which could include non-infallible figures. Similarly, when you say that the offensive jihad (jihad al-ibtida’i) was given to the divinely appointed and infallible Imām due to his legitimate and just authority, not because of his infallibility, this means that the primary jihad is no longer exclusively linked to the person of the Imām. When you say that khums is not the personal property of the Prophet, the Imām, or the Hashemites, but rather belongs entirely to the position of Imāmah, it will automatically transition to the position of the Imām during the occultation, which is held by the just ruler. This way, we will no longer think of it as the personal property of the Prophet or his relatives.

This reconfiguration leads to detaching many matters from the exceptional characteristics of the Imāms to make the characteristic broader, namely, the just authority or just Imām, for whom the Ahlulbayt are the clearest and most prominent representatives, but not the exclusive representatives throughout history.

When we analyze Muntaẓarī’s treatment of the issue of Fadak, we discover that, from the perspective of his opponents, he has marginalized the personality of Faṭimah. Faṭimah, as Faṭimah Al-Zahra, does not have a specific privilege in being granted Fadak; rather, she was given Fadak because she was the mother of the Imāms and the wife of the Imām. Fadak was given to her to serve as a conduit for ensuring the financial resources flow to the position of the Imāmah and its project. It is highly likely that Muntaẓarī’s opponents were concerned with this mode of thinking because it transcends the personalities of the Imāms or their positions. If another ordinary woman had replaced Faṭimah, the Prophet might have given her Fadak to be a conduit for it reaching the Imām, not through his person, but as the one responsible for the position of Imāmah.

Notice Muntaẓarī’s fatwa mentioned earlier. He is accused of not considering Fadak as the property of Faṭimah, while Muntaẓarī insists that it belongs to her, but it was taken as a means (or a conduit) for the purpose of supporting the Imāmah, in the terminology of Islamic jurisprudence. His opponents understand Muntaẓarī as having removed any particular privilege from Faṭimah in this case, which they classify as a doctrinal and historical threat, thus diminishing one of Faṭimah’s characteristics and distinctions throughout history.

Various issues of political authority and the powers granted to the Ahlulbayt in the community — apart from their personal, inherent privileges — will no longer be restricted to them. Instead, they will be transferred to the hypothetical alternatives during the occultation period. This is what creates anxiety among the mainstream doctrinal current, as it feels that this approach diminishes the uniqueness of the Imāms.

This way of thinking, when applied to the issue of Fadak, means that the battle is not between Abu Bakr and Faṭimah as individuals, but rather between the non-real Imāmah and the real Imāmah. This process of abstraction is not liked by the supporters of the mainstream doctrinal current and appears, to them, concerning in its future ramifications. From the perspective of Muntaẓarī’s opponents, his interpretation might cancel the entire tragedy of the dispute between Faṭimah and Abu Bakr, as it no longer easily allows for talking about the usurpation of the right of the daughter of the Prophet. The essence of the matter transcends such a personal depiction; it is a political struggle over a “financial-political” issue par excellence.

Here the difference appears between Muntaẓarī’s approach as read by his opponents and the approach of Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr in his study of Fadak. Al-Ṣadr preserved the entire historical framework presented by the Shi’a regarding the issue of Fadak. However, the key change he introduced was that Faṭimah used her case for higher political purposes, namely supporting the cause of the Imāmah. She turned the dispute from one about the ownership of land into a political and doctrinal dispute that highlighted the injustices faced by her and the Ahlulbayt. From al-Ṣadr’s perspective, her demand for Fadak was a political means to demonstrate her and the Ahlulbāyt’s oppression and to expose the illegitimacy of the ruling authority. There is a difference between using your case to support the cause of the Imāmah and not having a cause at all, with the case instead being fundamentally about the assets of the Imāmah itself.

I would say: It is highly likely that Muntaẓarī’s opponents were concerned with this way of thinking, and perhaps they saw it as undermining the foundation of the tragedy of the dispute between Abu Bakr and Faṭimah.

B – Perhaps the opposition to Muntaẓarī also stemmed from another angle, and I urge attention to this point: there are two ways to criticize the authority that existed at that time (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman).

The First Method: Opening all the actions and works they did and criticizing them one by one. For example, ‘Umar changed a certain ruling, and we say that this is an ijtihād (independent reasoning) against the text. He did not distribute wealth equally, so we say this is also an ijtihād against the text, and so on. Using this method—which is the most common among the Imāmi Shi’a—the number of mistakes and crimes committed by the first three caliphs becomes enormous. This serves the sectarian dispute by strengthening one viewpoint over another.

The Second Method: To say that Abu Bakr, for instance, committed a major crime, which was the usurpation of the caliphate. However, based on his belief that he was the legitimate caliph, many of his actions can be justified as stemming from the authority of the caliph under the Fiqh Al-Maṣlaha (jurisprudence of public interest). Just as the proponents of absolute Wilayah Al-Faqih today say that the ruler can suspend Ḥajj if he sees a benefit in it, similarly, one can defend ‘Umar ibn Al-Khattāb for stopping the allocation of the share to those whose hearts were to be reconciled (mu’allafatu qulubuhum), based on the idea that this wealth is public property. Thus, its decision lies in the hands of the governor, according to what he deems beneficial for the Muslims. Here, he may err or be correct in his decision, but in any case, he has the right to make such decisions.

