The Path to Civilization Passes Through the Gateway of Rationality

This is an interview conducted with Dr. Ghasem Pourhasan Darzi is an associate professor in the Philosophy Department at Allamah Tabataba’i University. His research primarily focuses on Islamic philosophy, hermeneutics, and philosophy of religion.


Let’s begin our discussion by defining civilization. Given the various definitions that exist, what is your view and interpretation of this concept?

We have approximately seven different approaches to defining civilization, and from these, multiple definitions arise. For example, if you define civilization from a “history-centered” perspective, it will differ from definitions based on an “essence-centered,” “geography-centered,” or “purpose-centered” approach. Nevertheless, the result and logical process of defining civilization can be summarized in a general and shared definition as the “highest state of knowledge.” This is an extremely broad sense of civilization: if a society reaches the highest level of knowledge (in its broadest sense), we say that society possesses civilization. This is the current definition.

In the West, the definition of civilization began with Hegel and Herder. Hegel’s definition of civilization is “the dialectical accumulation of reason,” meaning there must be various periods of historical action and conflict that, over a long process, lead to the emergence of the “state.” Therefore, in Hegel’s view, whenever a state emerges, civilization is present. For Hegel, civilization is synonymous with the emergence of the state. However, today, one cannot adhere strictly to this definition.

So, when we speak of “civilization,” we need to clarify within which intellectual framework we are situated. If we adopt the dominant Western perspective, which equates civilization with power and technology, it becomes impossible to build a new “world order” or a new civilization. This is because, according to Hegel, Fukuyama, and Popper, we are living in the “end period.” That is, Western reason began a dialectical process and has now reached its end; thus, it is meaningless for any country to claim that it wants to build a new world order, which would imply a new civilization. This impossibility arises from a flawed definition of civilization (equating it with technology). Therefore, we must understand that the highest state is not necessarily technology; it could be ethics, culture, etc. Thus, if we want to define civilization now, we cannot use the same definition used in the 18th and 19th centuries or even in the early 20th century. Popper, in The Open Society and Its Enemies, claims that America is the ideal manifestation of democracy and the culmination of Western civilization. However, if he were here now, he would likely retract this statement, as he gradually began to critique his own views.

We sometimes adhere to a single definition of civilization and then question whether this definition is history-centered, state-centered, or geography-centered. In a geography-centered view, Huntington, within the school of geographic determinism, states in The Clash of Civilizations that there are seven types of civilizations, basing his definition on geography. Sometimes he includes religion and claims that the geography of Western Europe and North America forms a single civilizational domain encompassing Catholics and Protestants. He also outlines an Islamic civilizational domain, explaining its geography, and believes that other civilizational domains are insignificant, as the future clash of civilizations will be between the West and Islam. Therefore, when he speaks of civilization, he is within a geographic determinism framework. Followers of this school believe that only one geography can create civilization: the geography of the West. Hegel, Heidegger, and others believed that philosophy and rationality were the foundations of civilization, while Huntington contends that the ultimate goal of philosophy and rationality is only achievable in the West. According to this approach, no other land, ethnicity, or intellectual group is capable of free rational thought and thus cannot bring about a new world order or a new definition of civilization. For this reason, I reject the notion of adhering to a single definition of civilization and believe that the civilization of the future will be culture-centered and ethics-centered. If I were to present a general definition of civilization, it would be one that encompasses the highest state of knowledge, including ethics, culture, and collective human life, while also being oriented toward the future.

How do you assess the relationship between civilization and culture? Some thinkers see a general-specific relationship between these two concepts, while others do not. What is your opinion on this matter?

Unfortunately, there was a misunderstanding at the outset of discussions on defining civilization among our thinkers, rooted in Western thought. This stems from the fact that the first discussions on civilization and the concept of civilization in the Islamic world took place in Egypt about 200 years ago. Due to Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt by France, French traditions entered Egypt and then spread to the Islamic world. Consequently, Egyptian thinkers adopted Western concepts, and due to their influence on the geographic regions of Iran and the Indian subcontinent, all the discussions initiated by figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Ali Abdul Raziq (in Egypt) spread to the subcontinent and Iran. For this reason, Iranian thinkers influenced by the Egyptian sphere—such as the late Bazargan, the late Taleqani, the late Shariati, and Shahid Murtaza Motahhari—did not adhere to such a distinction between civilization and culture.

This was because, in the West, the “soft” aspects of civilization were viewed as “culture,” while the “instrumental” and “hardware” aspects were seen as “civilization.” This is a misunderstanding that has persisted to this day, and even the debates and efforts of Allamah Jafari on civilization were based on this distinction. However, this distinction is fundamentally incorrect, as it cannot define or shape any aspect of civilization or culture. It is not accurate to say that societies possess culture but either do or do not culminate in civilization. If they do reach civilization, we would say they have both culture and civilization; if they do not, we would say they have culture but lack civilization.

This definition from the West views civilization as a stage of progression beyond culture—an advanced stage that reaches the “hardware” level, which today includes technology. Based on this definition, only a few societies achieve civilization. As Hegel states: “Any society that cannot move beyond culture and reach the formation of the state lacks civilization. Such societies, however rich their culture may be, cannot bring forth civilization.” This is an entirely imported and erroneous understanding from the West.

How do these relationships between civilization, culture, ethics, and so forth, fit into the definition you provided?

When we say “civilization is the highest state,” it implies that within civilization, a society may or may not possess a foundation of culture and ethics, and may or may not have a foundation of human relations. Freud, in his book Civilization and Its Discontents, states that Western civilization is merely a form of double repression. It has a discipline oriented toward technology and science, but if you think this technology represents the complete emergence of culture and ethics, that is entirely incorrect, because Western civilization is fundamentally based on mere repression in its relationships. Marx raises the same point in The German Ideology and Das Kapital, where he claims Western civilization led to alienation. Despite its advancements and welfare, it represses, without embodying true culture or ethics! This is the paradoxical state of Western civilization: its highest state of knowledge is solely based on technological advancement. In other words, Western civilization is the result of a superior technological status in today’s world. Today, if the West did not possess this technology, no one would regard it as a “superior civilization,” as it lacks the other foundational elements. In contrast, the East (including Iran) holds this capacity for human elements. This is the reality of the capitalist system. I am not saying the capitalist system is entirely wrong; no! Capitalism progressed in such a way that, as critics say, it led to alienation, widened distances, and caused repression. The reason is that it distanced itself from ethics, justice, and culture! Therefore, our fundamental understanding of civilization and what definition we adopt for it is incredibly important.

Based on this, I believe that if a civilization is to take shape in the future, its human dimension must be the most important aspect. That is, it should not lead to the alienation of humans from their instincts and essential human foundations, and it is our duty to develop an entirely different discussion regarding the definition of civilization. It’s not necessary that any civilization that arises should resemble Western civilization. Civilizations are unique and unparalleled, so each society, if it possesses effort and struggle, can bring about civilization through a process.

When the Islamic Revolution happened, we suddenly became aware that the Western world is merely one world among others, not the entire world! And we realized we could exist within a different world order (other than the West). This awareness has not occurred in many Islamic countries. For example, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey have Western-style cities, but do they possess civilization? No! They merely have buildings and structures, not civilization! If these buildings and facilities were taken from them, they would not have independently contributed to science. More importantly, they are not even aware that they exist under the umbrella of the West, which prevents them from standing outside it, critically analyzing it, and realizing whether they need to be within it or think about creating a new world order.

I’m not saying we can create a new civilization right now; civilization is not a formula that can be made on demand, but rather our endless endeavor. Just as in the history of Islam, figures like Farabi, Avicenna, and other thinkers like Biruni began a continuous effort and built Islamic civilization. At that time, Arabia had no prior civilizational foundation; it was merely a religion called Islam that emerged there. For this reason, you don’t see any 200 or 300-year-old intellectual effort within Arabia leading to the emergence of science and civilization. Instead, it was the interpretation of Islam by Iranians and other ethnicities that shaped the early Islamic civilization. In fact, the caliphate was an obstacle to civilization, persecuting all intellectuals, and those who created civilization were, in many cases, in opposition to the caliphate.

