Lesson #2 is from Friday, June 6, 2025.

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In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate.

All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds. May Allah bless our master and prophet Muhammad and his pure family.

Greetings to our dear friends and companions.

We now begin the second session of our discussion on taqlid. In the first session, we first raised the concept of taqlid and then turned to its foundation. In the broader discussion, we noted that taqlid can have an extra-religious foundation, and it can also have an intra-religious foundation. One may argue for the validity of taqlid through rational or rational-conventional evidence, and one may also argue for its validity through indications from verses and narrations.

For now, our discussion concerns the first section. We explained that within this extra-religious argument, one form of reasoning is a rational argument that regards taqlid as something natural and innate. The second is a rational-conventional argument that regards taqlid as a necessary and unavoidable matter in human life, something to which rational people grant validity. These two arguments are entirely different and must not be confused with one another.

According to the first argument, taqlid is a completely natural matter rooted in human reason and understanding. It is even said to be needless of argument, since a person grasps it self-evidently. We explained that proving such a claim is difficult and, for us, unacceptable.

The second argument, however, which is the rational-conventional argument, states that human beings live a social life with many different dimensions. In these different areas, they need to decide and act on the basis of knowledge and awareness. Yet awareness of all the dimensions of human life is not possible for every individual. Therefore, a person inevitably acts according to his own knowledge in matters where he is knowledgeable, while in matters where he does not possess direct knowledge, he gives weight to the views of those who do possess knowledge, trusts them, and acts according to their opinions.

This form of taqlid, unlike the first interpretation, is a social necessity, not a natural matter. In other words, if we were to suppose that human beings always and everywhere had access to knowledge and awareness in all their actions and decisions, then according to rational people, taqlid would have no validity. Why should a person submit to the statement of another and adopt another’s opinion when he already possesses knowledge himself? He would simply act according to his own view. But this is an unreal assumption. We do not possess knowledge of all the affairs and dimensions of our lives.

Therefore, according to this interpretation, taqlid arises from necessity. It does not possess intrinsic desirability. Rather, because of necessity, we are permitted to engage in taqlid. This differs from the first view, according to which taqlid is rooted in human fitrah and is regarded as fully compatible with human nature.

This distinction is important: some matters are rational, self-evident, and compatible with human nature and fitrah, while other matters are imposed upon human beings by the social requirements of life. This distinction must be kept in mind when understanding the difference between rational judgments and rational-conventional judgments.

For example, human beings need government, and social life depends upon governance. Otherwise, chaos occurs and people’s rights are violated. Is this a rational judgment or a rational-conventional judgment? It is similar to what Amir al-Mu’minin (a) said: “People must have a ruler, whether righteous or corrupt.” This is not a rational judgment in the sense that human fitrah directly rules that a person must have a governor or a leader. The intellect does not issue such a direct ruling. But when we live in society, social life requires an organization and order, and that is government. Therefore, rational people accept the formation of such an institution and accept that a person or institution should govern them. This is a social necessity.

Likewise, social life imposes upon us the need for the institution of judgment and adjudication, so that when disputes arise between people, hostility may be resolved and judgment may take place. This too is not a fitri matter. Rather, it is something that rational people deem necessary in social life.

Similarly, issues such as ownership are among rational-conventional constructs, not fitri matters. Thus, the nature of rational judgments and the nature of rational-conventional judgments are completely different, and these two categories must not be confused.

Yes, there are rational judgments such as the goodness of justice and the ugliness of oppression. But we cannot place taqlid under one of these rational titles and thereby establish its goodness and legitimacy.

Once taqlid is placed within the realm of rational-conventional judgments, then according to many scholars, such as Allamah Tabataba’i, it will naturally belong to the category of constructed or conventional judgments. Of course, Allamah also regards practical rational judgments, such as goodness and badness, as conventional judgments. But even if someone hesitates there and does not accept Allamah’s view, there should be no hesitation regarding this second category, namely rational-conventional judgments in which the intellect does not directly judge the matter. Examples include ownership, marriage, leadership and government, adjudication, and similar matters. These are conventional judgments, and these conventions are rational-conventional constructs from which rulings take shape. In Allamah’s terminology, they are “post-social conventions,” not “pre-social conventions.” That is, if life were purely individual, no such convention would exist among rational people, nor would it be assumed.

This completes one clarification regarding the previous discussion.

To complete this point, Allamah Tabataba’i’s view, which we presented in the previous session on the basis of his article published in the book Bahthi dar Marja’iyyat wa Ruhaniyyat, should also be noted in a more concise form. Allamah raises this issue in his marginal notes on Kifayah as well. Since Akhund Khurasani discusses taqlid at the end of Kifayah, and since we presented his view in the previous session, Allamah comments on taqlid in his own marginal notes on Kifayah. In volume two, page 307, after Akhund describes taqlid as self-evident, instinctive, and fitri, Allamah says that it would be better to describe it as one of the general rational-conventional practices.

According to Allamah, taqlid belongs to the general practices of rational people, practices known to all human beings. A person does not need to ask another person what the ruling is regarding referring to the learned.

