Ustad Soroush Mahallati is covering several unique topics during the Hawzah summer break in a weekly series of lessons. One of them is a series on Taqlid. I will try to translate these lessons over the summer, if Allah (swt) grants me the tawfiq. Below is the translation of the first class, delivered on 31 May 2025 (9 Khordad 1404 SH).

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In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate.

All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds. May Allah bless our master and prophet, Abu al-Qasim al-Mustafa Muhammad, and his pure family.

Greetings and salutations to our dear friends and respected companions.

The summer period is now before us, and with the suspension of formal lessons there is an opportunity to devote attention to some important issues. One of these important and widely relevant issues is the subject of taqlid (emulation).

In previous years, while teaching Usul al-Fiqh, I discussed the topics of ijtihad and taqlid on two occasions. The discussion that, God willing, we are beginning now will take place in a different setting. As has already been announced, this discussion belongs to the sphere of public fiqh. Therefore, we will set aside the highly technical and specialized discussions normally raised in Usul al-Fiqh at the advanced dars al-kharij level and intended for a specialized audience.

Taqlid is an issue that concerns many Muslims. People encounter questions and doubts regarding it and wish to understand it in a reasoned and evidence-based manner. Therefore, our audience in this discussion is not limited to seminary students attending advanced classes, although such discussions may also benefit them. Rather, our audience includes all researchers, thinkers, and those who wish to examine the issue of taqlid in light of its underlying foundations.

The reason for choosing this topic is that, in recent years, various questions have been raised regarding the legitimacy of taqlid. Objections have been voiced, and arguments have been presented against its legitimacy. These questions and criticisms differ from those raised in earlier centuries by certain scholars. For example, the Akhbaris had their own distinctive views on this issue. What is being discussed today, however, differs from those earlier debates.

It therefore seems necessary to revisit the issue of taqlid with a fresh perspective so that it may provide answers to contemporary questions, answers that may not be readily found in the works of earlier scholars because such questions simply did not arise in their time.

God willing, we will attempt to gather these questions, objections, and criticisms together and examine the subject of taqlid in light of the intellectual climate of contemporary society. At the same time, we will not sever this discussion from its historical background and roots. We shall begin with the traditional foundations upon which earlier discussions of taqlid were built and then proceed to address the objections and criticisms that have been raised.

This introduction is sufficient for entering the discussion.

The first issue that must be clarified is the meaning of the taqlid that we are discussing. We must first agree upon a definition. Has the meaning of taqlid changed from the past to the present, or does it remain the same? What exactly do we mean by this term today?

In the past, scholars provided definitions of taqlid, and whenever they declared taqlid permissible, or prohibited the taqlid of a less learned scholar, or discussed the permissibility of following one jurist over another, they first clarified what they meant by taqlid.

Their definition is as follows: taqlid is when a person acts on the basis of another person’s opinion without possessing knowledge or proof regarding that matter himself. If he is asked why he acted in that way, his only answer is: “So-and-so said so.” He cannot offer evidence or a proof for his action. This is taqlid.

Allama al-Hilli in Nihayat al-Wusul and Hasan ibn Zayn al-Din in Ma’alim both define taqlid in this manner:

“Acting upon the statement of another without proof.”

Taqlid therefore means acting upon another person’s statement without possessing proof for that statement.

If I consult another person and accept his opinion together with its evidence and reasoning, this is not taqlid. However, if I am like a patient who consults a physician and follows the physician’s instructions without knowing the rationale behind each prescription and treatment, then this constitutes taqlid. It is following another without knowing the evidence.

Among later scholars, Akhund Khurasani in Kifayat al-Usul offers a similar definition. In matters of practical law, that is, the subsidiary rulings of religion such as prayer, fasting, and similar obligations, taqlid means adopting another person’s opinion as the basis of one’s actions without demanding evidence for that opinion.

The “other person” here refers to the learned scholar and mujtahid. One adopts the opinion of another for practical purposes without asking that mujtahid to explain the evidence for his ruling and legal verdict. This is because the muqallid is, by definition, someone who lacks the ability to independently examine the proofs. Consequently, he accepts the opinion without examining its evidence, just as a patient who lacks medical expertise does not demand detailed medical proofs from the physician.

Accepting another’s statement and acting upon it without demanding evidence is what has traditionally been discussed under the heading of taqlid. Whether taqlid is permissible or impermissible, and what its conditions may be, all revolve around this concept.

There are, of course, some disagreements regarding details of this definition, but those details are not relevant to our present discussion. For example, some scholars have argued that taqlid consists in acting upon another’s opinion. Until a person actually enters the stage of practical obedience and implementation, he is not considered a muqallid, and taqlid has not yet been realized.