So, do you consider today’s Salafism to be, in its approach, an heir to the early Islamic caliphates?

Yes, precisely. For this reason, the dominance of that same mindset over parts of the Arab world still prevents them from entering the civilizational sphere. Some parts of the Arab world, from the past until now, have been entrenched in Salafism—that is, figures like Hasan al-Banna, Rashid Rida, Sayyid Qutb, and Muhammad Abduh are all part of Salafism in the sense of the “pious predecessors of the first 100 years.” These 100 years merely witnessed territorial expansion without any formation of civilization!

Islamic civilization, in essence, developed outside of official power and the Hanbali sphere in Arabia or the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. The efforts to establish civilization began around the year 300 AH when thinkers like Farabi initiated rational questioning. I discuss this in my book A New Reading of Farabi’s Philosophy: A Fundamental Epistemic Break from the Greek Tradition. In the seventh chapter, I mention that Farabi believed that religion (without rational questioning) could exist in a place like Arabia but would gradually turn into “anti-religion” (ignorance), as it lacks any rational questioning. Therefore, the emergence of Salafism and ISIS represents this anti-religion, in complete contradiction to the teachings of the Prophet (p), where humanity is entirely forgotten.

Civilization emerges through shared contributions to knowledge. Iranian thinkers of that time studied and translated other traditions (such as Greek, Roman, Alexandrian, Antiochian, and Syriac traditions). In The Virtuous City, Farabi, based in the heart of Baghdad, speaks out against the caliphate, arguing that this structure leads to misery and ignorance, creating a depraved and misguided society! He believes that a virtuous society is based on rational thought, which is absent in Salafism, Hanbalism, Wahhabism, or Ottomanism. This is why he was compelled to leave eight years later.

The reason Turkey today cannot initiate a new civilization is that it racially aligns itself with reviving the “Ottoman Caliphate.” Similarly, Saudi Arabia is tied to “Hijaz,” and the UAE to “Arabism.” Meanwhile, Iranian thinkers did not identify with “Iranian-ness” but rather with a humanistic perspective embedded in Islam! The project of Farabi, Avicenna, Biruni, Khwaja Nasir, and others was a project of “Islamic knowledge”—knowledge that Muslims could create, study, critique, assimilate, and then present anew. Yet, I must emphasize again that creating civilization is not a matter of choice; you cannot simply decide to build a civilization. Building civilization is akin to participating in knowledge, and knowledge has its own discipline; it is a continuous and evolving process.

As you mentioned, the concept of civilization is a modern concept created within Western society. It wasn’t a concept that, for instance, Farabi consciously set out to build. Instead, Muslims of that time derived an idea from Islam, combined it with the knowledge of Iranians and other Muslims across the Islamic world (from the southern islands of the Philippines to Andalusia), and never thought they were creating something that would later be called “Islamic civilization.” They were simply living their everyday lives, but when we now look back from another era, we say, “From such-and-such century, these features and structures were characteristics of Islamic civilization.” This aligns with your view that “civilization is not a blueprint.” However, the point here is that humanity in the 21st century has developed self-awareness regarding the concept of “civilization.” In this case, can we not reconsider the role and agency of humanity in creating a civilization?

Look, it’s not as though Western thinkers (from Machiavelli to Heidegger) consciously crafted a predetermined plan for the rise of Western civilization. None of the debates of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, Luther, Calvin, Kant, or Hegel were based on a “civilizational blueprint.” This is true of all historical processes; each thinker makes individual efforts. But the question is whether there is a will and determination to establish a new state of affairs. This is the main issue. Farabi had the determination to create a new order; otherwise, he would not have questioned the existing state, asking if it led to true happiness or not. We see the same determination in Biruni, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and other Islamic thinkers, for whom this was the primary question. So, it’s not the case that Islamic thinkers made efforts unconsciously, while Western thinkers did so consciously with a predefined plan.

When I mentioned self-awareness regarding humanity’s agency in shaping civilization, I was referring to the future, not to Western civilization.

But your question implies that Islamic thinkers had no understanding of civilization, which would make their efforts isolated, whereas one might argue that a collective awareness exists in the present.

Another point is that the question of civilization is not a recent one; even in the works of Ibn Khaldun (from the late 8th and early 9th centuries), the question of civilization is evident. He discusses what thinkers like Farabi said about “what civilization means”: Is it passive or active? Is being “civilized by nature” based on human custom or inherent nature? Ibn Khaldun raises questions about social sciences, the emergence of cities, families, countries, societies, governance, and their cycles of rise and fall. So, while it is accurate to say that our understanding of modern civilization is recent, it is incorrect to say that past societies and thinkers had no understanding of civilization. Even in the earliest days of Sumerian civilization, there was an intention toward civilization, as evidenced by their engagement with collective relations, urbanization, and record-keeping. When you’re building an empire, you’re essentially building civilization. Xenophon, in The Education of Cyrus, says that if we want to establish a proper foundation for society, we should learn from Iran, as they have structured their society correctly. This shows that the Greeks were eager to associate themselves with Iran, believing that Iran had developed principles for a better life that Athens and Sparta lacked. This demonstrates the Iranians’ intention to shape a civilization. So it’s not as though humanity blindly stumbled into “building” something; civilization does not emerge accidentally without intentional thought about a new order and change.

The first stage is your determination, the second is the question you are asking, and the third is the horizon you want to create.

All the thinkers we see in the Islamic era sought to create a new horizon; that’s why they asked questions about humanity and its happiness. We don’t fully understand our own civilization because we haven’t read our heritage and are disconnected from it, but the West has studied its past heritage and, having done so, says, “Our heritage is Hellenistic”—we’ve been in dialogue with Greece for 2,500 years. This is why you see multiple interpretations in the West, and they refer to Greece, Rome, Alexandria, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the 18th century, and so on. Could Kant have written What Is Enlightenment? without the questions posed during the Renaissance? Why didn’t this happen during the Middle Ages? Why didn’t Anselm, Aquinas, or Albertus Magnus write about enlightenment? Because the conditions weren’t yet established; it was the Renaissance that set the stage for the Enlightenment.

As I said, the issue of civilization is multi-faceted; it is not a formula that you can apply to create civilization. This multifaceted nature arises from the complexity of civilization’s emergence. Even ethics can play a role in it, which may have been overlooked in the past. Therefore, it’s a profoundly important rational and philosophical discussion: if a society does not question its heritage and only wants to return to its past, that society lacks the ability to question civilization and a new order, and it cannot think about the future or understand its relationship with its heritage. This isn’t about ethnic or racial superiority; this mindset existed in early Islamic Iran. Orhan Pamuk, the Turkish Nobel laureate in literature, says, “The difference between Iranians and Muslims in other Islamic countries is that you can tell someone is Iranian because they refer back to their tradition and recite poetry rooted in their heritage. In Turkey, what would we recite to say we are Turkish? In Saudi Arabia, what would we recite to claim we belong to a historical heritage?”

So, it’s a mistake to think that modernity arose by discarding and completely severing from Western heritage. Rather, modernity, in a reasoned way, questioned its heritage, asking where its weaknesses were and where its strengths could lie. It’s no coincidence that if you want to study in a philosophy department in the West, you’re told to study Greece first, then proceed; this illustrates the importance of heritage.

Thus, when we talk about civilization, we should recognize that this topic has always been questioned in Iranian society. For 400 years, we questioned civilization, the new order, and rationality, until we finally reached a point where Ibn Khaldun gave a comprehensive report on those 400 years, discussing the reasons for our elevation and what led to our decline. There must be an elevated state to experience decline, and he questions whether we can rise from this state of decline. In other words, we have been asking these questions for 600 years since the time of Ibn Khaldun.