On this basis, because taqlid is one of the rational-conventional constructs, and because rational-conventional practices are counted among conventional judgments, expressions such as “self-evident” are, in Allamah’s view, not precise here. The term self-evident applies to a person’s perception of realities and truths, whereas conventional matters lie outside the category of self-evident propositions, namely the self-evident propositions discussed in logic, or the fitri propositions discussed in logic.

Likewise, regarding Akhund’s statement that taqlid itself cannot be based on taqlid because that would lead to circularity or infinite regress, the response is that the impossibility of circularity and infinite regress pertains to real matters, not to conventional matters. Conventional matters are not governed by those rulings.

These details are not especially necessary for our present discussion, and we do not wish to enter into them. But the central question, whether taqlid is rational or rational-conventional, is important and has consequences that must be considered.

Now, if we accept that taqlid is a rational-conventional matter, according to the explanation given in the previous session and in this one, then certain points must be noted and certain conclusions may be drawn.

The first and most fundamental conclusion is that, from this perspective, taqlid is a general matter in human life. Every person who enters existence and lives within society encounters the issue of taqlid. That is, in matters where he lacks knowledge, he inevitably refers to those who are knowledgeable and acts on the basis of their opinion.

We observe many different professions, each of which possesses knowledge and expertise in a particular field. Those who lack that knowledge refer to them. Medical clinics are full of patients, and hospitals are full of people referring to physicians. The same applies to other professions. When our car develops a problem, we refer to someone with expertise. This is the case in many other fields as well.

Therefore, taqlid in religious rulings is not something separate from other instances in life where we refer to the learned. According to this extra-religious argument, all of these instances have the same nature and belong to the same category. Just as a person refers to a physician to diagnose an illness and determine what the patient must do, so too does a person refer to a jurist and mujtahid in order to determine his religious duties. No separate proof specific to religious rulings is being presented here.

The result of this view is that in taqlid regarding religious rulings, we are subject to the same general rational-conventional principles. Whatever rational people observe when referring to the learned in other areas of life must also be observed here. This is because we are relying upon a general rule, a rule that is not specific to religious issues. Religious issues, like other human needs, must be taken up and acted upon.

Keep this point in mind. Later, when we discuss the scope of taqlid among rational people, whoever accepts this foundation must also accept the full scope and restrictions that exist in the rational-conventional practice of referring to experts. He must also commit himself to those same restrictions in taqlid of a jurist and mujtahid, because the proof is a general proof. This is the first conclusion.

The second conclusion is that taqlid belongs to the realm of ignorance and lack of knowledge. It is specific to those who do not possess knowledge. They are permitted, because they are ignorant, to refer to the learned and accept the statement of the learned without understanding its proof. This general judgment and general understanding has validity among rational people only in this area.

But for a person who already knows to refer to someone else, set aside his own knowledge, rely upon another person’s statement, and act upon it, this is not a rational-conventional practice. Rational people do not grant validity to such taqlid. They understand taqlid as the ignorant referring to the learned, not the learned referring to the learned. A person who is not ignorant has no justification for taqlid.

Of course, a person may possess knowledge, but his knowledge may be relative. He may then refer to another learned person whose knowledge is higher, more complete, and more comprehensive. This is rationally acceptable and is still a case of referring to the learned, because from a certain perspective he remains ignorant. For example, a general physician may refer a patient with a specialized illness to a specialist, such as a neurologist or cardiologist. In reality, this is still the ignorant referring to the learned. But when a person himself is qualified to diagnose the very issue at hand, he does not refer to someone like himself in that issue.

The first point, then, is that taqlid is the ignorant referring to the learned.

The second point is that, in the taqlid validated by rational people, the ignorant referring to the ignorant has no validity. The mediating element in taqlid is knowledge and awareness. Therefore, those who do not possess complete awareness of the relevant issues cannot become a source of reference and reliance.

In medicine, the issue is that a person who lacks knowledge must refer to someone who possesses knowledge, not to someone who lacks scientific qualification. The link that gives taqlid validity and connects the follower to the one followed is knowledge. For this reason, taqlid is not merely referring to another person, even though in some scholarly definitions taqlid is described as referring to another or accepting the statement of another in a devotional manner without demanding evidence. The word “another” here must be restricted to the learned.

The ignorant referring to the ignorant, even if common usage might call it taqlid, is not the kind of taqlid that has rational-conventional validity. The ruling of taqlid, the validity of taqlid, and the permissibility of taqlid among rational people do not include such a case.

Therefore, it is very appropriate that when analyzing the reality of taqlid, we pay attention to this point: in taqlid, we are seeking to fill a gap in knowledge. Anyone who performs an action voluntarily must determine the goodness or badness, the benefit or harm, contained in that action. Sometimes the person himself possesses direct awareness. Sometimes, however, he does not possess direct knowledge. In that case, his action must ultimately be connected to knowledge. The patient who refers to a physician must have his action connected to the knowledge that exists in the physician. The physician acts on the basis of knowledge, a reasoned knowledge whose proof he understands. Thus, the patient’s referral is in reality a referral to that knowledge, although the patient himself does not have sufficient awareness of its proof and reasoning.