Others maintain that taqlid consists merely in accepting another’s opinion. Thus, when a person receives a physician’s prescription, even if he has not yet acted upon it but intends to do so, taqlid has already occurred. Likewise, when someone acquires the practical manual (risalah) of a mujtahid and intends to follow it, this already constitutes taqlid.

These details lie outside the scope of our present discussion and are not important for our purposes. Whether taqlid is defined as action or as acceptance of another’s opinion, in either case it involves accepting that opinion without demanding evidence.

Another question is whether taqlid applies only to practical legal rulings or whether it can also occur in matters of belief. Conceptually speaking, taqlid may indeed occur in matters of belief as well. However, that subject also lies outside our discussion. Although Akhund Khurasani broadened the definition, there remains broad agreement that taqlid is not permissible in doctrinal matters. Our discussion is therefore confined to taqlid in the subsidiary legal rulings of fiqh.

Now that the subject has been clarified, we may turn to the ruling of taqlid itself.

What is the basis for taqlid? On what grounds do those who consider taqlid permissible and legitimate justify it?

Those who uphold the permissibility of taqlid have relied upon four kinds of evidence. Some jurists emphasize certain proofs while others emphasize different ones, but in total there are four principal grounds for the permissibility of taqlid.

The first is a rational basis.

The second is a Qur’anic basis, where certain verses of the Qur’an are cited.

The third is the Sunnah and narrations. Some scholars believe that taqlid is established through reports from the Imams (a), who instructed their followers to refer to jurists.

Finally, some rely upon consensus (ijma’), arguing that there exists scholarly agreement concerning the permissibility of taqlid.

For now, we shall begin with the first and most important of these foundations: the rational proof for the legitimacy of taqlid.

The question is this: does reason itself judge taqlid to be legitimate? Does reason permit us, in certain matters, to act upon another person’s opinion without possessing knowledge of how or why that person arrived at that conclusion?

Many of our scholars answer this question affirmatively. They regard taqlid as a rational practice.

How is taqlid rational? Different explanations have been offered.

The first explanation, found in the writings of some later scholars, is that taqlid is a natural, instinctive, and self-evident rational practice. Reason tells a person: if you do not know something, then follow someone who does know it.

This is precisely why people consult experts in areas where they themselves lack knowledge. They rely upon those who possess expertise and act according to the judgments of those who are knowledgeable.

Indeed, almost our entire lives are intertwined with taqlid in this broad sense. We constantly refer to experts in fields where we ourselves possess neither expertise nor specialization.

This is not limited to medicine. Someone who cultivates plants and discovers a disease affecting them consults an agricultural expert. Someone constructing a building consults an engineer. Someone whose phone or laptop breaks down consults a technician who understands the matter and then follows that person’s instructions.

This expression appears in the words of Akhund Khurasani in al-Kifayah, where he describes taqlid as self-evident, instinctive, and natural. Matters that are known internally through one’s own reason and conscience require no external proof.

We practice taqlid because our reason tells us to do so, not because a marja’ tells us to do so.

Otherwise, if we justified taqlid solely by relying on another person’s statement that taqlid is permissible, then the very justification for taqlid would itself become an act of taqlid. Why do you accept that scholar’s opinion regarding the permissibility of taqlid? The problem would then lead to circularity or infinite regress. Such difficulties are only avoided if a person ultimately accepts the legitimacy of taqlid through his own understanding and then proceeds to consult others.

This is the position expressed by Akhund Khurasani in his famous work. He argues that the permissibility of taqlid and the recourse of the ignorant to the knowledgeable is self-evident, instinctive, and natural, requiring no external proof. Otherwise, ordinary people would be unable to know the evidences contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah, while taqlid itself could not be justified through taqlid without falling into circularity or infinite regress.

He even regards this rational foundation as the principal evidence for taqlid, while considering many of the other proofs, including certain Qur’anic verses and claims of consensus, open to discussion.

However, the claim that taqlid is “natural” (fitri) raises a number of questions.

The first question concerns the meaning of fitrah itself. Akhund Khurasani does not explain what he means by the term. Rather, he uses “self-evident,” “instinctive,” and “natural” almost interchangeably. The difficulty here is that in the technical terminology of logic, fitri has a specific meaning, and that meaning does not appear applicable to taqlid.

In logic, a fitri proposition is one whose middle term is immediately present with it. Classical logicians give examples such as the proposition that “four is an even number,” since it is immediately understood that four can be divided into two equal parts.