It’s natural that without rational questioning, we cannot enter a new phase. This fundamental questioning has always existed among Iranian thinkers. This is why I believe that if Iran can fundamentally question civilization based on its rational heritage, as in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th centuries AH, it can expand across the Islamic world. Iran has the potential to spread rationality within the Islamic world. I recently discussed this in an article titled Iran’s Role in the Future of Peace.

Wisdom requires a foundation. Wisdom is what enables discussion about humanity and the ideal human condition. If you are outside of wisdom, you cannot truly concern yourself with ethics, peace, or humanity; instead, your concerns will inevitably involve conflict. What we see today in the West, particularly in America, is a growing focus on conflict and division, which contrasts with what we envisioned from Kant’s mission of enlightenment or his Perpetual Peace. In any case, my point is that other Islamic countries are not necessarily excluded from rationality, but without a determination for rationality, they cannot achieve it.

So, in essence, you believe that the starting point of civilization formation is, first, a self-awareness of what a nation is, and second, a determination to move towards what they want to become. Is that correct?

Exactly! And thirdly, they need to engage in rationality because it is through critical questioning that they can analyze the current situation and explore a path forward with a view to the future.

And does this process not also require the formation of a culture?

That’s fine; if by culture you mean it in the broad sense, then yes. This culture could be “rationality,” it could be “identity,” or it could be your relationship with past heritage or your concern for the future. This is the general meaning of what we call progressive culture, implying a desire for a new worldview, a new order, and a new context.

So, based on this, wouldn’t it be accurate to say that civilization is built upon culture? For instance, if a culture of “I am a Muslim” takes shape within a society, it will eventually lead to behaviours, structures, knowledge, and all the relations necessary for an Islamic civilization. This seems to conflict with your statement that “culture” and “civilization” are independent of each other.

There is a difference between being independent and being completely separate. I didn’t mean that the realms of culture and civilization are separate. It’s similar to how mathematics is independent of physics, yet there is a significant exchange between them. These should not be confused. In the West today, religion and customs are two independent spheres, yet they are intricately intertwined. So, independence does not mean separation; rather, it means that there can be mutual exchange and influence.

I want to add something to the point you made, which is that the beginning of civilization formation does not belong to the general public; it starts with the elite—specifically, the intellectual elite, not the executive elite. Throughout the history of civilizations, it has always been the intellectual elite who initiated the process, and then society followed. So, we should not have the mindset that our society is unprepared to build an elevated culture. Not at all. Society follows its intellectuals, and at present, among the Iranian (and even broader Islamic) intellectuals, there is a questioning of the new order. Even Jabri, who critiques Arab rationality, raises questions about the future, albeit in a flawed way (since he views it from a racial perspective). No, the foundation of a civilizational idea for humanity’s future must be based on a “purpose-oriented” and “functionalist” approach, which seeks to address the deficiencies, alienations, and repressions within the aims of human civilization. Otherwise, it will create a civilization that is even darker and more inhumane than the existing one. Izutsu warns about this, saying that we must recognize that Western civilization is currently globalizing and that we should be wary of this globalization. Tashihiro Tashiro also argues that Western culture can lead to the destruction of cultures, ethics, and diverse worldviews.

Therefore, the initiation of a civilization, or the appearance of one, because it requires the highest and most complex understanding, begins with the intellectual elite. At the same time, the general public can participate and contribute as followers of the elite’s understanding.

What do you consider to be the most important factors in the formation of civilization during the early Islamic centuries?

We have two different perspectives on the emergence of Islamic civilization and several conflicting views on the causes of its decline. The first perspective is that the only foundation of Islamic civilization is intellectual life, specifically the philosophical movement. In this view, from the beginning of the 4th century AH, the philosophical movement deepened and spread, leading to the emergence of science, wisdom, art, and culture, which formed Islamic civilization. When this intellectual movement disappeared, the civilization also declined. This is a simple and reductive understanding of civilization’s emergence, while history, intellectual developments, and social transformations are far from simple.

The second perspective holds that Islamic civilization developed in three distinct stages (what I call a processual approach) and that, as each of these stages diminished, so too did the foundational factors of Islamic civilization. The first stage pertains to the first 100 years, often referred to as the “Pious Predecessors,” the “foundational century,” or the “prophetic and caliphal era.” This is the period when religious teachings were established, the Revelation was solidified, and, through adherence to the Qur’an and Sunnah, a new experience of life was introduced to society. These elements laid the foundation of Muslim life and a civilization with an Islamic identity. So, this foundation did not emerge only in the 3rd century.

While it’s true that we don’t see explicit rational debates about civilization in the first period, we can observe the effort to implement these teachings in life and society as a kind of “experience”—for example, the “Prophetic experience” in Medina, in Mecca, among the Muslims, and in their interactions with the Persian and Roman Empires. These experiences helped Muslims reflect on how to understand religious teachings. This period laid the groundwork for what we later recognize as the core teachings of Islam. I do not, however, agree with the narrow and literalist understanding that the Hanbalis have of this era. On the contrary, I believe that part of the Muslim struggle and effort was intellectual. Evidence for this is found in the rational questions posed within Imamiyyah thought between the years 60 to 100 AH. During these hundred years, Muslims were questioning governance, social structure, and the situation of the new human being, although these questions were internal and not yet influenced by external theological and philosophical debates.

The second stage is one of interaction with other ideas, spanning the 2nd and 3rd centuries AH, which saw the emergence of theological schools, including the Mu’tazilites—a rationalist movement—continuing until around the year 300 AH and ultimately leading to Ash’arite thought. During these two centuries, with the rise of rational and theological questions, tensions grew between legalistic and theological perspectives. This period also saw the translation movement, exposing Muslims to other civilizations and various intellectual traditions. Therefore, the second stage was a period of familiarization with others, absorption of ideas, assimilation, and attempts to structure a new body of thought.

If we examine the 2nd and 3rd centuries AH, we see the degree to which Persian wisdom, Mesopotamian wisdom, Egyptian wisdom, Eastern philosophy, Greek philosophy, and religious debates from Christianity and Zoroastrianism had penetrated Muslim society. This is why, when we talk about Islamic civilization at the start of the 4th century, it refers to a civilization that, over three hundred years, identified, engaged with, assimilated, analyzed, and made its own all of these ideas, ultimately synthesizing them in a form suitable to itself. This period saw no hesitation in drawing its raw materials and foundational elements from any culture or land. The distinctive feature of Islamic civilization during this time was its ability to draw from all of human reason.

Thus, we should not imagine that Islamic civilization was based solely on legal and hadith traditions but rather on the thought of individuals who made significant efforts to read, understand, analyze, and integrate knowledge. This is an important factor in the formation of Islamic civilization and indeed of all civilizations. Civilizations emerge through an integrated, cumulative process of interaction with other civilizations.

Regarding the decline of Islamic civilization, Hossein Nasr believes that the fall of early Islamic civilization was due to the rise of a new civilization, namely “Western civilization,” and that the efforts among Muslims to create a new Islamic civilization arose from their encounter with this “Other.” What is your opinion on this, and what do you consider to be the causes of the decline of the brilliant Islamic civilization in the early centuries of the Hijri calendar?