The opponents of Muntaẓarī considered—most likely, and here we are analyzing—that Muntaẓarī’s way of analyzing the issue implied acknowledging that this wealth, meaning the land of Fadak, belonged to the state and not to Sayyidah Zahra personally. It was, in essence, collective rather than individual ownership. Thus, Abu Bakr exercised his natural right to confiscate this wealth as he was the legitimate guardian of the state’s wealth. His crime lay in usurping the position of Imāmah, but if we overlook this, his actions, in this case, were correct in themselves, or at least a Sunni could justify and validate them based on Muntaẓarī’s argument. This would open the door to justifying some of the caliphs’ actions and assist other sects in making our criticism of the caliphs less solid and less forceful.

In contrast to all these concerns, Muntaẓarī and his supporters do not see what he said as a cause for worry at all. On one hand, he preserved Sayyidah Zahra’s ownership of Fadak while, at the same time, understanding this ownership as a tripartite relationship between the Prophet, Faṭimah, and the Imāmah. This removes the accusation of communism from the Prophet—on one level—and explains the reason for giving such abundant wealth to his daughter. It also helps us understand—on another level—the Prophet’s plans for the posthumous phase in establishing the project of Imāmah.

This diversity in approaching issues when analyzing history and the biography of the Prophet and the Ahlulbayt is what interests me here. A single historical event may be agreed upon by two individuals, yet they differ in how they understand it, and define its dimensions, motives, and origins. This is the cornerstone of what is known as the analytical study of the biography, as opposed to a purely narrative historical study.

That being said, Muntaẓarī’s critics were not all of a single intellectual tendency. Rather, figures from within the reformist religious thought also criticized Muntaẓarī’s interpretation. One such example is the analysis of researcher Hassan Yousufi Ashkouri regarding the issue of Fadak. In a study titled “Daastaan Fadak” (The Story of Fadak) published on the “Zaytoon” website, Ashkouri criticized a range of interpretations, including Muntaẓarī’s. He argued that Muntaẓarī’s interpretation offers no rational or textual evidence but rather relies purely on assumptions and religious-ideological beliefs, such as infallibility and divine foreknowledge.

A Final Word

To conclude, I wish to emphasize that I am not aiming to side with one group or the other, even though I believe that Shaykh Muntaẓarī’s argument requires further depth. The evidence he presented is insufficient, especially since a considerable portion of the historical texts he relied upon is subject to extensive debate regarding its historical validity—such as the narrations of Ibn Shahr Ashūb and Al-Kāfī—and its implications. For instance, the phrase “Fadak was in our hands” is not explicitly clear in negating individual ownership and affirming authority. I am not delving into a jurisprudential analysis of this matter here, but it is worth noting that some of the texts he cited contain contradictions among themselves.

What we need most today is an appreciation for the beauty of analytical diversity in studying history and the biography of the Prophet and Ahlulbayt in the modern era. Scholars and thinkers have, to a significant extent, moved beyond the traditional narrative frameworks toward varied interpretations stemming from different intellectual contexts. We hope this trend continues to grow, leading to a more mature understanding of history, God willing.

To conclude this article, I will mention a story which was shared with me personally by a respected scholar. According to him (the scholar)—though the accuracy of the account rests with the narrator and God knows best—one of the senior living jurists in Qum was asked, during the mid-1990s while performing Ḥajj, whether Shaykh Muntaẓarī or Sayyid Sistani was the most knowledgeable. The jurist responded that Shaykh Muntaẓarī had greater integration and expertise in understanding the ethos of the Imāms and the essence of Shi’ism.

Although this jurist was not a supporter of the concept of Wilayat Al-Faqih and was neither a student nor a follower of Shaykh Muntaẓarī—being instead closer to the intellectual school of Sayyid Sistani—his description might seem surprising to many. However, it is, in the end, a viewpoint that we must consider before hastily passing judgment on individuals.

Through sharing this story, it is aimed to stress the importance of refraining from rushing to judge others or accusing them of being distant from the understanding of the Ahlulbayt or the spirit of Shi’ism. Such statements should not be made hastily, no matter how strange or unfamiliar an idea may seem to us. Instead, we should approach it with an appreciation for diversity.

References

^[1] This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Shaykh Dr. Haidar Ḥobbollah at the “Al-Multaqa” Forum via Zoom on 16-12-2024. The report was written with the assistance of Sayyid Ayman Abdul Zahra Al-Musawi and later reviewed and edited by Shaykh Ḥobbollah, who added some modifications and additions.

^[2] Because the land of Fadak was given to the Prophet by the Jews after the events of Khaybar as part of a reconciliation agreement between the Jews and the Prophet, making it part of the fay’ (public property acquired without combat).

^[3] ‘Ilal al-Shāra’i, v.1, pg.191 https://lib.eshia.ir/10107/1/191

^[4] Dirāsāt Fi Wilayah Al-Faqih Wa Fiqh Al-Dhawlah al-Islāmiyyah, v.3, pg.331 https://lib.eshia.ir/15296/3/331

^[5] ibid. v.3, pg.332 https://lib.eshia.ir/15296/3/332

^[6] ibid. v.3, pg.332 https://lib.eshia.ir/15296/3/332

^[7] ibid, v.3, pg.332-333 https://lib.eshia.ir/15296/3/332

^[8] Manāqib Aale Abū Ṭālib, v.3, pg.435 https://lib.eshia.ir/16066/3/435

^[9] Al-Kāfī, v.1, pg. 543 https://ar.lib.eshia.ir/11005/1/543

^[10] Nahj Al-Balāghah, letter 45 Letter to Uthmān bin Ḥunayf

^[11] Ranjnameh, pg.14