In this technical sense, we cannot describe taqlid as fitri. What is fitri is that knowledge is a perfection in contrast to ignorance. But can following another person without demanding evidence be regarded as a perfection for human beings, especially when such following does not itself remove ignorance or produce knowledge? This is difficult to maintain.

A second possible meaning of fitri, perhaps intended by Akhund Khurasani, is that of being instinctive or innate. He himself pairs the term with jibilli (instinctive).

According to this interpretation, certain tendencies are rooted in human nature. The soul naturally inclines toward them. Human beings naturally incline toward marriage, for example. Such tendencies are sometimes called instinctive, natural, or even innate.

Human beings are also naturally inclined toward perfection. Every faculty seeks its own perfection. Yet it is difficult to say that taqlid itself, whether legally or rationally, belongs to this category.

Certainly, there exists within human nature a desire to escape ignorance. This is something we directly experience. Escaping ignorance occurs through attaining knowledge. Thus, if taqlid were understood as a method for overcoming ignorance, one might describe it as natural. However, the taqlid we are discussing, according to the definition provided by the scholars, contains an element of submission. A person performs an action without knowing its reason or rationale. Ignorance itself is not removed, nor is knowledge attained.

For these reasons, describing taqlid as fitri in either of these senses remains open to criticism.

This critique was raised by Akhund Khurasani’s distinguished student, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Isfahani, in his commentary on al-Kifayah. He argues that the logical meaning of fitri applies to propositions whose middle term is immediately evident, such as the evenness of four. What is truly fitri is the recognition that knowledge is light and perfection in contrast to ignorance. It is not the obligation of taqlid, whether in the eyes of the lawgiver or reason, nor even the removal of ignorance through another person’s knowledge.

Likewise, if fitri is taken in the sense of instinctive inclination toward perfection, then what is instinctive is the soul’s desire for its own perfection and the perfection of its faculties, not the obligation of taqlid itself.

The discussion of Shaykh Isfahani continues further, and we shall examine it later.

In response to this criticism, a kind of reconstruction of the concept of taqlid as a natural phenomenon has emerged among later scholars. This reinterpretation preserves the idea that taqlid is natural while avoiding the difficulties just mentioned.

Some later scholars therefore offered a broader understanding of what “natural” means.

According to this interpretation, human beings organize their actions through deliberate choice. This is one of the distinctive characteristics of human beings. Before acting, a person seeks to understand the practical value and significance of an action. Once he recognizes its value or necessity, he proceeds to act.

Yet human beings face an enormous range of needs and practical concerns. It is impossible for any individual to acquire complete knowledge of all of them or independently investigate all the relevant evidence.

For this reason, human beings, as social creatures, resort to division of labor. They inevitably accept from others what they themselves cannot determine. Human life simply cannot continue without referring to experts in areas where one lacks expertise.

This is the position presented by Allama Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i. Although he was a student of Shaykh Isfahani, on this issue he distances himself somewhat from his teacher’s position.

He continues to describe taqlid as natural, but in a different sense: a naturalness shaped by necessity, social life, and the diversity of human needs. Because human needs are so diverse, and because no person can independently master all fields of knowledge, human beings are compelled to benefit from others in areas beyond their own expertise.

In an article published in 1961 in the collection Bahthi dar Marja’iyyat wa Ruhaniyyat under the title Society and Taqlid in Islam, Allama Tabataba’i explains that human theoretical knowledge and practical needs are so vast and numerous that no ordinary individual can fully encompass them. This reality naturally leads people toward civilized social life, in which activities are distributed and divided among individuals.

As a result, human beings are compelled to proceed through independent reasoning only in those areas where they possess expertise and specialization. In other areas, they rely upon those whose expertise and integrity they trust. Through this reliance, they effectively adopt the specialist’s scientific judgment as their own and act accordingly. This is what taqlid means.

Whenever we wish to perform a task whose method we do not know, we consult an expert. Whenever we wish to enter a profession, we seek guidance from specialists in that field. Whenever we wish to learn an art or skill, we become the students of those who have mastered it. We seek medical treatment from physicians and architectural plans from architects. Indeed, the entire system of public education rests upon this principle.

This constitutes a second explanation for the rationality of taqlid, one that differs significantly from the first. Although the language of fitrah is still sometimes used, it is clear that what is meant here differs from the technical meaning employed in logic. Here the emphasis is on social life, civilization, division of labor, and practical necessity. It is within this framework that the concept of taqlid emerges.

These are the two principal interpretations.

Whoever accepts the rational basis for the legitimacy of taqlid must also accept its implications and consequences.

For our first session, this much should suffice. I especially encourage our respected friends to consult and study the sources that were referenced, so that in the coming sessions we may continue our discussion of these interpretations in greater depth.

And peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be upon you.