Understanding why we declined requires reading the history of Islamic civilization. If we consider the emergence of Western civilization to coincide with the Enlightenment, it generally started from the 16th century and specifically from the 18th century. This was a period when Western thinkers like Hobbes and Locke were grappling with concepts such as the “state of nature” and the “social state.” This effort, however, dates back to the 12th century, beginning with the conflict between the church (as the holder of religious power) and the emperors (representing secular and political power). The transformations that took place in the West from the 12th to the 14th century were extremely important. For example, in the 12th century, the emperor was subordinate to the Pope, and the Pope, due to the emperor’s insubordination, ordered his execution. By the 14th century, however, the opposite occurred, with the emperor ordering the Pope’s execution and relocating the Papal center from Italy. Thus, in the West, we have several periods: from the 12th to 14th centuries, 14th to 16th centuries, and 16th to 18th centuries. They themselves divide it into five periods, recognizing that even the 18th century to the present is not a monolithic era. The key point we must consider is whether we had an Islamic civilization in the Islamic world during these periods.

The peak of what emerged as Islamic civilization belonged to the 4th and 5th Hijri centuries, with its origins going back to the 3rd century. In my view, Islamic civilization began to flourish when rationality rose exponentially. Before rationality developed in the Islamic world, we didn’t speak of an Islamic civilization but rather of religious teachings. Thus, until the year 300 AH, we observe the growth of sects, schools, and theological debates between them, along with some rational theological inquiries. However, once rational and philosophical questions, as well as inquiries into science, began to emerge, civilization also appeared and continued until the 5th century.

In the late 5th century, with the rise of Hanbali and Ash’ari thought, we see opposition to rational and philosophical currents, with the growth of literalist jurisprudential and theological trends. I don’t necessarily view the Ash’arite school as entirely opposed to reason, but there is opposition to philosophical rationality. This very opposition to philosophical rationality marks the beginning of the decline of Islamic civilization. Thus, the decline of Islamic civilization is not necessarily linked to our encounter with the West; in fact, when the West was beginning to take shape, corresponding to the 11th century AH, we had the Isfahan School—an intellectual school that was later continued by Mulla Abdullah Zanuzi and transformed into the Tehran School. Hossein Nasr himself refers to the Isfahan School as a rational-religious school, citing Mir Damad and noting, “The titles of Mir Damad’s books are both religious and rational, such as al-Rawashih al-Samawiyyah and Qabasat.”

So, you mean that in the 16th century, despite the presence of intellectual life, there was no civilization. Why?

Because the legalistic (fiqh) movement dominated the philosophical one. During this period, the fiqh current became so dominant that a philosopher like Suhrawardi was declared an apostate and sentenced to death. This wasn’t merely the killing of a philosopher; it was the killing of intellectual life. The opposition to Ibn Rushd and his exile is another example of opposition to intellectual life. Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, in the introduction to Nasirean Ethics, writes, “In this long period (more than 25 years)… I am forced to remain here,” highlighting that when we failed to sustain intellectual life and rational thought, we entered decline. The roots of this opposition should be traced back to historical events. This period coincided with the Crusades, during which the ruling authorities needed jurists to issue rulings for jihad against the enemies. Thus, after the theological current, the legalistic one took control.

Contrary to Hossein Nasr’s view, I believe our decline began internally, and indeed, we encountered Western civilization during the height of our decline—the period of our old age and decay. For 200 years in this state of decline (from the 16th to the 18th centuries), we were silent, and only in the last 200 years have we started to study the West, prompted by questions from Abbas Mirza. During the second Iran-Russia war—which led to the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828—Abbas Mirza asked Jaubert (the French consul), “Why are we defeated?” Jaubert replied, “Because you lack the knowledge of the West.” Abbas Mirza then sent students to the West, and 40 years later, Amir Kabir established Dar ul-Funun (a polytechnic school). But in the beginning, our engagement with the West was not through questioning but rather blind admiration. All the travelogues and books by authors like Akhundzadeh, Talibov, Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, Mostashar al-Dowleh, and Malkum Khan said, “There is no other way but the West.” I’m not saying they were all opposed or were Freemasons—no! My point is that, in our deep state of decay, when we saw the West and its advancements, we became infatuated, and this infatuation sometimes led to misguided actions. We advised that “if we become exactly like the West, we’ll progress.” Akhundzadeh, for instance, suggested that “we should change our Persian script and language, discard our poetry, forget our heritage, and become like the West.” On this basis, Akhundzadeh wrote a book called The Persian Alphabet, advocating for a script change, similar to what happened in Turkey, where today, Atatürk’s 1924 speeches need to be translated three times for a modern Turkish person to understand. The reason is that they lack any connection with their heritage—they need to learn another script to access their libraries, leading to a complete disconnection from heritage in Turkey.

In contrast, in Saudi Arabia (Hanbali countries), we see a disconnection from the modern world and a serious commitment to return to the past. When we say a society like Saudi Arabia cannot be civilization-building, it is because Saudi Arabia lacks an understanding of the future—it is rooted in the past, and this return can be dangerous and accompanied by violence. Anyone unwilling to return to their past can be exterminated, as seen with ISIS and the entire Salafi outlook, which advocates this very idea.

So, what is your solution for reviving or forming a new Islamic civilization in the present era?

It’s to regain our intellectual life. There is no way forward except through reasoning and re-engaging with rationality. If the Islamic world wants to enter a new phase, it must begin with a return to rationality, which you called self-awareness. Rationality means that the Islamic world should focus on understanding why we have declined and why we are in this current state. If we consider this question to be important, then the only valid criterion is a rational answer. Without such understanding, we naturally lack a future-oriented perspective. In other words, if we do not question the future, we won’t make any effort to understand this issue.

The next question is whether our approach to a future Islamic civilization should be to revive the previous civilization or to create a new one. My question here is that if we adopt a revivalist approach, we would have to consider civilization as a single entity that goes through cyclical waves, reaching peaks and then falling into decline. We would then have to wait for another upward wave. In contrast, the second approach requires that we consider the previous civilization as “dead” in order to be able to build a new one.

Civilization, in general—whether in the West or in other societies—is something new, and it’s not as if Western civilization is simply a continuation of Greek civilization, though there is certainly a connection. There is no complete disconnection, but when we talk about a “new era of Islamic civilization,” we do not mean to revive that dormant civilization. Rather, this new civilization is shaped by our current context, questions, needs, and new way of life. For this reason, we say that this civilization is Islamic in relation but is new in its essence.

It’s obvious that we cannot return to the pre-technology, pre-science, and pre-modern era. This is axiomatic; anyone claiming otherwise does not understand civilization. You can’t return Iran to a hundred years ago, just as you cannot bring the Iranian family back to what it was fifty years ago. Some requirements are imposed on us that we cannot resist.

When we talk about civilization, we don’t mean a single, static civilization that declined at some point and can now be revived. Instead, we ask, “How did that civilization emerge?” It arose through the relentless efforts of thinkers. Thus, building and manifesting civilization means participating in knowledge, creating, exchanging ideas across the world, assimilating, analyzing, critiquing, and giving it a new structure. This is the rule of civilization and the discipline of the emergence of knowledge. Knowledge doesn’t arise by chance; it requires sustained effort from thinkers. This principle is timeless: just as you posed a question in the 4th and 5th centuries and built a civilization around it, in the 21st century, you now have a new question and must create a civilization aligned with these new needs and questions—a civilization that can be based on knowledge, technology, ethics, and culture. You cannot eliminate technology, but it doesn’t need to be the central or primary focus. Just as we don’t agree with historical determinism (meaning being overpowered by history), we acknowledge that history matters. Similarly, with science and technology, we recognize their importance, but we do not need to be dominated by them. Instead, we can build a new civilization rooted in humanity, ethics, culture, and future orientation. Civilization, when directed toward the future, is aligned with new rationality; you cannot create an effective system today based on the rationality of the 3rd or 4th centuries because your once-simple society has become complex, as Allamah Tabataba’i describes, “demanding complex considerations.” In an article titled “Attributions,” I have argued that societal progress relies on new attributions; the values you establish advance society. The fewer of these attributions you have, the more simplistic and oral your society will be.