Therefore, everyone needs to refer to the learned. The taqlid that rational people validate has precisely this feature: referring to the learned and benefiting from his knowledge. If it is otherwise, there is no validity for taqlid.

Allamah Tabataba’i also presents this conclusion in his article, on page 60 of Bahthi darbareh-ye Marja’iyyat wa Ruhaniyyat. He presents both the first conclusion, stating that the issue of society and taqlid is one of the most fundamental and general issues in human life, and that every human being who enters the sphere of society is, in terms of method, inevitably faced with both ijtihad and taqlid.

He also presents the second point. He writes that the general judgment and fitrah regarding the permissibility or necessity of taqlid applies where a person is ignorant and lacks the ability to exercise judgment and intellectually examine the issue, and where the assumed authority and guide possesses the necessary qualification, meaning that in the given issue he is knowledgeable, trustworthy, and reliable. Otherwise, taqlid is blameworthy and condemnable.

Now, those who consider taqlid valid on the basis of the judgment of reason or the judgment of rational people also add another premise here. That premise is that Islam has accepted and endorsed rational judgments and rational-conventional judgments. Therefore, in addition to being a rational judgment, taqlid is also a judgment affirmed by the Shari’ah. This practice is one that has received the endorsement of the Lawgiver.

In other words, taqlid is not an originally established ruling of the Shari’ah. In various matters, rational people already grant validity to taqlid. The ignorant refer to the learned, accept the statement of the learned, and act on its basis. This is not something first introduced to them by the Shari’ah. Rather, this existing rational practice, one of the practices of rational people and acted upon by the wise, has also been affirmed by the Shari’ah. The Shari’ah accepts what reason judges, and it accepts what rational people judge.

Here I should add a clarification. If taqlid is a rational judgment, as jurists such as Akhund Khurasani have said, then the endorsement and agreement of the Shari’ah is certain. This is because whatever reason judges, the Shari’ah judges as well, and there is no possibility of conflict between the judgment of reason and the judgment of the Shari’ah.

But if taqlid belongs to the second category and is a rational-conventional judgment, is conflict with the Shari’ah still impossible? Most of our scholars believe that if something is not a rational judgment but a rational-conventional judgment, then such rational-conventional judgments require the endorsement of the Shari’ah, and the Shari’ah may oppose such judgments. If the Shari’ah does not oppose them, then they are accepted and endorsed.

However, in our discussions in Usul al-Fiqh, we have explained that even in this second category, there is no need for the endorsement of the Shari’ah. If it is established that a ruling belongs to the category of rational-conventional judgments and that rational people agree upon it, then that ruling is valid in the Shari’ah, and the Shari’ah cannot annul it. Many scholars have said that the Shari’ah can annul and invalidate rational-conventional judgments. We have explained elsewhere that this is not the case.

Indeed, the same applies to the current issue. Once we regard taqlid as necessary and unavoidable, such that human life cannot continue without taqlid, then it cannot be annulled. Either we must be knowledgeable ourselves, which is not possible in every field, or we must refer to others and accept their views. We have no other practical option. Of course, someone may raise the theoretical possibility of acting according to precaution, but we do not find such a thing as a general rule in the rational practice of human beings. We will speak independently about this later.

In any case, what is being discussed here is that Islam is founded upon fitri judgments and acts in accordance with fitrah. Therefore, if we regard taqlid as fitri, Islam accepts it. The Qur’an says: “So set your face toward the religion, inclining to truth, the fitrah of Allah upon which He created people.”

But if we do not use the term fitrah here and instead count taqlid among rational-conventional constructs, it is still clear that this construct has been accepted, and the Shari’ah has accepted this practice.

From here it also becomes clear that the taqlid condemned in the Noble Qur’an, and the followers who are criticized there, fall outside the discussion we are having concerning rational and rational-conventional taqlid. In those cases, taqlid means blind following of previous generations, where children follow their fathers and ancestors. Such following and taqlid has no validity among rational people.

For example, the noble verse in Surah al-Baqarah refers to those who justified their conduct on the basis of the practices of their forefathers. Does reason justify following ancestors as such? No. Reason says the same thing that God says: even if your fathers were ignorant and not guided, will you still follow them?

The objection is this: if your fathers acted unwisely, then your following them is not justified. This is precisely based on the same principle we mentioned: taqlid means referring to the learned, not referring to one’s father. A father may be learned and he may not be. What is rationally justified is referral to reason, thought, and knowledge. Nothing else can replace this rational form of taqlid.

This was a clarification of the two foundations we briefly discussed in the previous session. We hope that with these explanations, the matter has become clearer.

In the continuation of the discussion, we must examine the other foundations as well. We must also examine whether the taqlid that occurs in the religious sphere is truly this same rational taqlid, which appears to be beyond doubt, or whether it is something different.

May Allah bless our master and prophet Muhammad and his pure family.