Thus, when we say a new Islamic civilization must be created with new conditions, questions, and needs, and in relation to new knowledge and technology, we don’t mean replicating Western civilization exactly. Instead, we can envision a new order, a new world, and there’s no need for all worlds to fall under the Western world.

In your definition of civilization, you said, “Civilization is not a blueprint; it is an endless endeavour.” Based on this definition, it seems you view the formation of civilization as a process rather than a project. Is that correct?

Yes! It’s a process. In fact, it’s a natural or evolutionary process and by no means a project!

When you speak of the emergence of awareness within a society and its connection with rationality, you’re pointing to an initial stage where the people of that society, through awareness of a specific identity, can become civilization-builders. Or, when you say that a society reaches rationality, meaning it has attained the self-awareness needed for civilization-building, doesn’t this approach contradict your statement that civilizations are a process, not a project?

I will try to answer this question by continuing from our previous discussions. When we talk about the factors in the decline of a civilization, we encounter two specific factors: one is structural, and the other is cognitive (which we didn’t discuss before).

The structural factor in the decline of civilization has both internal and external aspects, although I believe that for the decline of Islamic civilization, internal factors played a larger role. Among external factors, we can refer to wars, such as the Crusades, wars among Muslim rulers, invasions by foreigners (like the Mongols), which greatly impacted the decline of Islamic civilization. History records that in 1059 CE, 10,000 handwritten books were burned in the city of Shapur in Fars. In 1254 CE (656 AH), Ibn Battuta noted that the Mongols massacred 24,000 intellectuals, threw many manuscripts into the Tigris, and burned the rest. So, this factor alone is significant. Additionally, there were internal structural factors that led to the decline of Islamic civilization, like the power struggles among Muslim rulers. Despotism was an internal structural factor that drove Islamic civilization into decline. Even now, without internal unity among Islamic countries and Muslims, an Islamic civilization cannot be established. If the current state of Islamic countries remains unchanged, not only will the emergence of such power and civilization be delayed, but it might also mean that an Islamic civilization may never truly form. Civilization-building doesn’t always have unlimited historical opportunities. You make efforts within a process, and if these efforts reach a certain level of accumulation and synergy, they may lead to the emergence of a new civilization—much like in social situations, where, if the highest level of conflict is reached, tensions may lead to revolution; otherwise, they will be suppressed.

Alongside structural factors, and even more importantly, we have cognitive factors, which can also be divided into internal and external domains. If we prioritize these factors, internal cognitive factors come first, then external cognitive factors, followed by internal structural factors, and finally external structural factors. If a nation distances itself from internal cognitive factors (such as rationality) and lacks awareness of its universality and self, it naturally will not have the motivation or drive to strive for a superior state and will never gain awareness of its current state, future, or potential horizons.

In the present situation of the Islamic world, if Muslims do not have a clear understanding of their current and future conditions, they will not be able to form a new civilization. The reason why the Egyptian revolution failed is that cognitive factors were lacking in that society, and they didn’t reach the awareness that revolution is more significant than a coup. This is why Egyptian society accepted a coup and Saudi society accepted despotism. The current problem preventing the Islamic world from creating a new civilization lies in this internal disarray and despotism. As long as a nation remains in a state of despotism and lacks freedom, it will not gain the awareness needed to construct a new civilization. Here, I agree with Hegel: if a society lacks freedom, it is impossible for it to become a nation, then a state, and then a civilization. A society that lacks freedom cannot have intellectual flourishing.

Thus, the first stage of rational flourishing and establishing and expanding rationality is freedom. As Shahid Murtaza Mutahhari said, I mean “freedom in thought,” not merely political or social freedom. Those freedoms are important but are just boundaries. There are two meanings of freedom: one is “freedom from,” meaning to be free from despotism, and the other is “freedom to,” meaning the freedom to think—not like when the Church burned thinkers for their ideas. If, in the Islamic world, thinkers are killed for thinking (as is happening in Saudi Arabia), how can we expect such a society to contribute to the emergence of civilization?

My purpose in discussing structural and cognitive factors is to illustrate that civilization-building is a process; it is not merely about a passage of 50 or 100 years with a desire for civilization to emerge. This process could indeed take 100 years. It’s more like a hermeneutic cycle: the more you think in the beginning, the more you lay the foundation of awareness for the later stages, and as you progress, broader stages of awareness are developed until they lead to flourishing. In precise philosophical terms, we call this process projection. Projection means that a society, a thought, a nation, or a land has potentials that start from an initial point (a seed), which then expands. Through a natural process, it can lead to intellectual dominance and gradually to the emergence of a civilization.

Since you mentioned cognitive factors, here’s a question that comes to mind: In centuries before the rise of Islam, Iranians had established great civilizations like Sumer, the Medes, and the Achaemenids. However, in the decades or centuries close to the advent of Islam, we see a civilizational decline in Iran. But with the arrival of Islam in Iran, we witness the emergence of a great Islamic civilization, in which the influential role and contributions of Iranians are undeniable. What did Islam introduce to Iranian culture that suddenly led to this massive civilizational transformation? Did it, as you suggest, introduce a cognitive foundation, or did it simply serve as a motivator, or something else?

This question you raise is extremely important and has been debated by Islamic thinkers. In preparation for a lecture, I examined two books on this very question: Two Centuries of Silence by Aqa Zarrin-Koub and Reciprocal Services Between Islam and Iran by Shahid Motahhari. Both books were written around the same period (the 1950s), and both authors were in contact with one another. I don’t fully agree with Zarrin-Koub’s view that Iranians experienced 200 years of intellectual or political silence in the early centuries of Islam, nor with Shahid Motahhari’s perspective that all foundations stemmed from a few specific Iranian thinkers, as this conflicts with my theory of “civilization as a multi-faceted and processual phenomenon.”

If we trace Iran’s beginnings back 5,000 years (to the civilization of Shahr-i Sokhta and Jiroft), we find that Iran was one of the rare regions in the world where civilization emerged. Based on this, despite Hegel’s support for Greece, he acknowledges that “Iran is the beginning” of empire and civilization. Interestingly, he even believes that “Zoroaster and Zoroastrianism marked the dawn of the divine spirit and monotheism among all religions.” So, before the advent of Islam, Iran was already a “center of gravity” in terms of thought—what we might call Iranian wisdom. This Iranian wisdom, as Shahrastani describes and Jabri discusses in his writings, was both “digestive” and “forward-thinking,” meaning it thoughtfully contemplated the future with patience. Jabri contrasts this with “Arab reason” (which he refers to as “Hijaz”), a concept I’ve elaborated on in detail in my book A New Reading of Farabi’s Philosophy. There, I analyze what he meant and how it can be understood. Jabri states, “When we encounter Iranian wisdom, we see that it has existed since the beginning, encompassing civilization, art, power, politics, and society, and this was integrated into the Islamic world. To this day, we remain within the framework of Iranian wisdom.” On page 336 of The Critique of Arab Reason, he quotes Shahrastani’s statement about the differences between Iranian reason and other types of reason: “Iranian reason is similar to Greek reason; both are reflective and do not hastily consider ideas and then discard them. Their way of thinking is foundational and future-oriented, whereas the thought processes in Arab and Indian traditions are more impulsive (‘faltaan’—thinking and speaking on the spur of the moment).” Civilization cannot emerge from impulsive thinking; one cannot build a civilization based purely on poetry.

In response to your question, one analysis suggests that up until the beginning of the 4th century, when Iranians entered and helped shape Islamic civilization, there was nothing significant. I don’t entirely agree with this view because, before reaching the 4th century, we pass through two phases: Islam is not simply “Hijazi Islam”; it is “Fundamental Islam.” Fundamental Islam transcends Hijaz, Iraq, and Iran and addresses humanity as a whole, without reference to race, ethnicity, or history. Since it addresses humanity, any individual can relate to it. The late Iqbal describes a moment when he was reading the Qur’an, and his father asked him, “What are you doing, Muhammad?” He replied, “I am reading the Qur’an.” His father said, “That is not how one reads the Qur’an!” So he asked, “Then how should I read it?” His father answered, “You should read it as though it is revealed to you personally, not as a historical text written a thousand years ago.” The questions, teachings, laws, and relationships in the Qur’an are addressed to humanity, so a person equipped with reflection can connect with it and its teachings. Iranians, more than others, were able to relate to the foundational teachings of the religion, the Qur’an, the Prophet, and the Sunnah. This is a significant point. Any nation could have connected similarly, but a nation lacking reason cannot freely read the Qur’an with a human-centered perspective. For example, the Arabs’ conflict with Islam was a conflict over the caliphate. Ibn Abbas returned from Saqifah, and Imam Ali asked, “What happened?” He replied, “They claimed that the imamate belongs to Quraysh.” Imam Ali said, “This is a return to pre-Islamic ignorance,” meaning the Arabs couldn’t grasp the new understanding and remained bound to a past unrelated to Qur’anic teachings. Despite being geographically close, they couldn’t intellectually connect with it. Over time, however, Iranian wisdom—thanks to its reflective nature—established a relationship with these teachings, enabling it to realize its potential and contribute to the new Islamic civilization. This civilization, in its intellectual richness, is considered a “civilization,” and in its religious teachings, it is regarded as “Islamic.”

Thus, the pre-Islamic Iranian understanding of power, life, humanity, the afterlife, God, and existence was different—not incompatible, but different. With the advent of Islam, this understanding was transformed. That’s why we see that, within Islamic civilization, the foremost scholars and religious thinkers were Iranians. Bayazid Bastami, as a pure Iranian mystic, was neither in Hijaz nor raised in the Arab world; rather, he emerged from our Khorasan school. Contrary to the accusation that “Sufis are not people of the Shari’ah,” Bayazid said in The Book of Light, “A Sufi who does not follow the Shari’ah is not a Sufi.” This continued with figures like Abul Hasan Kharqani. All these aspects—Sufism, mysticism, theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, and poetry—are part of our civilizational thought and the foundational elements of Islamic civilization. You cannot discuss Islamic civilization and exclude Ferdowsi, Hafez, Sa’di, or Rumi, nor can you overlook Avicenna, Farabi, or Biruni. When I say that civilization is multi-faceted, drawing from a variety of domains, it’s not to dismiss history; historical context is important in its own right.

I don’t agree with Zarrin-Koub’s claim that Iranian Muslims were silent for 200 years. Even if we don’t accept that Iranians played a role in the events following 60 AH, we can’t deny their leading role in the transfer of power from the Umayyads in Damascus to the Abbasids in Baghdad. In 132 AH, it was Iranian efforts that led to the fall of the Umayyads, and later, Iranians, alongside al-Ma’mun, defeated al-Amin’s caliphate in Baghdad, resulting in the Islamic capital’s transfer from Baghdad to Tus in 198 AH. These are significant events, and you can’t claim we were silent for 200 years, regardless of the intellectual efforts at play.

In The Influence of Khusrawani Wisdom on Arabic Ethics, Jabri notes that immediately after the advent of Islam, Iranians preferred their refined ethics over the tribal Arab ethics, expanding and solidifying it, to the point that we can no longer speak of Arab ethics today; all that exists now is Iranian ethics. This illustrates how Iranians, after Islam, connected with religious teachings. Avicenna, the greatest philosopher of Islamic civilization, says, “I would attend Isma’ili sessions with my brother and father. Although I did not fully align with them, I listened to their discussions on ‘reason’ and ‘the soul.’” Look at that! In Bukhara at the time, Batini and Isma’ili thought—derived from religious philosophy—was so powerful that it attracted Avicenna. This influence wasn’t limited to him; Farabi also expressed similar views, and before him, we see the same with Nasafi and Sajistani. Within the Buyid dynasty, figures like Abu Hatam Razi, Hamid al-Din, and Nasir Khusraw were among our Batini thinkers, engaging in deep intellectual debates in Islam, as seen in works like al-Islah and al-Mahsul. The debate between Zakariya Razi and Abu Hatam Razi about the efforts of religious thinkers to understand Islam shows that Iranian thinkers had a role in Islamic civilization. A better example of this effort can be found in Farabi’s Kitab al-Huruf, written in 1320. This book was inspired by a debate between the logician Matta ibn Yunus and the grammarian Abu Sa’id al-Sirafi. Abu Sa’id argued that “Muslims have no need for non-religious reason; Greek and Iranian reason are suited for them alone. We organize our lives based solely on religion.” In contrast, Matta ibn Yunus believed that without rationality, nothing could be accomplished. When Abu Sa’id ultimately won the debate, Farabi wrote Kitab al-Huruf in response, arguing that the idea of a purely Hijazi or caliphate-based Islam without a foundation in reason is nothing more than an illusion. The second chapter of this book is titled The Link Between Philosophy and Religion (or the Nation).

Thus, we see that Iranian Muslims endeavoured to gain a foundational and profound understanding of the teachings from the first 300 years of Islam. For every Muslim philosopher, the Sharia is a critical concern. Farabi states on the second page of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, “The reason that the Greeks speak of is the same as the angels or Gabriel.” His entire effort was to reconcile religion with philosophy.

So, when we talk about Islamic civilization, we cannot truly understand it without a comprehensive awareness of the developments in the first three centuries and the subsequent civilizational period. Islamic civilization is not merely one field of knowledge; it is a synthesis of various sciences that emerged in the Islamic world—a logical and organic blend of knowledge with which the Muslim community engaged and restructured. These elements formed the foundations of Islamic civilization, and when they collapsed, so did Islamic civilization.

Based on what you’ve explained so far, it seems one can distinguish between the three concepts of a “civilization-building idea,” “civilization-building rationality,” and “civilization-building knowledge” (in a broad sense, encompassing ethics, culture, etc.) and examine each of their roles in the formation of civilizations separately.

Yes, that’s correct.

Then, how do these three concepts relate to one another in the formation of a civilization? For instance, is it possible for one of these to be absent and a civilization still form, or must they all be present together for a civilization to arise?

A society and its thinkers cannot make efforts that lead to the emergence of a civilization without a clear understanding of what civilization means. Of course, one does not plan for knowledge, civilization, and power in advance—just as we might say that “a particular country has the most advanced democratic structure without any prior blueprint.” This country has achieved this advanced democracy through a long-lived experience and many debates about democracy, freedom, and justice; no country can acquire such a democracy by accident. Thus, initially, there is an understanding that is discussed and read about, based on which a way of life takes shape, gradually evolving. Once it becomes established, it serves as the foundation for future development.

In the West (from Machiavelli to Locke), there has been a great deal of intellectual debate over the understanding of freedom, democracy, the state of nature, and social structure. Western thinkers didn’t remain silent for 200 years and then suddenly find themselves in a new social situation; there may even have been bloody transformations and long conflicts to achieve the outcomes we see today in the modern world (as we saw with the internal American wars for independence that led to the abolition of slavery). So, it’s not as if someone decides to create a civilization and it forms; no. Social life is different from power; power alone cannot decide the direction of society or its relationships. Social relationships, over a long-lived experience, give rise to the structure.

If some societies still live under despotism, it’s because they haven’t engaged in serious debates about freedom and democracy. To the surprise of all nations, some Arab Islamic countries have absolute monarchies. One might wonder how, in the modern era, a society can exist with no concept of democracy, elections, or participation. The answer is that such a society has not undergone the necessary intellectual and conceptual debates to achieve this perspective. Thus, through intellectual debates, an idea emerges. If you engage in intellectual disputes, an idea arises in subsequent stages. The idea cannot simply be created by a few individuals. A civilization-building idea is a collective phenomenon, a product of humanity’s collective reason. It’s not as if one can say, “I have a civilization idea on paper today, will I achieve it?” No.

In Iran, since the beginning of the revolution until now, for 40 years we’ve had claims of universality and a new system—meaning independence from Eurocentrism and the civilization of the Western world and its dominance. I believe that even before this, our thinkers gradually raised this notion, which has evolved into an “idea of civilization.” Likewise, Egypt has had the idea of Islamic civilization, as have Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. These are countries that even before the revolution held meetings and conferences in Jeddah, Cairo, and Kuala Lumpur under titles such as “Islamic Knowledge,” “Islamic Sciences,” “Religious Society,” and “The Future of Islamic Civilization.” Turkey has also held similar gatherings. These are mere attempts, not the will to establish a civilization. The will includes revealing or manifesting it. This is an extremely important concept, which in German tradition has two parts: following the idea, there is the stage of “will and intention.” This will is not an internal or personal desire but a collective, social, and public determination. It’s not enough for the ruler of Egypt or a power figure in Turkey to have such an inclination; it does not lead to a public determination. While it’s true that if intellectuals are determined and think, it can generally lead to public will, political power alone cannot enforce it, as it does not represent the broader society, whereas intellectual elites are part of society.

So, once we have established an idea, we proceed through a process, organizing our determination following the idea, which may or may not lead to its manifestation and emergence. In the West, for example, the debates from the 12th to the 16th century led to the development of a strong resolve, and from the 18th century onwards, we see the new era of the West and the emergence of thinkers belonging to the period of modernity.

Another important point to consider is that civilizations rarely emerge; it is not as though we see the rise of a civilization at every historical stage. This is why civilizations require prolonged intellectual and practical effort from a land, society, or a particular mode of thought. When a significant portion of potential is realized in that land, nation, or type of thought, it can lead to stages of civilization’s emergence and expansion. For example, in the past 1,500 years, we have witnessed the emergence of only two major civilizations: Islamic and Western. So it makes sense when Pourhasan says that if Iran today works to bring rational awareness to the Islamic world, creating a foundational understanding of civilization, it could establish a new civilization in the future.

Currently, we have only a thinly developed idea of civilization; thin in the sense that not all of the Islamic world shares this idea. We are still struggling to determine whether to build a civilization that mirrors and rivals the West, or whether we can pursue a different path and envision a world and a new global order. This idea is not yet fully formed.

Even if we manage to successfully complete the first stage (building the idea), the next stage (the determination) requires extensive effort and a revival across intellectual, social, political, and cultural fields. This stage demands that the currents of knowledge and rationality become dominant throughout the Islamic world. Only then will we gradually witness the stages of civilization’s emergence.

Thus, civilization is layered. Internal coherence may be the first layer of a civilization’s emergence. Following this, there may be a turn toward knowledge, which ultimately reaches the practical domain, enabling the formation of a better life and a more desirable, healthier society. It is not the case that the emergence of civilization is like a social revolution that suddenly appears. No! Civilization is a continuous and unending effort that requires a more thorough understanding of the stages, concepts, and layers of civilization.

In your opinion, at which of these stages that you mentioned does Iran currently stand?

At present, we are in the initial stage of the idea phase, situated between two perspectives: one is distinct from the Western civilizational idea, and the other aligns with it. After the revolution, we became aware of the question of whether a new universal vision could be possible for us. I’m not saying that this idea has fully developed, but we have attained an awareness of it. Meanwhile, among our closest neighbours, such as Turkey—which claims to be building a new Islamic world—or Saudi Arabia and the UAE, you don’t see the idea of an “Islamic world.” Instead, what you observe is an effort to adopt aspects of Western civilization, reflected in Western cities, Western tourism, Western beaches, Western buildings, Western industries, and so forth. I’m not questioning whether this is knowledge—knowledge is knowledge; it has no East or West. However, what is happening in Islamic countries like Malaysia, Egypt, and Indonesia is only an approximation to the West, which means there is no foundational idea. It’s as if you establish a university like King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, which ranks high in Asia, but all its intellectuals are Western. If an article by a Saudi scholar doesn’t cite a Western thinker, it won’t be published, and as a result, more than $100,000 might be paid to an American or European professor to stay with them for three or four months to ensure publication. This article then becomes, in reality, part of Western civilization.

Whenever we can think about the Islamic state, Islamic cities, and an Islamic world—not in opposition but as distinct from the West—then we will have achieved a civilizational idea.

I do not believe that there is any country among the Islamic nations, apart from Iran, that has developed an idea or awareness of Islamic civilization.

What is the reason this idea has taken shape in Iran?

The reason is that for a long time, we have been discussing the possibility of moving beyond the Western-dominated worldview. We have many critiques of Eurocentrism, technology, the Western individual, Western ethics, and even Western political structures such as democracy, while no alternatives to Western concepts are seen in the rest of the Islamic world. For instance, Shahid Motahhari, when discussing freedom, views spiritual freedom as intellectual freedom, distinct from social freedom that applies within society. Shariati similarly addresses this concept within the framework of a religious society. Or, when Seyyed Hossein Nasr mentions that, before the revolution, efforts were made to think about religious science, Islamic knowledge, religious insight, and Islamic civilization, there was a real concern for attaining such a vision. I believe that perhaps since the 1940s, when Allamah Tabataba’i began shaping the Islamic intellectual movement, and with Corbin enthusiastically engaging in discussions during the 1950s and 1960s, our awareness of a concept based on human-Islamic thought started to emerge.

So, for now, this idea is being discussed at the elite level and hasn’t yet reached the broader layers of society. Is that correct?

Yes, that’s correct, and indeed, this is a drawback, as the civilizational idea should gradually spread throughout society, just as it did in the West or in the sphere of Islamic civilization. However, the fact that this idea is emerging among intellectuals and not within the power structure suggests that it is on the right path. Nonetheless, when an idea is discussed at the intellectual level, there must be determination and effort so that society as a whole can become aware of the future and the civilizational state.

The concern here is that the civilizational idea could form within a specific intellectual elite class close to centers of power, and as Foucault suggests, power attracts knowledge to itself, creating structures of knowledge that serve to affirm, stabilize, and perpetuate its own presence. This could lead to a distortion of the initial idea. In such a situation, what measures can we take to prevent this distortion and preserve the authenticity of the idea?

First, unlike Foucault, I firmly believe that the system of knowledge does not operate under the system of power; rather, I believe the opposite: that the system of knowledge shapes the system of power. Secondly, the idea of Islamic civilization was already being discussed in the Islamic world before the revolution, so contrary to the view of some who attribute it to the rulers of the Islamic Republic, it’s not a recent idea.

Critics of the Islamic civilization concept argue that, because we haven’t achieved significant success in other areas, we have turned to the idea of civilization to maintain internal cohesion and identity. However, this claim is inaccurate. Even if we had achieved all possible accomplishments, the most fundamental outcome of the revolution was our realization of what it means to exist under Western dominance. We became aware of the meaning of “nation” in Iran, the nature of society, the future, and what knowledge shaped by the needs and questions of Muslims and the Iranian community truly means. Therefore, the concept of civilization is not exclusively tied to the founders or rulers of the Islamic Revolution. Rather, during the revolution, due to increased awareness and insight, the concept gained greater intensity.

The question is whether we can conceive of the Eastern, religious, or Iranian individual within the framework of Western civilization. If we cannot, then this Iranian-Islamic heritage (as the late Daryush Shayegan put it, the cultural roots and future of Iran) comes to our aid. Through the understanding of figures like Rumi, we have a conception of humanity that is deeply religious and purely Islamic, something that could not arise in Turkey. This is why Turkey lacks Rumi scholars or a genuine connection to his thoughts, possessing only his statue. The same applies to Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. These are critical issues, for if you cannot establish a genuine intellectual relationship with a particular thought, no amount of material in your libraries will be of value.

The misconception is to think that if the Islamic Revolution claims to present a new framework, then the civilizational idea is entirely limited to the scope of the Islamic Revolution. No! In the Islamic Revolution, we gained a heightened awareness of the importance of civilizational matters, which is not centered on any individual. This is why I say, “Fortunately, it’s discussed at the level of intellectuals, not within the power structure.” The issue is that the idea of Islamic civilization is not based on a single person, a single mode of thought, or a handful of individuals, nor can it be, as it is not about power to be centered on one or a few people. Instead, it is a broad, expansive idea that encompasses an entire society or a whole way of thinking. If it does not, it will never lead to a renaissance. A renaissance is the collective awareness of society regarding a new state, a new way of living, and a fresh perception of themselves. Thus, to view the concept of Islamic civilization as a governmental concept is to misunderstand the matter and lack sufficient awareness of the efforts of Muslims over the last 200 years to overcome decline.

Whether Saudi Arabia wishes it or not, the civilizational idea exists. Whether Iran takes action or not, the civilizational idea exists. Whether Turkey tries to steer Islamic civilization toward neo-Ottomanism or not, the concept of Islamic civilization will persist. It is not something that anyone can simply direct toward a specific path. In fact, the decline of Islamic civilization occurred because it moved away from a human understanding of civilization and adopted a racial or tribal perspective, overshadowed by a mistaken understanding of Arabism and legalism. For example, you cannot claim to have knowledge that applies only to your own land; such a concept cannot be called knowledge. Just as knowledge is universal, so too is civilization.

Anyone who views civilization merely as an extension of power or as a pastime does not understand civilization at all. In many conferences I have attended on Islamic civilization, I have observed, unfortunately, that most participants lack a fundamental understanding of civilization, and many of the speeches are simply a display of terminology, resembling any other public address.

Let’s move to our fundamental question: if a new Islamic civilization were to emerge in today’s time and context, how would its rational foundations relate to both the previous Islamic civilization and modern Western civilization?

The historical background of civilizations shows that they are borderless, beyond race, and ideology-free. I explained earlier that when Islamic civilization emerged, it absorbed all types of thought; Muslim thinkers read, engaged with, understood, and applied these ideas. Western civilization undoubtedly belongs to all of humanity’s collective intellect, not exclusively to the West. Civilization cannot carry the color, race, or regionalism. Today, we use the term “Western civilization” for simplicity, but we should really say “the modern era civilization”—this new era belongs to a new type of intellect, which itself is not geographically bound, just as mathematics remains the same in America, India, China, or Iran; the universal rules of knowledge are not bound by land, history, race, or geography. This is a critical point. So, if we say that civilization is built on elements primarily based on common, universal human principles, our understanding shifts away from seeing civilization through a racial or cultural lens.

If by Islamic civilization we mean a civilization based solely on hadith and traditions that stands in direct contrast to Western civilization—which is viewed as excluding religion—then these two are indeed at odds. But I believe this is a misunderstanding of the historical essence and development of civilization, as civilizations did not emerge in this way. In the West, for instance, when we say secularism, it only begins the debate about civilization. Dr. Nasr believes that modernity, since it is based on separation rather than connection, means that Western civilization is fundamentally human-centered—meaning separated from the divine. But if we correctly understand secularism (as the independence of spheres), we do not find inherent opposition to religion. Western civilization, today, includes religiosity, although it does not dominate its ultimate goals. Yes, it does not prevail in its epistemological roots, but it is not devoid of religiosity, humanity, or ethics either. So if you view things in black and white and say one civilization is entirely religious and God-centered while another is secular, I do not share this view. I think such a claim is a complete misunderstanding of the foundational principles of civilization.

Civilization is fundamentally a human endeavor, rooted in foundations and origins. Therefore, if a civilization forms in the West, its roots—like Greek foundations, medieval thought, and the Western understanding of democracy—are naturally more visible. But these elements are not inherently anti-human or anti-religious. Yes, perhaps religion plays a lesser role. If that is the case, we must clarify that what you are calling a civilization is more accurately Western power or a religious-based power structure, not a true civilization. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding has existed in Iran since before the Constitutional Revolution and was reinforced by the 1953 coup; our leftist intellectuals in Iran created a deeply flawed perception of the West, as if the modern age and modernity were purely dark and derived from Satanic, atheistic rationality rather than humanity’s collective reason. This is a misinterpretation. Knowledge is knowledge, and civilization is civilization, but a civilization can be deeply rooted.

The Islamic civilization, while rooted in the questions, needs, and demands of Muslim thinkers and Islamic society, is also human. Therefore, if we call it “local” or “racial” or say it “bears a religious color,” then it is no longer truly a civilization. No one can benefit from a civilization that is not universal and does not address general human concerns. Just as everyone today uses the science developed in the West, the primary nature of civilization is human rather than atheistic. These two are different. While Freudian and Darwinian views originated in the West, not all Western civilization is fundamentally opposed to religion or humanity. Civilization, at its core, is humanistic, though not necessarily against religion or the divine. Democracy, likewise, is not solely Western—it is the historical struggle of humanity for freedom and the right to choose governance, and for whatever reason, a significant part of this struggle happened in the West in the modern era. This does not mean it is solely a Western product; all societies have fought for freedom.

Imagine we’ve created an Islamic civilization, and now we want to understand its essential characteristics. Primarily, it would be a civilization that embodies humanity and ethics, encompassing all people. Just as God describes the Prophet (p) as a mercy to the worlds and mentions in Surah at-Tawbah, verse 128, that the Prophet (p) is of the people, compassionate and caring about their future. God sent a prophet who cares deeply for humanity, and when He says “you,” it addresses all people. So, if we claim that the Prophet (p) is for all humanity, then the understanding of religion in that civilization will naturally be universal and humanistic. The distinctive aspect and importance of Islamic civilization lie in this humanistic nature, which met fundamental human needs.

I emphasize again that if we cannot strive to understand the true meaning of civilization, all our efforts—whether opposing or supporting—will be in vain. Unfortunately, a significant portion of our support is superficial, aligning under the power structures that form and thus leading to a distorted understanding of civilization. I have repeatedly emphasized that if we genuinely care about civilization, our first efforts should be directed toward a correct understanding of it. Civilization, at its core, must be human-centered; otherwise, it is not a civilization—it could be a structure, a power, an ideology, or a religion serving only its followers. It can only be called a civilization if it is universal, human, and globally inclusive.

Thank you very much for the time you’ve given us. In conclusion, if there are any final thoughts or points you think would benefit the readers of this interview, please share them.

I believe that the efforts you’re making could lead to two essential actions. First, you could facilitate gatherings that bring together those with a well-rounded, academic, and scientific understanding of civilization. Then, expand these gatherings to include members from various Islamic countries, holding them annually in different Islamic nations—ensuring, of course, that they focus on genuine discourse, free from idealistic, ideological biases and without opposition to other civilizations.

Second, I believe that creating a specialized journal focused on the subject of civilization would be an enduring and significant endeavour. Although similar content exists today, unfortunately, much of what I have seen revolves merely around power in its mistaken sense, not in terms of potential or strength, and leans too heavily on political aspects. This concern leads me to fear that they may fail to establish a true understanding of civilization and could ultimately undermine the efforts of our thinkers to establish a new civilizational outlook. If these two key initiatives were pursued—similar to efforts initiated by a handful of individuals across various countries before the revolution—they could lay the groundwork for inner cohesion among Islamic nations. We must also keep in mind that it is impossible to create a civilization through conflict or mutual animosity. Civilization is vast and formidable, and all Islamic nations must either, with awareness, unity, and a vision for the future, focus all efforts on creating a noble and powerful way of life, or else resign themselves to abandoning their dignity, existence, and identity.